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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation deals with a relatively unknown 
campaign of the War for Southern Independence, the Con­
federate offensive into New Mexico. Its purposes are to 
discover the origins of the campaign, the Confederates1 
immediate as well as future objectives, to describe the 
military campaign itself, to discern the reasons for its 
failure, and to make a brief statement as to the possible 
effects the campaign might have had on the course of the 
war in general had it been a success. 
The immediate objective of General Henry Hopkins 
Sibley and his "Army of New Mexico" was to seize the 
territory of New Mexico from the Union forces. This was 
but the first step in his overall strategy which was to 
culminate in the conquest of California. This paper 
deals mainly with the campaign to bring New Mexico into 
the Confederate fold. 
Even during the period of the campaign, relatively 
little attention was paid to it by the bulk of the 
Southern and Northern population. During the latter part 
of 1861 and the first half of 1862, great armies were 
vi 
clashing in the Eastern theatres of war. The focus of 
attention on these momentous events close at home 
naturally relegated to obscurity a minor campaign in a 
sparsely settled region in which only a few thousand 
troops were involved. 
Several accounts of the New Mexican venture have 
been written from time to time. In general, these re­
lations do not delve into sufficient detail and, in many 
instances, they contain inaccuracies. In this paper, 
whenever possible, stress has been given to the use of 
primary materials—official records, journals, diaries, 
letters, and the like which were written by actual 
participants. Several manuscripts not employed by 
previous writers have been used to present as complete 
and as accurate a picture as possible. 
In retrospect it appears that Sibley's ultimate 
aim to capture California, though within the realm of 
possibility, was mainly visionary. The chief obstacles 
to overcome before such an eventuality could have come 
about precluded defeat. The New Mexican campaign was a 
mere sideshow of the war in the East. But had Sibley 
achieved success in the venture herein described, un­
doubtedly the Confederate government would have taken a 
keener interest (as would have the Union government), and 
a greater part of the war would have been fought on 
Western soil. 
vii 
Brig. Gen. Henry Hopkins Sibley 
Robert U. Johnson and Clarence C. Buel (eds.), 
Battles and Leaders of the Civil '/Jar (New 
York, lg£52^1888), II, 1^97 
CHAPTER I 
CONDITIONS IN NEW MEXICO AT THE OUTBREAK OP WAR 
At the outbreak of the War for Southern Inde­
pendence, the territory of New Mexico, consisting of the 
present-day states of Arizona and New Mexico, was a vast 
expanse of land which lay between California and Texas. 
For the most part, the area was barren and forbidding in 
appearance. Its desolate, and apparently worthless, 
nature prompted General William T. Sherman to remark that 
he would advocate a new war with Mexico to make her take 
back the territory, "*• 
The census of i860 gave the population of New 
p 
Mexico as 93*516. The overwhelming majority were 
Mexicans, seven-tenths of whom lived in small farming 
villages north of Fort Craig along the Rio Grande 
"'"A. A. Hayes, "The New Mexican Campaign of 1862," 
Magazine of American History, XV (February, 1886), 171. 
2Joseph C. G. Kennedy (camp.), Population of the 
United States in i860; Compiled from the Original Returns 
of the Eighth Census; Under tfie" Pirec^Ton of the""*Secretary 
oF the Interior (Washington, 1864), 5fc>7» 
1 
2 
River and its northern tributaries.3 The Mexicans, form­
ing the greater bulk of the population, had become Ameri­
can citizens only thirteen years before by terms of the 
Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo.^ A few families controlled 
most of the landed and commercial wealth, while the mass 
of the people worked as laborers or farmed small tracts 
of land.^ Long isolated from the rest of the world, the 
Mexicans in general had little interest in outside affairs, 
£ 
and were concerned only with their own problems. Aside 
from army personnel, several thousand Americans resided in 
New Mexico when war broke out. Most of these were govern­
ment officials, professional men, merchants, traders, 
ranchers, or miners. Though small in number, the Ameri­
cans tended to dominate the political affairs of the 
7 territory. 
^canby to Assistant Adjutant-General, June 20, 
1861, War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official 
Records of~The"17nlon and Confederate Armies, Series I, 
Volume IV, 41. Hereafter cited as 0. R. A.; unless other­
wise noted, all citations are to Series 17 
^Hubert H. Bancroft, History of Arizona and New 
Mexico, 1530-1888 (San Francisco, 1B09J, 442. 
5Loomis M. Ganaway, New Mexico and the Sectional 
Controversy, 1846-1861 (Albuquerque, 1944), 3. 
^Bancroft, History of Arizona and New Mexico, 680. 
^Edward D. Tittmann, "The Exploitation of Treason," 
New Mexico Historical Review, IV (April, 1929)* 129J 
Ganaway, New Mexico and the Sectional Controversy, 60. 
3 
Since many articles of food, clothing, and other 
items were shipped from Missouri over the Santa Pe Trail, 
the northern, and most populous, section of New Mexico 
g 
became commercially dependent upon that slave state. 
On May 11, 1861, the Mesilla Times reported that "uni­
versal opinion and decision among the leading and influ­
ential citizens of New Mexico is to abide the choice of 
Missouri in the present national difficulties between 
North and South."^ In 1858 the Butterfield Overland 
Express commenced operations. Running across Texas and 
southern New Mexico to California, this new transportation 
development resulted in the southern area of the terri­
tory, consisting mainly of the Gadsden Purchase, becoming 
more closely associated with Texas."1"0 
By terms of the Compromise of I85O, New Mexico 
was organized as a territory without reference to slavery. 
As a result, this relatively unimportant geographical area 
emerged, for a time, as a factor in national politics. 
Southern leaders, of course, were anxious to make New 
Mexico a slaveholding area. This, plus the fact that the 
Q 
Canby to Assistant Adjutant-General, June 11, 
1861, 0. R. A., I, 606. 
^Mesilla Times, May 11, 1861. 
10Frederic L. Paxson, The Last American Frontier 
(New York, 1910), 181. 
4 
negative wording of the Compromise gave tacit approval of 
slavery in the territory, caused Northern politicians to 
speak critically of the people of New Mexico. Most of 
the territory's political leaders tended to align them­
selves with the South, for they knew that by espousing 
Southern sentiments they would be assured of Southern 
support for statehood. Miguel A. Otero, territorial 
delegate from 1855 to 1861, was probably the most out­
spoken in this respect. Otero received his higher edu­
cation in the United States and had become thoroughly 
familiar with American life and politics. His marriage 
to a South Carolinian also undoubtedly had an influence 
upon his views. 
In 1857 the New Mexico legislature passed an act 
which stipulated that no free negro could remain longer 
than thirty days in the territory. Those who w^re already 
in residence were ordered to post bond as a guarantee of 
good behavior.^ The passage of this law was indicative 
of the growing influence of Southerners in territorial 
politics. In 1859* due to the influence of Otero's 
•^Ganaway, New Mexico and the Sectional Contro­
versy, 80, 59-61, l£4. 
the Legl __ 85b-1857. 
Mexico. Passed b£ 
.N" 
. \"u 





Atlas to Accompany the Official Records of the Union 
and Confederate Armies (Washington. 1891-1MTT7 
II, plate CLXIV. ' 
friends and supporters, the legislature passed a stringent 
slave code.Geographically New Mexico was not suited 
for African slavery.^" The census of i860 listed eighty-
five negroes in New Mexico, and only about twenty to 
thirty were slaves.Most of the slaves belonged to army 
officers or government officials and served as domestics. 
Though there really was no need for a slave code, its 
passage served the political purpose of showing that New 
1 fl 
Mexico was aligning herself with the South. 
Though African slavery was virtually non-existent, 
two other forms of involuntary servitude were not. New 
Mexicans had for generations engaged in the custom of 
enslaving captured hostile Indians. There were no laws 
governing this practice, but it was accepted as just by 
the community.•*•? The system of domestic servitude called 
peonage was not technically slavery, but it amounted to 
it in fact. Peonage, unlike Indian slavery, was recog­
nized by statutory law. It was a contract between masters 
•^Qanaway, New Mexico and the Sectional Contro­
versy, 59. 
^Bancroft, History of Arizona and New Mexico, 682 
•^Kennedy (comp.), Population of the United States 
in i860, 567; Ganaway, New Mexico and ffiTe Sectional 
Controversy, 76. 
•^Bancroft, History of Arizona and New Mexico, 683 
•*•7Ibid., 681. 
and servants. For his services the master paid the peon 
a small sum of money with which he was to support himself 
and his family. The master generally kept a store where 
the servant was obliged to buy every article he wanted. 
In this way, and by loans, it was an easy matter to keep 
the servant chronically in debt. By law, the peon had to 
remain and work for the master until he had paid off all 
his debts. Even the peon's children were responsible for 
his debts. Since it was virtually impossible for the peon 
to become solvent, he was forced to work for his master 
for life. One observer noted that the only difference 
between peonage and slavery was that the peons were not 
bought and sold in the market as chattels. Furthermore, 
the master was not obliged to maintain the peon in sick­
ness and old age. In reality, peonage gave the master all 
the advantages of slavery without any of its responsibillr. 
ties.1® 
When the crisis of secession came, New Mexico 
appeared to be safely in the Southern fold. This was 
deceiving, however, for apathy was a prime characteristic 
of the Mexican people and only a few individuals of that 
race manifested an interest in national politics. Local 
institutions and extreme regionalism were factors which 
caused the native population to be little concerned with 
1®William W. H. Davis, El Gringo; or New Mexico 
and Her People (New York, 1857), 231-233. 
distant national controversies. Though there appeared to 
be a close bond with the South, many New Mexicans nursed 
an underlying hatred of Texans.-^ This feeling had been 
engendered not only by the Texas Revolution, but also as 
a result of the efforts of the Texans to make good their 
claim to that part of New Mexico which lay east of the Rio 
on 
Grande River. 
Arizona, or that part of the territory which com­
prised the Gadsden Purchase, was isolated from the more 
populous region of the upper Rio Grande by a stretch of 
desert known as the Jornada del Muerto. The whole area 
had been incorporated into the county of Dona Ana with 
21 the county seat at Mesilla. South of the Jornada 
stretched the Mesilla Valley which lay principally along 
the west bank of the Rio Grande. Though only about thirty 
miles long and from a quarter to two miles wide, this 
22 fertile area contained approximately two-thirds of the 
people of Arizona.The Mexicans, comprising the great 
19 
Bancroft, History of Arizona and New Mexico, 
68o, 686> 
20Ganaway, New Mexico and the Sectional Contro­
versy, 124. 
21Rufus K. Wyllys, Arizona, The History of a 
Frontier State (Phoenix, 191557T"T3'5• 
22Davis, El Gringo, 385• 
23sylvester Mowry, Arizona and Sonora: The Geo­
graphy, History, and Resources of tEe"~Silver RegTon"~oF 
fiorVh America f frewTork, 1864) ,~T3" 
9 
bulk of the population, were primarily engaged in grazing 
and agriculture. The most important of the small towns 
which dotted the valley were Mesilla, Dona Ana, and Las 
Cruces. 
When the United States acquired the Gadsden 
Purchase, the western section was nearly deserted because 
24 
of the ravages of the hostile Apache Indians. Americans 
coming into this region soon discovered that there was 
considerable mineral wealth there, and numerous mining 
companies were formed. Western Arizona shortly gained a 
25 
reputation as a silver district. Population tended to 
concentrate mainly in the center of the territory, in and 
around the Santa Cruz Valley, and along the lower Gila 
26 
River. The two most important towns were Tubac and 
Tucson. Tubac, located in the Santa Cruz Valley, though 
abandoned when the Americans took over, was repopulated 
by the Sonora Exploring and Mining Company. The Heintzel-
man Mine, the mines of Arivaca, Sopori, and Santa Rita 
were within a radius of twenty miles of Tubac and the town 
27 became the business center of the silver district. 1 
24 
Ibid., 17. 
25Raphael Pumpelly, Across America and Asia (New 
York, 1870), 29. 
Mowry, Arizona and Sonora, 35* 
27Ibid., 25-26. 
10 
Shortly before the outbreak of war, this small town of 
353 people, which laid claim to being the most refined 
and cultured center in Arizona, was also the home of 
28 
Arizona's first newspaper. 
The old village of Tucson lay about fifty miles 
29 
northwest of Tubac. It had a fortunate location on the 
main road from the Rio Grande to California. It was also 
30 
the center of trade with Sonora and its seaport of Guaymas. 
The town showed considerable promise, and by 1859 its 
31 population was estimated at 1,000. 
The Overland Mail began operations in 1858.^ Not 
only did this enterprise serve to keep Arizona in closer 
contact with the outside world, but it also stimulated 
migration and the consequent development of the territory. 
In addition to engineers and other professional men who 
28W. Clement Eaton, "Frontier Life in Southern 
Arizona, 1858-1861," Southwestern Historical Quarterly, 
XXXVI (January, 1933), 175. 
29Mowry, Arizona and Sonora, 25. 
3°pumpelly, Across America and Asia, 30. 
3"hviowry, Arizona and Sonora, 25. 
32Paxson, The Last American Frontier, 178. 
11 
came to work the mines, small numbers of farmers and 
ranchers also settled in the various valleys.^3 An Ameri­
can population grew up, with the majority coming from 
California and the South.Apparently most of these 
people, both settled and floating, were social outcasts. 
An observer in i860 noted that the population of western 
Arizona, with the exception of a few widely separated 
35 
ranchers and miners, was made up of outlaws and renegades. 
If ever a town epitomized the lawless, wild 
frontier, it was Tucson at this time. On the eve of the 
war, it had become a refuge for a heterogeneous population 
consisting of traders, speculators, gamblers, horse 
thieves, murderers, and nondescript politicians. Though 
the silver mines did much to swell the population, one 
writer remarked that the San Francisco Vigilance Committee 
did more to populate the new territory than did the mines. 
The most desperate class of renegades from Texas, Cali­
fornia, and Sonora found Tucson a haven from arrest, and 
36 
Tucson became the center of vice, dissipation, and crime. 
33jy[OWry, Arizona and Sonora, 26-27. 
3^Prank C. Lockwood, Pioneer Days in Arizona, From 
the Spanish Occupation to Statehood (New York, 1932), tfb; 
J. Ross Browne, Adventures in the Apache Country (New York, 
1869), 22. * *• 
^Raphael pumpelly, My Reminiscences (New York, 
1918), I, 200. 
3%rowne, Adventures in the Apache Country, 134, 
22. 
12 
Since there was no semblance of law or of constituted 
civil authority, each individual was his own Judge, Jury, 
and sheriff.3? With every man "armed to the teeth," 
scenes of bloody violence in the streets were everyday 
occurrences.38 Lack of government was the direct cause 
of this chaotic situation. With no law or protection 
from the Federal government, everyone redressed "his own 
wrongs with pistol or knife or submitted/ in silence. 
The Americans in Arizona had been at odds with the 
rest of the Territory for several years before the seces­
sion crisis. The people in the north monopolized the 
territorial government at Santa Fe and they paid little 
40 
heed to the desires and demands of the Arizonians. This 
situation, of course, bred agitation and ill-feeling. So 
opposed were the people of Arizona to continuing as a part 
of New Mexico that in the election for territorial delegate 
in 1859* five-sixths of the qualified voters chose to stay 
away from the pollsAs early as 1856 Arizonians had 
37pumpelly, Mjr Reminiscences, I, 200. 
38Browne, Adventures in the Apache Country, 22. 
39Mowry, Arizona and Sonora, 3^. 
^°Rupert N. Richardson and Carl C. Rister, The 
Greater Southwest (Glendale, 1935)# 264-265. 
^Weekly Arizonian, September 15, 1859 • 
13 
unsuccessfully attempted to organize a separate territory. 
Conventions had met and sent representatives to Washington 
to present their demands. But sectional animosity had 
reached such intense proportions in Washington that 
ho 
Arizona's pleas could not be answered. 
* * * * *  
From the earliest days of the American occupation, 
the military had played a prominent part in the affairs of 
New Mexico. Hostile Indians had been, and continued to be, 
a menace to the security and development of the whole terri­
tory. In the north the Navajos were the chief danger; in 
the south the Apaches wrought death and destruction. 
Shortly after the acquisition of New Mexico, the War De­
partment set about constructing a chain of military posts 
4*3 
along the Rio Grande and westward to the Colorado River. 
This frontier defense proved to be inadequate for the 
majority of the posts were poorly garrisoned. In addition, 
most of the troops were infantry—almost useless in the 
pursuit of mounted Indians. What cavalry detachments were 
present proved invaluable, but they were too small in 
44 
numbers to be effective. 
^2Wyllys, Arizona, 135-138. 
^A. B. Bender, "Frontier Defense in the Territory 
of New Mexico, 1853-1861," New Mexico Historical Review, 
IX (October, 1934), 372. 
^Mowry, Arizona and Sonora, 55-56. 
14 
There was a determined effort in 1859 by Colonels 
Benjamin L. E. Bonneville and Joseph E. Johnston to re­
organize the defense system, but the coming of the war 
interrupted such plans.^ Early in i860 the New Mexico 
territorial legislature memorialized Congress for the 
46 
establishment of seven additional military posts. 
Perhaps there was another reason, aside from defense, why 
the legislature of New Mexico desired additional forces 
within its borders. The New Mexicans had no market for 
their surplus products other than that afforded by the 
Federal government. It was also estimated that eighty per 
cent of the money in circulation in the territory was 
contributed by the civil and military departments of the 
United States 
When the crisis of secession and war came, the of­
ficers of the military forces stationed in New Mexico, as 
elsewhere, were divided in their sympathies. Colonel 
William Wo Loring had assumed command of the department 
. B. Bender, "Military Posts in the Southwest, 
1848-1860," New Mexico Historical Review, XVI (April, 
19^1), 135. 
2i.fi 
Laws of the Territory of New Mexico« Passed 
the Legislative Assembly, Session of 1859-lfcfoO. 




on March 22, 1861. Loring was from North Carolina. 
True to the dictates of his native state, he tendered his 
resignation in order to cast his lot with the Confederacy. 
On June 11, in anticipation of the acceptance of his 
resignation, Loring departed from Santa Fe. Before leav­
ing, he turned over his command to Lieutenant Colonel 
4Q 
Edward R. S. Canby of the Nineteenth Infantry. J Other 
officers who left to serve the Confederate States were 
Colonel John B. Grayson, Major Henry H. Sibley, Captain 
Cadmus M. Wilcox, Lieutenant Colonel George B. Crittenden, 
First Lieutenant Lawrence S. Baker, Second Lieutenant 
Joseph Wheeler,5° Captain Richard S. Ewell,^! captain 
Dabney Maury, Captain Andrew Jackson Lindsay, Captain 
John Stevenson, and Major James Longs treet.^2 
Edward Richard Sprigg Canby was born in Kentucky 
in 1819. He was graduated from West Point in 1339 anci served 
^Loring to Thomas, March 23, 1861, R. A., I, 
599. 
^9cariby to Assistant Adjutant-General, June 11, 
1861, ib id., 606. 
5°m. L. Crimmins, "Fort Fillmore," New Mexico 
Historical Review, V (October, 1931)t 329. 
5lLydia S. Lane, I Married a Soldier, or Old Days 
in the Old Army (Philadelphia, 18937"* 102. 
52santa Fe Gazette, May 25> 1861. 
16 
in the Seminole War in Florida. Later he was engaged in 
removing the Cherokees, Creeks, and Choctaws to Indian 
Territory. During the Mexican War he was present at the 
siege of Vera Cruz and the battles of Cerro Gordo, 
Contreras, and Churubusco. In I855 he became major of 
the U. S. Tenth Infantry and was engaged in frontier duty 
in western Wisconsin and Minnesota. Three years later he 
was ordered to Fort Bridger, Utah. In i860 he was ap­
pointed commander of an expedition against the Navajos. 
When the war broke out, he was post commander of Fort 
Defiance. He became colonel of the Nineteenth Infantry 
in May, l86l.~^ 
Serious problems confronted Canby when he assumed 
command of the Department of New Mexico. For some time 
he was unable to receive any word from Washington. His 
troops had not been paid for months. The money that the 
paymasters did have, if distributed, would still have left 
many soldiers unpaid for several months of service. During 
the preceding two years near droughts had plagued the 
-^James q. Wilson and John Fiske (eds.), Appleton's 
C^clogaedia of American Biography (New York, I888-JL90I), I, 
5^Ralph E. Twitchell, The Leading Facts of New 
Mexican History (Cedar Rapids, i9i.l-J.9iTT, II, 3^;"~THe 
Department of New Mexico was also known as the Ninth 
Military District. Bancroft, History of Arizona and New 
Mexico, 655. 
17 
country, resulting in a scarcity of water, crops, and 
grass. Many horses and mules had died and the military 
55 
forces were seriously short of riding and draught animals. 
Hostile Indians continued their depredations,-7 and the 
troops were hardly sufficient for the defense of the terri-
57 
tory. Due to the fact that so many officers had resigned 
to join the Confederacy, Canby was forced to appoint non-
cQ 
commissioned officers to act as commissioned officers. 
In addition to all these problems, the people of 
the territory were of great concern, apathy seeming to be 
their leading characteristic.^ Although Canby assumed 
them to be loyal, he noted that they were far more in­
terested in their own personal affairs than in the national 
6o 
issue at hand. The situation in Arizona was gravely 
^Canby to Assistant Adjutant-General, June 11, 
1861, 0. R. A., I, 606. 
56canby to Assistant Adjutant-General, June 23, 
1861, ibid., IV, 44. 
57sancroft, History of Arizona and New Mexico, 686. 
58Reports of Committees, 37th Congress, 3rd 
Session, Senate Report 10b, 370. 
^^Bancroft, History of Arizona and New Mexico, 680. 
fio 
Canby to Assistant Adjutant-General, August 16, 
1861, 0. R. A., IV, 65. 
18 
different, for there the people manifested Southern 
sympathies and made no secret of their feeling. On 
March 16, 1861, a "Convention of the People of Arizona" 
62 
was held in Mesilla. The sixth resolution which was 
passed declared: 
Resolved, That we will not recognize the present 
Black Republican administration, and that we will 
resist any officers appointed to this Territory by 
said administration with whatever means in our 
power.63 
After repudiating the authority of the United States 
government, this body pledged its loyalty to the Confeder-
6k 
acy. A convention was also held at Tucson where the 
people of that area also asserted themselves to be a part 
of the Confederacy.^ When Arizona declared itself a new 
territory and attached itself to the Confederate govern­
ment, Canby uncomfortably found himself in command of a 
department which was divided within itself. 
Bancroft, History of Arizona and New Mexico, 
511.  
U£1Paul to Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, 
June 16, 1861, 0. R. A., IV, 39. 
^^Lucas to Labadi, June 14, 1861, ibid. 
^Paul to Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, 
June 16, 1861, ibid. 
^Bancroft, History of Arizona and New Mexico, 
5H. 
19 
On June 14, Canby received Instructions from the 
general in chief of the army to withdraw the regular 
infantry force from the department. Though he considered 
this an unwise move at the present, Cariby took measures 
to bring in these foot soldiers from the interior and the 
fifl 
most distant posts. The colonel was fully aware that 
the removal of such forces would leave certain areas, 
67 
particularly Arizona, open to attack from hostile Indians. 
To partially compensate for this, Canby was instructed to 
redistribute the remaining regulars in areas which would 
afford the best possible protection to the territory. A 
call for volunteers was ordered. If enough citizen 
soldiers could be recruited, perhaps, they would be capable 
of filling the gap left by the departure of the regulars. 
In accordance with orders, Canby made requisitions upon 
the Governors of New Mexico and Colorado for the necessary 
68 men. 
Since the southern part of the territory was 
plagued by hostile Indian activity, as well as by the 
active secession movement, Canby decided to establish a 
CC 
Canby to Assistant Adjutant-General, August 16, 
1861, 0. R. A., IV, 63. 
^Tcariby to Assistant Adjutant-General, July 29, 
1861, ibid., 61. 
6®Canby to Assistant Adjutant-General, August 16, 
1861, ibid., 63. 
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strong force at Fort Fillmore in the Mesilla Valley. The 
colonel considered one mounted and seven infantry compa­
nies a sufficient body to protect the governments in­
terests there. In addition this force would cover the 
69 
withdrawal of the troops from the interior of Arizona. 
It soon became apparent that the volunteer forces 
could not be relied upon for the defense of New Mexico 
unless they were supported by a strong force of regulars. 
Canby notified the War Department of this matter in a 
special report. Nevertheless, on July 12, the departmental 
commander was instructed to withdraw the remaining regular 
troops. Believing that the general in chief did not fully 
understand the situation in New Mexico, Canby sent Captain 
Robert A. Wainwright to Washington to present an accurate 
picture. That officer was to point out that if all the 
regulars were removed, it would inevitably result in the 
abandonment of the territory. As a country New Mexico 
might be worthless, but within its confines was an immense 
amount of government property which could not be allowed to 
70 
fall into the hands of the Confederates. 
Canby received reports that a Confederate force was 




New Mexico, was only about forty miles north of that post, 
the colonel reinforced the garrison there with two addi­
tional mounted companies. Ports Stanton and Craig were 
also strengthened. On July 15# Canby informed the com­
manding officer at Fort Fillmore that he should take 
measures to gather up and prepare to remove all public 
property within his jurisdiction. As soon as the troops 
from western Arizona had passed through, he was to abandon 
his post. The first line of defense in the south would 
then be Forts Craig and Stanton. But even at those stra­
tegic points the regulars were to be withdrawn just as 
rapidly as they could be replaced by inexperienced volun­
teers.^1 
As Canby anxiously endeavored to ameliorate his 
difficult situation, Brigadier General Earl Van Dorn, 
Confederate commander of Texas, dispatched four companies 
of Texas troops to Fort Bliss. This small force was to 
reoccupy that post and take charge of the public property 
72 
there in the name of the Confederacy. 
71Ibid. 
72Sibley to Loring, June 12, 1861, ibid., 55. 
CHAPTER II 
COLONEL JOHN R. BAYLOR'S ARIZONA CAMPAIGN 
When Texas seceded from the Union and joined the 
Confederacy, Major General David E. Twiggs surrendered 
the Department of Texas to the commissioners of the Com­
mittee of Public Safety.1 The garrison at Port Bliss, 
located near Franklin (present-day El Paso), withdrew to 
San Antonio as prisoners of war. Before their departure, 
their arms and supplies were turned over to commissioner 
James W. Magoffin, contractor and sutler to Port Bliss. 
He and Simeon Hart, a mill owner and contractor, and 
Josiah P. Crosby, the district judge, were the three most 
2 prominent citizens of the area. 
Brigadier General Earl Van Dorn, the Confederate 
commander of Texas, ordered Lieutenant Colonel John R. 
Baylor and four companies of the Second Regiment Mounted 
Rifles to occupy Fort Bliss.^ During the first week of 
•^Rupert N. Richardson, Texas, The Lone Star State 
(New York, 1943), 249-250. 
2Wllliam W. Mills, Forty Years at El Paso, I858-
I898 (Chicago, 1901), 39# ltf. 
3van Dorn to Ford, May 27, 1861, 0. R. A., I, 577. 
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July, 1861, Baylor arrived at Franklin, where he and his 
men were warmly received by the American population of 
the neighborhood.^ Baylor was born in Kentucky in 1822. 
Reared in Indian Territory and Texas, this rugged indi­
vidual had no trouble adapting to the rigors of the 
frontier. He had served Texas during trying times when 
Mexican invasions and Indian depredations threatened her 
settlements. For a short time he had been a special 
Indian agent at Fort Belknap, but he resigned to engage 
in farming. In his spare time he studied law and was 
elected to the Texas legislature. When Texas seceded, he 
immediately came to the front as an ardent supporter of 
his state. With the formation of the Second Regiment, 
John S. Ford became colonel, and Baylor was designated 
second in command. 
On assuming command at Fort Bliss, Baylor learned 
that Federal forces were concentrating at Fort Bliss. 
Since that post was only forty miles away, he assumed that 
^George H. Pettis, "The Confederate Invasion of New 
Mexico and Arizona," Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 
(New York, 1884-1888), II, 103T 
^William A. Keleher, Turmoil in New Mexico, 1846-
1868 (Santa Fe, 1952), 195. 
^William W. Heartsill, Fourteen Hundred and 91 
Days in the Confederate Army (Marshall, ltS7b), 1WT" 
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the Union commander in New Mexico was planning to attack 
him.^ Baylor had a total of 375 men, a considerably-
smaller force than that which formed the garrison at Port 
Fillmore. But Baylor decided to seize the initiative by 
striking first, for to wait until more reinforcements 
came to Fort Fillmore might prove fatal. Before launching 
his offensive, the colonel sent Major Edwin Waller with a 
detachment to reconnoiter the area around the Federal post. 
Waller was to locate the enemy's pickets and to ascertain 
whether the Texans could approach the fort undetected. 
The major's subsequent satisfactory report prompted Baylor 
to leave for Fort Fillmore on the night of July 23. The 
O 
Confederate invasion force numbered 258 men. It was com­
posed of Captain Isaac C. Stafford's Company E (85 men), 
Captain P. Hardeman's Company A (90 men), Captain Bethel 
Coopwood's Spy Company (40 men), and a detachment of 
Captain Trevanion T. Teel's artillery (38 men). Several 
civilians from El Paso and Mesilla also added their 
Q 
strength to the expedition. 
^Baylor to Washington, September 21, 1861, 
0. R. A., IV, 17. 
8Ibid. 
^Mesilla Times, July 29, 1861. 
Lt. Col. John R. Baylor 
4 
William C. Whitford, Colorado Volunteers in the Civil 
VJar (Denver, 1906) , 29• 
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Port Fillmore was located in a basin which was 
commanded, and partially surrounded, by chaparral-covered 
sand hills. Under cover of this growth, an enemy could 
come to within 500 yards of the post without fear of 
detection. If artillery was placed on the sand hills, the 
10 
fort would be rendered nearly helpless. Another weak­
ness was that the only water supply was a mile and a half 
away.11 Major Isaac J. Lynde had assumed command of Fort 
Fillmore and the Southern District of New Mexico on 
July 4, 1861. Soon after his arrival, that officer re­
ported the defenseless nature of the post to Canby. After 
due observation, Lynde concluded that Fort Fillmore, and 
even the whole Mesilla Valley, for that matter, was not 
IP 
worth the effort to hold it. Later Lynde was informed 
that as soon as the troops from western Arizona had passed 
through, he was to abandon the fort and withdraw to the 
north.*3 perhaps his knowledge that he would be leaving 
soon accounts for the fact that I^rnde took little pre­
caution in fortifying his position. Several of his 
10Lynde to Canby, July 7, 1861, 0. R. A., IV, 58. 
iiLyi nde to Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, 
August 7, l86l, ibid., 5. 
12Lynde to Canby, July 7 »  1861, ibid., 58. 
"^Canby to Assistant Adjutant-General, August 16, 
1861, ibid., 64. 
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officers suggested that he at least should send away the 
103 women and children at the post because in case of an 
enemy attack, they would be a serious hindrance to active 
military operations. But Iynde refused to do so. At this 
time a Confederate flag was waving over Mesilla, and the 
Union commander did not send a force to haul it down. 
Such action would have been a sign of the power and 
authority of the United States government and would have 
served to keep the secession element overawed. Since Port 
Fillmore was defenseless, Lynde should have sent a con­
siderable portion of his supplies northward and occupied 
the strong points of Mesilla and Dona Ana. In case of an 
attack upon the fort, the Federals could have rapidly 
14 
fallen back to these positions. Taking few defensive, 
and no offensive, measures, Major Lynde preferred to 
tranquilly remain within Fort Fillmore until the arrival 
of Captain Isaiah N. Moore's command from western Arizona. 
On the night of July 24, the Texans succeeded in 
reaching a position on the river near Fort Fillmore with­
out the Federals1 knowledge. Baylor posted pickets and 
cautiously made preparations to take the fort by surprise 
at daybreak. His plan would probably have been a complete 
14 
Statement of Captain C. H. McNally, ibid., 
13-14. 
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success had it not been for a deserter from Captain Teel's 
company. This individual informed the commander of the 
fort of Baylor's plans and whereabouts.1^ Lynde immedi­
ately ordered the long roll beaten, and the troops fell 
into line.1^ With an attack upon his post imminent, Lynde 
ordered in two companies of infantry which had been posted 
at San Tomas to guard the ford. Having concentrated all 
his forces, Lynde and his men nervously awaited the enemy 
17 
assault. But the attack did not come, for Baylor had 
heard the roll of the drums. Knowing that the enemy had 
been warned, he moved across the Rio Grande toward 
18 
Mesilla. At dawn Baylor's men were at the village of 
San Tomas. The two Union companies which had been 
stationed there had, in their haste to get to Port Fill­
more, abandoned large quantities of clothing, ammunition, 
and other supplies.^ This materiel, plus seven soldiers 
^^Baylor to Washington, September 21, 1861, 
ibid., 17. 
^Statement of Captain C. H. McNally, ibid., 14. 
^Tlflmde to Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, 
July 26, 1861, ibid., 4. 
^®Baylor to Washington, September 21, 1861, 
ibid., 17. 
"^Mesilla Times, July 29, 1861. 
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who also had been left behind, fell into the hands of the 
Texans. After interrogation as to the estimated time of 
20 
arrival of the troops from western Arizona, the prison-
21 22 
ers were paroled and allowed to return to Port Fillmore. 
The Confederates then set out for Mesllla. Located six 
miles from Fort Fillmore, Mesllla was a strategic point. 
If occupied by Union forces, it could be easily defended 
23 
and would enable them to hold the valley. Baylor was 
fully aware of this, and he and his men entered the town 
about ten o'clock that morning. The Confederates were 
received with great joy by the citizens, and "Vivas and 
24 
hurrahs rang them welcome from every point." 
When Lynde heard that Baylor had occupied Mesllla, 
he decided at last to take the offensive. About four-
thirty in the afternoon the Federal column, consisting of 
20 
Lynde to Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, 
July 26, 1861, 0. R. A., IV, 4. 
21Mesilla Times, July 29, 1861. 
22 
Lynde to Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, 
July 26, 1861, 0. R. A., IV, 4. 
2^Baylor to Washington, September 21, 1861, 
ibid., 17. 
2%Iesilla Times, July 29, 1861. 
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380 men composed of two companies of mounted rifles and 
six companies of infantry, left Port Fillmore. One 
company of infantry acted as artillerymen2^ for the four 
12-pounder howitzers. The band, one infantry company, 
and some convalescents remained behind to garrison the 
fort.27 
Near five o'clock clouds of dust on the main road 
leading to Mesilla gave warning that the Federals were on 
their way. Several of the main streets of the town con­
verged on the southside, and the houses in that area were 
quite scattered. In addition several corrals and the 
proximity of corn fields made the position an excellent 
one for defense. Baylor posted his men on the adobe 
house tops and behind the corrals. Only Captain Coop-
wood* s company remained mounted. Some of the citizens 
also took position in order to assist the Confederates. 
Lynde's column advanced to within 500 yards of Baylor's 
force and then halted, forming a battle line with their 
howitzers in the center, the infantry on each flank, and the 
28 
cavalry on the wings. After these preparations had been 
2^Lynde to Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, 
July 26, 1861, 0. R. A., IV, 4. 
^Statement of Captain C. H. McNally, ibid., 14. 
27Iynde to Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, 
July 26, 1861, ibid., 4. 
28flflesilla Times, July 29» 1861. 
completed, Major Lynde sent two of his officers under a 
flag of truce to demand the immediate and unconditional 
surrender of the Texas forces. The flag bearers were met 
by Majors Edwin Waller and P. T. Herbert. Both of these 
Confederates were mounted and armed with double-barreled 
shot guns which were carried on the front of their 
s a d d l e s A f t e r  h e a r i n g  L y n d e ' s  d e m a n d ,  t h e  T e x a n s  
retired to relay the message to Colonel Baylor. Upon 
30 
their return they informed the Federals that their com­
mander's reply was "that if they wished the town to come 
and take it."^ 
Lynde moved his battery forward, and fired two 
shells which fell short of their target. His command 
continued to advance slowly toward the town while the 
battery was pushed forward by hand through the heavy 
sandAfter firing several more rounds of bombs, 
^^Lynde to Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, 
July 26, 1861, 0. R. A., IV, 4; James C. McKee, Narrative 
of the Surrender oF a Command of U• S. Forces at Fort 
FD-more, N. M. ln~7uTy, A. P.,~I85I "(Boston, 1B86;, I5. 
3°Statement of Asst. Surg. J. C. McKee, 0. R. A., 
IV, 12. ~ 
31]yiesilla Times, July 29, 1861. 
•52 
J Lynde to Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, 
July 26, 1861, 0. R. A., IV, 4. 
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grape, and canister, the Federal cavalry began to form for 
a charge.33 The cavalry came to within 300 yards of a cor­
ral behind which Captain Hardeman's company was stationed. 
Hardeman's well directed fire threw the cavalry into com­
plete confusion and forced them to retreat hastily, regard­
less of the efforts of the officers to rally their men.3^ 
Three Union enlisted men were killed, and two officers and 
four men were wounded. Since the Confederates were so well 
entrenched and with night falling, Iynde discontinued the 
attack. Reforming his men, he returned to Fort Fillmore.35 
As the Federals retreated a wave of cheering and shouting 
came from the Confederates.3^ Baylor thought that lynde's 
action might be a feint in order to draw him from his 
strong position. Because of this he did not go in pursuit, 
but stayed where he was until the next morning. When the 
Union troops failed to appear, Baylor sent out a recon-
noitering party which discovered that the Federal forces 
33Baylor to Washington, September 21, 1861, 
ibid., 17. 
3^Mesilla Times, July 29/ 1861. 
3^Lynde to Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, 
July 26, 1861, 0. R. A., IV, 4. 
3^McKee, Narrative of the Surrender, 17. 
33 
were busily engaged in throwing up breastworks around 
their fort. In view of this situation, the Confederate 
commander dispatched an express with an order for his 
artillery to come up from Fort Bliss. When these rein­
forcements arrived, he planned to attack Fort Fillmore. 
Through spies Major Lynde was quickly informed 
that Baylor had sent for his artillery. The Union com­
mander was in a quandary. If he sent a large enough force 
to intercept the Confederate reinforcements, it would 
weaken his post and might even result in its capture if 
Baylor attacked with his main body. Rather than take the 
chance of dividing his army, Lynde decided that it was 
best to evacuate Fort Fillmore and withdraw to Fort 
Stanton. Most of his officers were in agreement, for the 
defenseless nature of the post placed the whole command 
in danger if attacked. Lynde issued orders for the 
evacuation and all public property which could not be 
OO 
transported was to be destroyed.'3 When it came to dis­
posing of the hospital whiskey, many of the men emptied 
39 
their water canteens and filled them with the liquor. 
^Baylor to Washington, September 21, 1861, 
0. R. A., IV, 18. 
38Lynde to Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, 
August 7, 1861, ibid., 5. 
39p. Stanley, Fort Union (Canadian (?), Tex., 1953)> 
153. This material is from a manuscript by an anonymous 
author, "Notes on the Affair at Valverde and Glorieta in 
the Late War of the Rebellion,11 which is reprinted in 
Stanley's book. 
3 4 
A blacksmith shop, bakery, and one of the quartermaster 
store rooms were completely burned down. Most of the 
post buildings, however, were uninjured. A large amount 
of ammunition was destroyed as were the hospital stores 
and medicines. Even with this destruction, several 
thousand dollars worth of commissary stores and other 
40 
property were left unharmed. 
At one o'clock in the morning of July 27, Lynde 
ill 
and his entire command set out for Port Stanton. The 
road lay over table lands and foot hills to a pass through 
42 
the Organ Mountains to San Augustine Springs. Until day­
light the Federal column proceeded without difficulty. 
But when the sun rose, it became exceedingly hot, and the 
men and teams began to show signs of exhaustion. About 
six miles from San Augustine Springs the trail began to 
ascend to the pass. At this point many men began to fall 
21-3 
by the wayside from fatigue. Undoubtedly the hospital 
whiskey played a part. 
Shortly after daylight, Confederate spies reported 
a column of dust off toward the Organ Mountains about 
^°Mesilla Times, July 29, 1861. 
^Lynde to Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, 
August 7, 1861, 0. R. A., IV, 5. 
^2Mesllla Times, July 29, 1861. 
^Lynde to Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, 
August 7t 1861, 0. R. A., IV, 5. 
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fifteen miles away on the Port Stanton road. Baylor raced 
to the top of a house where, with the aid of a field 
glass, he discerned Lynde's whole army on the retreat. 
The Confederates quickly saddled up and set out in pursuit. 
By a forced march, Baylor hoped to overtake the Federals 
at the pass. When he reached the Rio Grande, the Texas 
commander received word that the Federals had put their 
fort to the torch, but that the fire had been extinguished 
with little damage. Baylor ordered Major Waller to take 
a detachment to the post to save as much of the property 
as possible. After leaving an adequate guard, he was to 
j|ji 
return and overtake Baylor on the march. 
When Baylor reached the foot of the Organ 
Mountains, he overtook the rear of the enemy. This was 
composed chiefly of stragglers who were trying to make 
their way to water. A number of them were captured and 
disarmed, and the Confederates gave them what water they 
had. The Texans were now compelled to proceed to a small 
spring to replenish their supply. At the spring they 
discovered twenty-four exhausted and sleeping Federals. 
These men were also taken prisoner. After filling their 
canteens, the Confederates started toward the main body 
of the enemy which had now passed through San Augustine 
^**Baylor to Washington, September 21, 1861, 
ibid., 18. 
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Pass. Baylor was delayed for some time while awaiting 
the arrival of Major Waller. By mistake the major had 
taken more troops with him than Baylor had intended. 
When Waller finally rode up, the pursuit was quickly 
ilR 
resumed. v 
Completely unaware that the Texans were pursuing 
him, Lynde took his mounted troops and pushed ahead of 
the main body of his column to San Augustine Springs. He 
intended to secure water which would be carried back to 
46 
his thirsty troops in the rear. On his return Captain 
47 
Alfred Gibbs rode up to report that eight companies of 
cavalry, supported by artillery, and a large number of 
48 
infantry were approaching the rear. Gibbs and his party 
of thirty-five cavalrymen had come from Fort Craig and 
were bringing 100 head of cattle to Fort Fillmore. Having 
been warned that the Texans held Mesilla, Gibbs decided to 
turn off the main road and, by a circuitous route, come 
45Ibid. 
^Lynde to Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, 
August 7j 1861, ibid., 5-6. 
^Statement of Captain Gibbs, ibid., 10. 
^^Lynde to Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, 
August 7, 1861, ibid., 6. 
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into Port Fillmore from the Port Stanton road. It was 
i|Q 
while on this detour that he came upon Lynde's command. 
Lynde instructed Gibbs to take his cavalry to the 
rear where, in concert with the infantry rear guard, he 
was to contest the approach of the enemy.J Lynde himself 
was so exhausted that he could not sit upon his horse. 
Instead of taking over personal direction of the defense, 
he returned to San Augustine Springs.^ when Gibbs got to 
the rear he discovered that the infantry were lying under 
bushes, too exhausted to rise or carry their muskets. 
Apparently the cavalry was the only force upon which Gibbs 
could rely. At this time the Confederates made their ap­
pearance from below a hill. Gibbs formed his mounted 
troops in a skirmish line, but his force was too small to 
combat the oncoming Confederates. In good order Gibbs1 
52 
men steadily fell back toward San Augustine Springs. 
This retreat allowed the Texans to advance and capture the 
wagons, artillery, and supplies. When Baylor reached the 
summit of the pass, he obtained a clear view of the road 
^Statement of Captain Gibbs, ibid., 9-10* 
5°lbid., 10. 
^Lynde to Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, 
August lo6l, ibid., 6. 
52statement of Captain Gibbs, ibid., 10. 
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to the springs. For five miles the road was lined with 
fainting and thirsting soldiers who threw down their arms 
as the Texans rode "by. Major Waller was to charge ahead 
until he reached the end of the line of straggling 
soldiers. He was then to form and cut them off from the 
main body. Baylor followed behind, disarming the enemy 
as he went.*^ 
When Lynde first heard that the enemy was approach­
ing, he gave the call to arms. But only about one hundred 
infantrymen were able to respond. Gibbs now came in with 
his cavalry and reported the capture of the rear guard and 
three of the four howitzers. Under these circumstances 
the Federal commander considered it useless to resist. He 
did not believe that honor demanded the sacrifice of blood 
after the terrible suffering that his men had already 
cli 
undergone. As Waller and Hardeman's forces neared, 
Lynde sent for those two officers and informed them of his 
desire to surrender. Baylor was told of this development, 
and he rode forward to Lynde's camp. When asked on what 
terms he would allow the Federals to surrender, Baylor 
^Baylor to Washington, September 21, 1861, 
ibid., 18. 
•jLynde to Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, 
August 7, 1861, ibid., 6. 
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replied that it must be unconditional.-^ To this Major 
Iynde replied, "Colonel Baylor, to avoid bloodshed, I 
conditionally surrender this whole force to you, on con­
dition that officers and their families shall be pro­
tected from insult and private property be respected." 
Nearly every Union officer present protested the sur­
render, but Lynde stated that he was the commanding of-
56 
ficer and would take the responsibility for this action. 
After the articles of capitulation were signed, the order 
57 was given for the Federals to stack arms. ' 
Iynde's command, consisting of seven companies 
of the Seventh Infantry and three of mounted rifles, 
59 
totaled almost 700 men. Baylor's force numbered only 280. 
^^Baylor to Washington, September 21, 1861, 
ibid., 18. 
^Statement of Captain Gibbs, ibid., 11. A 
staunch Union man maintained that, either by indifference 
or treachery, lynde's subordinate officers aided in 
bringing about the surrender. Once that had been ac­
complished, they united in charging the whole responsi­
bility upon their commander. Mills, Forty Years at El 
Paso, 52. 
^Baylor to Washington, September 21, 1861, 
0. R. A., IV, 18. 
5®Gibbs to Canby, August 6, 1861, ibid., 8. 
•^Mesilla Times, July 29, 1861. 
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The Federals surrendered four pieces of artillery and all 
the transportation, arms, ammunition, commissary and 
quartermaster's stores,^ 200 cavalry horses, and 270 
head of beef cattle.^ The Confederates were delayed for 
two days at San Augustine Springs because of the condition 
of the Union troops and the lack of transportation. The 
prisoners were marched to Las Cruces where they were 
paroled. Baylor knew that Captain Isaiah Moore's command 
of 250 men was due to arrive soon. With his small army, 
it would have been difficult for the Texas colonel to have 
fought this force and attempt to guard the prisoners as 
well. Furthermore, Baylor reasoned that by paroling the 
prisoners, the enemy would have to take care of them. If 
they remained prisoners of war, the Texans would be 
obliged to feed them. 
After Lynde's command had been paroled and started 
on its way northward, Baylor took up a defensive position 
near the village of Picacho. It was here that the road 
from the west struck the Rio Grande and he hoped to lie in 
wait to attack the unsuspecting Federal column as it 
^°Baylor to , August 3, 1861, 0. R. A., IV, 16. 
6^Mesilla Times, July 29, 1861. 
^Baylor to Washington, September 21, 1861, 
0. R. A., IV, 19. 
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approached. While Baylor was at Picacho a party arrived 
which was composed of about thirty civilians and resigned 
army officers who were on their way to offer their 
services to the Confederacy. The most distinguished 
member of this group was Albert Sidney Johnston, late 
commander of the Department of the Pacific. As a matter 
of courtesy Baylor offered his command to Johnston who, 
though with reluctance, accepted it.^ Privately Johnston 
remarked to a member of his party that he did not like the 
delay, "but that it was like being asked to dance by a 
lady—he could not refuse. 
Johnston sent Captain Coopwood's Spy Company west­
ward to locate the enemy and to watch his movements. The 
scouts discovered Moore's command moving along the 
Miembres.^5 From the careless manner in which they were 
travelling, Coopwood knew that they had not been informed 
of Iynde's surrender. It seemed that all was going well, 
and within a few days the Confederates would spring the 
trap at Picacho. The plan was upset, however, the night 
63lbid. 
^\filliam P. Johnston, The Life of Gen. Albert 
Sidney Johnston (New York, 1878), "287. 
^^Baylor to Washington, August 3> 1861, 
0. R. A., IV, 19. 
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that the Federals stopped at Cook's Spring, about fifty 
miles from the Rio Grande. An express from Port Craig 
rode into the Union camp and brought the news of I<ynde's 
surrender. Fearing that the Confederates would soon be 
upon them, Moore and his men lost no time in preparing for 
a hasty march to the security of Fort Craig. The men 
destroyed their cannon and burned all but eight of their 
wagons. After ridding themselves of all incumbrances, the 
infantrymen mounted the draught mules, and the Union com­
mand set out directly for Fort Craig 120 miles away. As 
Johnston remarked, "thus 250 infantry and dragoons—U. S. 
soldiers—saved themselves from the terrible Texans by an 
66 
ignominious flight." 
Immediately after tendering his military command 
to General Johnston, Baylor went to Mesilla where, on 
August 1, 1861, he issued a proclamation to the people of 
Arizona. He declared that Arizona was now organized as a 
territory under a military government. As commander of 
the Confederate forces in the area, Baylor formally took 
possession of the territory of Arizona in the name of the 
Confederate States of America. Geographically, the 
territory comprised that part of New Mexico which lay 
66 
Johnston to wife, August 7, 1861, Johnston, The 
Life of Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston, 287-289. 
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south of the thirty-fourth parallel of north latitude. 
Mesilla was designated the capital. All civil and 
military offices which existed before August 1, l86l, 
were declared vacant. However, all laws and enactments 
passed before the date of the formation of the territory 
which were consistent with the Constitution and laws of 
the Confederate States, as well a3 with the proclamation 
itself, were to continue in effect. The government was 
divided into two separate and distinct departments: the 
executive and the judicial. The executive authority was 
vested in the commandant of the Confederate army in 
Arizona. This meant, of course, that John R. Baylor as­
sumed the governorship. The judicial power was placed in 
a supreme court, two district courts, two probate courts, 
and several justices of the peace. In addition, as the 
need arose, municipal and other inferior courts might be 
established. The first judicial district composed that 
part of Arizona lying east of Apache Pass. District and 
probate court sessions were to be held at Mesilla. The 
second judicial district was made up of the remainder of 
the territory with the district and probate courts holding 
their sessions at Tucson.^7 Later in August Governor 
^Proclamation to the People of the Territory of 
Arizona, 0. R. A., IV, 20-21. 
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Baylor extended the limits of the territory of Arizona to 
the parallel of 36° 301, and from there to the Colorado 
68 
River, and down that stream to its mouth. It is in­
teresting to note that the mouth of the Colorado River is 
well within the border of the Republic of Mexico. Whether 
Baylor was laying claim to part of Mexico, or whether he 
was merely ignorant of the actual boundary, is not known. 
Baylor established the provisional government of 
the territory, proclaimed himself governor, and made ap­
pointments to fill the offices he created. All this was 
done, of course, subject to the approval of the Congress 
of the Confederate States. On February 14, 1862, Presi­
dent Jefferson Davis issued a proclamation which had been 
authorized by the Confederate Congress on January 21, 
giving legal sanction to Baylor's accomplishments.^ In 
proclaiming a territorial government for Arizona, Baylor, 
and later the Confederate government, was but giving 
expression to the avowed desire of several years of 
70 
agitation by the people living in that area. On March 
11, 1862, Malcolm H. MacWillie took his seat in the 
^^Baylor to Van Dorn, August 14, 1861, ibid., 23. 
69james d. Richardson (comp.), A Compilation of 
the Messages and Papers of the Confederacy including ̂ Ke 
Diplomatic Correspondence""!^ l"-18b5 (Nashville, 1905-
190b )t i, iur. 
7°Charles S. Walker, Jr., "Confederate Government 
in Dona Ana County as Shown in the Records of the Probate 
Court, 1861-1862," New Mexico Historical Review, VI (July, 
1931), 256. 
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Confederate Congress as the delegate-elect from the 
71 
territory of Arizona.' 
Within a few days the news of Lynde's surrender 
reached Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin S. Roberts, the com­
mander of Port Stanton. That officer was well aware of 
his isolated position, and he knew that his small garrison 
would be no match against Baylor's men. In view of the 
circumstances, Roberts decided to evacuate his post and 
thus save his troops for more important duty elsewhere. 
On August 2, he ordered his two companies of infantry to 
Albuquerque while he took charge of the two mounted rifle 
72 
companies and set out for Santa Fe. The Federals left 
in the buildings what supplies they could not carry, and 
then they set the post on fire. Shortly after their 
departure, a rainstorm extinguished the flames, leaving 
most of the materiel unharmed. Some Americans who lived 
nearby took possession of the post and the supplies, but 
the Mexicans and Indians of the area demanded the right 
to plunder. Since they were greatly outnumbered, the 
73 
Americans had to agree. Eight days after Roberts1 
^Journal of the Congress of the Confederate 
States of America,"T861~i8bb (Washington, 1W-1TO), 
V, tfO. 
^Roberts to Canby, August 2, 1861, 0. R. A., 
IV, 22. - - -
73:Baylor to Washington, September 21, 1861, 
ibid., 19. 
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evacuation, Baylor was apprised of the situation. The 
Confederate commander sent Captain James Walker with 
Company D to occupy the post. He was instructed not only 
to claim the military stores, but also to lend protection 
74 
to the Americans. Walker managed to recover part of the 
supplies which the Mexicans and Indians had pillaged. 
Among the captured articles were four pieces of artillery, 
75 
two of which were in serviceable condition. 
Baylor's spirited campaign to drive the Federals 
from southern New Mexico (Arizona) had taken less than a 
month. In summing up his activities in a report to 
General Earl Van Dorn, Baylor stated that he had acted in 
all matters relating to the acquisition of Arizona entirely 
upon his own responsibility. He could only hope for ap­
proval from the Confederate government.^ That approval 
came, of course, when the President and Congress recognized 
Arizona as a Confederate territory and sustained Baylor as 
governor. 
^Baylor to Van Dorn, August 14, 1861, ibid., 23. 
^Baylor to Washington, September 21, 1861, 
ibid., 19-20. 
^^Baylor to Van Dorn, August 14, 1861, ibid., 23. 
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Now that he had taken possession of Arizona, 
Baylor hoped that the government would send a competent 
man with an adequate force to occupy and hold the terri­
tory. The governor pointed out that the vast mineral 
resources of Arizona, as well as the potentiality of its 
affording an outlet to the Pacific, made its acquisition 
of considerable importance.77 
77Ibid. 
CHAPTER III 
COLONEL EDWARD R. S. CANBY'S EFFORTS 
TO STRENGTHEN NEW MEXICO 
The disaster of Lynde's surrender placed Cariby 
in a most unenviable position. The southern part of his 
department was in Confederate hands, and he still was 
not certain whether the War Department intended to retain 
New Mexico. Until he could receive definite instructions, 
he speedily reinforced Fort Craig and Fort Union.'1' The 
troops busily threw up earthworks around Fort Craig to 
strengthen it from any possible enemy assault. Fort 
Union, located in the northeastern part of the territory, 
was moved from its old position under the mesa and rebuilt 
about a mile out in the valley. Here it was converted 
2 
into a fortification with bomb-proof quarters. Because 
of their strategic locations, Canby considered these two 
posts as his key bases for amy future offensive or de­
fensive operations within his command.^ 
-'•Canby to Assistant Adjutant-General, August 16, 
1861, 0. R. A., IV, 64. 
2Pettis, "The Confederate Invasion of New Mexico 
and Arizona," loc. citI, 104. 
3canby to Assistant Adjutant-General, August 16, 
1861, 0. R. A., IV, 64. 
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Undoubtedly Cariby*s greatest problem was one of 
supply. On August 16, he again Informed the War Depart­
ment that New Mexico was sorely lacking in military re­
sources and supplies of every description. The commander 
had heard nothing concerning his annual supply of ordnance. 
This was of grave concern for there was not enough 
artillery in the department to arm a single post properly. 
And except for small arms, the supply of ammunition was 
exceedingly limited. The quartermaster department was 
unable to secure remounts for the cavalry or draught 
animals for its supply trains. Canby urgently pointed out 
that if it was the intention of his government to hold New 
4 
Mexico, supplies would have to be sent as soon as possible. 
The native population north of the Jornada del 
Muerto were another source of concern which taxed the 
strength of the Union commander. With a few exceptions, 
Canby believed the people to be loyal. But he also real­
ized that they were apathetic and would be slow to adopt 
any measures for the defense of their country. In the 
colonel's opinion the natives were far more concerned with 
their private interests. By their personal and political 
quarrels they were defeating the objectives of the Union 
4Ibid., 64-65 
V •» 
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government.-* To guard against spies and the treasonable 
activities of a few, Canby found it necessary to suspend 
the writ of habeas corpus throughout the territory 
With such a lethargic attitude on the part of the 
people he was obliged to defend, Canby seriously doubted 
whether an adequate volunteer force could be raised for 
the defense of the territory. The commander had earlier 
received instructions to send the regulars to the East 
just as soon as volunteer units could be mustered in to 
replace them. Even if a volunteer force could be raised 
in New Mexico, Canby did not believe it would be reliable 
unless supported by regular troops. He contended that 
the most that could be expected from the volunteers would 
be the occupation of two or three important points. 
These would be fortified and held by them until the 
government's policy in regard to the territory could be 
"settled and expressed."''' 
During the first part of July, Canby notified 
William Gilpin, governor of the territory of Colorado, 
5Ibid., 65.  
/r 
Circular, August 8, 1861, ibid., 62.  
^Canby to Assistant Adjutant-General, August 16, 
1861, ibid., 65.  
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that increased Indian hostilities in New Mexico prevented 
him from sending any of his volunteer forces to garrison 
Port Garland. That post, though located in Colorado, was 
within Canby's jurisdiction. Canby requested that the 
governor raise two companies of infantry for duty there. 
Though unable to issue the troops any clothing at present, 
Canby promised that arms and equipment for the volunteers 
Q 
would be forwarded immediately. Gilpin responded by 
raising the two companies (Company A under Captain John 
P. Slough and Company B commanded by Samuel P. Tappan) 
and ordering them to report for duty at Fort Garland 
Prom the Union viewpoint, all was not well in the 
neighboring territory of Colorado. The governor reported 
that the results of a recent election, though showing an 
overwhelming Union majority, also made it clear that there 
was a strong secession element. Colorado depended upon 
supplies from the East. Hostile Indians were a constant 
menace to this 800-mile life line. Because of this 
fact, as well as because of the secession element, Gilpin 
deemed it absolutely necessary to keep an adequate 
®Canby to Governor of Colorado Territory, July 6, 
1861, ibid., 53-54. 
^Gilpin to Canby, , ibid., 68. 
volunteer .force for home defense. To arm such a body, 
Gilpin asked Cariby to send him 5,000 arms and all neces­
sary ammunition and equipment, and enough guns for two 
batteries of artillery.10 Obviously Canby was in no 
position to meet the governor's request. He did, how­
ever, forward Gilpin's letter to the commander of the 
Western Department and asked that such supplies be sent 
from Port Leavenworth. Cariby assured Gilpin that if a 
revolt broke out in Colorado, he would send enough 
materiel to enable his volunteers to suppress it. But at 
present Canby had only enough arms in his department to 
equip the volunteers that had been authorized for New 
Mexico.11 Meanwhile the War Department notified Canby 
that New Mexico's volunteer quota had been increased by 
two additional regiments. The colonel was chagrined for 
he still did not believe that they could be raised within 
the limits of his department. As a result, he informed 
Governor Gilpin that it might be necessary to ask him to 
12 organize four or six more companies in Colorado. 
10Ibid. 
llCariby to Assistant Adjutant-General, 
September 8, 1861, ibid., 68. 
12cariby to Governor of Colorado Territory, 
September 8, 1861, ibid., 69.  
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By September 8, Canby reported that the defensive 
works at Port Craig were nearly completed and would be 
ready to turn over to the volunteers within a few days. 
Since that post could be held easily against a greatly 
superior force, Canby intended to let the unreliable 
volunteers garrison it. The regular troops would then be 
released from such defensive duty and would be available 
for whatever offensive operations Canby might undertake 
The volunteer force which the War Department 
stipulated should be raised in New Mexico was two regi­
ments of infantry (2,092 officers and men) and two regi­
ments of cavalry (1,632 officers and men). The term of 
service was three years. The cavalry could not be secured 
for that long a term, so Canby authorized the mustering 
in of mounted companies for a period of six months only.1^ 
As anticipated, the organization of the volunteer forces 
proceeded slowly. In the hope of meeting the War Depart­
ment's quota as soon as possible, Governor Henry Connelly 
of New Mexico planned to call out the militia. In this 
•^cariby to Assistant Adjutant-General, 
September 8, 18b1, ibid., 69.  
•^Canby to Governor of New Mexico, September 8, 
1861, ibid., b9-70. 
Lt. Col. Edward R. S. Canby 
Johnson and Buel (eds.), Battles and Leaders 
of the Civil War, II" 107. 
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way, he would force the people to do what they seemed 
indisposed to do voluntarily.^ Canby ordered a mounted 
force to Albuquerque to arrest a group of citizens who 
refused to adhere to the Federal law in regard to the 
i f  
enrollment of the militia. By early September the 
First Infantry Regiment had been organized. Even so, 200 
men were needed by the companies which had not reached 
their quota. In the Second Regiment, where eight compa­
nies had been mustered, 400 enlistees were lacking. Since 
only one company of cavalry had been sworn in, a call was 
issued for independent companies of mounted volunteers. 
Canby planned to incorporate these independent companies 
with the cavalry regiments if the men concerned would 
consent to that extension of their term of enlistment.^7 
While the Federal commander was feverishly at­
tempting to raise an adequate volunteer army, he received 
•jo 
reports of a possible invasion from the Canadian River. 
•^canby to Assistant Adjutant-General, September 8, 
1861, ibid., 69. 
I6chapin to Rossell, September 27, 1861, ibid., 71. 
l^Canby to Governor of New Mexico, September 8, 
1861, ibid., 70. 
"^Otis to Canby, August 22, 1861, ibid., 67.  
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To guard against a surprise move from this direction, 
Canby ordered the commander of Port Union to be 
constantly on the alert. Patrols were to be continuously 
sent out to bring a timely notice of any movement of the 
19 enemy. ̂  
During the first part of October Canby learned to 
his dismay that Governor Gilpin had been unable to raise 
the volunteer units which were needed at Port Wise. 
Gilpin's failure was disappointing. Canby had counted 
upon the regulars at that post, and at Port Garland, to 
form part of the force he intended to use in a campaign 
against Baylor. Canby gently rebuked Gilpin for not in­
forming him earlier, for had he known, he could have made 
arrangements to replace the garrison at Fort Wise from 
20 
some other quarter. In an effort to accomplish what 
the governor had failed to do, Canby notified the com­
mander of Port Wise that he was authorized to raise four 
21 
companies from Colorado territory. 
Monetary problems were still weighing heavily upon 
the Ninth Military District. In the middle of November, 
•^Nicodemus to Chapman, October 22, 1861, ibid., 
72-73. 
20Canby to Gilpin, October 11, 1861, Ibid., 72. 
21Canby to Otis, October 13, 1861, Ibid. 
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Canby informed the paymaster general that the military 
operations in New Mexico for several months had been 
greatly "embarrassed" and were now almost "paralyzed" by 
the lack of funds. Many of the regulars had not been 
paid for more than twelve months and the volunteers had 
not been paid at all. Aside from the suffering caused 
the troops, lack of money had seriously affected the 
raising of volunteer units. Few New Mexicans had the 
desire to serve in the army without pay. One unsuccessful 
attempt had been made to borrow money for the government. 
Canby reported that a new effort to secure a loan had been 
made and it promised to be at least partially successful. 
The chief quartermaster, the chief commissary, and the 
departmental commander promised that this money would be 
repaid in treasury notes bearing 7.3 per cent interest. 
Canby, of course, requested that the paymaster general 
make arrangements to redeem this promise. If he failed 
to do so, Canby pledged himself personally responsible 
22 
for the interest. 
Hostile Indians continued to ravage the territory. 
The Navajos and Mescalero Apaches were the chief offenders, 
but the Kiowas and Comanches also made raids along the 
22canby to Paymaster-General, November 18, 1861, 
ibid., 75. 
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frontier. The Navajos were the chief concern, for that 
2^ 
tribe predominated in northern New Mexico. From the 
earliest times the Navajos and the New Mexicans had been 
engaged in hostilities. When there were intervals of 
peace, each side always claimed that the treaty of peace 
24 
was broken by the other. Those Mexicans who had stock 
stolen, or who could not cultivate their farms in 
security, suffered heavily from these Indian raids. When 
retaliatory forays were carried out against the Navajos, 
invariably the consequences fell upon the peaceful members 
of that tribe.2-* Pursuing forces apparently assumed that 
all Navajos were guilty of the acts committed by a few. 
These activities, however, applied to the tribes in and 
around New Mexico, and not just the Navajos alone. Canby 
feared that if the situation continued, all the Indians 
within his jurisdiction would turn to robbing and plunder-
23canby to Assistant Adjutant-General, December 1, 
1861, ibid., 77. 
P4 
Canby to Governor of New Mexico, November 22, 
1861, ibid., 76. 
25 
Canby to Assistant Adjutant-General, December 1, 
1861, ibid., 77. 
26 
Canby to Governor of New Mexico, November 22, 
1861, ibid., 76. 
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Some of these Indians raids, if they were not 
caused by, were at least encouraged by an unscrupulous 
portion of the Mexican population. These individuals 
27 
profited by buying the plunder from the Indians. Ap­
parently these people and their acts were not restrained 
by the "moral sense" of the population. Cariby lamented 
that as long as these marauders found a ready sale for 
their plunder and for their captives, it would be im-
28 
possible to prevent the depredations. The military 
commander informed Governor Connelly that the War Depart­
ment and the Indian Office had a right to expect that all 
good citizens would aid in the enforcement of the laws 
and in sustaining the government's policy. He pointed 
out that the army's duty of protection involved a recipro­
cal obligation upon the people of New Mexico. Unless the 
citizenry denounced the illegal acts of a "few vicious 
individuals" and supported the enforcement of the laws, 
military action would be futile. Meanwhile the colonel 
assured the people that he would use all means at his 
disposal to protect them from the hostile Indians. Troops 
were posted at key approaches in the Navajo country in an 
27Ibid. 
28 
Canby to Assistant Adjutant-General, December 1, 
1861, ibid., 77. 
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effort to restrain those Indians, as well as to give ample 
warning of the coming of raiding parties,2^ 
By early December, Canby had made great strides 
in getting his forces into fighting form. His regulars 
were well-drilled and instructed. However, there was a 
lack of officers and recruits to maintain the company 
quotas. The regulars had the best arms obtainable at the 
time. The infantry was equipped with the Springfield 
rifled musket (.58 caliber), and the cavalry had the 
Harper's Ferry rifle, Colt's navy pistol, Sharp's and 
Maynard's carbines, and a few of the Colt revolving rifles 
for experimental use. In regard to the volunteers, the 
colonel still maintained that it would be exceedingly dif­
ficult to raise the entire force authorized for New Mexico. 
He suggested that one or two regiments of volunteers from 
the East be sent to replace the regulars when they were 
withdrawn. The volunteers that had been recruited were 
slowly improving in discipline and instruction. But they 
were still far from efficient, and in Canby's opinion, 
they could not be made so within any reasonable length of 
time. Not only were they without self-reliance and mili­
tary spirit, but their ignorance of the English language 
and their lack of intelligence were serious obstacles to 
29 
^Canby to Governor of New Mexico, November 22, 
1861, ibid., 75-76. 
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improvement. For Indian or partisan warfare, or for use 
in conjunction with regulars or volunteers of American 
origin, Canby believed that they might make valuable 
auxiliaries. The volunteers were equipped with older 
model firearms: the rifled musket (.69 caliber), the 
Harper's Ferry rifle (calibers .54 and .58), the cavalry 
musketoon, the carbine pistol, and some smooth-bore 
*3Q 
muskets ( .69 caliber). 
Though in general the troops of both categories 
were fairly well-equipped with weapons, there was still 
a deficiency of supplementary equipment. The regulars 
were well-clothed, but the uniforms of the volunteers 
were of an inferior quality. Ordnance supplies were in­
adequate and the annual supply for the department had been 
held up at Fort Leavenworth. Canby set about buying up 
as much ammunition as he could from civilian sources. 
Transportation was also a problem. The horses and mules 
of the territory were generally too light for cavalry or 
draught purposes, so they had to be purchased elsewhere. 
Fortunately some animals had arrived from the East and 
more were expected soon. The subsistence department was 
now fairly well supplied. When money was available, beef, 
•ai 
flour, beans, and salt were purchased locally. 
3°Cariby to Adjutant-General, December 8, 1861, 
ibid., 78-80. 
33-ibid., 79. 
Canby believed that his army was in such good 
condition that he could launch an offensive. He desig­
nated Fort Craig as his base of operations, for his 
objective was to drive Baylor's numerically inferior 
force from the Mesilla Valley. If successful, he might 
even be able to occupy several key points in western 
Texas. The regulars formed the backbone of Canby's 
force, but picked volunteers were also selected to join 
the campaign. Late in December Canby arrived at Port 
Craig to personally take charge of the preparations. He 
still lacked transportation, but he hoped that a scheduled 
arrival of mules from the East in a few days would over­
come that difficulty. Canby also let new contracts to 
32 
furnish a further supply of animals. 
As everything approached a state of readiness, 
Canby was stunned to hear that the Texans in the Mesilla 
Valley had received a reinforcement of 1,400 men. An 
army of 2,000 more were reportedly moving up the Pecos 
•a-a 
River to attack central and northern New Mexico.A 
Union offensive was now out of the question, for the de­
partmental commander was faced squarely with the grave 
task of defending his far-flung territory from invasion. 
32Canby to Adjutant-General, December 14, 1861, 
ibid., 80. 
33canby to Adjutant-General, December 28, 1861, 
ibid., 81. 
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The reported Confederate reinforcement in the 
Mesilla Valley was larger than Canby had expected. Even 
so, his greatest concern was with the safety of Port Wise 
and communication with the East.3^ On January 1, Canby 
advised Governor Gilpin that the large Confederate force 
made it absolutely necessary that the governor send as 
many companies of Colorado volunteers to Ports Wise and 
Garland as possible. If the line of communication with 
the East was cut, Canby and his command would be com-
35 
pletely isolated from any aid coming from that direction. 
Canby at first had doubted that an invasion might 
come by way of the Pecos River. Now he was certain of it. 
He also feared that a cooperating force would move up the 
Canadian River. Canby had heard that the Texans had not 
raised as many men as they had hoped. If this was so, 
the expedition up the Canadian might be suspended tempo­
rarily.^ 
As he was faced with the prospect of invasions 
from several directions, Canby set about devising a plan 
which would best defend his department. The key points 
34Ibid. 
•^Cariby to Gilpin, January 1, 1862, ibid., 82. 
3^Canby to Donaldson, January 3# 1862, ibid., 83.  
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of defense were still Ports Union and Craig. Both of 
those posts were rapidly reinforced. At an intermediary 
point between the two forts, Canby planned to establish 
a large force of regulars. Whichever post was attacked, 
this body would march rapidly to its relief. In addition, 
this strategically located army would serve as the nucleus 
for the concentration of the regulars and volunteers which 
would be drawn from areas which were not threatened at the 
07 
moment by the enemy. Canby estimated that all his 
available troops, about 1,500, could be concentrated at 
the key base within twenty-four hours. The departmental 
commander designated the village of Belen as the best 
intermediary point. If the invasion came from the Pecos, 
the Rio Grande Valley could be reached only by the Abo, 
Manzano, and Galisteo passes. Belen was located above 
the Abo pass and was centrally situated for concentrating 
troops to meet any Confederates marching from the Pecos, 
or coming up the Rio Grande to attack Fort Craig. 
Canby arrived at Belen from Port Craig on January 
11, 1862. He was accompanied by a detachment of 500 men 
consisting of three companies of cavalry, three of 
infantry, a battery of light artillery, and four volunteer 
•^Canby to Paul, January 7, 1862, ibid. 
3®Canby to Adjutant-General, January 11, 1862, 
ibid., 84. 
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Infantry companies. With the force of regulars, Canby 
established his reserve base, Camp Connelly, at Belen. 
The volunteers which had come up with him were to be used 
to keep open communications and to convoy supply trains 
between Camp Connelly and Fort Craig. Canby left Port 
Craig in charge of Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin S. Roberts 
and a garrison of 1,400 men. Roberts had six companies 
of regulars, ten of volunteers, one of spies and guides, 
and two of militia. In addition he had subject to his 
call six companies of volunteers which could join him 
"3Q 
within twenty-four hours. ̂  Canby assumed that this was 
an adequate army to maintain Port Craig if the expected 
invasion came from the Pecos. If it came up the Rio 
Grande, however, all available forces would be rushed 
40 
from Belen. 
Patiently Canby waited to see where the Confeder­
ates would strike. The Union troops at Port Union, Santa 
Pe, Albuquerque, and Camp Connelly were held in constant 
readiness to move in any direction. Troop transportation 
and ten days' supplies were held in reserve to meet any 
2ii 
emergency. Canby advised Governor Connelly that all 
39ibid. 
^°Canby to Paul, January 7, 1862, ibid., 83. 
4lIbid. 
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arms and ammunition should be collected and held for 
instant use by his army. If powder and lead were taken 
from the merchants, receipts should be given. If it was 
used the government would pay for it later. All citizens 
were asked to watch the roads and trails to report the 
coming of enemy scouts, spies, or small parties which 
might endeavor to enter the territory. The governor was 
asked to make arrangements for the calling of any addi­
tional militia units which might be needed. Part of the 
militia would be held in readiness to reinforce Santa Fe 
42 
and Fort Union. Canby sent out scouts and spies to 
watch all the different approaches to the country. In 
this way, he was assured that he would have at least 
43 
several days1 notice of the advance of any enemy army. 
While Canby was feverishly engaged in strengthen­
ing his defenses, new troubles developed. During the 
middle of January, the colonel learned that the army pay­
master had been detained at Fort Leavenworth. As a conse­
quence, no funds would come to New Mexico until spring. 
Canby was greatly alarmed for he feared that if news of 
this leaked out, his volunteer forces would desert and 
42 
Canby to Connelly, January 1, 1862, ibid., 82. 
^30anby to Adjutant-General, January 11, 1862, 
ibid., 84. 
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the people of New Mexico might become even more apathetic 
than they already were. Cariby knew that the Mexicans 
had no affection for the institutions of the United 
States, for they manifested a strong, but restrained, 
hatred toward, the, Americans as a race. Canby was afraid 
that Confederate agents in the territory would seize upon 
the opportunity of this news to arouse the Mexicans to 
rebellion.^ When word of the paymaster's delay reached 
the Mexicans, Canby's fears were fully vindicated. A 
revolt broke out in a volunteer company at Port Union. 
Two hundred miles away at Camp Connelly, two companies of 
the Second Regiment of volunteers mutinied. The first of 
these revolts was quickly suppressed by Colonel Gabriel R. 
Paul. The second was not so easily managed, and about 
thirty of the mutineers escaped and fled to the mountains. 
Only stern measures prevented further outbreaks 
Canby still did not have enough commissioned 
officers for his army. Colonels Paul and Roberts sug­
gested that regular army officers be appointed to head 
volunteer units. Canby declined to do this. His refusal 
was based on the fact that he needed the regular officers 
^Canby to Adjutant-General, January 13# 1862, 
ibid., 84-85. 
^^canby to Adjutant-General, January 20, 1862, 
ibid., 86-87. 
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where they were. Furthermore, and perhaps of more im­
portance, the prejudice of the Mexicans toward the 
Americans was too great. If the field officers were 
chosen altogether from the Americans, it might seriously-
hinder the organization of the volunteers. Canby hoped 
46 
to be able to select outstanding natives for commissions. 
Faced with an imminent invasion, and harried by 
tremendous internal problems, Colonel Canby's mettle was 
put to the test. At this critical moment, the Union 
government was fortunate in having such a capable com­
mander in New Mexico. 
^Cariby to Paul, January 15 (?), 1862, ibid., 85.  
CHAPTER IV 
THE FORMATION OP THE "SIBLEY BRIGADE" 
AND THE MARCH TO NEW MEXICO 
While Baylor was actively engaged in his campaign 
in the Mesilla Valley, Henry Hopkins Sibley, a veteran 
cavalryman, distinguished in appearance with long side 
burns and bushy mustache, was commissioned a brigadier 
general in the army of the Confederacy with instructions 
to raise a brigade and invade the territory of New Mexico"^ 
Sibley was originally from Louisiana. From I838, the date 
of his graduation from the United States Military Academy, 
until his resignation, Sibley had served with distinction 
in the United States army. As a young lieutenant of the 
Second Dragoons, he had taken part in the Seminole wars 
in Florida. Later he fought in the War with Mexico, at­
taining the rank of captain in 1847. Sibley was present 
at the siege of Vera Cruz, the skirmish of Medelin, the 
battles of Cerro Gordo, Contreras, Churubusco, Molino del 
Rey, and the capture of Mexico City. Because of his 
"gallant and meritorious conduct" at Medelin, Sibley 
"^Bancroft, History of Arizona and New Mexico, 688. 
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received a brevet majorcy. He was stationed in Kansas 
during the anti-slavery conflict, and he later took part 
in two Utah expeditions to quell the Mormon disturbances. 
He then marched to New Mexico in i860 to engage in a 
2 campaign against the Navajo Indians. While stationed in 
New Mexico in 1852, Sibley superintended the building of 
Port Union, the post which came to be the most important 
3 
military base in New Mexico when the war broke out. 
Aside from his military exploits, Sibley also achieved 
success as an inventor. He designed the "Sibley tent," 
patterned after the plains Indians' tipis, which was 
4 adopted by the United States Army. 
When the War for Southern Independence broke out, 
Sibley was stationed in New Mexico. He was elevated to 
the rank of major on May 13» 1861, but he resigned the 
day he received his promotion in order to join the Con­
federate army.5 After tendering his resignation, Sibley 
2Theo. P. Rodenbough (comp.), From Everglade to 
Canon with the Second Dragoons (New York, 10/5), 453. 
3william C. Whitford, Colorado Volunteers in the 
Civil War: The New Mexico Campaign in 1U62 (Denver, 
190b;,"55". 
Wilson and Piske (eds.), Appleton's Cyclopaedia, 
v, 521. 
^Rodenbough (comp.), Prom Everglade to Canon, 453. 
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left the territory for the capital of the Confederacy. 
The stage from El Paso to San Antonio ran semiweekly and 
made the journey in six days. While awaiting transpor­
tation facilities at Hart's Mill (near present-day El 
Paso, Texas), Sibley wrote to his former commander, 
Colonel William W. Loring, who was soon also to cast his 
lot with the Confederacy. Jubilantly he stated that at 
last he was "under the glorious banner of the Confederate 
States of America" which "was indeed a glorious sensation 
of protection, hope, and pride." When the Federal troops 
at Fort Bliss withdrew to San Antonio, much public 
property had been left behind. Sibley suggested that 
Loring, as commander of the Department of New Mexico, 
remain at his command a little longer, in order to allow 
the Texas forces which were already on their way, to take 
charge of the property. Should Loring be relieved of his 
command too soon to prevent an attempt on the part of his 
successor to recapture the stores, Sibley advised his 
former commander to send a notice by extraordinary express 
to Judge Simeon Hart, a leading citizen of the area. In 
this same letter Sibley regretted more than ever the 
"sickly sentimentality" which had overruled him in his 
desire to bring his whole command with him. Sibley felt 
assured that the best of the rank and file of the soldiers 
in New Mexico were pro-Southern. By leaving without 
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bringing his troops with him, he felt that he had "betrayed 
and deserted" his men.^ 
Prom Hart's Mill, Sibley proceeded to Richmond, 
Virginia, where on July 5> 1861, he was commissioned a 
brigadier general.^ With such an active and distinctive 
background in the regular army, the newly commissioned 
general gave the Confederacy every reason to expect great 
things of him. 
During his tour of duty in the territory of New 
Mexico, Sibley had acquired a great deal of information 
concerning the resources of the country, the condition of 
the Federal forces, and the amount of government stores 
and supplies there. Upon his arrival in Richmond, Sibley 
informed Jefferson Davis of these matters and submitted to 
Q 
him a plan of campaign. Davis approved of Sibley's bold 
scheme. On July 8, 1861, Samuel Cooper, the adjutant and 
inspector general of the Confederacy, instructed Sibley 
that "in view of. . ,/K±sJ recent service in New Mexico 
^Sibley to Loring, June 12, 1861, 0. R. A., 
IV, 55-56. 
^Wilson and Fiske (eds.), Appleton's Cyclopaedia, 
v, 520. 
^Trevanion T. Teel, "Sibley's New Mexican 
Campaign—Its Objects and the Causes of Its Failure," 
Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, II, 700. 
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and knowledge of that country and the people, the Presi­
dent. . .intrusted. . with the important duty of 
driving the Federal troops from that department, at the 
same time securing all the arms, supplies, and materials 
of war." Sibley was further authorized to take into the 
Confederate service "all disaffected officers and 
soldiers on the original commissions of the former and 
enlistments of the latter." Without delay, Sibley was 
ordered to proceed to Texas where, in concert with 
Brigadier General Earl Van Dorn, he was to organize, "in 
the speediest manner possible, from the Texas troops, two 
full regiments of cavalry and one battery of howitzers, 
and such other forces" as he deemed necessary.^ Later 
Sibley realized that two regiments were not sufficient, 
and he asked the Secretary of War for more. Subsequently, 
Sibley was authorized to accept any additional armed 
10 
regiments which the governor of Texas might tender to him. 
As far as possible, Van Dorn was to supply from the depots 
under his command the materiel for the armament and equip-
11 
ment of Sibley's brigade. If Sibley was successful in 
^cooper to Sibley, July 8, 1861, 0. R. A., IV, 93. 
10Chilton to Sibley, September 25# 1861, ibid., 111. 
11Cooper to Van Dorn, July 9, 1861, ibid., 93. 
his effort to drive the Federal forces from New Mexico, 
President Davis instructed him to organize a military 
government within the territory. The details of such a 
government were to be submitted to Davis at the earliest 
possible time. Sibley's instructions were of a general 
nature, for it was not considered necessary to confine 
him to minor matters which might arise from time to time. 
In this respect he was to be guided by circumstances and 
12 
his own good Judgment. In other words, Sibley was 
practically allowed a free hand in the conduct of his 
New Mexican campaign. 
The distant and relatively unimportant territory 
of New Mexico was not the main objective of this campaign-
far from it. It was merely a means to attaining the real 
aim, the conquest of California.^ Not only would the 
gold supply from the West, which was valued by the North 
as a source from which to pay for the prosecution of the 
war,"1*^ be diverted from Washington to Richmond, but the 
South would also gain two good seaports on the Pacific 
coast. The remoteness of this coast would have made it 
•^Cooper to Sibley, July 8, 1861, ibid. 
^•^Teel, "Sibley's New Mexican Campaign," loc. 
cit., 700. 
1^Carleton to Thomas, September 13, 1863, 
Condition of the Indian Tribes. Report of the Joint 
Special Committee, Appointed Under Joint Resolution of 
March 3, 1865 (1867), 136. 
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impossible for the Union navy to have blockaded it.^5 
Thus the South would have been assured of a steady flow 
of supplies from the West.1^ The factor of prestige in 
the conquering of the West might also have been an aid in 
the recognition of the Confederacy by a foreign power. 
Although the Department of Texas was to supply the 
men and some of the necessary equipment and materiel, 
Sibley's campaign, in the main, was to be self-sustaining. 
Upon arrival in Arizona the brigade was to be furnished 
with the arms and equipment out of the supplies already 
captured by Baylor and by any additional materiel which 
17 
might be captured in the course of the campaign. Indeed, 
Sibley counted on a rapid conquest of New Mexico's forts 
and depots of supplies, so that his army could subsist "on 
18 
the enemy's country." Poodstuffs were to be procured from 
the Mesilla Valley and the Rio Grande Valley in and around 
El Paso. Negotiations for further supplies, particularly 
^Latham Anderson, "Canby's Services in the New 
Mexican Campaign," Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, 
II, 697-98. 
•^Teel, "Sibley's New Mexican Campaign," loc. 
cit., 700. 
17Ibid. 
•^Theo. Noel, A Campaign From Santa Pe to the 
Mississippi (ShreveporF, IO05), lTI 
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commissary items, were to be opened with the governors 
of the states of Chihuahua and Sonora.^ 
Many factors made Sibley confident of victory. 
Baylor's short campaign in the Mesilla Valley had 
cleared the way for an invasion to the north. Sibley, 
viewing the Federal forces in New Mexico as insufficient 
and inefficient, consequently thought that they would 
90 
easily fall before the might of his brigade. There 
seems to have been a belief among the Texans that the 
Mexican population of New Mexico and Arizona might come to 
their aid, or at least not hinder their efforts. Friends 
of the cause reported that the Mexicans could be depended 
21 
upon for supplies because they were completely controlled 
by Anglo-Americans, most of whom in the El Paso area were 
Southern sympathizers.22 It was also assumed that since 
New Mexico was commercially dependent upon states of 
^Teel, "Sibley's New Mexican Campaign," loc. 
cit., 700. 
20Noel, A Campaign, 14. 
21A. A. Hayes, Jr., New Colorado and the Santa 
Fe Trail (New York, 1880), 162. 
22Mills, Forty Years at El Paso, 38-39• 
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Southern sympathies, especially Missouri and Texas, the 
23 
people would support the Confederacy. In addition, the 
territory of New Mexico had a slave code, Congressional 
Delegate Miguel Otero was a secession advocate, and three 
newspapers in the territory (the Santa Fe Gazette, the 
Tucson Arizonian, and the Mesilla Times) were pro-Southern. 
This assured Sibley and the Texans that New Mexico was pro-
Confederate in its leanings and consequently might be 
24 
expected to aid a Confederate invasion. 
Sibley assumed that once the territory of New 
Mexico was conquered and pacified, many men from the West 
would flock to his banner.2-* A large number of the people 
26 
in the territory of Colorado possessed Southern sympathies, 
while the Mormons of Utah were known to have no love for 
the Union, particularly after the two military campaigns 
waged against them.2? General Edwin V. Sumner, the Union 
2^canby to Assistant Adjutant-General, June 11, 
1861, 0. R. A., I, 6o6. 
2^charles S. Walker, "Causes of the Confederate 
Invasion of New Mexico," New Mexico Historical Review, 
VIII (April, 1933), 88. 
25Teel, "Sibley's New Mexican Campaign," loc. 
clt., 700. 
26whitford, Colorado Volunteers, 36. 
2?Hubert H. Bancroft, History of Utah, 1540-1886 
(San Francisco, I889), 538. 
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commander in California, estimated that there were twenty-
thousand Southern sympathizers in his state, and that if 
the South "should ever get an organized force into this 
State, as a rallying point for all the secession element, 
it would inevitably inaugurate a civil war here immedi­
ately."2® With such favorable developments on the 
horizon, Sibley confidently planned that as soon as New 
Mexico was occupied an army of advance would be organized, 
29 
and "On to San Francisco" would be the watchword. 
Sibley left Richmond and arrived in San Antonio, 
Texas, in the middle of August, 1861. Setting up his 
headquarters in San Antonio, he was fully confident that 
he would be able to raise and organize his brigade within 
a short time. Many unexpected difficulties arose, how­
ever, which shattered his dreams of rapidly getting his 
command into the field. The new general was disappointed 
in not receiving as much cooperation from Governor Edward 
Clark as he desired. This was not due to any lack of 
zeal on the part of the governor. It was but a "conse­
quence simply of the very inefficient system of the State 
military organization to which the governor had recourse 
2®Sumner to Townsend, September 7, 1861, 0. R. A., 
L, i, 610. 
29Teel, "Sibley's New Mexican Campaign," loc. 
cit., 700. 
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to supply the troops." Governor Clark ordered a suf­
ficient number of companies, which had reported to him 
as organized, to report to Sibley for duty. Most of 
these units which were called to the colors unfortunately 
proved to be either entirely disbanded or so reduced in 
numbers that they did not meet the minimum set for the 
Confederate service. Reliance on this method of raising 
troops caused the first serious delay. A further cause 
of retardation was the idea, prevalent throughout the 
state, that the "Sibley Brigade" would be filled only 
with the companies ordered out by the governor. Conse­
quently, other companies not so organized did not offer 
their services to the general. As a result, Sibley was 
Qf) 
forced to appeal directly to the public, particularly 
31 
through the medium of the piatriotic press, for recruits. 
Even so it required some time to counteract the effects 
of the "misplaced reliance" upon the State system. Com­
petition for men which grew out of the calls for the 
several regiments required for service east of the 
Mississippi was another cause of delay in filling the 
3°Sibley to Cooper, November 16, 1861, 0. R. A., 
IV, 141-142. - - -
^Noel, A Campaign, 5-6. 
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ranks.32 Apparently a good many men of Texas preferred 
glory east of the Mississippi rather than in the desolate 
and barren waste lands of Arizona and New Mexico. 
Recruiting was but one problem Sibley faced. 
Because the people of Texas expected an attack on the gulf 
coast, officials were exceeding reluctant to allow war 
materiel to be removed from the state.33 Although many 
34 
recruits in the "Sibley Brigade" brought their own weapons, 
every company reported itself short of arms. "In virtue 
of the authority delegated to. . ./Elm/ in the written 
instructions of his excellency the President," Sibley 
found it necessary to attempt to buy serviceable firearms 
and to construct lances. Since there was not a dollar in 
the hands of any of his disbursing officers, the general 
resorted to the credit of the Confederate government for 
these purchases.35 
According to orders, General Earl Van Dorn, as 
commander of the Department of Texas, was to have supplied 
32Sibley to Cooper, November 16, 1861, 0. R. A., 
IV, 141-142. - - -
33Ibid., 142. 
3ihceleher, Turmoil in New Mexico, 161. 
35sibley to Cooper, November 16, 1861, 0. R. A., 
IV, 142. ~ 
Sibley with as much materiel of war as possible. Soon 
after Sibley's arrival, Van Dorn was relieved from duty, 
and Colonel Henry E. McCulloch temporarily assumed his 
office. General P. 0. Hebert was appointed the new 
departmental commander, but he did not immediately come 
to headquarters to assume command. Shortly McCulloch and 
Major Sackfield Maclin, the assistant quartermaster and 
acting ordnance officer of the department, left to meet 
General Hebert at Galveston. For several weeks there was 
not an officer within Sibley's reach to whom he could 
apply for the issuance of ordnance supplies. Paced with 
this new frustration, Sibley assumed the responsibility 
of ordering the remaining subordinates to issue supplies 
which were indispensable to the brigade and which could 
be spared from the service of the department itself. 
Although Sibley had obviously overstepped his authority, 
he justified his action on the grounds that to have 
awaited the return of a responsible officer would have 
Incurred another indefinite delay "which would have 
probably paralyzed" his command for the winter. 
Sibley's anxiety to get his command on the march 
was greatly increased by the arrival of a dispatch from 
or 




force of 2,500 men, was on the march for Dona Ana. 
Earlier Sibley had advised Baylor to make a demonstration 
against Fort Craig in order to draw the Federals out to 
attack his smaller force. With the Federals lured from 
the security of their strong point and with the expected 
timely arrival of his troops, Sibley planned to destroy 
oQ 
or capture the enemy. The delays which Sibley had en­
countered, however, threatened to make his plan backfire. 
It might mean the destruction of Baylor's small force, as 
well as the loss of territory which Baylor had already 
gained for the Confederacy. 
The first company to join Sibley was raised in 
Guadalupe and Caldwell counties and was commanded by 
William P. Hardeman. On August 27, 1861, this unit, 
along with all others in the "Sibley Brigade," was sworn 
into service "for during the war." It was designated 
Company A of the Fourth Texas Cavalry Regiment. By 
September 20, the full complement of companies had been 
mustered into service. The Fourth Regiment was organized 
without the privilege of allowing the men to elect their 
field officers. Shortly after its organization, which 
37;Baylor to Sibley, October 25, 1861, ibid., 132. 
38sibley to Cooper, November 8, 1861, ibid. 
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was effected at the camp first established by Captain 
Hardeman on Leon Creek, the regiment was moved to Camp 
Sibley on Salado Creek, five miles from San Antonio on 
the Austin roadcolonel James Reily, originally from 
Ohio,^® who was the "beau ideal of a gentleman and of­
ficer" and "the very counterpart in looks and actions of 
Robert E. Lee,"^'1' commanded the Fourth Texas Cavalry. 
Regimental officers included: 
William R. Scurry, lieutenant colonel 
Henry W. Ragnet,42 major 
Ellsberry R. Lane, adjutant 
H. E. Loebnitz, assistant quartermaster 
John Riley, assistant commissary 
J. B. McMahon, sergeant major 
William Southworth, surgeon 
L. H. Jones, chaplain^3 
Colonel Thomas Green began organizing the Fifth 
Texas Cavalry Regiment at Camp Manassas on Salado Creek 
^Noel, A Campaign, 6-7. 
^9Denison to Chase, May, 1862, S. H. Dodson 
(comp.), "Diary and Correspondence of Salmon P. Chase," 
Annual Report of the American Historical Association for 
the Year 19(52" "(Washington, 1903)* II# 301. 
^Theophilus Noel, Autobiography and Reminiscences 
of Theophilus Noel (Chicago, 1904)7 69. 
^20ther sources spell this name Raguet. The 
0. R. A. version will be used throughout this paper. 
^3Noel, A Campaign, 147-148. 
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ith 
two miles above the camp of the Fourth Regiment. 
"Daddy" Green, a.a the colonel was affectionately called, 
"was a very fine specimen of the Southern planter." 
Never was a "commander. . .more beloved than he by 'his 
boys'." Green was born in Virginia in 1814, but his 
family later moved to Tennessee. In January, 1836, at 
the age of 21, Green entered the ranks of the revolution­
ary army in Texas and fought his first battle at San 
Jacinto. In 1841 he was engaged in skirmishes and expe­
ditions against the Indians, and he served with great 
distinction in the forces of the Republic of Texas during 
the Mexican invasion of the frontier in 1842. In the War 
with Mexico he fought gallantly in the battle of Monterrey 
and his daring aggressiveness in that encounter won for 
him commendation as a soldier and a leader. After the 
war, until 1861, he was employed in the office of clerk 
of the Supreme Court of Texas. D Other important men of 
the Fifth Texas Cavalry were: 
^Ibid., 6. 
H. Williams, With the Border Ruffians, 
Memories of the Far West, 1B52-T85» (Toronto, 1^19), 179. 
^Clement A. Evans (ed.), Confederate Military 
History (Atlanta, 1899) XI, 231-232; Robert F. Kroh, Tom 
Green: Shield and Buckler (M. A. Thesis, University of 
Texas, 1951)• 
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Henry C. McNeill, lieutenant colonel 
Samuel A. Lockridge, major 
Joseph D. Sayers, adjutant 
M. B. Wyatt, assistant quartermaster 
J. H. Beck, assistant commissary 
Charles B. Sheppard. sergeant major 
F. Bracht, surgeon^' 
On October 4, 1861, Captain Powhatan Jordan's 
company was mustered in as Company A of the Seventh Texas 
48 
Cavalry under Colonel William Steele. Steele was born 
in Albany, New York, and had graduated from the United 
States Military Academy in 1840. Like Sibley, he had 
served with the Second Dragoons in Florida. During the 
Mexican War he earned the brevet of captain for his 
bravery in the battles of Contreras and Churubusco. Later 
he was stationed in New Mexico, Kansas, Dakota, and 
Nebraska where he was engaged in various expeditions 
against the Indians. He resigned his commission in the 
United States Army in May, 1861, to join the Confederate 
49 
Army. Steele set up Camp Pickett, several miles above 
the Fifth, on Salado Creek for the training of his Seventh 
Cavalry Regimental personnel included: 
^Noel, A Campaign, 148. 
48tv^ 7 Ibid., * 
^Evans (ed.), Confederate Military History, 
XI, 257-258. 
-*°Noel, A Campaign, 11. 
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51 
John S. Sutton, lieutenant colonel-' 
Arthur P. Bagby, major 
T. C. Howard, adjutant 
W. L. Ogden, assistant quartermaster 
A. R. Lee, assistant commissary 
J. M. Ferguson, sergeant major 
George Cupples, surgeon52 
With the formation of the three cavalry regiments, 
the "Sibley Brigade" formally came into being. The follow­
ing officers composed the staff: 
Brigadier General Henry H. Sibley, commanding 
officer 
Major Alexander M. Jackson, assistant adjutant 
general 
Major Richard T. Brownrigg, chief commissary 
Major W. L. Robards, chief of ordnance 
Captain William H. Harrison, paymaster and chief 
quartermaster 
Captain Joseph E. Dwyer, inspector general 
Lieutenant Thomas P. Ochiltree, aide-de-camp 
Surgeon E. N. Covey, chief surgeon and medical 
director53 
The rolling hills about San Antonio echoed with 
shouts and commands as the eager recruits were trained and 
instructed in the art of war. The training program called 
for drilling as infantry in the morning and as cavalry in 
the evening. The troops "had roll calls by morning and by 
^•""Sutton had been on the ill-fated Texan-Santa Pe 
Expedition. Ibid., 122. 
52lbid., 147. 
lbId. The Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Regiments 
Texas Cavalry (or Volunteers) were often referred to, 
respectively, as the First, Second, and Third Regiments of 
the "Sibley Brigade." 
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night, as also tattoo and reveille according to the forms 
prescribed on page 2299 of the revised edition of the 
military statutes." To make certain that each regiment 
was thoroughly drilled on the most improved tactics, 
Winfield Scott's Infantry-Tactics and W. J. Hardee's 
Rifle and Light Infantry Tactics were consulted on all 
occasions.^ The articles of war were read to the men,"^ 
and the strictest guard and discipline were maintained.^ 
Within a short time, Sibley's troopers were being whipped 
into fighting form. 
The brigade was armed with practically every type 
of small arm in existence. There were "squirrel-guns, 
bear guns, sportman's-guns, shot-guns, both single and 
double barrels, navy revolvers, minie muskets and 
common rifles.''® Pew armies probably have ever had a 
^ Ibid., 7-8; Winfield Scott, Infantry-Tactics 
(New York, lb54); W. J. Hardee, Rifle and Light Infantry 
Tactics, 2 vols. (Philadelphia, 1555)• 
-^Walter A. Faulkner (contrib.), "With Sibley in 
New Mexico; The Journal of William Henry Smith," West 
Texas Historical Association Year Book, XXVII (October, 
T95iT/Trs: 
5^Noel, A Campaign, 7-8. 
57Ibid., 8. 
5%>enison to Chase, May, 1862, Dodson (comp.), 
"Diary and Correspondence of Salmon P. Chase," loc. cit., 
301. 
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more motley collection of weapons. In addition to the 
small arms, one battery of mountain howitzers was attached 
to the Fourth Regiment and another to the Fifth. Green's 
Fifth Regiment had two companies, commanded by Captains 
Willis L. Lang and Jerome B. McCown, which were armed 
with lances and six shooters.^9 The picturesque lancers, 
who were Sibley's pride and joy, bore weapons that con­
sisted of three-by-twelve-inch blades mounted on nine-
foot shafts^0 that also boasted eight-by-seventeen-inch 
red flags. 
Recruited largely from frontier areas, Sibley's 
men were the flower of Texas youth—"the best that ever 
threw a leg over a horse or that had ever sworn allegiance 
to any cause. All-around men, natural-born soldiers, they 
were under twenty-five, with a liberal sprinkling of older 
ones who had seen more or less service on the frontier." 
As the Mesllla Times later expressed it: 
59 
Noel, A Campaign, 11; Evans (ed.), Confederate 
Military History? XI, 15®. 
6°0vando j. Hollister, A History of the First 
Colorado Regiment of VoIunteers""(Denver, 1853) • Reprinted 
as Boldly Tney Rode (Golden, 1949)* 110. 
^Noel, A Campaign, 11. 
^2Noel, Autob iography, 57. 
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The Confederate "Army of New Mexico" is composed 
of what is probably the best material for an army 
that the world affords. That distinct type of man­
kind, the south-western frontiersman, inured to all 
hardships, of indominable energy, familiar with the 
use of fire-arms, at home on horse-back, and fired 
with the love of country and for the redress of 
wrongs. There is no conflict which they would not 
undertake, and none can occur on these lines in which 
they will not be perfectly successful.°3 
On October 21, 1861, a brigade review was held, 
with Sibley's daughter presenting a battle flag to a 
fill 
company of lancers. By the end of October Sibley had 
completed the recruiting and training of his brigade. He 
now felt that he was ready to begin the campaign in New 
65 
Mexico. Shortly the men were issued a full military 
uniform which included a haversack, pants, drawers, 
66 
pantaloon boots, and a broadcloth coat with brass buttons. 
The time had come to take up the seven-hundred-mile march 
to Port Bliss. 
^^Mesilla Times, January 15* 1862 (Microfilm 
courtesy of the New York Historical Society, New York 
City). 
^Faulkner (contrlb.), "With Sibley in New 
Mexico," loc. cit., 114. 
^Sibley to Cooper, November 16, 1861, 0. R. A., 
IV, 143. - - -
66paulkner (contrib.), "With Sibley in New 
Mexico," loc. cit., 114. 
One of Sibley's Texas Rangers 
From a sketch drawn by one of Colonel Canby's 
subalterns. Benson J. Lossing, Pictorial 
History of the Civil War in the United 
States -of America ("Philadelphia, 1866-1868) , 
II, 187. 
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On November 7 >  1861, "at the usual hour in the 
morning, 'hoots and saddles1 was sounded." The baggage 
had been weighed the day before (fifteen pounds to each 
man), and the wagons had been loaded. All was in readi­
ness. Fifteen minutes later "assembly" was heard, and in 
a short time the men of Reily's Fourth Regiment were in 
their saddles and ready to take up the line of march. 
After forming the regiment in a solid square so all could 
hear, Reily addressed his men. He told them that they 
were on the eve of leaving a land that many of them might 
never see again. On this day they would "bid adieu to 
all friends, home, and happy firesides, to try. . . 
/Ehelr/ fortunes in the field in the defense of. . . 
^Eheir/ country's honor." He declared that they were 
soldiers together, and that a people, who in after years 
would prove grateful to them for their acts, expected much 
from them. After closing his remarks, he removed his hat 
and requested all to do likewise. Then in a "solemn, 
pious, and fervent tone, he offered up to the High God, 
in the behalf of the cause, of those under him, of those 
around him, and for himself," a most eloquent prayer. 
"Everyone was moved to tears and solemn thoughts. 
^Noel, A Campaign, 8-10. 
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In a few moments came the command, "By fours from 
the right, march 111 And the Fourth Texas Cavalry proudly 
marched from Camp Sibley into San Antonio to the stirring 
strains of "The Texas Ranger." The men were again formed 
into a solid column in the main plaza of the city. At 
this time a flag was presented to the regiment "in the 
name and in behalf of the ladies of Nacogdoches." Reily 
again addressed his men, and then General Sibley, astride 
his horse, came forward to speak. "In a few 'unguarded 
remarks111 the old general "convinced all that he was no 
orator; yet in his speech, which was short, he displayed 
a great deal of originality and much determination." He 
informed the men of the regiment that they were still 
"green, green saplings; bending to discipline," but that 
they would make the best soldiers in the world and he 
was proud of them. He told the troopers that they would 
precede him but a few days and that he did not fear the 
result of the campaign with such men to follow him as 
were those whom he had the honor to address and the honor 
to command. After bidding the regiment "adieu," three 
ftPi 
rousing cheers were given for Sibley, and the soldiers 
started on the road to Port Bliss. "With drums beating 
68Ibid., 9-10 
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and flags flying," the gallant force marched away. 
"Every man, from the General downwards, /was/ confident 
of victory. 
The main road to Port Bliss, consisting of about 
700 miles of wagon ruts, passed through vast, rolling 
plains, bleak and inhospitable deserts, and rugged 
mountains. Most of this route lay within the realm of 
70 
hostile Indian tribes.' Since water was too scarce at 
many places for a whole regiment to travel together, the 
Fourth was divided into three sections.^ Aside from 
the wagons which carried materiel of war, two wagons were 
allotted to each company to carry the men's baggage. An 
additional wagon was given to each company for the use of 
the officers. Daily travel would be limited by the miles 
the beeves could be driven and by the distance between 
water holes.72 
On November 9, Captain William P. Hardeman led 
the first division of the Fourth Regiment on the line of 
^Williams, With the Border Ruffians, 201. 
^°Noe1, A Campaign, 10. 
71Ibld. 
^Reminiscences of H. C. Wright (MS., University 
of Texas Library). 
ruraftlMltuUir 
IH'W-M" tW TOt'OCJCUU' KM."' iM^l l«nllilaiT |>wfMn 
utr»7 mlnw 
— Route of the "Sibley Brigade" 
Atlas to Accompany the Official Records of the Union 
and Confederate Armies, I, plate XIV. 
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march. The next day Lieutenant Colonel William R. Scurry 
started out with his section, and on the eleventh Colonel 
Reily himself brought up the rear detachment. The regi­
ment traveled in this manner until San Felipe Springs was 
reached. At that point Major Henry W. Ragnet arrived and 
took command of Hardeman's division.^ As the Fourth 
passed by Fort Clark, an express from Colonel Baylor to 
brigade headquarters in San Antonio was received. The 
governor of Arizona urgently requested reinforcements. 
When Reily learned of the contents of the dispatch, he 
ordered the divisions of his regiment to set off on 
7l± 
"double quick time." 
On November 1, Green's Fifth Regiment left Camp 
Manassas. As the troops passed through San Antonio, the 
ladies of the city waved their white handkerchiefs "the 
same as to say brave boys victory awaits you." Baylor's 
urgent express arrived in San Antonio, and these troops 
were also ordered on a forced march to Fort Bliss. As 
the regiment proceeded from San Antonio, General Sibley 
reviewed the men from his carriage on a hill a short 
distance away. "The whole regiment shouldered arms and 
73 
Noel, A Campaign, 10. 
7li 
' Heartsill, Fourteen Hmdred and 9 1  Days, 47. 
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marched by in regular order," whereupon "the old General 
pulled off his hand and gave them a general salute."75 
That night the Fifth camped on the prairie near 
Castroville. The following day as the troops passed 
through the town of D'Hanis, the old Mexican women ran to 
the road with their butter, eggs, chickens, watermelons, 
but none of the soldiers bought anything. As the command 
advanced into Uvalde county, the men of Captain Isaac G. 
Killough's company were detailed as ammunition guards. 
They were ordered to load their guns and be on a 
constant lookout. This was Indian country and would 
continue to be, almost to the very limits of Port Bliss. 
On November 17 a private struck Captain Killough. The 
soldier was immediately courtmartialed and condemned to 
"be chained hard and fast" to the baggage wagon for the 
duration of a month.^ As the regiment passed by Port 
Clark, a large number of sick men were left in the hospi­
tal there.77 port Clark was situated near the source 
^Faulkner (contrib.), "With Sibley in New 
Mexico," loc. cit., 115-116. 
76 lb id. 
77Heartsill, Fourteen Hundred and 91 Days, 47. 
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of Las Moras Creek about thirty miles north of the Rio 
Grande. 
Green's men had been marching in a body until 
they reached San Felipe Springs. From that point on to 
79 
Fort Bliss, the regiment was marched in three divisions. 
At San Felipe Springs a general courtmartial was held for 
three men who had been found sleeping while on sentry 
duty. Each man was condemned to close confinement on 
bread and water for ten days, but the sentences were later 
remitted.®0 
On November 24, while encamped on Yellowstone 
Creek in Maverick County, Major Samuel A. Lockridge, com­
manding the first squadron, had the misfortune of losing 
all of his beef cattle and work steers. The following 
day, the squadron arrived at Fort Hudson, and on 
^ The post was established in 1852 to protect the 
southwestern frontier, particularly the road to California, 
from the depredations of Mexicans and Indians. Federal 
troops abandoned the fort on March 19, 1861. T. H. S. 
Hamersly (comp.), Complete Army Register of the United 
States: For One Hundred Years, 1YV9 to"1879" (Washington, 
lbbl), II, 12bj Circular No. 4, A Report on Barracks and 
Hospitals with Descriptions oT Military Posts, War Depart­
ment, Surgeon General's Office (Washington, 1870), 203; 
Summary of Principal Events, 0. R. A., I, 502. 
^Noel, A Campaign, 11. 
®°Faulkner (contrib.), "With Sibley in New 
Mexico,11 loc. cit., 117. 
December 1, the division reached Fort Lancaster, a 
distance of about 333 miles from San Antonio.®1 Port 
Lancaster, another in the line of frontier posts, was 
situated about a half mile above the junction of Live 
82 
Oak Creek with the Pecos River. Six days later the 
squadron marched by Port Stockton,^ a post established 
84 
in 1859 on Comanche Creek and Comanche Trail on the 
main road across a vast dry and barren prairie. Since 
the springs and creek had been a favorite haunt of the 
Comanche Indians, the fort was founded to guard the mail 
route from San Antonio to El Paso and to form a link in 
the chain of forts needed to protect emigrants and 
85 
merchandise going to Chihuahua and California. Pass­
ing through the rugged Limpia Mountains, a squadron of 
8b 
the Fifth on December 16, reached Fort Davis which was 
8lIbid., 117-119. 
82pirst garrisoned in 1855, Fort Lancaster was 
evacuated by Federal forces on March 19# 1861. Hamersly, 
Complete Army Register, II, 140; Summary of Principal 
Events, 0. R. A.7 X# 502. 
®3paulkner (contrib.), "With Sibley in New 
Mexico," loc. cit., 120. 
®^Hamersly, Complete Army Register, II, 155. 
^Circular No. 4, 223. In April, 1861, the 
Federal garrison abandoned Fort Stockton. Summary of 
Principal Events, 0. R. A., I, 502. 
^Faulkner (contrib.), "With Sibley in New 
Mexico," loc. cit., 120-121. 
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at the mouth of a three-quarter mile long canyon. Port 
Davis, named in honor of the former Secretary of War, 
Jefferson Davis,^ was established in 1854 on Limpia 
OQ 
Creek, 446 miles from San Antonio and about 72 miles 
southwest of Fort Stockton.The site was chosen be­
cause of its location on the road between San Antonio 
and El Paso, its fine climate, its defensibility, its 
position relative to marauding Indians, and its proximity 
to Presidio del Norte which it also served to protect.9° 
Since Fort Davis was situated in a mountain fastness, a 
guide was obtained to help lead the divisions of the 
regiment through the mountain passes. The command 
traveled over "natures beautiful valleys," and many saw 
their first mustangs.^1 
^Circular No. 4, 227-228. 
^Hamersly, Complete Army Register, II, 152. 
^Faulkner, (contrib.), "With Sibley in New 
Mexico," loc. cit., 120. 
9°Circular No. 4, 227-228. Troops of the U. S. 
Eighth Infantry abandoned the post on April 13, 1861. 
Summary of Principal Events, 0. R. A., I, 502. 
^Faulkner (contrib.), "With Sibley in New 
Mexico," loc. cit., 121. 
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On Christmas day the troops of the squadron ate 
a breakfast consisting of biscuits, coffee, and poor 
beef—hardly a banquet worthy of the yuletide season. 
The same day the men marched a distance of fifteen miles. 
Arriving at Port Quitman, about eighty miles southeast of 
El Paso, the troops stood "upon the Rio Grande and 
looked/ upon the dividing line between the Confederate 
92 
States of America and the United States of Mexico." The 
post lay on a gradual slope to the Rio Grande which was 
about four hundred yards west of the fort. At this 
place hay was obtained for the regiment's horses. While 
there the men of the squadron were read the articles of 
war. Since Mexico was so near, a strong guard had to be 
maintained constantly. "All along the Rio Grande Valley, 
the water from the river. . ,/yias/ very unhealthy for 
horses, . . .^/and gave/ them the scours." On New Year's 
Day the breakfast was not much better than that of 
Christmas: beef, biscuits, curshaw, and coffee without 
sugar. On this same morning, Colonel Green's negro stole 
92 
Ibid., 122. Fort Quitman was established in 
1858. The Federal garrison left the post on April 5* 
1861. Hamersly, Complete Army Register, II, 150; Summary 
of Principal Events, £. k. A., I, 502. 
^Circular NO. 4, 230-231. 
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his horse and apparently fled across the Rio Grande to 
Mexico. The adjutant and several troops, after obtaining 
a pass from the local alcalde, went into Mexico to look 
for the thief, but the negro was not to be found.^ 
At last the three divisions of the Fifth arrived 
QK 
at Fort Bliss where they were reunited.^ Making from 
fifteen to twenty miles a day, the arduous forced march 
of 700 miles from San Antonio to Fort Bliss had taken the 
Fifth Regiment Texas cavalry a little less than two months. 
* * * * *  
While the brigade was being formed and trained, 
Sibley engaged Judge Josiah F. Crosby and Simeon Hart, two 
prominent citizens of the Franklin area, to secure sup-
q6 
plies for his command. Thoroughly familiar with the 
inhospitable area of New Mexico, Sibley was aware that his 
army could not expect to live solely off the land. Since 
his closest base of supply would be San Antonio the 
general's only hope of keeping his brigade succored with 
food was to seize such provisions from Federal quarter­
master depots in New Mexico, and to have agents, such as 
9^Faulkner (contrib.), "With Sibley in New 
Mexico," loc. cit., 122-123. 
95Noel, A Campaign, 11. 
96sibley to Cooper, November 8, 1861, 0. R. A., 
IV, 132. ~ ~ ~ 
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Hart and Crosby, buy up some of the necessary supplies in 
Chihuahua and Sonora. Failure to secure adequate food­
stuffs, of course, would be disastrous. 
Late in October Judge Crosby notified Sibley that 
he had employed a contractor to proceed to Mexico at once 
to buy up corn, beans, and other foodstuffs for the 
brigade's use. As there was still the threat of a Federal 
advance from Fort Craig, Crosby stated that none of the 
supplies purchased would be brought over to the American 
side of the Rio Grande until such time as they would be 
97 
safe from the enemy. 
Simeon Hart, owner of a flour mill near Franklin, 
also rapidly took steps to secure adequate provisions. 
Hart pointed out that the greater part of these food­
stuffs would have to come from Sonora, since there was a 
great scarcity of such items in Chihuahua at that time. 
Hart purchased in Sonora 10,000 pounds of corn and 
300,000 pounds of flour for Sibley. To facilitate 
matters, he sent for his Sonoran agent to discuss the 
situation. It was arranged that with a proper escort 
from Colonel Baylor, this agent, with some thirty to 
forty wagons, would begin hauling provisions from the 
Sonoran border to the Rio Grande. It was hoped that the 
^Crosby to Sibley, October 27> 1861, ibid., 133. 
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first wagonloads of supplies would arrive around the 
middle of December. In the meantime, Hart assured Sibley 
that his mills would continue to turn out flour for his 
brigade from the limited amount of grain that was avail­
able in the Rio Grande valley. Hart surmised that he now 
had from 40,000 to 50,000 pounds of flour and would have 
about that much more if the Federals did not force Baylor 
to fall back beyond Franklin. As suggested by Baylor, 
what flour was already available was placed in the safety 
of El Paso, Mexico. Since the supplies from Mexico had to 
be paid for in cash, Hart advised Sibley that it was quite 
important that the general supply cash funds. Although he 
now had about $40,000 to $50,000, Hart pointed out that 
almost all of this had to go immediately to Sonora to pay 
98 
for supplies already purchased. 
At this time there was a rumor prevalent that 
General Edwin V. Sumner, commanding in California, was 
planning to send an expeditionary force across Sonora and 
Chihuahua to attack Baylor's Confederates. To check the 
authenticity of this story, Baylor suggested that Hart 
send an express rider to Sonora. In an effort to kill two 
birds with one stone, Hart instructed this express not 
only to check the validity of the rumor, but also to buy 
98Hart to Sibley, October 27, 1861, ibid., 134. 
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up flour, beans, salt, beef, soap, corn, and other neces­
sary items. In a most reassuring manner, Hart concluded 
his report to Sibley by stating, "Be easy about your 
supplies; we shall get all we want from Sonora—what this 
valley cannot furnish—until such time as you may be in 
full possession of New Mexico, and can avail of its re­
sources or such part as the hungry Federals may leave for 
your command."" 
* * * * *  
With assurances of adequate provisions and with 
two regiments already on the road to Fort Bliss, Sibley 
decided that the time had come to "move with. . .^is7 
headquarters to assume in person the command of. . .^Tis/ 
forces in the Territory of Arizona, and to conduct the 
military operations there and in New Mexico." On 
November 18, Sibley left San Antonio"*"00 traveling by 
coach. He could make the journey to Fort Bliss in a 
fraction of the time that his regiments could, encumbered 
as they were by large numbers and slow-moving baggage 
wagons. At Fort Lancaster the lieutenant commanding that 
post ordered his company to appear in uniform, armed and 
"ibid. 
100Sibley to Cooper, November 16, 1861, ibid., 141. 
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mounted, to escort Sibley and to pay him full general's 
honors. When Sibley arrived, he took charge of the 
company to see how well it was drilled. The sergeant 
was on the right, marking by two's. "The command was 
given by the Gen'l, 'file left,1 which was of course un­
heard, and on they went at a brisk trot,11 ascending a 
near-by mountain. As they disappeared the General turned 
around mettering "gone to hell." In the evening the 
company returned, and "found that the General had gone 
on his way rejoicing to New Mexico."101 
Five companies (A, B, F, H, I) of Steele's Seventh 
Texas Cavalry took leave of San Antonio on November 30. 
Pour (C, D, E, G) left on December 15 under the command 
of Colonel Steele and Major Bagby and Company K remained 
in San Antonio to escort Captain William H. Harrison, the 
brigade paymaster. On January 6, Company E was detained 
at Port Clark because measles had broken out in that unit 
after it had begun its march. Fortunately the disease 
1 C)0 
did not spread, only fifteen men being lost. c 
On December 14, 1861, General Sibley assumed 
"command of all the forces of the Confederate States on 
101Heartsill, Fourteen Hundred and 91 Days, 49. 
102Noel, A Campaign, 11. 
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the Rio Grande at and above Fort Quitman and all in the 
Territory of New Mexico and Arizona."103 The troops 
under Sibley were designated as the "Army of New Mexico" 
104 
with headquarters temporarily fixed at Port Bliss, Texas. 
The "Army of New Mexico" not only included the original 
brigade but also Colonel Baylor's portion of the Second 
Regiment Mounted Rifles, now commanded by Major Charles L. 
Pyron, and Hunter's and Phillips' battalions of Arizona 
and New Mexico volunteers ,-1-05 Although Sibley had de­
clared martial lav/ throughout the area under his control, 
he did not intend "to abrogate or supersede the powers of 
Colonel John R. Baylor." To be sure, Sibley had taken 
charge of all troops, but Baylor was still to continue to 
exercise the functions of the office of civil and military 
1 
governor of the territory of Arizona." 
1C3 
.Sibley's assumption of command of that part of 
Texas "at and above Port Quitman" conflicted with the 
jurisdiction of Ben McCulloch, commander of the Western 
Military District of Texas. Benton to McCulloch, December 
31, 1861, 0. R. A., IV, 164. 
"''^General Orders, No. 10, December 14, 1861, 
ibid., 157-158. 
10^Noel, A Campaign, 12. 
10^General Orders, No. 12, December 20, 1861, 
0. R. A., IV, 159. 
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On December 20, 1861, Sibley addressed the follow­
ing proclamation to the people of New Mexico: 
An army under my command enters New Mexico, to 
take possession of it in the name and for the benefit 
of the Confederate States. By geographical position, 
by similarity of institutions, by commercial interests, 
and by future destinies New Mexico pertains to the 
Confederacy. 
Upon the peaceful people of New Mexico the Con­
federate States wage no war. To them we come as 
friends, to re-establish a governmental connection 
agreeable and advantageous both to them and to us; to 
liberate them from the yoke of a military despotism 
erected by usurpers upon the ruins of the former free 
institutions of the United States; to relieve them 
from the iniquitous taxes and exactions imposed upon 
them by that usurpation; to insure and to revere their 
religion, and to restore their civil and political 
liberties. 
The existing war is one most wickedly waged by 
the United States upon the Confederate States for the 
subjugation and oppression of the latter by force of 
arms. It has already failed. Victory has crowned 
the arms of the Confederate States wherever an en­
counter worthy of being called a battle has been 
joined. Witness the battles of Bull Run, of Manassas, 
of Springfield, of Lexington, of Leesburg, of Columbus, 
and the capture in the Mesilla Valley of the whole 
force of the enemy by scarcely half their number. 
The army under my command is ample to seize and 
to maintain possession of New Mexico against any 
force which the enemy now has or is able to place 
within its limits. It is my purpose to accomplish 
this object without injury to the peaceful people of 
the country. Follow, then, quietly your peaceful 
avocations, and from my forces you have nothing to 
fear. Your persons, your families, and your property 
shall be secure and safe. Such forage and supplies 
as my army shall require will be purchased in open 
market and paid for at fair prices. If destroyed or 
removed to prevent me from availing myself of them, 
those who so co-operate with our enemies will be 
treated accordingly, and must prepare to share their 
fate. 
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It Is well known to me that many among you have 
already been forced by intimidation or inveigled by 
fraud into the ranks of our foes, The day will soon 
arrive when you can safely abjure their service. 
When it comes, throw down your arms and disperse to 
your homes, and you are safe. But persist in the 
service, and you are lost. 
When the authority of the Confederate States 
shall be established in New Mexico, a government of 
your best men, to be conducted upon principles with 
which you are familiar and to which you are attached, 
will be inaugurated. Your religious, civil, and 
political rights and liberties will be re-established 
and maintained sacred and intact. In the meantime, 
by virtue of the powers vested in me by the President 
and Government of the Confederate States I abrogate 
and abolish the law of the United States levying 
taxes upon the people of New Mexico. 
To my old comrades in arms, still in the ranks of 
the usurpers of their Government and liberties, I 
appeal in the name of former friendship: Drop at once 
the arms which degrade you into the tools of tyrants, 
renounce their service, and array yourselves under 
the colors of justice and freedomI I am empowered to 
receive you into the service of the Confederate 
States; the officers upon their commissions, the men 
upon their enlistments. By every principle of law 
and morality you are exonerated from service in the 
ranks of our enemies. You never engaged in the 
service of one portion of the old Union to fight 
against another portion, who, so far from being your 
enemies, have ever been your best friends. In the 
sight of God and man, you are justified in renouncing 
a service iniquitous in itself and in which you never 
engaged. 
Done at headquarters of the Army of New Mexico by 
me this 20th day of December, A. D. 1861. 
H. H. Sibley, 107 
Brigadier-General, Army C. S. 
^^Proclamation, December 20, 1861, ibid., 89-90 
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Agents distributed copies of the proclamation, 
printed in both Spanish and English, throughout the 
villages of New Mexico. According to Governor Henry 
Connelly, however, Union citizens gathered them up and 
delivered them to the military commander before they 
could be circulated among the people. Connelly scoffed 
at the proclamation and maintained that it would have no 
10S 
effect, even if circulated. 
* * * * *  
The Fourth Regiment, having preceded the others, 
reassembled at Port Bliss and then moved up the valley 
to the territory of Arizona. The troops crossed the 
Texas border on December 12. The Fourth established a 
camp in sight of the large mountain on the opposite side 
of the Rio Grande which marked the international boundary 
between Mexico and the Confederate States. The following 
day the men marched to Camp Lesure, where they remained 
several days before continuing up the river to within 
a few miles of Mesilla. On Christmas morning Colonel 
Reily temporarily turned over the command of the regiment 
to Captain A. J. Scarborough, that officer being the next 
in rank. Reily then addressed his troops, bidding them 
n aQ 
Connelly to Seward, January 31* 1862, ibid., 
IX, 640. 
Ill 
"adieu" and telling them that his country required his 
109 
services elsewhere. Sibley had selected the colonel 
for a diplomatic mission to Chihuahua. 11(^ 
While waiting for the remainder of his forces to 
arrive, Sibley planned to send a raiding party against 
the Federals to the north. Lieutenant Colonel William R. 
Scurry was ordered to assemble two companies of the Fourth 
and those of Pyron's (formerly Baylor's) Second,111 and 
two pieces of artillery. With this force of about 500 
men,^"^ Scurry was to move rapidly up the Rio Grande to 
capture the Union outpost at Alamosa, about thirty-two 
miles below Fort Craig.11^ News of the intended raid was 
relayed, probably by spies, to the Federal commander.-*--1-^ 
109Noel, A Campaign, 12. 
H°Sibley to Governor of Chihuahua, December 27, 
1861, 0. R. A., IV, 168. 
li:LNoel, A Campaign, 13. 
HP 
Canby to Donaldson, January 3* 1862, R. A., 
IV, 82. 
•^Noel, A Campaign, 12. 
11^Canby to Donaldson, January 3* 1862, 0. R. A., 
IV, 82. 
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The Texans left Robledo and, after marching sixty miles 
with scarcely a halt, they found themselves "before the 
walls of Alamosa. The little village was quickly sur­
rounded.1^ Besides having prior information of the raid, 
Union pickets had detected the Confederate approach and 
were able to warn the garrison.When Scurry's men 
closed in, they were disappointed to discover that the 
Union troops had already fled and had left only a few 
Mexicans behind. Before departing, the Federals had 
scattered their flour, sugar, rice, coffee, and beans 
over the area so as to prevent the Texans from seizing 
117 
them. "Failing in their object, the Texans retired 
*1 *1 Q 
rapidly by the same road. ° 
On January 12, a band of Indians, probably 
Mescalero Apaches, under cover of night stole forty head 
of horses and sixty head of beef cattle from the Fourth 
Regiment11^ while it was encamped at Willow Bar. At 
115Noel, A Campaign, 13. 
H6canby to Donaldson, January 3, 1862, 0. R. A., 
IV, 82. 
^^Noel, A Campaign, 13. 
^^Cariby to Donaldson, January 3» 1862, 0. R. A., 
IV, 82-83. 
119Mesilla Times, January 15* 1862. 
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eight o'clock the next morning Major Henry W. Ragnet set 
out with Company A in hot pursuit. By ten o'clock that 
night the command was in the Organ Mountains, about fifty 
miles away. Next day at 11 o'clock Ragnet had reached 
San Augustine Springs, but the Indians had too great a 
] PO 
head start so the chase was given up. c 
The Fifth Regiment arrived at Fort Bliss on or 
about January 3. Shortly after, the advance squadron of 
the Seventh was due to arrive. For over a week the men 
121 of the Fifth rested from their long and weary journey. 
With the bulk of his brigade having arrived from San 
Antonio, Sibley issued the following: 
GENERAL ORDER — No. 2. 
Head-quarters Army of N. M., 
Ft. Bliss, Tex., Jan. 9th, 1862. 
The General Commanding expresses to the Troops 
under his command, his high appreciation of the 
patience, fortitude, and good conduct, with which, 
in spite of great deficiences in their supplies, they 
have made a successful and rapid march of seven 
hundred miles, in mid winter, and through a country 
entirely devoid of resources. 
The General congratulates his troops upon the 
prospect of early and important services, for the 
successful accomplishment of which, their past 
120Noel, A Campaign, 13. 
•^Faulkner (contrib.), "With Sibley in New 
Mexico," loo. cit., 124. 
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conduct is an ample guarantee; and he is assured that 
he will never be disappointed in his early boast, 
that "We could go any where, and do any thing." 
By order of 
Brig. Gen. H. H. Sibley. 122 
Tom. P. Ochiltree, A. de C. & A. A. At. Gen., A.N.M. 
A general courtmartial was held at Port Bliss on 
January 8. Private T. M. Harvey of Captain Jerome B. 
McCown's company of lancers was charged with the murder 
of one of his comrades. Lieutenant Colonel H. C. McNeill 
acted as president of the court and Aide-de-Camp Tom P. 
Ochiltree served as judge advocate. The prisoner was 
12*5 
found guilty and condemned to be shot. On January 10, J 
the whole Fifth Regiment was drawn up to witness the 
Ipii 
execution. Harvey met his death with extraordinary 
nerve and firmness. He pinned a white paper on his breast 
as a mark to "those compelled to perform the disagreeable 
duty of executioners, and exorted them 'to die as bravely 
as he did.'"125 
122Mesilla Times, January 15, 1862. 
123ibid. 
^^Paulkner (contrib.), "With Sibley in New 
Mexico," loc. cit., 124. 
l25Mesilla Times, January 15* 1862. 
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The Fifth Regiment set out from Fort Bliss for 
Arizona. On January 12, Green's men passed through Las 
Cruces. Here they were welcomed with music by the band 
of the Second Regiment, and by numerous citizens. The 
editor of the Mesilla Times observed that the Fifth was 
"a fine looking body of men of that material of which 
there is no better for soldiers. "^26 pifth continued 
on to Willow Bar where it encamped, for the Fourth had 
127 
recently vacated this place and had moved farther north. 
Discipline among the soldiers of the "Sibley 
128 
Brigade" was apparently quite lax, and the officers 
were unable to exercise complete authority over their 
men."^ The individualism that had always been charac­
teristic of the frontier made it difficult for Sibley's 
men to submit completely to authority. Lack of discipline 
was particularly evident when the brigade was in the 
Mesilla Valley. Although the men had orders not to graze 
their horses in the green Mexican wheat fields that 
abounded in this area, hundreds did so anyway. The 
126Ibid. 
•^^Noei, a Campaign, 11. 
iS^Teel, "Sibley's New Mexican Campaign," 
loc. cit., 700. 
129Robertson to Wright, April 18, 1862, 0. R. A., 
L, i, 1012-1013. - - -
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excuse generally was "M^r horse got loose and I could not 
find him." Although a reprimand would follow, with 
sometimes a day or two of extra duty, this did not com­
pensate the Mexicans whose fields had been damaged. 
While it had been the policy of Baylor and Sibley to 
treat the Mexicans with "kindness and justice," many of 
the brigade acted otherwise. Pew soldiers had tents, so 
when the weather turned cold, many moved into the Mexi­
cans' adobe houses. Often the family was crowded into 
1*30 
one room, or driven out altogether. J Since the Texans 
had few supplies, they stole "blankets, onions, wine, 
and everything" they could lay their hands on. Females, 
either in or out of their homes, were not safe, according 
to one Union correspondent A Texas soldier maintain­
ed, however, that the women were "appropriated" only with 
their consent. At any rate, the behavior of the men of 
the "Army of New Mexico" enraged the whole Mexican com-
1^2 
munity and caused intense feelings of hostility. u Had 
the brigade been well-supplied and well-disciplined, such 
a situation would never have been able to develop. 
•^^Reminiscences of H. C. Wright. 
•^Robertson to Wright, April 18, 1862, 0. R. A., 
L, i, 1013. - - -
•^Reminiscences of H. C. Wright. 
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Sibley's lack of foresight arid adequate planning 
henceforth began to manifest itself. True, the general 
had hoped to reach New Mexico early in September. When 
he found he could not arrive that early, he should have 
taken measures for a winter campaign. The middle of 
January found him still at Port Bliss with only two and 
t o o  
a half regiments. J~' These were not only poorly armed 
and lacking in sufficient ammunition,but also badly 
clothed and poorly fed.^35 "Forage there was none; com­
missary supplies were getting scarce; the cold season was 
coming; clothing was being needed; all of which the 
country afforded none.1'^"^ There was not a dollar of 
quartermaster's funds on hand to supply the daily and 
pressing needs of the brigade. What the Mesilla and Rio 
Grande valleys could produce had been long consumed by 
Baylor's force. Because of these factors, the credit of 
the government was not as available a resource as it 
might otherwise have been."1"^ 
•^Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A., 
DC, 507. ~ ~ 
•^-^Denison to Chase, May, 1862, Dodson (comp.), 
'toiary and Correspondence of Salmon P. Chase," loc. 
cit., 301. 
135Mesilla Times, January 15, 1862. 
136Noei, & Campaign, 12. 
137sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 507. ~ ~ ~ 
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Apparently the commissary supplies Hart and 
Crosby had gathered were not sufficient, and the expected 
foodstuffs from Mexico were not forthcoming. Sibley's 
greatest blunder had been in banking too heavily on 
capturing everything that he would need from the garrisons 
at Port Craig, Albuquerque, and Santa Pe. As a result, he 
did not think it necessary to start from San Antonio with 
more provisions than would actually be needed to subsist 
the command en route. Sibley was confident that he would 
be able to move into the territory of New Mexico without 
resistance and take possession of all its garrisons, 
forts, and depots of supply. This was truly a gambler's 
dream, for Sibley had failed to realize that perhaps in his 
absence a vigorous Union commander might have reinforced 
his fortifications and' called up additional troops, and 
thus challenge him every foot of the way. A more able and 
cautious commander would have taken cognizance of possible 
changes in the military set-up of the enemy. In addition 
he would have better equipped and supplied his forces 
before undertaking such an arduous campaign. It is true, 
however, that Sibley had tried to get more arms and equip­
ment for his brigade but had failed. Since one of the 
reasons for the campaign in the first place had been to 
"^Noel, A Campaign, 12-14. 
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seize the supply depots of the enemy, Sibley should not 
be blamed too harshly. But in any perspective, the New 
Mexican campaign was a gamble—victory or disaster lay 
uneasily in the hands of fate. 
The ranks of the "Sibley Brigade" ivere daily 
being thinned by "those two terrible scourges to an army" 
smallpox and pneumonia. "^9 Smallpox had broken out among 
Baylor's men several weeks before the arrival of Sibley's 
regiments and by the middle of January the Second Regi­
ment reported 104 cases with six deaths. Hasty efforts 
were made to vaccinate all men who had not yet contracted, 
the disease.Winter weather and lack of adequate 
clothing and blankets accounted for the great number of 
pneumonia cases. 
Sibley established a general hospital at Dona 
Ana, and then "determined to move forward with the force 
143 
at hand. The advance guard set out for old Fort Thorn. 
Port Thorn had been deserted since I859 when the Federal 
army had evacuated it because of the prevalence of sick-
142 ness there. Baylor had earlier taken possession of 
139sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 507. - - -
^°Mesilla Times, January 15* 1862. 
•'•^•'•Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 507. - - -
142 
House Executive Documents, 33rd Congress, 2nd 
Session, No. 1, Part 2, bO; Senate Executive Documents, 
36th Congress, 1st Session, No. 52, 222-225. 
120 
the post, but since it was of no importance, he had 
143 
evacuated it. 
After treating his escort to a basket of cham-
144 pagne, Sibley set out from Port Bliss on January 12. 
Smallpox was then prevailing at Fort Fillmore,so when 
146 
Sibley and his staff arrived at Mesilla two days later, 
the men of his escort were vaccinated,-^7 Sibley's staff 
now included a new member. In the absence of the chief 
quartermaster, who was still in San Antonio, Judge J. F. 
Crosby, general agent of the government, was chosen to 
assume his duties as acting chief quartermaster. On 
January 21, the staff arrived at Fort Thorn where 
149 
temporary headquarters was established. 
•^Faulkner (contrib.), "With Sibley in New 
Mexico," loc. cit., 125. 
lZ^Ibid., 124. 
•^Noel, A Campaign, 14. 
1^6jy[esilla Times, January 15, 1862. 
1^7Faulkner (contrib.), "With Sibley in New 
Mexico," loc. cit., 124. 
148]v[esilla Times, January 15, 1862. 
1^9Faulkner (contrib.), "With Sibley in New 
Mexico," loc. cit., 129. 
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The Fourth Regiment proceeded northward from 
Mesilla. By this time the beef cattle were so poor that 
they could barely stagger along. Their meat was coarse, 
tough and difficult to eat.1^0 When the Fourth reached 
Fort Thorn, camp was set up on the east side of the Rio 
Grande, opposite the post. The Fifth Regiment came up 
two days later and encamped about three miles below the 
Fourth. The first five companies of the Seventh Cavalry 
arrived"1"^ on February 4. The other five companies were 
still some three hundred miles behind.^52 
Sibley allowed a sutler train which came with 
the Seventh to set up within the fort its "stock of 
goods, wares and chattels for sale. . . . stock 
in trade consisted chiefly in liquors of all brands, 
preserved fruits of all sorts, candy, raisins, tobacco, 
pipes, and on an average of one pair of pants to every 
ten men in the Fourth regiment, for which regiment they 
were alone appointed."^-53 
"^Reminiscences of H. C. Wright. 
•^"'"Noel, A Campaign, 15. 
"^Faulkner (contrib.), "With Sibley in New 
Mexico," loc. cit., 129. 
153 
Noel, A Campaign, 15. 
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While at Port Thorn "with a view to the pro­
tection of the important and growing interest, chiefly 
mineral, in Western Arizona, and for the further purpose 
of opening communications with Southern California,11 
Sibley ordered Captain Sherod Hunter of Company A, Second 
Regiment Mounted Rifles, to take post at Tucson.15^ 
Hunter made the 280-mile march as rapidly as possible and 
arrived in Tucson on February 28. His timely arrival was 
hailed by a majority, if not the entire population of the 
"Old Pueblo."155 
Sibley was now ready to move up the Rio Grande to 
begin his long-awaited New Mexican campaign. 
1 ̂Sibley to Cooper, January 27, 1862, (). R. A., 
IV, 170. 
155Hunter to Baylor, April 5, 1862, ibid., 
IX, 707. 
CHAPTER V 
COLONEL JAMES REILY, C. S. A., DIPLOMATIC AGENT TO 
CHIHUAHUA AND SONORA 
"In view of the importance of establishing satis­
factory relations with the adjacent Mexican" border states, 
Sibley deemed it expedient to send a diplomatic agent to 
the governors of Chihuahua and Sonora.^ Not only did the 
Confederate commander wish to buy supplies, but he had 
heard reports that the Central Mexican Congress had issued 
a decree granting the North the privilege of transporting 
troops and munitions across northern Mexico to attack the 
p 
Confederates. Sibley was anxious to learn from the 
governors whether or not this was true. 
He chose as his representative his second in com­
mand, Colonel James Reily of the Fourth Regiment. This 
was no random choice, for prior to the war, Reily had 
achieved recognition in the field of diplomacy. In 1841 
President Sam Houston had appointed him charge d'affaires 
1Sibley to Cooper, January 3> 1862, 0. R. A., 
IV, 167. 
2Sibley to Governor of Sonora, December 16, 1861, 
ibid., L, i, 767. 
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to Washington. While acting in this capacity, he and 
Daniel Webster had negotiated the Treaty of Amity and 
Commerce and Navigation between the United States and 
Texas. In 1844 Reily had been selected again to be the 
Texas representative to Washington, but his nomination 
was not confirmed because of his known opposition to 
annexation. During the administration of James Buchanan, 
•5 
he had served as United States minister to Russia. It 
is interesting to note that in sending this diplomatic 
mission to Mexico, Sibley, a field commander, was acting 
on his own authority and initiative. The Department of 
State of the Confederate States government had no part in 
the proceedings. 
Reily was instructed to proceed first to Chihuahua 
City and deliver a letter from Sibley to the governor. 
L 
Sibley's note, aside from assurances of cordial and 
friendly relations between the Confederacy and Mexico, 
dealt with three main points: an interrogation concerning 
the rumored convention between the United States and the 
3walter P. Webb and H. Bailey Carroll (eds.), 
The Handbook of Texas (Austin, 1952), II, 459. 
Sibley's letter has not been found, but its 
contents can be reasonably ascertained from Terraza's 
reply. Terrazas to Sibley, January 11, 1862, 0. R. A., 
IV, 172. - - -
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Central Mexican government relative to the passage of 
United States troops and munitions through northern 
Mexico, a proposition for the mutual crossing of the 
frontier in "hot pursuit" of hostile Indians, and a re­
quest to allow Confederate agents to buy supplies and 
5 
provisions in Chihuahua. Reily was also to ask the 
governor of Chihuahua to order the customhouse official 
at El Paso to remit the duties paid by the Texans who had 
transported their goods across the international border 
for pvirposes of safety when it had appeared that a Union 
invasion from New Mexico was imminent. Sibley's letter 
gave only a general outline of the policy and nature of 
the questions at hand. Reily's chief and primary duties 
were "to unfold that policy and to explain /Vao/ ob-
ject^/ives/ in detail, to further their accomplishment, to 
counteract any adverse influences, and to obviate any 
possible objections." The manner of discharging these 
diplomatic duties was left to his own judgment and dis­
cretion.^ 
7 
On January 2, 1862, Colonel Reily, accompanied 
Q 
by Sibley's volunteer aide-de-camp, Captain G. Dwyer, 
5lbid. 
^Jackson to Reily, December 31* 1861, ibid., 168. 
"^Sibley to Cooper, January 3> 1862, ibid., 167. 
8jackson to Reily, December 31* 1861, ibid., 168. 
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and escorted by six Mexicans, set out on the three-hundred-
mile journey to the capital of ChihuahuaThe fact that 
Sibley sent his second in command and his aide-de-camp 
on this diplomatic mission attests to the importance which 
he attached to it. Six days later Reily arrived in 
Chihuahua City where he took up quarters at Riddell's 
hotel, and notified Governor Luis Terrazas of his arrival. 
The next day Carlos Moyo, the governor's brother-in-law, 
called upon Reily to accompany him to the governor's 
palace. Reily, dressed in the uniform of a colonel in the 
Confederate cavalry and carrying his dress sabre, was 
cordially received by the governor. After presenting his 
letter of credence and the letter from General Sibley, 
Reily was introduced to the secretary of state and other 
high officials. Since Sibley's note was written in 
English, the governor asked that he be given time to have 
it translated so that he could give it due and intelligent 
consideration. Accordingly, an appointment was made for 
twelve o'clock the next day. Before the audience closed, 
the Mexicans asked Reily many questions concerning General 
Sibley, the number and character of the Confederate troops 
under his command, and the war between the North and South. 
9Reily to Reagan, January 26, 1862, ibid., 
L, i, 826. 
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Upon taking leave of the governor and the other officials, 
Reily was escorted hack to the hotel by Moyo. Moyo re­
mained for some time, and Reily "found him quite a friend 
of the South."10 
The next day Carlos Moyo again accompanied Reily 
to the governor's palace. Upon arrival, Reily found that 
only the Secretary of State and a member of the Supreme 
Court were present with the governor. Shortly Joaquin 
Durand, who had been requested by Reily because of his 
fluency in the English language, made his appearance. 
The group then almost immediately began discussions con-
11 cerning the points in Sibley's letter. 
In regard to the supposed convention between the 
United States and Mexico allowing United States troops 
and munitions to cross northern Mexico, Terrazas main­
tained that he had heard nothing about such an agreement. 
In his formal letter to Sibley, the governor pointed out 
that his government would not respect such a convention 
unless it had been entered into legally under Article 72, 
Part 16, of the Mexican constitution. Under this article 
only the Congress of the Union could exclusively grant 




"the privilege of permitting or denying the entrance of 
foreign troops in the territory of the confederation 
and of consenting to the stationing of squadrons of 
other powers for more than one month in the waters of 
the republic Terrazas, however, personally informed 
Reily that "if even the assent of the President had come 
to him, sanctioned by the act of Congress, he did not 
think he would permit Federal troops to pass through the 
territory of Chihuahua to invade Texas. 
The group next discussed the issue of the "hot 
pursuit" of Indians across the international frontier. 
Reily maintained that "hot pursuit" was a recognized 
legal principle in international law. As an illustration, 
he informed the governor that in I838 Texas troops had 
invaded the United States as far as Shreveport, Louisiana, 
while in "hot pursuit" of a band of Caddo Indians, and 
that this invasion had not been considered a wrongful one 
by the United States government. He pointed out further 
the precedent of Revella who, in 1858, while governor of 
Chihuahua, had granted the United States the right to 
14 
pursue Indians, even into the city of Chihuahua itself. 
12Terrazas to Sibley, January 11, 1862, ibid., 172. 
•^Relly to Sibley, January 20, 1862, ibid., 174. 
l^Ibid. Under instructions from General Garland, 
then commanding in New Mexico, Judge Simeon Hart had made 
this application to Governor Revella in I858. A check of 
the records of the War Records Office of the National 
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Reily's arguments on this point bore little fruit, though, 
for in his official reply to Sibley, Terrazas stated that 
"by that constitutional principle which it is not lawful 
to violate in any way nor for any consideration whatever,11 
he could not allow the crossing of foreign troops into 
Chihuahua. Should the Indian depredations continue, and 
if he became convinced of the advantages of Sibley's 
plan, Terrazas promised to "take the steps necessary to 
act upon it before the Congress of the Union. 
As to the right to purchase supplies in Chihuahua, 
Terrazas made assurances that it would be allowed and that 
there would be no "official intervention whatever." The 
governor also ordered the customhouse dues remitted, and 
asked Reily to deliver the letter of instruction to the 
appropriate official at El Paso on his return journey. 
Reily noted that the governor "appeared to be 
anxious to have the best relations established and con­
tinued between" Chihuahua and the Confederate States. 
Terrazas even went so far as to state that "at all times 
Archives has failed to produce documentary evidence of 
the treaty. 
•^Terrazas to Sibley, January 11, 1862, ibid., 
172. 
•^Reily to Sibley, January 20, 1862, ibid., 174. 
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whenever necessary he would be pleased to afford pro­
tection to the persons and property of the citizens of 
17 
the Southern Confederacy." 
As a colonel in the Confederate army, Reily had 
been "recognized, received, entertained, addressed, and 
1 ft 
recredited" by Governor Terrazas. 0 The governor had 
invited Reily to his private residence where he was 
introduced to many leading citizens, and he had dined 
with the governor at Carlos Moyo's home."^ Only Reily's 
sudden departure at the conclusion of his mission pre­
vented him from receiving a public testimonial of the 
20 
kind feelings of the people of Chihuahua. Flushed with 
such favorable treatment, Reily concluded his report on 
his,.diplomatic mission to Chihuahua by congratulating 
Sibley for having been instrumental in obtaining the first 
official recognition of the Confederate States of America 
21 




•^Reily to Sibley, January 20, 1862, ibid., 171. 
^Reily to Sibley, January 20, 1862, ibid., IJb. 
20Reily to Sibley, January 20, 1862, ibid., 
Ibid., 171. 
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matter was obviously not valid, for Terrazas had merely 
accepted Reily as a foreign agent, and it was not within 
the governor^ power to recognize a foreign government. 
Armed with a letter of introduction and recom-
22 
mendation from Terrazas to Governor Pesqueira of Sonora, 
Reily left Chihuahua City to return temporarily to 
Sibley's interim headquarters. His mission to Chihuahua, 
encompassing a six-hundred-mile round trip—parts of 
which took him through Apache country—was accomplished 
23 
in twenty-one days. 
After about a month's stay at Fort Thorn, Reily 
set out again to continue his diplomatic mission to 
Sonora. His route took him through Tucson, and he and 
his two subalterns and escort of twenty troopers arrived 
in that town on March 1, 1862, the day after Captain 
Sherod Hunter had occupied it for the Confederacy. Dur­
ing his two-day stay in the "Old Pueblo," he delivered a 
speech in the public plaza as part of the celebration of 
24 
the raising of the Confederate flag. 
22Ibid., 170. 
23Reily to Reagan, January 26, 1862, ibid., 
L, i, 826. 
^Carleton to Wright, March 22, 1862, ibid., 944. 
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Reily carried a letter from Sibley to Ignacio 
Pesqueira, governor of Sonora, which was similar in most 
respects to the one he had delivered to Terrazas. After 
assuring the governor of the Confederacy's desire for not 
only peaceful relations, but amity and good will toward 
Mexico, Sibley again approached the question of the con­
vention of the United States and the Mexican government 
which purported to allow the passage of United States 
troops through northern Mexico. Sibley asked for con­
firmation of such a treaty, and if one existed, he wanted 
to know if the governor recognized and honored it. If 
he did, and if the United States government took ad­
vantage of it, Sibley implied that appropriate Confederate 
action would be taken. Again as in the letter to Terrazas, 
Sibley suggested mutual cooperation in action against the 
Indians. Sibley proposed that the troops of either the 
Confederate government or the Sonoran government should 
be at liberty to pursue hostile Indians within the juris­
diction of the other, as long as the pursuing force re­
ported as early as practicable their purpose and strength 
to the nearest military post of the country within which 
they entered. Sibley surmised that only through such 
concerted action could the hostile Indians be brought 
under control. The Confederate general also asked 
Pesqueira for the privilege of buying supplies for his 
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forces in Sonora. Realizing the value of a port on the 
Pacific, Sibley asked the governor for the right to 
establish a depot at the port of Guaymas, and the right 
of transit from that port through Sonoran territory to 
Arizona. Sibley assured the Mexican governor that he was 
prepared to give him, in any form that he might suggest, 
the amplest guarantees that such privileges would not be 
abused.2^ 
At this time the capital of Sonora was the city 
of Ures. On March 14, 1862, Reily arrived in Hermosillo 
on his way to the capital, but learning that the governor 
was at that moment in the city, he immediately made con-
26 
tact with him. While in Hermosillo, Reily happened to 
discover the February 14, 1862, issue of the San Francisco 
(California) Herald and Mirror. This newspaper contained 
an article which dealt with the Mexican-American convention 
dealing with the occupation of Guaymas by Federal troops. 
Besides desiring a reply to the letter from General Sibley 
which he delivered, Reily also asked for confirmation and 
the position of the governor in regard to the terms of the 
27 
convention as stated in the newspaper article. 
25sibley to Governor of Sonora, December 16, 1861, 
ibid., 766-768. 
2^Reily to Pesqueira, March 14, 1862, ibid., 1031. 
27Reily to Pesqueira, March 16, 1862, ibid., 
1031-1032. 
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On March 17, three days after his arrival in 
Hermosillo, Reily received answers to his own notes as 
28 
well as to the official letter of his commander. The 
letters which Pesqueira sent to Reily have not been 
found, but if the account of an American with strong 
Union sympathies can be trusted, Reily, before returning 
to his command in New Mexico, apparently boasted that he 
had obtained all the privileges asked for, and even more. 
Reily also reportedly asserted that Pesqueira was friendly 
to the Confederates and their cause and was only restrained 
from more open demonstrations of his good will by the op­
position of his people and their fears of the designs of 
the Confederates 
Union civilians in Sonora speedily reported the 
activities of the Confederate diplomat to Brigadier 
General George Wright, the Union commander of the Depart­
ment of the Pacific. W. G. Moody, a correspondent for the 
San Francisco Evening Bulletin, and a friend, P. H. Water-
30 
man, were in Ures attending to some private business 
with the government of Sonora when they learned that 
oO 
Reily to Pesqueira, March 18, 1862, ibid., 1032. 
2^Waterman to Wright, April 7* 1862, ibid., 989. 
3°Ibld., 988-989. 
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Colonel Reily had arrived with despatches from General 
Sibley for the governor. Through the acquaintance of 
Manuel Escalante, a confidential friend of the governor 
and a deputy from Hermosillo to the Sonoran legislature, 
the two Union men were able to learn the content of 
Reily's despatches. Since Governor Pesqueira could ap­
parently not read English, Reily's letters were given to 
Escalante to be translated. Moody, learning of this, 
asked Escalante for permission to receive copies of the 
letters. Permission was granted and all the Confederate 
correspondence was copied down by the Union men. 
Escalante even assured the two men that copies of 
Pesqueira's replies would be furnished them as well. It 
appears, however, that Pesqueira learned of Escalante's 
generosity and disapproved of his action. While the two 
Union men remained in Ures two days beyond their schedule 
to receive copies of Pesqueira's replies,^ they were in­
formed in a note penned by Escalante that Governor 
Pesqueira had asked him to write to the two Union gentle­
men for the purpose of telling them "that it would be very 
convenient not to publish the copies" of Sibley's and 
Reily's correspondence which they already had in their 
^Moody to Alden, April 7> 1862, ibid., 990-991. 
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possession.32 Copies of Pesqueira's replies to the 
Confederates were not made available, but Escalante in­
formed the two that Pesqueira had denied the Confederates 
the privileges of pursuing Indians into Sonora, and of a 
depot at Guaymas. Escalante also stated that the governor 
had declined to answer Sibley's question concerning his 
respect for the convention between the United States and 
the Central Mexican government.33 
As soon as Brigadier General George Wright re­
ceived copies of Sibley's and Reily's letters to 
Pesqueira, he wrote his subordinate, Colonel James H. 
Carleton, then at Port Yuma, that he intended to write 
Pesqueira immediately concerning the matter. Although 
Wright assumed that Pesqueira had refused Sibley's re­
quests, and that any Confederate designs on Sonora had 
been deferred, he nevertheless authorized Carleton to 
cross into Sonora should Sibley's forces invade that 
state.3^ 
Although Wright's letter to Pesqueira was 
couched in friendly language and expressed confidence 
that the governor had granted nothing to the Confeder­
ates, Wright clearly stated that he "need not point out 
32Escalante to Moody, April 4, 1862, ibid., 990. 
33waterman to Wright, April 7, 1862, ibid., 889. 
3^wright to Carleton, April 30, 1862, ibid., 
1042. 
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to. . .His Excellency the utter ruin and devastation 
which would inevitably befall the beautiful State of 
Sonora should the rebel forces obtain a foothold within 
its limits." In such an event, Wright assured the 
governor that he had "an army of 10,000 men ready to 
pass the frontier and protect. . ./Ehe Sonorar^7 govern-
35 ment and people. 
Carleton, stationed at Port Yuma just a short 
distance from the frontier of Sonora, appeared anxious 
to march his troops into Sonora if Pesqueira had granted 
the Confederates extensive privileges. Since the Central 
Mexican government at this time was in such dire straits 
with foreign powers, he even suggested that it would be 
a "kind act" to move in and hold Sonora until the Central 
government could claim it. "Ethically," he philosophized, 
"we have the right, and I doubt very much if it is not our 
duty to do this.As had his superior officer, Carleton 
also wrote to Pesqueira and, though expressing full con­
fidence that the Sonoran governor had granted nothing to 
the Confederates, he warned the uneasy official of the 
dangers of allowing the Confederates any concessions with­
in his state.37 
35v/right to Pesqueira, May 3> 1862, ibid., 93. 
36carleton to Drum, May 14, 1862, ibid., 1071. 
37carleton to Pesqueira, May 2, 1862, ibid., 
1044-1045. 
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After receiving these not-so-veiled threats from 
the Union commanders, Pesqueira deemed it wise to allevi­
ate any "misapprehensions" they might have. He informed 
Wright that he had nothing but friendly and sincere 
sympathies for the American Union, and he hoped that the 
Union commander would have the opportunity to see his 
communications to Sibley (which, incidentally, he had 
forbidden the two Union civilians in Sonora to have) so 
that he could easily ascertain that through his "cautious 
management, the chief of the Southern Confederacy could 
not calculate upon ̂ Tis7 sympathies to carry out his 
plans." Pesqueira staunchly maintained that any move­
ment of Confederate troops into Sonora, for any purpose 
whatsoever would "be considered as an invasion by force 
.,38 
of arms. 
In answering Carleton, Pesqueira stated that his 
government considered "the assertions circulated by Mr. 
Reily as exaggerated, or perhaps badly interpreted." 
Although Reily had been offered due hospitality and the 
Confederacy had been given all the rights of the 
3 Pesqueira to Wright, August 29, 1862, ibid., 
93. By the time of the writing of this letter, the 
Confederate cause in Arizona and New Mexico was lost. 
This, no doubt, accounts for Pesqueira's firmer pro-
Union stand. 
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neutrality circular which Mexico had been compelled to 
adopt, Pesqueira maintained "that no arrangement nor 
agreement was entered into between the forces or authori­
ties of the States called Confederate and. . 
,,39 
government. 
There is little doubt that Pesqueira had been 
quite conciliatory and friendly with Reily, and this 
attitude probably served as the basis for Reily's "boast­
ing" of having obtained favorable concessions. On the 
other hand, Pesqueira's letters make it appear that he 
was quite favorably inclined toward the North. The 
governor of Sonora probably cared neither way, but he was 
in an uncomfortable situation. Finding himself wedged 
between the Federals in California and the Confederates 
in Arizona, he sought to conciliate both. 
Although Reily's mission to the Mexican states 
had been one of avowed peace and amity, Reily personally 
related that "there are no such mines in the world as 
are within sight of Chihuahua City,and that "these 
mines and their soil need^/ed/ the inducement of capital, 
energy, and enterprise, which. . .^/could/ only be induced 
QQ 
Pesqueira to Carleton, June 2, 1862, ibid., 1118. 
^°Reily to Reagan, January 26, 1862, ibid., 826. 
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. . .by a stable and enlightened constitutional govern­
ment."^* Exhuberantly, Reily proclaimed that these 
lands "would improve by being under the Confederate 
flag," and "with Sonora and Chihuahua. . .^Ehe South 
would/7 gain. . .^aja/ California, and by a railroad to 
Guaymas, render. . ./the/ State of Texas the great high-
.,ho 
way of nations J Personally Reily and many other Con­
federates may have nursed imperialistic ambitions and 
have desired to acquire Mexican territory. But annex­
ation was not the policy of the Confederate government 
at this time^ because it would have brought a decla­
ration of war from the Juarez government, and would have 
incurred the displeasure of the European powers, particu­
larly Spain and France.^ Furthermore, neutral Mexico 
served as an agency through which supplies from abroad 
could be shipped to the Confederates who were feeling 
the pinch of the blockade. Annexation of Mexican terri­
tory would have extended the blockade to those now free 
^Reily to Sibley, January 20, 1862, ibid., 
IV, 174. 
^2Relly to Reagan, January 26, 1862, ibid., 
L, i, 826. 
^3president Davis had refused the offer of 
Vidaurri to annex to the Confederacy the two Mexican 
border states of Nuevo Leon and Coahuila which he 
controlled. Richardson (comp.), Messages and Papers of 
the Confederacy, II, 78. 
^Frank L. Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy: Foreign 
Relations of the Confederate States of America (Chicago? 
1931), i23=T2T. 
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ports. If the Confederacy planned to expand eventually 
into Mexico, it would have to wait a while, for it was 
now engaged in a war for its very existence, and it 
could not afford to waste its strength by assuming the 
burden of defending additional territory. J 
Fred Rippy, The United States and Mexico 
(New York, 1931), 232. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE CONFEDERATE ADVANCE UP THE RIO GRANDE 
When Colonel Canby received intelligence which 
definitely showed that any proposed Confederate invasion 
would come up the Rio Grande, he took immediate steps to 
bolster the garrison at Fort Craig. True to his plan, 
Canby, with 1,500 men, left his intermediary base of 
Camp Connelly and rapidly proceeded downstream. He ar­
rived at Fort Craig on or about January 31 
On January 25* Governor Henry Connelly called up 
all the available militia in the territory. Though the 
legislature still had five more days before its session 
ended, Connelly decided not to remain in Santa Fe while 
exciting developments were brewing farther south. Since 
2 
the militia contained the territory's best citizens — 
"the elite yeomanry of the country"^—Connelly believed 
•^Connelly to Seward, January 31* 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 640. - - -
2Connelly to Seward, February 11, 1862, ibid., 644. 
^Connelly to Seward, February 5> 6, 1862, ibid. 
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that his presence at Fort Craig would set an example 
which would bolster popular feeling. In addition, he 
took into account the fact that militia units which were 
coming from the northern counties might hesitate to march 
south if he, the governor, were to remain safely behind 
in Santa Pe. At any rate, there were only a few unim­
portant laws left to pass, and since most of these were 
later sent to him and signed before the legislature ad­
journed, Connelly did not feel that he had neglected his 
4 civil duties as governor. On January 26, after leaving 
the major general of divisions of the militia actively 
engaged in organizing and sending into the field all the 
available militia forces in the territory, Governor 
Connelly, accompanied by Major James L. Donaldson, and 
James L. Collins, the territorial Indian agent, set out 
for Port Craig^ and the "theater of war. 
^Connelly to Seward, February 11, 1862, ibid. 
^Connelly to Seward, January 31* 1862, ibid., 640. 
^Collins to Dole, January 25* 1862, Records of the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs, Selected Documents Concerning 
the Administration of Indian Affairs in Texas and New 
Mexico, 1861-1862. Record Group 75, National Archives, 
'Washington. 
^Connelly to Seward, January 31* 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 640. 
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Connelly's party proceeded as far as Socorro. 
Here they tarried for three days while awaiting the 
coming of the first column of militia called out by the 
governor's recent order. When that unit arrived, 
Connelly and the others jubilantly accompanied it to 
Port Craig.® The governor was very optimistic upon his 
arrival. He observed, or at least felt, that Canby had 
q 
the entire confidence of the army and of the country. 
Intelligence reports stated that the Confederates, 
though 3j000 strong, were seriously hindered by lack of 
adequate supplies,10 as well as having their ranks thinned 
by smallpox.More and more Federal militia units were 
arriving daily. With an assurance of superior numbers, 
the governor was even more confident of a decisive Union 
victory. Happily he commented that the spirit of the 
people was good,12 and the militia had "displayed a 
®Connelly to Seward, February 5* 1862, ibid., 643. 
9connelly to Seward, February 11, 1862, ibid., 
644. 
^Connelly to Seward, January 31> 1862, ibid., 
643. 
1]-Connelly to Seward, February 5> 1862, ibid., 
641. 
12Connelly to Seward, February 5* 6, 1862, 
ibid., 644. 
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commendable spirit in the present emergency."^ Indian 
Agent Collins had earlier stated that there had been 
some doubt concerning the courage of the Mexicans when 
coming into contact with the Texans. One of the main 
reasons for his and the governor's coming to Port Craig 
was to give them encouragement and "every possible 
incentive" to acquit themselves creditably He now 
observed that the Mexican volunteers and militia had 
turned out with a spirit that was "truly commendable." 
With the morale of the Union forces at such a high level, 
Collins had no doubt of the result.Equally impressed 
by this spirit, as well as by the number of troops at 
the fort, Connelly felt assured that the territory was 
safe. Only if the enemy received reinforcements—and 
this was highly unlikely—could there be any danger of a 
"great disaster" to the Union forces.The governor 
triumphantly averred that the Federals would "conquer 
the Texan forces, if not in the first battle, it. . . 
•^Connelly to Seward, February 11, 1862, ibid. 
•^Collins to Dole, January 25, 1862, Records of 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs. 
•^Collins to Dole, February 11, 1862, ibid. 
^Connelly to Seward, January 31# 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 640. 
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^would]? be done in the second or subsequent" encounters.^7 
Though Canby also observed that the Mexican 
troops appeared to be animated by a "very good spirit,"^ 
he did not share the enthusiasm of Connelly and Collins. 
Recent experiences with the native troops had taught him 
to be cautious concerning their possibilities on the 
field of battle.^ 
The bulk of the Confederate forces were mounted. 
Canby therefore expected that Sibley's main efforts would 
be directed toward crippling his means of transportation 
by attacking his wagon trains, impeding the operations 
of his troops by stampeding their animals, or in subject­
ing his forces to night attacks. The Federal commander 
attempted to impress upon his men the fact that night 
attacks were to be feared only when they succeeded in 
"throwing a portion of the command into confusion and in 
forcing their way within the lines." In repelling such 
attacks, the colonel cautioned that firing should be 
avoided, since it probably would more "endanger their 
friends than enemies." An old infantryman himself, Canby 
^Connelly to Seward, February 6, 1862, 
ibid., 644. 
1®Canby to Adjutant-General, February 14, 1862, 
ibid., 632. 
"^Canby to Adjutant-General, March 1, 1862, 
ibid., 488. 
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pointed out that in any encounter with the Texas cavalry, 
the main reliance of the infantry should be in their 
clubbed muskets or bayonets. According to Canby, an 
infantryman who was cool was more than a match for a 
horseman, and in groups, foot soldiers were safe against 
any number. In preparation for any emergency, the colonel 
ordered that four days' rations were to be constantly car­
ried in the company wagons and the remainder placed in the 
20 supply train. 
As speedily as was possible, Canby had concen­
trated all his available forces at Port Craig. When they 
were finally assembled, he had an army of 3*810 men. Of 
these, about 1,200 sturdy, reliable regulars composed 
five companies of the Fifth, three of the Seventh, and 
three of the U. S. Tenth Infantry; two companies of the 
First and five of the U. S. Third Cavalry; and two bat­
teries of howitzers. The native New Mexican troops con­
sisted of the First Regiment New Mexico Volunteers (com­
manded by Colonel Christopher "Kit" Carson), seven 
companies of the Second, seven of the Third, one of the 
Fourth, two of the Fifth, Graydon's Independent Spy 
Company, and about 1,000 "hastily-collected and unorgan­
ized" militia.2^" In addition, one company of Colorado 
^Memorandum, No. 116, January 28, 1862, ibid., 
626-627. 
2^Canby to Adjutant-General, March 1, 1862, 
ibid., 488. 
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Volunteers, commanded by Captain Theodore H. Dodd, had 
arrived at the fort. Dubbed the "Foot Volunteers," this 
unit eventually became Company B of the Second Regiment 
Colorado Volunteers.22 With his forces all assembled and 
apparently in a high state of morale, Canby was ready to 
face the "Army of New Mexico." 
While still at Port Thorn, General Sibley sent 
Captain Daniel H. Ragsdale with a party of fifty men to 
reconnoiter the general area around Port Craig. Ragsdale 
was to make a check of the terrain and to secure as much 
information as he could. On the basis of this report, 
the Confederate staff would decide the best method of 
attacking the enemy stronghold. On the same day that 
Ragsdale left, January 22, news arrived that six Union 
spies had been caught in the Mesilla Valley while on their 
way to bring information to Port Craig. Meanwhile a 
Federal lieutenant, who had deserted his company at Fort 
Craig, brought the Texans cheering news. Although ad­
mitting that Canby had in the neighborhood of 1,400 New 
Mexican volunteers under his command, the lieutenant 
pointed out that they were "badly dissatisfied," and did 
"not want to fight the Southern people. "23 
22Whitford, Colorado Volunteers, 44. 
23Faulkner (contrib.), "With Sibley in New 
Mexico," loc. cit., 126. 
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Though it was bitterly cold, the morning of 
January 29 dawned beautifully over the Confederate en­
campment at Port Thorn. The distant hills, whitened by 
snow, presented a picturesque sight. The Rio Grande had 
risen considerably during the past few days, making that 
stream more treacherous than ever. Two Indians were sent 
to Santa Fe as spies, and the Fifth regiment was ordered 
to begin the forward movement to Fort Craig. Sibley's 
campaign had finally begun. Sickness, principally 
pneumonia, was still rampant, and the Fifth had to leave 
one company behind. Traveling up the valley on the west 
side of the river, the Fifth stopped on February 1 for a 
few days, so as not to get too far ahead of the rest of 
the brigade. While in camp, many of the troops were 
busily engaged in washing their clothes in the river, 
grazing their horses, while some were "complaining, some 
sick, some cooking, some cursing the army, some cursing 
the Confederacy, some playing cards, some hunting, while 
others. . .^were/ reading their Bibles." A strict routine 
was followed: roll call was set at four o'clock in the 
morning, retreat was sounded at sundown, and another roll 
call was held at eight o'clock at night. After staying 
in camp five days, the Fifth resumed its march up the 
river. The biting winter weather caused one soldier to 
complain that it was "as cold as any I ever felt in any 
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land or country." Under such circumstances it is no 
wonder that Sibley was losing many men to the ravages of 
pneumonia. By February 9 the regiment had pushed to 
within thirty miles of Port Craig. Expecting an attack 
from the Federals at any time, the troopers were warned 
to graze their horses carefully and to keep their weapons 
p4 
loaded at all times.^ 
On the night of February 5* Union spies reported 
25 
to Canby that Sibley's forces were moving upon Fort Craig. 
Earlier in January a body of Texans had made a raiding 
p6 
foray against Alamosa. In order to discover whether or 
not the reported force was just another raid, Canby as­
sembled a considerable number of his regulars and volun­
teers to make a reconnaissance down the river. In high 
spirits the force set out on February 8, but after march­
ing as far south as Adobe Walls and "not finding the 
enemy in the desired place," the reconnoitering party 
returned to Fort Craig to await further developments.2''' 
24Ibid., 129. 
25connelly to Seward, February 5> 6, 1862, jO. R. A., 
IX, 644. 
2f^Canby to Donaldson, January 3* 1862, ibid., 
IV, 82. 
27"Notes on the Affair at Valverde," Stanley, Port 
Union, 156. 
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Shortly after this, Federal scouts captured two 
men whom they believed to be spies a few miles below the 
post. The pair were Germans and could hardly speak 
English. On being interrogated they insisted that they 
were deserters from Sibley's force and had come to join 
the Federal army. Governor Connelly and his territorial 
staff were then at the fort, and two members of that 
staff were Germans. These two, Major Charles E. Wesche 
and Adjutant General Charles Clever, decided to see what 
information, if any, could be gotten from the prisoners. 
"They put large quids of tobacco in their mouths, rolled 
up their trousers inside the boots, /and/7 commenced talk­
ing aloud in angry tones about the G— D— Yanks." 
Speaking in German, the two played their roles so well 
"as to make the approaching prisoners believe that they 
were ushered into the presence of some distinguished 
Texans who also had the unfortunate experience of being 
captured." Being completely "taken in," the prisoners 
soon began giving out information concerning Sibley's 
army. Unfortunately, an officer, "not being aware of the 
plot to gain the desired information, called out: 'Hello, 
General'Clever. What are you doing with the prisoners?'" 
Immediately the captives perceived the deception and 
p Q  
nothing more could be "pumped" from them. 
28Ibid., 156-157 
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By February 10, Green's Fifth Regiment, leading 
the Confederate advance, had come to within twenty-two 
miles of Fort Craig. Three companies tinder Major S. A. 
Lockridge were sent out to spy around the post while the 
remainder of the regiment set up camp in a cottonwood 
thicket. The Texans were "daily and hourly" expecting 
an attack by the Federals. Camp was laid off in battle 
form, making two ranks, and the howitzers were placed in 
a commanding position on a nearby hill. The men remained 
inactive during the twelfth, but the following day, camp 
was broken and the regiment proceeded twelve miles up the 
river. The terrain continued to be rough and mountainous. 
One observant Texan noted that "this country will be a 
tax to any government to which it may belong." Federal 
troops drawn up in a skirmish line, were sighted ahead. 
Immediately the Texans drew up in battle formation to meet 
them. "The men and captains all seemed cool and anxious 
for a fight. Some were cursing the Yankees, some were 
careless and unconcerned, while others were almost praying 
for an attack." The expected battle did not materialize, 
however, for the Federals withdrew in the direction of 
Fort Craig. 
2%aulkner (contrib.), "With Sibley in New 
Mexico," loc. cit., 133-13^. 
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Farther down the river the bugle sounded at 
twelve o'clock at night and the men of the Fourth and 
Seventh Regiments saddled their horses and took up the 
line of march for Green's camp. At eight o'clock on 
the morning of February 14, the "Sibley Brigade" was 
united. It had been a most unpleasant march for the 
Fourth and Seventh. The men had been facing a north 
wind with sleet and snow falling so hard "as to almost 
pelt the skin off" their faces.3° 
The assembled "Army of New Mexico" consisted of 
the Fourth Regiment under the command of Lieutenant 
Colonel William R. Scurry, the Fifth Regiment led by 
Colonel Thomas Green, five companies of the Seventh com­
manded by Lieutenant Colonel J. S. Sutton, five companies 
of the Second Regiment Texas Mounted Rifles under Major 
Charles L. Pyron, and three independent companies. In 
addition there was a battery of light artillery officered 
by Captain Trevanion T. Teel and a light howitzer battery 
commanded by Lieutenant John Riley.3"*" Accompanying the 
brigade was a supply train of three hundred and twenty-
seven wagons.32 Based on the rolls and returns of the 
30journal of Ebenezer Hanna (MS., University of 
Texas Library). 
31cariby to Adjutant-General, March 1, 1862, 
0. R. A., IX, 488. 
32Brown to Wife, April 20, 1862, Hollister, A 
History of the First, 169• 
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brigade, this made an aggregate of nearly three thousand 
men. However, by the time that Sibley's army had made 
its appearance before Port Craig, it had been reduced by 
disease and the posting of detachments to about 2,600 
33 men.JJ
On February 15> the brigade came in sight of Fort 
Craig. From their camp the Texans could see "the stars 
and stripes waving." Major Lockridge jokingly boasted 
that he intended to make his wife a shimmy out of that 
flag, and if he could "get a wife as easy as he. . . 
/could/ get that he. . ,/yovXdJ never sleep by himself 
34 
any more." 
At a council of war that night the Confederate 
staff decided to attempt to engage the Federals in battle 
the next day. Sunrise of the sixteenth found the Second, 
Fourth, Seventh, and five companies of the Fifth drawn up 
in battle formation^ about a mile or so south of Fort 
36 
Craig. Challenging Canby to a battle on the open plain, 
33canby to Adjutant-General, March 1, 1862, 
0. R. A., IX, 488. 
^Faulkner (contrib.), "With Sibley in New 
Mexico,11 loc. cit., 134. 
35ibid.; Noel, A Campaign, 16. 
36sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862;. ,0. R. A., 
ix, 507. 
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Sibley and his men eagerly awaited the Federal com­
mander's reaction. The Texas right wing rested on the 
Rio Grande, the center stretched across the plain, and 
the left (west) spread out over a range of low hills. 
The artillery, with a few hundred sharp-shooters armed 
with double-barrelled shot guns as support, was kept in 
reserve. The tension of the long, anxious moments was 
broken when suddenly from around the bend of the river a 
courier came dashing up to the lines yelling "They're 
coming, boys I" Immediately bugles sounded, and the army 
galloped ahead on the "double-quick." The command of 
"right dress" was issued to keep the skirmish line even 
while moving forward. The Texans pressed ahead until 
they reached the bend of the river and the "blue coats" 
came into view. In the distance the Confederates heard 
"the rumbling sound of wagons; then a blast of the 
enemy's bugle."37 
When it became evident to Canby that Sibley was 
not planning to attack the fort, the colonel decided to 
send out a force to meet him. This consisted of the 
various companies of the Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth regu­
lar infantry, the First and Second Regiments of volunteers, 
37}joel, A Campaign, 16-17. 
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two cavalry detachments, and a battery of six guns.38 
Soon the Federals had unlimbered their artillery 
and begun firing into the Confederate line. One Texan 
was wounded by this action. After sending every tenth 
man to the front "where they were ordered to stay at all 
hazards," the Confederate battle line was withdrawn out 
of range of the enemy's guns. With this, the Federals 
on 
"ceased firing, limbered up, and drove to the rear." 
While the rest of the Union troops remained behind, 
Major Thomas Duncan was ordered to move forward with his 
squadron of cavalry. Duncan's advance was quickly cut 
short, however, for the Confederate guns which had been 
concealed in a ravine, opened up and sent him scurrying 
back.^® It was obvious that the Federal forces did not 
want to engage in a full-fledged battle . Most of the 
troops were kept well concealed in a bosque above the 
hi 
fort and within its walls. About sundown, after leav­
ing a strong picket line, the few Union troops withdrew 
3^collins to Dole, March 1, 1862, Records of the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs. 
39Noel, A Campaign, 16-17. 
^Collins to Dole, March 1, 1862, Records of the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs. 
^Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 507. 
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to the safety of the fort. The Texans also posted a 
ho 
large force of pickets and then retired to their camp 
lio 
which was about five miles below Fort Craig. J 
Had Cariby desired, he could have accepted 
Sibley's challenge to battle. However, since he had "no 
confidence in the militia and but little in the volun­
teers, " Canby was determined from the beginning to bring 
on a battle in a position where the New Mexican troops 
would not have to maneuver "in the presence or under the 
fire of the enemy." The open plain south of Fort Craig 
certainly was not the desired place for a battle under 
those circumstances 
During the seventeenth and eighteenth, a furious 
southeastern wind raised such a cloud of sand and dust 
that active operations by either side were impossible 
For several days General Sibley had been suffer­
ing from ill-health and had been confined to his ambu­
lance. The subsequent operations of the brigade, though 
^Noel, L Campaign, 17. 
^3collins to Dole, March 1, 1862, Records of the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs. 
^Cariby to Adjutant-General, March 1, 1862, 
0. R. A., IX, 488. 
^^collins to Dole, March 1, 1862, Records of the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs. 
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approved by him, were actually carried out by Colonel 
Thomas Green. As reconnaissance had shown the futility 
of frontally assaulting Port Craig—the Confederate 
artillery was far too light—the only hope of success was 
to force the enen^r to come out from his post and fight a 
battle in the open. It was decided that the brigade 
should withdraw a few miles down the river and cross to 
the east side of the Rio Grande. In this way, the fort 
could be by-passed in safety and a battle for the re-
crossing of the river above could be forced upon the 
Federals. To do this involved "the hazardous necessity 
of crossing a treacherous stream," as well as the proba­
bility of having to make a "dry camp" once the river was 
46 
forded. Engineer, sapper and miner corps who were sent 
out to reconnoiter the area,found a suitable ford 
|iQ 
several miles down the river at Paraje. 
Early on the morning of the nineteenth, the bri­
gade retired down the valley to the ford and by evening 
iiq 
had safely crossed the river. v Camp was set up on the 
^Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 507. 
^Noel, A Campaign, 17. 
^Connelly to Seward, March 1, 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 637. 
^Noel, A Campaign, 17. 
159 
heights about two miles above ParajeThe troops were 
ordered to cook three days' rations, that night, but 
since food was short, many men had almost none at all. 
Constantly on the alert, the men slept with their arms 
and kept their horses saddled. Daylight found the "Army 
of New Mexico" in the saddle, and the forward movement 
was begun. For the utmost protection, the wagon train 
was placed in the middle of the column. Veering away 
from the river valley, the command turned up a large 
ci 
ravine and continued on its way to by-pass Port Craig.J 
The route the Texans chose was a very difficult one. 
Rugged and roclqr pedegral and heavy sand made the going 
52 
difficult, and the teams became easily exhausted. 
Meanwhile great anxiety prevailed among the Union 
troops, and many were the conjectures made by officers 
and men as to Sibley's intentions. Did Sibley plan to 
completely by-pass the post, or was he going to select 
the favorable ground opposite the fort and shell the 
garrison? "Many expressed an unfavorable opinion about 
50collins to Dole, March 1, 1862, Records of the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs. 
^Noel, A Campaign, 17-18. 
52Reminiscences of H. C. Wright. 
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the willingness of Colonel Cariby to fight his brother-
in-law." Had not the colonel been reluctant to fight 
the day before, even though everyone, including the raw 
recruits, "had clamored to be led into battle?" About 
noon the Texans1 long wagon train came into view as it 
moved up the country. "'So the Texans intend. . .to cut 
us off was heard from every mouth." The troops were 
soon called to arms and orders were quickly given for 
the men to carry one day's cooked rations in their haver­
sacks and to have a new supply of ammunition in each 
cartridge box. Company after company "marched down the 
steep bank and crossed the Rio Grande to get to the 
bluffs on the other side."^ By four o'clock the Texans 
had reached a position where Canby thought he could at­
tack them, even though the ground before him was exceed­
ingly rough for the operations of cavalry and artillery. 
Cautiously advancing into the general area of the ravine 
cii 
up which the Confederates were moving, and where they 
were forming their camp for the night,55 cariby threw his 
skirmishers forward to draw the fire of the Texan 
^"Notes on the Affair at Valverde," Stanley, 
Port Union, 157-58. 
5^Canby to Adjutant-General, March 1, 1862, 
0. R. A., IX, 488-489. 
55sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, ibid., 507. 
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batteries to locate their position.^ Immediately the 
Texans, with "spirit and courage," formed a battle line, 
and their field pieces boomed and echoed throughout the 
mesa.57 colonel Miguel Pino's men of the Second Regiment 
New Mexico Volunteers were "thrown into such utter con­
fusion by. . ./these/' few harmless cannon-shots that it 
was impossible to restore them to any kind of order."58 
Even though his batteries "showed his whereabouts and 
extent of his front," Sibley had the best position by 
far, for his whole line was out of sight behind the mesa. 
The Confederate wagon train continued to roll along un­
disturbed, and Canby was unable to form a good battle line 
since his men had to be kept crouched behind rocks on the 
steep decline to evade "being picked off."59 This con­
dition and the approach of nightfall convinced Canby that 
further action was inexpedient. In order to cover his with' 
drawal and to keep the Texans in their position as long as 
possible, Canby ordered Colonel Roberts, with all his 
5^canby to Adjutant-General, March 1, 1862, 
ibid., 489. 
ibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, ibid., 507. 
5^canby to Adjutant-General, March 1, 1862, 
ibid., 489. 
59"Notes on the Affair at Valverde," Stanley, 
Fort Union, 158. 
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cavalry, to make a demonstration upon the Confederate 
right flank. While this feint was being carried out, 
the Union forces were withdrawn. The infantry was then 
posted on the strategic mesa which commanded the view of 
Port Craig, and the artillery and cavalry then crossed 
O 
the river to the fort. Since most of the infantrymen 
had waded the chilly Rio Grande in water up to their hips, 
they suffered intensely from the cold. Their wet uniforms 
were made of wool, and it took a long time for them to 
dry. Passing "the night in damp clothes, most of them 
without overcoats, or blankets; no warm cup of coffee to 
put life into their chilled bodies and spirits," the 
troops were a desolate and downhearted lot.^"1" The Texans 
remained in their "dry camp" in the sand hills directly 
opposite to, and within sight of, Port Craig. Prom a 
62 
distance of less than two miles, the Federals could 
"count their numerous camp fires in the stillness of the 
night and with the wind from that direction they could 
hear the loud noises of the rebels."^3 
6°Cariby to Adjutant-General, March 1, 1862, 
0. R. A., IX, 489. 
61"Notes on the Affair at Valverde," Stanley, 
Port Union, 158-159. 
62pettis, "The Confederate Invasion of New 
Mexico and Arizona," loc. cit., 105. 
63"Notes on the Affair at Valverde," Stanley, 
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No further action occurred that night except for 
the raid of Captain James "Paddy" Graydon, probably the 
most colorful figure of Canby's command next to "Kit" 
Carson. Though he appeared to be ordinary, his looks 
were deceiving. Long a resident of New Mexico, he was 
64 
well acquainted with the country and its people. Be­
fore the Federal troops evacuated Arizona, he had oper-
6c; 
ated a saloon at Fort Buchanan, J and when war broke 
out, Graydon recruited a company of Union men who had 
been dispossessed and driven north by Southern sympa­
thizers . To them the war was more of a personal affair 
and they "fought from the heart." Graydon's Independent 
Spy Company served the four-fold purpose of "spy, scout, 
police and forager." Enterprising and fearless, "Paddy" 
and his men were always "hovering around the foe, watch­
ing with eagle-eye for a chance to strike a telling 
blow." They soon won a name in New Mexico which was 
equalled by few.^ 
6^Hollister, A History of the First, 96. 
65james B. O'Neil, They Die But Once, The Story 
of a Te.jano (New York, 1935)> O5> 
^Hollister, A_ History of the First, 96. In the 
latter part of 1862 Graydon diecT~from a bullet wound 
received in a duel at Fort Stanton. Santa Fe Gazette, 
November 29# 1862. 
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After receiving Canby's permission, Graydon ob­
tained a couple wooden boxes in which he placed half a 
dozen 24-pounder howitzer shells with the fuses cut. 
The boxes were then securely lashed to the backs of two 
old mules. With three or four of his men, the captain 
crossed the river just below the fort and proceeded 
through the darkness toward the Confederate camp. Gray-
don's plan was to get the "torpedo mules" within sight 
of the Confederate picket line without being discovered. 
If this could be accomplished, the fuses would be lighted 
and the mules driven into the outpost. The captain and 
his men came to within 150 yards of the Texans. The fuses 
were lighted, and after the mules were driven forward, the 
party began a hasty retreat. Upon looking back, Graydon 
was horrified to see that the mules, instead of going to­
ward the enemy, were following him. Soon the shells 
began to explode, bringing the Confederate camp quickly 
to arms. Graydon and his men were unharmed and made their 
67 
way back to Port Craig, needless to say, without the mules. 
^^Pettis, "The Confederate Invasion," loc. cit., 
105-106. 
CHAPTER VII 
THE BATTLE OP VALVERDE 
General Sibley and his staff concluded that Port 
Craig was too strong to be taken by assault and that 
Canby could not be decoyed into a showdown battle. The 
Confederates, therefore, decided to by-pass the Union 
stronghold and continue their northward march. In order 
to do this, they would have to cross the river to the 
west bank. Perhaps then Canby might contest their cross-
ing and bring on a general engagement. 
For several days Sibley had been ill. Neverthe­
less, though still weak, he took the saddle at dawn on 
the morning of February 21, to personally direct the 
operations of the brigade. Colonel Thomas Green's Fifth 
Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel John S. Sutton's battalion 
of the Seventh, and Captain Trevanion T. Teel's battery 
were ordered to make a threatening demonstration against 
Fort Craig. Under the cover of this feint, Lieutenant 
Colonel William R. Scurry's Fourth Regiment, well-flanked 




by Major Charles L. Pyron's command on the left., was to 
move cautiously up the river to the Valverde ford. This 
movement was unfortunately delayed because of the loss 
P 
of several hundred of the Fourth Regiment's mules. 
About midnight the mules, frantic from lack of water, had 
broken for the river in spite of all the guards could do.^ 
Most of these draught animals were captured by the Feder­
al 
als and brought into the post. Rather than give up his 
plan, Sibley abandoned a number of his wagons containing 
the entire kits, blankets, books, and papers of the Fourth 
Regiment.^ 
With 180 men, Major Pyron set out early to recon-
/r 
noiter the road leading to the ford near Valverde. The 
air was crisp and cold and the sky cloudy as the advance 
7 
Confederate unit started on its way. The route Pyron 
2Ibid., 507-508. 
^Reminiscences of H. C. Wright. 
^Cariby to Adjutant-General, March 1, 1862, 
0. R. A., IX, 489. 
^Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, ibid., 508. 
^Pyron to Jackson, February 27, 1862, ibid., 512. 
"^Faulkner (contrlb.), "With Sibley in New 
Mexico," loc. cit., 135* 
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followed passed through the rough pedregal on which they 
had made camp the night before and continued northward 
about two and a half miles. At this point was the Mesa, 
del Contadero. Formed by the action of an extinct 
volcano, this basaltic eminence, which rose to a height 
of about 300 feet, was about three miles long and two 
wide.® Pyron passed around the eastern end of it and 
then turned westward toward the river. As he approached 
the Rio Grande the terrain immediately sloped down into 
the valley. The river had changed its course, and the 
dry arroyo of the old channel formed more or less the 
western edge of the valley at this point. Rows of small 
hills and sand ridges ran, not far back from the river, 
northward for over a mile to another, but lower, mesa. 
A grove, or bosque, of large cottonwood trees covered a 
considerable part of the valley area. The river here 
broadened out and could be easily forded. Nearby was a 
small village named Valverde. The Valverde ford had 
played a part earlier in the history of New Mexico. In 
1846 after Stephen W. Kearney had occupied New Mexico 
and was on his way to California, he was met at Valverde 
by "Kit" Carson who brought the news that California had 
Q 
Canby to Adjutant-General, March 1, 1862, 
0. R. A., IX, 488. 
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already been taken. As a result, Kearney sent Colonel 
Doniphan down the valley to Chihuahua while he took the 
9 
remainder of his forces on to California. Sixteen 
years later Valverde would again become prominent in the 
history of the West. 
Upon reaching the Rio Grande, Pyron saw no enemy, 
so he dispatched a note to Sibley informing him that the 
road was clear. He and his men then leisurely proceeded 
to the river, for their horses had had no water for 
twenty-four hours. 
By eight o'clock the Fourth Regiment had taken 
up the line of march. Scurry's objective was to take and 
hold some point on the river above Fort Craig. Captain 
George M. Frazier and his company of the Second Regiment 
(Pyron's command) acted as the Fourth's guide. Scurry 
assumed that his regiment was leading the advance, but 
because of the poor command system, the colonel had not 
been informed that Pyron had preceded him. As a security 
measure, Scurry ordered Major Henry ¥. Ragnet to take 
four companies, including Frazier's, and proceed as the 
g 
Whitford, Colorado Volunteers, 58. 
10Pyron to Jackson, February 27> 1862, 0. R. A., 
DC, 512. 
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advance guard. At the same time, frontal and flank 
patrols were sent out. Within a short while, Scurry-
learned that Pyron had already gone ahead. There was 
now no need for an advance guard, so Ragnet's force was 
recalled and reunited with the rest of the command. 
While en route, Pyron's message that the road was clear 
of the enemy arrived. Confidently the Fourth continued 
11 
its march to the north side of the Mesa del Contadero. 
From across the river, Canby easily saw through 
the feint which the Confederates were making against his 
post. Around eight o'clock, the Union commander noticed 
that a column of Texans was proceeding northward in the 
direction of Valverde. The intentions of the Confederates 
were obvious. In order to prevent the enemy from reaching 
the ford, Canby dispatched Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin S. 
Roberts up the western side of the Rio Grande. He was to 
cross over to the east bank and hold the ford before the 
IP Texans could get there. Roberts' force consisted en-
13 
tirely of cavalry detachments numbering about 220 men: 
•L1Scurry to Jackson, February 22, 1862, ibid., 513. 
^canby to Adjutant-General, March 1, 1862, 
ibid., 489. 
1-^Reports of Committees, 37th Congress, 3rd 
Session, Senate Report lOti. 
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Four companies (C, D, G, K), U. S. Third Cavalry, 
Major Thomas Duncan. Company G, U. S. First Cavalry, 
Lieutenant Ira W. Claflin, but attached to Duncan's 
command. 
Four companies, Third Regiment, New Mexico Volun­
teers, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Jose M. 
Valdez 
Shortly after Roberts' departure, Canby ordered 
additional forces to his support. These consisted of 
two sections of Captain Alexander McRae's provisional 
battery (composed of companies G, Second, and I, Third 
U. S. Cavalry) and two of Lieutenant Robert H. Hall's 
24-pounders, supported by Captain David H. Brotherton's 
company of the U. S. Fifth Infantry, Captain Charles H. 
Ingraham's company H of the U. S. Seventh Infantry, and 
two selected companies of volunteers (Captain William 
Mortimore's of the Third Regiment and Captain Santiago 
Hubbell's of the Fifth). Captain "Paddy" Graydon's Spy 
Company and 500 mounted militia, under Colonel Miguel 
Pino and Robert H. Stapleton, had already gone to the 
eastern side of the river opposite the fort. Here they 
were instructed to watch the enemy's movements, as well 
as to threaten his flanks and rear, and otherwise impede 
his movements as much as possible.^ 
1^tDuncan to Meinhold, February 23, 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 497; Roberts to Nicodemus, February 23, 1862, ibid., 
493-494. 
•^Cariby to Adjutant-General, March 1, 1862, 
ibid., 489, 493. 
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After Roberts had marched a short distance, he 
instructed Major Duncan to take four of his companies 
and rapidly advance to the ford. If the Texans had not 
arrived, he was to cross the river and hold the bosque 
on the other side. When Duncan reached the ford, he 
discovered that Valdez' two companies of volunteers had 
gotten there ahead of him. With these, as well as his 
own command, Duncan crossed the frigid waters of the Rio 
Grande. No sooner had he gotten to the other side than 
he saw Pyron's force passing through the cottonwoods a 
few hundred yards to his front. Immediately he sent 
Lieutenant Claflin with Company G to go up the river to 
see what the Texans were doing. In a few minutes this 
officer returned to report that Pyron's cavalrymen had 
reached the river about 1,000 yards above, had watered 
their horses, and were now returning. 
Upon seeing Claflin's company, Pyron gave chase. 
As the Federals retired, Pyron followed until he reached 
the bank of a slough. There he found himself in front 
of the rest of Duncan's command. Hastily he formed his 
17 
men along the bank, and the action commenced. Duncan 
^Duncan to Meinhold, February 23, 1862, 
ibid., 497. 
•'•fpyron to Jackson, February 27* 1862, ibid., 
512-513. 
173 
had already dismounted his men and had the horses taken 
back behind a low sand ridge for protection. His men 
deployed behind sand hills, logs, and a few scattered 
trees. Duncan was determined to hold his position until 
Roberts with the artillery and infantry could cross to 
1 o 
support him. 
Upon encountering the enemy, Pyron dispatched 
Captain John Phillips to carry the news back to the main 
command. On his way Phillips met Scurry and informed him 
of the developments ahead. Since Pyron's force was small, 
Scurry feared that that officer would be overpowered be­
fore he could come to his support. With Phillips as 
guide, the Fourth Regiment galloped ahead as rapidly as 
their horses would carry them.^ About nine o'clock 
90 
Scurry approached the scene of conflict. The men 
quickly dismounted and advanced to take position behind 
the low sand bank on Pyron's right. Captain Prazier and 
his company rejoined Pyron's command. Lieutenant John 
Riley's howitzers were unlimbered and commenced firing 
91 
into the Federal line. The fighting now began in 
l^Duncan to Meinhold, February 23, 1862, ibid., 497. 
•^Scurry to Jackson, February 22, 1862, ibid., 
513-51^. 
20Ragnet to Jackson, February 23, 1862, ibid., 516. 
21Scurry to Jackson, February 22, 1862, ibid., 514. 
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earnest. Perhaps this battle would be decisive. If so, 
it could easily decide whether New Mexico would remain 
in the Union or become a part of the Confederacy. 
Roberts remained on the east bank of the river to 
await the artillery and reinforcements which Canby had 
sent. From his position, the colonel observed that a 
large force of Texans, with a piece of artillery, was 
moving down through the cottonwoods toward the Mesa del 
Contadero. The Confederates obviously intended to turn 
Duncan's right flank, while extending their own left to 
the river. Roberts quickly notified Duncan and ordered 
him to throw some skirmishers into the heavy timber to 
drive the enemy back. Duncan had sent Captain Edward 
Treacy's Company D into the bosque as skirmishers to 
keep out small reconnoitering parties which had been 
seen to his right before Roberts' came over to tell him 
of the enemy movement in that direction. Duncan dis­
patched Captain George W. Howland's Company C to rein­
force Treacy. After a spirited skirmish of several 
minutes, the Texans were driven back, but they soon 
rallied and vigorously renewed their assault. Though 
repulsed several times, they continued to return, but 
22 finally Duncan was able to clear them from the area. 
22Duncan to Meinhold, February 23, 1862, 
ibid., 498. 
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This enabled Roberts to set up the batteries on the west 
bank to cover the crossing of reinforcements, as well as 
to shell the Texans in the heavy timber 
When Canby observed from Port Craig that the 
Confederate movement toward the upper ford was becoming 
more determined and might develop into a full-scale 
battle, he ordered more reinforcements to Roberts1 com­
mand. The regulars consisted of Captain Henry R. Selden's 
battalion of the U. S. Fifth Infantry, including the 
battalions of Captains Benjamin Wingate and P. W. L. 
Plympton. In addition there was one company of Colorado 
volunteers captained by Theodore H. Dodd. Colonel "Kit" 
Carson's First Regiment New Mexico Volunteers (eight 
. 24 
companies) followed immediately afterwards. 
About ten o'clock McRae's and Hall's batteries 
reported to Colonel Roberts They were unlimbered on 
the west bank and began pouring a heavy barrage of shot 
and shell into the bosque where the Texans were en­
trenched. As the howitzers blasted the woods, Duncan's 
^Roberts to Nicodemus, February 23, 1862, 
ibid., 494. 
2^Cariby to Adjutant-General, March 1, 1862, 
ibid., 489. 
25Roberts to Nicodemus, February 23, 1862, 
ibid., 495. 
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command and Captain David H. Brotherton's company of the 
Fifth Infantry, which had come to his support, raked the 
area with small-arms fire. This combined artillery and 
rifle fire drove the Texans back. u 
Twenty minutes after the Federal battery's first 
shot, the Texans set up more of their guns which replied 
with well-directed blasts of shot, shell, and grape. 
Though they were making a determined effort to drive 
Duncan from the ground which he had taken, the gunners 
soon came to devote all their attention to the Union 
batteries across the river. Though Duncan's small-arms 
fire was intense, McRae's and Hall's guns were doing far 
more damage. For nearly two hours this duel of artillery 
27 
and rifles continued. 1 Finally Scurry realized that 
Riley's light howitzers were no match for the heavier 
metal of the enemy. He thereupon ordered Riley to with-
?8 
draw with his guns to the rear tinder cover. Though the 
Texans were fighting desperately, the superior fire of 
the enemy had, by around noontime, driven them back from 
^^Duncan to Meinhold, February 23> 1862, 
ibid., 498. 
2^Roberts to Nicodemus, February 23, 1862, 
ibid., 495. 
p Q  
Scurry to Jackson, February 22, 1862, ibid., 514. 
177 
the original line they had held.29 
All during the morning Colonel Green continued 
Of) 
his unsuccessful feint against Port Craig. Attached 
to Green's command was Captain Teel's battery of 
howitzers, but with the conflict at Valverde assuming 
greater proportions, Sibley ordered Teel's guns to the 
front.^ One section of the battery was at the head of 
the wagon train. After leaving instructions for the 
other guns in the rear to rush ahead as fast as possible, 
Teel came to the head of the train to take charge of that 
section. Teel and the guns set out at a gallop and 
reached the battlefield around noon. The two guns were 
set up in the center of the Fourth Regiment's line and 
commenced blasting the Federal left. From across the 
river, the Union batteries opened a furious fire upon 
Teel's artillery. So heavy was their barrage that the 
captain soon found himself with only five men to work 
•ap 
his two guns. To add to the confusion, a bomb exploded 
^Roberts to Nicodemus, February 23, 1862, 
ibid., 495. 
3°Green to Jackson, February 22, 1862, ibid., 519. 
^Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, ibid., 508. 
32Teel to Jackson, February 27, 1862, ibid., 524. 
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nearby and set the grass on fire. Undaunted, the sturdy 
captain stayed with his pieces and seized a rammer to help 
his men load the guns. Seeing that his reduced force 
could not maintain both howitzers, Teel asked Scurry for 
additional men.3^ Lieutenant Riley and his cannoneers 
were immediately sent to Teel's relief.35 Lieutenants 
Jordan W. Bennett and Joseph H. McGinnis arrived on the 
field with the rest of Teel's artillery and the captain 
ordered them to place their section in battery. Within a 
few minutes their guns were raking the enemy line. Since 
Pyron was hard-pressed on the left, Lieutenant Bradford 
took one gun and went to his support.3^ 
Near noon Sibley ordered Colonel Green to discon­
tinue the feint and take his Fifth Regiment to the scene 
of battle.37 since the wagon train, which was moving 
northward, was stretched out for miles, and a large 
Federal force (probably Pino and Stapleton) threatened 
33scurry to Jackson, February 22, 1862, ibid., 514. 
3^Teel to Jackson, February 27* 1862, ibid., 524. 
35scurry to Jackson, February 22, 1862, ibid., 514. 
3^Teel to Jackson, February 27> 1862, ibid., 524. 
37sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, ibid., 508. 
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it, Green saw the need of leaving a sufficient protective 
force.Lieutenant Colonel J. S. Sutton's battalion of 
the Seventh Regiment and Companies C and H of the Fifth 
were ordered to remain behind.39 with the other eight 
companies of his regiment, Green hastily set out for 
Valve rde Major S. A. Lockridge was sent ahead with 
2n 
three companies. At the field he reported to Scurry 
2ip 
who instructed him to support Pyron on the left. 
Shortly Green's other companies arrived and took position 
between Pyron on the left and Scurry on the right. Green 
ordered Lieutenant Colonel H. C. McNeill to take three 
companies to drive the enemy from the north point of the 
mesa where they were annoying the left and threatening 
the wagon train.^3 Sibley, finding himself completely 
exhausted and unable to stay in the saddle, sent his 
aides and other staff officers to report to Green. From 
3^Green to Jackson, February 22, 1862, ibid., 519* 
39Jordan to Sibley, February 27* 1862, ibid., 523. 
^°Green to Jackson, February 22, 1862, ibid., 519. 
^Ragnet to Jackson, February 23, 1862, ibid., 516. 
^2Scurry to Jackson, February 22, 1862, ibid., 514. 
^3(}reen to Jackson, February 22, 1862, ibid., 519. 
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this point on, Green was to command the Confederate 
forces at Valverde 
Around twelve o'clock Captain Selden's battalion 
of regular infantry, including Wingate's and Plympton's 
battalions, and "Kit" Carson's regiment reported to 
Colonel Roberts. Roberts directed Selden to ford the 
river higher up and move against the Confederate right 
with the bayonet. The colonel received information that 
five hundred enemy cavalry had crossed the river above 
and threatened his rear. In order to check any such pos­
sible movement, Roberts ordered Carson's regiment to take 
position in a bosque higher up the west bank near the 
main road leading to Valverde.^5 
To prevent the enemy from flanking him on the 
right, Scurry had extended his line a considerable 
distance.^6 The Confederate artillery was rearranged so 
as to provide the whole line with a more effective sup­
port. Lieutenant Bradford with one gun had already gone 
to Pyron's assistance on the left. Lieutenant McGinnis, 
in command of one gun, took position on the right of 
^Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, ibid., 508. 
^Roberts to Nicodemus, February 23, 1862, 
ibid., 495. 
^Scurry to Jackson, February 22, 1862, ibid., 514. 
181 
Lockridge's companies of the Fifth, and Lieutenant 
Bennett set up in the center of Scurry's Fourth. Another 
piece was sent to bolster the extreme right flank. From 
time to time throughout the battle, the guns changed 
hi 
positions as circumstances dictated. ' 
Up to this time, the Federal forces had been 
hitting the Confederate left the hardest. As soon as 
Captain Selden got his men across the river, he reformed 
il8 
them and attacked the Confederate's right. Selden's 
men sent a galling fire into Scurry's ranks as they pushed 
ahead. At this moment Captain Willis L. Lang of the Fifth 
49 
Regiment formed about forty of his lancers for an attack. 
The point which Lang chose to assault was defended by 
Ford's company of Colorado Volunteers. They were dressed 
in gray like the New Mexico militia, and the Texans proba­
bly mistook them for Mexican troops.50 Lang's mounted 
SI 
lancers launched a gallant and furious charge.-' The 
47Teel to Jackson, February 27* 1862, ibid., 524. 
48Roberts to Nicodemus, February 23, 1862, 
ibid., 495. 
49Green to Jackson, February 22, 1862, ibid., 519. 
5°Mills, Forty Years at El Paso, 57. 
5lGreen to Jackson, February 22, 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 519. ~ ~ 
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Coloradoans reserved their fire until the lancers came 
52 
into close range and then poured a heavy fire into them. 
Twenty-nine horses lost their riders. Lang's desperate 
charge was ineffectual against the overwhelming superior­
ity of the enemy, and his company suffered more loss of 
life than any of the brigade. Though the lancers were 
completely repulsed and nearly decimated, their charge 
did have the effect of bringing the Federals within range 
of the Confederate guns. Two pieces of Teel's artillery 
and the small-arms fire of two of Scurry's companies 
drove the advancing Federals back, thus securing the 
Confederate right flank.^ 
Meanwhile on the Confederate left, Duncan's com­
mand was sending a hot small-arms fire into the enemy 
line. Bradford's gun had been put out of action and was 
now in an exposed position. Major Lockridge called 
Ragnet's attention to the piece and he immediately dis­
patched a body of men to retrieve the gun. Since all the 
horses which belonged to the weapon had been killed or 
-^Mills, Forty Years at El Paso, 57. 
53Noel, A Campaign, 19. 
5^Scurry to Jackson, February 22, 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 514-515. - - -
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wounded, the men had to pull the gun back by hand. The 
enemy vigorously shelled the group while they were en­
gaged in this operation. Though the fire from the 
Federal artillery was extremely hot, only one man was 
killed and several wounded. The howitzer was used by 
three of Riley's company until Ragnet ordered it silenced 
due to the lack of gunners. The piece was left double-
shotted to await an anticipated enemy charge.^ 
The Federals continued to threaten the Confederate 
left in such great numbers and with such a heavy fire that 
Lockridge and Ragnet sent messages to Green for reinforce­
ments. When these did not arrive, Lockridge considered it 
wise to fall back to a new position. After the artillery 
and the wounded had been removed, the Confederates re­
tired, by companies, to a sand bank about 100 yards to 
their rear.-^ The whole Texas line was now situated be­
hind this sand bank which formed the left side of an old, 
dry channel of the river. This position was one of great 
natural strength, for not only did it afford the men and 
guns protection from Union fire, but it also concealed to 
a considerable degree the Texans1 movements.^7 
55Ragnet to Jackson, February 23, 1862, ibid., 517 • 
56 ibid. 
^Canby to Adjutant-General, March 1, 1862, 
ibid., 490. 
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After Seidell's and Duncan's attacks, Colonel 
Roberts felt secure in crossing his artillery to the east 
bank. McRae's battery was posted on Selden's right. The 
guns were supported by Captain David H. Brotherton's and 
Captain Charles H. Ingraham's companies of regular in­
fantry and Hubbell's and Mortimore's companies of volun­
teers.^® At Duncan's request Hall's 24-pounder (one of 
Hall's howitzers had been disabled) was sent to bolster 
his command on the right.^9 The Federal batteries now 
opened fire again, forcing the Confederates to change the 
positions of their artillery. Within a short time, they 
were responding with gusto. Before long, however, the 
Texas batteries ceased firing and a lull ensued. About 
this time Roberts learned that Canby was on his way to 
the field with reinforcements. Since his soldiers had 
been fighting for five hours or more, Roberts allowed 
his fatigued troops to eat lunch while awaiting the com­
mander's arrival. In addition, the respite allowed the 
men to replenish their ammunition.^0 
^Roberts to Nicodemus, February 23, 1862, 
ibid., 495. 
59ouncan to Meinhold, February 23, 1862, ibid., 
498; A. W. Evans, "Canby at Valverde, Battles and 
Leaders of the Civil War, II, 699. 
6°Roberts to Nicodemus, February 23, 1862, 
0. R. A., IX, 495-96. 
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Shortly after noon, Cariby decided to go to the 
scene of operations to personally assume command of his 
fighting forces. Enemy detachments were still threaten­
ing Port Craig from across the river, so before leaving 
his post, Canby detailed two companies of volunteers, 
Colonel Manuel Armijo's regiment of militia, and some de­
tachments of regulars to serve as a protective garrison. 
Colonel Manuel Pino's regiment was recalled from the east­
ern bank and ordered to the battleground. Canby set out 
for the field of Valverde accompanied by Company G of the 
First Cavalry and the remaining section of McRae's bat-
tery.61 
Canby reached the scene of operations about three 
o'clock and relieved Roberts of command. The lull in 
the fighting allowed the commander to spend nearly an 
hour^ in conference with his field officers and in making 
a personal reconnaissance. He was convinced that a direct, 
frontal attack upon the Texans1 new, strong position would 
not only prove costly, but might even end in failure. 
After taking all matters into careful consideration, Canby 
^Cariby to Adjutant-General, March 1, 1862, 
ibid., 490. 
62Roberts to Nicodemus, February 23, 1862, 
ibid., 496. 
63Hollister, A History of the First, 111. 
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devised a plan to envelope the Confederate left. Using 
his own left as a pivot, Canby's tactical scheme was to 
send the center and right of his line smashing into the 
Texans1 left. Once the left had been shattered and 
doubled back, the Federals would be able to enfilade the 
Confederate position behind the old river bed. Thus 
64 
enveloped, the Texans would be driven from the field. 
The day was growing short and Canby quickly began 
ordering his troops into position to carry out his en­
veloping maneuver. McRae's battery, forming the pivotal 
left, was moved about two hundred yards to the left. 
The battery's support was increased by Plympton's bat­
talion of four companies of regulars and Dodd's company 
of Colorado Volunteers. Colonel Pino's Second Regiment 
New Mexico Volunteers, which was just approaching, was 
ordered to cross the river to serve as the reserve for the 
left as well as an additional support for McRae's guns. 
"Kit" Carson's First Regiment was instructed to ford the 
river where that body and Selden's regular infantry were 
fill 
Canby to Adjutant-General, March 1, 1862, 
0. R. A., IX, 490. 
65lbid. 
^Evans, "canby at Valverde," loc. cit., 699* 
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to serve as the center. Hall's 24-pounder, with its in­
fantry support and Duncan's dismounted cavalry, formed 
the Union right. Captain R. S. C. Lord, uniting his 
company with Claflin's, was to act as the cavalry re­
serve. In addition Valdez' volunteers were to be held 
in reserve. But hardly had Canby begun the movement of 
his troops when Colonel Green took the offensive 
While the Union commander was devising his plan 
to attack the Confederate left, Lieutenant Colonel John 
S. Sutton arrived on the field with reinforcements. That 
officer had been engaged in protecting the wagon train, 
but as the conflict increased in severity, he was ordered 
to the battle. Sutton detached Companies A and F of the 
Seventh and C of the Fifth to remain with the train and 
with the remainder of his command, Companies B, H, and I 
of the Seventh and F of the Fifth, he set out at a gallop. 
Major Lockridge met the battalion on the field and ordered 
them to take position on the left. 
With the Federal batteries again sending a furious 
fire of round shot, grape, and shell into his ranks, Green 
6?Canby to Adjutant-General, March 1, 1862, 
0. R. A., IX, 490. 
Jordan to Sibley, February 27# 1862, ibid., 523. 
189 
concluded that only by a daring frontal assault all along 
the line could the Confederates win the day. Since the 
main emphasis of the charge would be directed toward the 
Union guns, the attack would be in two parts. Under cover 
of the sand hills, Green began to gather and reform his 
troops for the attack. The drive from the right, directed 
at McRae's battery, would be composed of dismounted troops 
of the Fourth and Fifth Regiments, parts of Sutton's and 
most of Pyron's battalions. In addition Teel's, Riley's, 
and Wood's batteries would lend their support. This com-
6° 
bined attacking party numbered about 750 men. J Teel was 
instructed to place his guns on the extreme right flank 
as a reserve. If the charge was unsuccessful, he would 
be in a position to shell the enemy as a cover for the 
70 
retreating Confederate troops. Simultaneously with the 
attack on the right, Major Ragnet (Lockridge had been in 
command on the left, but had now gone to the right to en­
gage in the attack on that wing) was ordered to lead four 
companies of the Fourth and one company of the Fifth in a 
cavalry charge against Hall's battery."^1 Ragnet's command 
^Qreen to Jackson, February 22, 1862, ibid., 
519-520. 
7°Teel to Jackson, February 27* 1862, ibid., 524. 
f^-Green to Jackson, February 22, 1862, ibid., 5I9. 
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consisted of approximately two hundred men composed of 
the companies of Captains Charles Buckholts, Marinus von 
Heuvel, W. L. Alexander, A. J. Scarborough of the Fourth 
and Daniel H. Ragsdale of the Fifth. When Captain J. E. 
Dwyer brought Green's instructions for the assault, 
Ragnet ordered his men to mount and align themselves in 
a single row.^2 Anxiously the troops awaited the signal 
to charge. 
When Duncan learned of Canby's plan to turn the 
Confederate left, he requested that another c-ompany of 
infantry be sent to join Brotherton's company as a sup­
port to Hall's battery. With this addition, he would be 
then able to throw all of his dismounted cavalry forward. 
Canby promptly sent Ingraham's company of regular in­
fantry to Duncan's command."^ 
With a hail of small-arms fire and rebel yells, 
Ragnet's cavalry came charging down upon the Union right. 
Taken completely unaware, Canby hastily dispatched Win-
gate's battalion of the Fifth Infantry to aid in repelling 
the attack. "Kit" Carson's regiment, which had just 
crossed the river to take position, was attracted by the 
72Ragnet to Jackson, February 23, 1862, ibid., 517. 
f^Duncan to Meinhold, February 23, 1862, ibid., 
498. 
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firing and rushed toward the right.^ When Ragnet's men 
came to within about 150 yards of the Union line, Duncan 
sent a destructive small-arms fire into their midst. In 
addition, Graydon's company and Carson's regiment added 
more fire.75 as the enemy charged diagonally in front of 
his column, about eighty yards to his right, Carson order­
ed his men to fire a volley into the Confederate cavalry. 
This fire, combined with the explosion of a well-aimed 
shell from Hall's howitzer, completely smashed the Con-
ry/* 
federate assault. As Major Ragnet looked back toward 
his men, nothing but confusion met his eyes. The squeals 
of wounded horses and the groans of the wounded who had 
tumbled from their saddles were evidence enough. As his 
men reeled back in great disorder, Ragnet ordered his 
command to retreat to the sand bank from which they had 
started. The rout was complete. So great was the Con­
federate flight that most of the cavalrymen did not stop 
at the first sand bank as ordered, but continued on to 
others farther to the rear.77 
7^Canby to Adjutant-General, March 1, 1862, 
ibid., 490. 
75ouncan to Meinhold, February 23, 1862, ibid., 
499. 
7^Carson to Nicodemus, February 26, 1862, ibid., 
502-503. 
77Ragnet to Jackson, February 23* 1862, ibid., 
517. 
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Ragnet's cavalry charge, made against far 
superior numbers, had been a costly failure in one 
respect. Nearly one-fifth of the men and horses in­
volved had been either killed or wounded.Captain 
Heuvel—"one of the most distinguished heroes of the 
day"—was lost during the action. Colonel Green proba­
bly meant this offensive on the left to be only a feint. 
At any rate, it did serve a valuable purpose by divert­
ing the attention of the enemy from the Confederate 
right,^9 for the Union center had rushed to the support 
of Duncan's command and Hall's battery. In their pursuit 
of the retreating Confederates, they left a great gap in 
the center of the Union line. This gap would prove fatal 
o0 
to Federal arms that day. 
Almost simultaneously with Ragnet's charge on the 
left, the main body of the Texans charged on the right. 
The enemy lay seven hundred yards ahead over an open area 
which was thinly interspersed with cottonwood trees. At 
the command, "Up boys, and at them!" 750 determined 
Texans leaped over their protective sand bank. With 
78Ibid., 518. 
79Green to Jackson, February 22, 1862, ibid., 520. 
®°Anderson, "Canby's Services in the New Mexican 
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ringing shouts and rebel yells they bravely dashed for­
ward, paying but little heed to the storm of grape, 
canister, and musket balls which the enemy sent against 
them.®*'" 
Canby saw the attack coming. Fearing that 
Captain Plympton, whose command formed part of McRae's 
support, was unaware of the new development, Canby 
hastened in person to warn him. Before Canby could make 
defensive arrangements, rebel yells and the onward surge 
of the "terrible Texans" proved too much for the volun­
teers.®^ Hubbell's and Mortimore's companies,^ who were 
also part of the battery's support, broke and fled in 
wild confusion. Canby did all he could to stop the flight 
and bring the volunteers into action. Even Captain McRae 
temporarily left his guns to plead with the men to come to 
84 
his aid. All such efforts were to no avail. In their 
race to the river, the volunteers passed through Plympton's 
^Scurry to Jackson, February 22, 1862, 0. R. A_., 
IX, 515. 
S^canby to Adjutant-General, March 1, 1862, ibid., 
490-491. 
®3Edwin L. Sabin, Kit Carson Days, 1809-1868 
(New York, 1935), II, 691. 
^Collins to Dole, March 1, 1862, Records of the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs. 
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battalion, carrying part of that unit with them in their 
panic. Most of Plympton's regulars maintained themselves 
and rushed to the battery to engage in a desperate effort 
to repel the enemy. Their actions drove back the advance 
of the Confederate assault. Captain R. S. C. Lord's 
cavalry, which was in reserve, came up from the right at 
this time. Canby ordered Lord to charge, but as this 
mounted force neared the battery, it became exposed to 
both Union and Confederate fire and was forced to fall 
back. The Confederate storming party deployed as 
skirmishers and enveloped the left, front, and a part of 
the right of the battery with an arc nearly half a mile 
in length. Armed with double-barreled shot-guns and 
pistols, the Texans sent a destructive fire into the 
battery and silenced the guns. The Union gunners with 
their revolvers and the infantry with their muskets now 
85 
engaged in a bloody, hand to hand battle with the Texans. 
Colonel Sutton, while leading his men, fell mortally 
86 
wounded about twenty paces from the guns. Captain 
87 
McRae and Lieutenant Mishler were killed at their pieces. 
85canby to Adjutant-General, March 1, 1862, 
0. R. A., IX, 490-491. 
^Jordan to Sibley, February 27, 1862, ibid., 523. 
87Roberts to Nicodemus, February 23, 1862, 
ibid., 496. 
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Major Lockridge fell almost at the muzzle of the enemy's 
guns.®® Completely overwhelmed, the defending Federals 
were driven from the field, but not until they had lost 
in killed, wounded, and captured, nearly half of their 
numbers.®9 
At this juncture Wingate's battalion arrived on 
the scene from the right. The fire of his infantrymen 
threw the Confederates into such confusion that Canby 
thought that he might yet win the day. However, the 
Texans quickly rallied and captured the guns. Colonel 
Roberts, in command of the Union right, ordered the troops 
to speed to the left. They had pursued Ragnet's Confeder­
ates such a great distance, however, that they were unable 
to be of any assistance. Pino's regiment, which had been 
ordered to cross the river as part of the reserve, failed 
to do so. Only one company and part of another followed 
orders. The refusal of this unit to obey orders was an­
other cause of the loss of McRae's battery. It did not 
take Canby long to see that a prolongation of the battle 
would only increase the casualties without changing the 
result. Selden was to cover the retreat on the left, and 
®®Green to Jackson, February 22, 1862, ibid., 520. 
®9cant>y to Adjutant-General, March 1, 1862, 
ibid., 491. 
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the commanders on the extreme right were instructed to 
fall back and cross the river. 
As soon as the Texans had seized McRae's battery, 
they turned the six pieces around and began using them 
on their fleeing enemy. Captains Hardeman and Walker 
manned several on the right while Lieutenant Ragnet of 
Riley's battery took charge of another. Ragnet had no 
rammer, so he used a flagstaff in its place.91 Within a 
few minutes Teel came forward with his guns and joined in 
the cannonading.^2 After crushing the Union left, Green 
turned his attention to the right. But the Federals were 
already in retreat, and the forces sent against them only 
increased their flight across the river.^3 
Canby reported that Selden's four companies of 
the Fifth Infantry, though under heavy fire, successfully 
covered the retreat on the left. Under the personal 
supervision of Roberts, the columns on the right were also 
crossed over. On the west bank the volunteers and militia 
that had escaped from the battle were greatly scattered 
9°Ibid. 
91scurry to Jackson, February 22, 1862, ibid., 515. 
92Teel to Jackson, February 27* 1862, ibid., 524. 
93Green to Jackson, February 22, 1862, ibid., 520. 
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and disorganized. Pino's Second Regiment was In the 
wildest confusion. No efforts of Its officers, nor of 
Cabby's staff, could restore that unit to order. More 
than 100 men from that body had deserted. According to 
Canby, the regulars, in contrast, were easily formed and 
marched to the fort. Under the protective cover of 
Selden's infantry, and later of the regular cavalry, the 
Federal stragglers were collected and returned to Port 
Craig.9^ 
After the enemy had crossed the river in full re­
treat, Major Ragnet, having rallied part of his forces, 
arrived on the scene. It had been his intention to join 
in the final charge on the right. Fresh mounted companies 
under Captains Denman W. Shannon, Isaac Adair, W. L. 
Alexander, Charles Buckholts, and Lieutenant A. S. Thur­
mond rode up. Scurry received permission from Green to 
cross the river with these companies to pursue the foe. 
But when the head of the column reached the opposite bank, 
it was ordered to return,95 for a flag of truce had ar­
rived from the Union commander.9^ por two hours the 
9^Canby to Adjutant-General, March 1, 1862, 
ibid., 491. 
95scurry to Jackson, February 22, 1862, ibid., 515* 
9^Ragnet to Jackson, February 23, 1862, ibid., 518. 
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Confederates thought this meant that Canby intended to 
surrender. The flag had, however, been dispatched for 
the purpose of removing the dead and wounded.97 Darkness 
had now settled over the field of Valverde. In the first 
full-scale encounter with the Federals, the "Army of New 
Mexico" had emerged victorious. 
Sibley reported that the Confederate forces on 
the field had not exceeded 1,750 in number (Fourth Regi­
ment, 600; Fifth Regiment, 600; Seventh Regiment, 300; 
Second Regiment, 250).9® At all times the Texas officers 
had been in the thickest of the fight, and field and 
staff officers alike had served as sterling examples to 
their men. Throughout the engagement Scurry's cheering 
voice was heard above the din of battle. The bravery of 
Green, Lang, Pyron, McNeill, Heuvel, Ragnet, Ochiltree, 
Lockridge and a host of others marked February 21 as a 
day of valor.99 Proudly Sibley informed the adjutant 
general that "For the first time, perhaps, on record 
batteries were charged and taken at the muzzle of double-
barreled shot-guns, thus illustrating the spirit, valor, 
97sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, ibid., 508. 
98ibid. 
99(jreen to Jackson, February 22, 1862, ibid., 
520-521. 
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and invincible determination of Texas troops. Nobly have 
they emulated the fame of their San Jacinto ancestors. 1,100 
Sibley admitted that the victory of Valverde should 
have resulted in the capture of Fort Craig, but that 
Canby's flag of truce had prevented further action that 
day.10'1' It seems, however, that the main reason why the 
Texans did not follow up their victory was the extreme 
exhaustion of the troops and the coming of nightfall. 
The battle of Valverde had been won at a heavy 
cost. The Texans lost thirty-six killed, 150 wounded, and 
one missing: 
Second Regiment, Major Pyron commanding: 4 killed, 
17 wounded, 1 missing. 
Fourth Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Scurry: 8 killed, 
36 wounded. 
Fifth Regiment, Colonel Green: 20 killed, 67 wounded. 
Seventh Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Sutton: 2 killed, 
26 wounded. 
Teel's battery: 2 killed, 4 wounded. 
The losses sustained caused Sibley to write the adjutant 
general for reinforcements. The general suggested that 
lOOsibley to Cooper, February 22, 1862, ibid., 506. 
lOlSibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, ibid., 508. 
102Green to Jackson, February 22, 1862, ibid., 521. 
Scurry reported that he had lost 8 killed and 56 wounded. 
Scurry to Jackson, February 22, 1862, ibid., 515. Teel 
reported that he lost 4 killed, including 2 who died the 
next day, and 6 wounded. Teel to Jackson, February 27, 
1862, ibid., 524-525. 
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these be sent mainly from Texas, and as soon as possible. 
The Federal losses were even greater than those 
of the Confederates. Three officers and sixty-five en­
listed men had been killed. Three officers and 157 men 
had been wounded.Captain William H. Rossell, Tenth 
Infantry, was a prisoner-1-^ in addition to thirty-four 
enlisted men.^-0^ Hundreds of militia and volunteers had 
deserted.Canby asserted, though, that his troops 
were "not dispirited" by the reverse at Valverde and that 
all believed that the ultimate result of the contest 
would be in their favor.3-0® 
•^Ssibley to Cooper, February 22, 1862, ibid., 5°6. 
^O^Canby to Adjutant-General, March 1, 1862, 
ibid., 493. 
•^^sibley to Cooper, February 22, 1862, ibid., 506. 
•^Canby to Adjutant-General, March 1, 1862, 
ibid., 493. 
10^Chapin to Halleck, February 28, 1862, ibid., 
634. 
10®Canby to Adjutant-General, February 22, 1862, 
ibid., 487. 
CHAPTER VIII 
ONWARD TO ALBUQUERQUE AND SANTA FE 
In their hasty retreat from the battlefield, 
many Union soldiers had discarded their small arms and 
other equipment. Even Hall's 24-pounder had been 
abandoned in the Rio Grande. Under the flag of truce 
granted after the battle, and under another the next day, 
the Federals sent detachments with wagons to remove their 
dead and wounded.1 Many Confederates "confidently as­
serted and believed" that the enemy violated the truce by 
gathering up large numbers of small arms and carrying 
2 them off in their dead wagons. While Sibley maintained 
that the Federals sent a force which recovered the 
howitzer from the river,^ Green reported his certainty 
that a company flag and a guidon from his regiment had 
been picked up from the field during the cessation of 
hostilities.^ Since most of these reputed violations of 
^Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A., DC, 508. 
2 G r e e n  t o  J a c k s o n ,  F e b r u a r y  2 2 ,  1 8 6 2 ,  i b i d 5 2 1 .  
3sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, ibid., 508. 
^Green to Jackson, February 22, 1862, ibid., 522. 
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the truce had occurred during darkness,5 the Confederates 
had been unable to prevent them. 
Sibley and Canby agreed to a two day truce the day 
after the battle to allow ample time to care for the 
wounded and to bury the dead. On February 22, Sibley 
sent Lieutenant Colonel William R. Scurry, of the Fourth, 
and Captain Denman W. Shannon, of the Fifth, under a white 
flag, to demand the surrender of Fort Craig. These "of­
ficers and gentlemen"^ informed Canby that "very honorable" 
terms would be granted, but the Union commander refused to 
Q 
capitulate. During the course of the interview, Canby 
referred to the flags from the Fifth Regiment as "trophies 
of the fight.Colonel Green, upon learning of this, 
surmised that Canby must not have been aware of how they 
had been obtained, "as he would not have spoken of stolen 
flags as trophies."*^ 
^Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, ibid., 508. 
^Connelly to Secretary of State, March 1, 1862, 
ibid., 638. 
^Sibley to Canby, February 22, 1862, ibid., 632. 
^Connelly to Secretary of State, March 1, 1862, 
ibid., 638. 
^Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, ibid., 508. 
10Green to Jackson, February 22, 1862, ibid., 522. 
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Prom Valverde on, much disaffection came to reign 
within the Confederate ranks. The Texans found themselves 
in the "midst of a population of 80,000 souls possessing 
no very friendly spirit" towards them, and in a country 
"nearly or quite exhausted as regards forage and other 
army supplies." Northward at Port Union was a strongly 
entrenched enemy force of nearly 1,000. At Port Craig 
Canby's army was determined to hold out. If the Confeder­
ates continued up the river, Canby's men would cut off all 
communication with, and all hope of supplies from the 
Mesilla Valley.^ A cardinal feature of Sibley's strategy 
was to seize needed supplies and materiel from the Federal 
army. Alas! The Texans had won a victory at Valverde, 
but the resources of Port Craig were not forthcoming. Ap­
parently Sibley had not counted upon such a possibility. 
At any rate, the horizon appeared bleak for the "Army of 
New Mexico." 
Added to these problems was a spirit of "insub­
ordination and prejudice" directed against their command­
ing officer. This feeling, though possibly Intensified by 
the fact that Sibley was not a Texan, arose primarily be­
cause the general had failed to continue commanding his 




troops during the battle. Some spoke of him as a 
coward,^ while others went so far as to accuse him of a 
"deliberate plan" to deliver his army into the hands of 
the enemy.With morale at such a low ebb, it would 
obviously be difficult to maintain discipline and keep 
the men in a fighting mood. 
The Union soldiers, aside from small arms and 
miscellaneous equipment, also had abandoned large numbers 
of their haversacks and canteens. These contained food 
and drink, and the half-starved Texans "sumptuously ate 
15 
on Yankee light bread and other most delicious eatables." 
But even with this addition to their diet, the men had 
only "five days' scant rations" left."^ 
12 Ibid. 
•^•3v/right to Greer, September 7, 1927* "Confeder­
ate Reminiscences of 1862," New Mexico Historical Review, 
V (July, 1930), 321. 
•^Steele to Cooper, March 7, 1862, 0. R. A., 
LIII, 793. 
•^Noel, A Campaign, 20. 
^Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A 
IX, 508. 
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Paced with such grave problems, the Confederates 
held a council of war to determine their course of 
action."^ According to some Texas deserters, the more 
daring officers favored an attack on the fort. Others 
maintained that their army was too small to conquer the 
territory and that they should retreat to the Mesilla 
*1 Q 
Valley. Scurry and Shannon, having been inside Port 
Craig under a flag of truce, asserted that the post was 
too strongly defended to be taken either by assault or 
siege.After all views had been presented and dis­
cussed, the council reached a decision. The "Army of New 
Mexico" would continue its northward march, leaving Port 
Craig unmolested, for Sibley and his officers believed 
20 that adequate supplies could be captured farther north. 
Such an eventuality would lessen disaffection within the 
ranks and would also render possible the continuance of 
the campaign. To have turned back now would have meant 
17Ibid., 509. 
•^Connelly to Secretary of State, March 1, 1862, 
ibid., 639. 
^whitford, Colorado Volunteers, 68., 
20Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A., IX, 
508-509. - - -
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the end of Sibley's dream after a fruitless expenditure 
of time, money, and men. Prom the first the campaign had 
been a gamble, and the decision to continue the advance 
was another calculated risk. 
Leaving the graves of their fallen comrades behind 
them, the Texans began their northward march on February 
23. By taking prompt action, the Confederates prevented 
a party of Federals from taking their cannon up the road 
under a white flag. As the Texans moved along, every 
Mexican house which they passed displayed a "white flag 
p*l 
sticking upon the top.1 In this conflict between the 
North and the South, the native population apparently 
preferred to remain neutral. While the bulk of the army 
remained in camp during February 24, Lieutenant Colonel 
H. C. McNeill took five companies of the Fifth Regiment 
and rapidly set out on the road to Albuquerque as the 
pp 
advance guard. McNeill's force consisted of about four 
23 
hundred men and two pieces of artillery. 
* * * * 
^Faulkner (contrib.), "With Sibley in New 
Mexico," loc. cit., 135. 
22Noel, A Campaign, 20-22. 
23connelly to Seward, March 1, 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 639. 
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Meanwhile on the night of February 22, Colonel 
Nicolas Pino, Second Regiment New Mexico Volunteers, set 
out from Fort Craig with 280 men for Polvadera. Success­
fully circumventing the Texans, Pino's force reached 
Socorro—about thirty miles north of Fort Craig—on the 
twenty-fourth. While en route, many volunteer and militia 
deserters were picked up and added to the command. A 
dispatch rider, overtaking the party at Limitar, brought 
orders for Pino to fall back and station his men in and 
around Socorro. Pino paused briefly to rest his horses. 
He ordered Major Ramon Sena y Rivera to continue north­
ward with the deserters, while he and the main detachment 
countermarched. Reaching Socorro about dusk, Pino set up 
his headquarters, and ordered a mounted guard of fourteen 
men to take post south of the town. At the same time a 
strong guard took the column's animals out to graze. 
Scarcely five minutes had elapsed after these arrange­
ments had been made before Captain Cruz Gutierrez, in 
charge of the mounted guard, sent word that Texas pickets 
were approaching. Quickly Pino ordered two companies to 
reconnoiter on foot, while the animals were ordered back 
and placed under guard in a nearby corral. Below the 
town, Lieutenant Colonel Baca posted his two companies 
under the cover of some adobe walls, and then sent 
Captain Gutierrez to dislodge the enemy pickets. 
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Gutierrez had advanced but a short distance when the 
Confederates fired a shot. Baca's party thereupon dis­
charged their rifles in the direction of the flash, and 
it appeared that the Texans retired to their main body. 
This action was immediately reported to Colonel Pino who 
cautioned the officers of his command to keep their men 
under arms in anticipation of immediate action. As an 
added security measure, the colonel sent small parties 
pii 
to cover the most important defensive points. 
Lieutenant Colonel McNeill had not been idle; he 
stationed the bulk of his forces on a strategic elevation 
southwest of the town while Captain Prazier circled around 
Socorro to cut off any possible retreat of the Federals 
on the road north. At about 8 o'clock p. m., McNeill 
ordered a cannon ball fired over the town as a warning. 
This was a wise move, for from that moment on, the New 
Mexican militia and volunteers began "to desert and to 
hide themselves away."2^ It was obvious that they had 
had enough of the "terrible Texans" at Valverde. 
As the New Mexican troops rapidly began to dis­
integrate, Major Charles Wesche, a member of Governor 
2^Wesche to General, May 5# 1862, ibid., 605 
25lbid. 
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Connelly's staff and now attached to Pino's force, sent 
an urgent appeal to Camp Connelly for reinforcements. 
Accompanied by the adjutant, Major Wesche visited the 
homes of some of the influential Mexicans in a vain ef­
fort to "make them take up arms in defense of their 
Government, their homes, and firesides." His entreaties 
fell on deaf ears, and one Don Pedro Baca probably best 
summed up the Mexicans1 sentiments when he replied that 
"the United States Government was a curse to. . ./the/ 
Territory, and if the Texans would take and keep pos­
session of New Mexico the change could only be for the 
better." Disheartened, Wesche returned to Pino's head-
26 
quarters to relate the attitude of the citizenry. 
After Wesche had returned, the alcalde (mayor) 
of Socorro arrived to tell Colonel Pino that a Confeder­
ate officer had come to his house to ask him to seek out 
the Federal commander for an interview. Instead of going 
himself, the colonel sent Wesche to see the Texan. The 
major was conducted to the alcalde's home where he was 
presented to Lieutenant William Simmons, C. S. A. 
Simmons informed the major that Lieutenant Colonel 
McNeill had instructed him to demand the unconditional 
surrender of the town, and as such, he wished to be taken 
26Ibid 
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before the commanding officer. Although Wesche assured 
the lieutenant that Pino would not consent to such a 
demand, Simmons was adamant. The Texan was thereupon 
conducted to Pino's headquarters where the demand for the 
unconditional surrender of the town was again voiced. 
Pino refused to capitulate, so Simmons reminded him that 
failure to comply would mean an attack upon the town with 
the consequent imperilling of the lives of innocent 
families. Pino was as anxious to spare the innocent 
families as was McNeill, so he proposed that his force 
meet the Confederates at daybreak to give battle on the 
plain south of the town. Simmons promised to inform 
McNeill of that proposal and to return with his com­
mander's answer. Wesche mounted his horse to accompany 
Simmons through the Union lines, and on the way he was 
chagrined to find that the Federal pickets had all dis­
appeared and that the Texans had advanced to "the very 
houses of Socorro." Shortly Wesche and Simmons came upon 
Colonel McNeill and several other Texas officers. After 
listening to Lieutenant Simmons' report, McNeill decided 
27 
it would be best if he himself went to see Colonel Pino. 
At the Federal headquarters, a conference was 
held between Colonel Pino, Lieutenant Colonel Baca, and 
27Ibid., 605-606. 
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Major Wesche for the Union, and Lieutenant Colonel 
McNeill, Major Ragnet, and interpreter Stewart for the 
Confederates. Pino reiterated his desire not to expose 
Socorro to battle, and he again proposed that his forces 
meet the Texans the next morning on the open field. The 
Federals were trying to play for time, for they were 
desperately hoping that their message for help would get 
through. Governor Connelly, General Hovey, and Adjutant 
General Clever were thought to be at Polvadera, and it 
was hoped that they would come to their relief with the 
volunteers stationed at that place. While the discussion 
was still in progress, several Federal officers inter­
rupted and asked to see Pino alone. Once outside the 
building, the officers informed the commander that all 
their men had deserted. Pino returned to the room, and 
taking Major Wesche aside, asked him to find out the 
state of affairs at the quarters. As the major approached 
the building, he discovered that a captain had to serve 
as sentinel since all his men had left. Inside there were 
only about thirty-seven men. The New Mexican troops had 
all but completely disappeared. Quickly Major Wesche re­
turned to headquarters and quietly informed his colonel 
of the hopeless state of affairs. The conference con­
tinued and McNeill made it clear that he would not wait 
until morning. The Texan maintained that he knew he had 
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the advantage at the moment and, therefore, he demanded 
the immediate surrender of the town. Finally the Con­
federate commander did offer somewhat of a compromise. 
If Colonel Pino could give his word of honor that no one 
of his command had written to anybody or otherwise given 
notice of the approach of the Confederate troops, he would 
agree to refrain from hostilities until daylight. Since 
Pino replied indirectly to this, the Texans considered 
28 
the conference at an end. 
Several times throughout the discussion, McNeill 
had invited Pino to visit his camp to see for himself that 
his forces greatly outnumbered the Federals, thus making 
resistance futile. Colonel Pino now decided to accept the 
invitation, and in company with Baca and Wesche, he rode 
with the Texans to their camp and there saw "the long line 
of rebels." With apparently no relief coming from Camp 
Connelly, Colonel Pino clearly saw the handwriting on the 
wall. He surrendered his command, or what remained of 
it, at two o'clock a.m. on February 25. After the sur­
render had been negotiated, many Union militiamen came 
out of their hiding places, and at least I50 took the 
oath of neutrality that morning at ten o'clock. Colonel 
Pino, Lieutenant Colonel Baca, and Major Wesche were 
28jbid., 606 
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paroled.^ Successfully and bloodlessly, McNeill's ad­
vance guard had cleared the way for the arrival of the 
rest of the brigade. 
McNeill's advance temporarily halted in Socorro 
in order to set up a hospital to receive the brigade's 
sick and wounded. Searching about the village, a few 
supplies were found and a large quantity of medicines 
and "hospital necessaries" were located. The medical 
purveyor, Dr. E. N. Covey, acting as chief surgeon, 
formally established the general hospital. 
During the battle of Valverde many of the Fourth 
Regiment's horses had been killed, leaving that body 
"half foot and half mounted." Lack of forage and over­
work also had caused the loss of a great number of 
mounts. In order to make the brigade as a whole more 
Q1 
efficient, the men of the Fourth were asked to turn 
over their horses to the quartermaster so they could be 
reapportioned to those needy units which were to remain 
cavalry. Since the horses were the private property of 
the soldiers, it was necessary to receive their permis­
sion before such a change could be made. Colonel Scurry, 
g9lbid., 606-607. 
3°Noel, A Campaign, 20. 
31Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A., 
ix, 509. 
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verbally backed by General Sibley, promised his men that 
the government would reimburse them for their mounts at 
their appraised valueScurry pointed out that since 
the horses would probably die from the rigors of the 
campaign, it would be a wise measure to get rid of them 
33 now while they could receive compensation. The 
colonel's words had the desired effect. According to 
Sibley, "without a dissenting voice" this proud cavalry 
regiment took the line of march as a strong and reliable 
regiment of infantry The battalion of the Seventh 
had also lost many of its mounts, so it, too, voluntarily 
dismounted. The animals were distributed to the Fifth 
Regiment and to the two batteries, Captain Teel's and 
the one captured from the Federals—the "Valverde Bat­
tery." By this action the largest part of the "Army of 
New Mexico" became infantry.^ 
Contrary to what Sibley reported, the men did 
not take kindly to becoming infantry. There was probably 
nothing more degrading to a proud cavalryman than to be 
32Noel, A Campaign, 20. 
33Reminiscences of H. C. Wright. 
3^Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A., 
ix, 509. 
35Noel, A Campaign, 21. 
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reduced to the status of a foot soldier. In addition, 
the Texans were not accustomed to walking. Loaded down 
with gear, the troops found that a march of ten miles 
made them so sore and tired that they were scarcely able 
to drag themselves along. The fact that Green's men 
rode while the rest walked caused much resentment and 
unrest.3^ 
On February 27» the main body of the brigade ar­
rived in Socorro, pausing only to deposit the sick and 
wounded, before moving on. Foodstuffs were rapidly being 
used up, and the men were facing the prospect of having 
•37 
to eat nothing but beef. Such a situation could do 
nothing but increase the dissatisfaction among the troops. 
At Albuquerque was located a Federal depot. This base 
was known to have large quantities of supplies and if it 
could be captured, perhaps all would soon be well. 
Colonel Green, at the head of 400 cavalry, crossed to 
the east side of the river, while Colonel McNeill, with 
an equal number, remained on the west bank. McNeill's 
force, reinforced by part of Pyron's command and Company 
A of the Seventh, was ordered to move with "all possible 
haste" to Albuquerque. Green, with his cavalry detachment, 
3%eminiscences of H. C. Wright. 
37paulkner (contrib.), "With Sibley in New 
Mexico," loc. cit., 136. 
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was to move with him on the opposite side of the Rio 
Grande.3® 
* * * * 
After the defeat at Valverde, with the Texans 
still occupying the battlefield, Canby saw three possible 
courses of action. (1) He could attack the Confederates 
again, and thus submit his portion of the Federal army in 
New Mexico to the chances of battle. (2) Fort Craig 
could be abandoned and the troops there rapidly marched 
northward, circumventing the Texans. Once above the Con­
federates, Canby could then impede their northerly 
progress. In such an action, Canby could also join forces 
with the Federal forces in the northern part of the terri­
tory. This course would involve the loss of many of the 
supplies then at Fort Craig, the abandonment of an im­
portant strategic point, as well as necessitate the leav­
ing behind of the sick and wounded who could not be trans­
ported. (3) Canby could retain Fort Craig while awaiting 
the arrival of the reinforcements that had previously been 
asked for. Upon their arrival, concerted operations in 
the direction of the Pecos and Rio Grande could be launched 
in the effort to defeat the Texans. Success would force 
the Confederates to retreat down the Rio Grande and the 
3%ioel, A Campaign, 22. 
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troops at Port Craig would then be able to cut off their 
escape. Also while Sibley was involved further north, 
the Federals at Fort Craig would be in a position to 
launch an attack against the small Confederate force left 
in the Mesilla Valley. In Canby's judgment, the last 
plan was the best. In a council of war this was agreed 
to "by the several commanders and functionaries of the 
Territory," including the governor, who were consulted. 
39 Measures were immediately taken to put it into effect. 
After refusing to yield Fort Craig to the Con­
federate emissaries, Canby expected the Texans to assault 
40 
his post when the truce period had terminated. To 
strengthen his position, the commander "disembarrassed" 
himself of the militia by sending them away.^ This left 
him with a force of about 2,000 Americans and about 1,500 
New Mexican Volunteers.^2 Before the militia's departure, 
Canby instructed the officers of those units to hinder the 
operations of the Confederates as much as possible. 
39canby to Adjutant-General, February 23, 1862, 
0. R. A., IX, 633. 
^°connelly to Secretary of State, March 1, 1862, 
ibid., 638. 
^Canby to Adjutant-General, February 23, 1862, 
ibid., 633. 
^2connelly to Secretary of State, March 1, 1862, 
ibid., 639. 
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Should the Texans attempt to move up the river, the 
militiamen were to obstruct their movements as well as 
cut off their supplies by removing from their route the 
cattle, grain, and other goods in private hands which 
would aid the enemy. All the government-owned animals 
which were not required for immediate use at the fort 
were also sent away since there was not an adequate sup-
iiQ 
ply of forage for them at the post. J 
Canby set about organizing a partisan force com­
posed of picked men from the volunteers whose purpose was 
to harass the Texans by operating on their flanks. The 
night after the battle, Canby sent instructions to his 
subordinate officer commanding in the north to remove or 
destroy any public property which might possibly fall 
into the hands of the Confederates. Major James L. 
Donaldson, chief quartermaster, volunteered to carry out 
the above order. During the night of February 22, he set 
out with the militia. Donaldson was "charged with the 
duty of superintending the removal of the public property, 
procuring supplies, and collecting troops for future 
operations.Canby authorized the major to use his name 
to take such steps as he deemed best.^5 if the Texans 
^3canby to Adjutant-General, February 23, 1862, 
ibid., 633. 
44Ibid., 633-634. 
^^Donaldson to Thomas, March 1, 1862, ibid., 636. 
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should decide to advance northward, Canby planned to send 
part of his regular cavalry at Fort Craig to reinforce 
the troops in the northern part of the territory. After 
making all these preparations, commander Canby averred 
that "If there be any consistency of purpose or per­
sistence of effort in the people of New Mexico, the enemy 
will be able to add but little to his resources from a 
temporary occupation of the country. 
Governor Connelly, seeing that his "presence out 
of the capital would be of no further utility," decided 
to accompany Donaldson and the militia force. During the 
night march, the great bulk of the militia deserted and 
headed for their homes. As a result, Donaldson and 
Connelly were left with only a handful of men. On the 
morning of their arrival on the river, Donaldson heard 
that McNeill's advance guard was on its way to capture 
the depot of supplies at Polvadera. To prevent this, the 
provisions were hastily gathered up and sent off. Governor 
Connelly, in company with a few militia officers, arrived 
47 
in Santa Fe on February 27. 
When Canby learned that the Confederates had be-
gvui their northward march and did not plan to attack the 
^6canby to Adjutant-General, February 23* 1862, 
ibid., 633. 
^Connelly "to Seward, March 1, 1862, ibid., 
638-639. 
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fort, he ordered a full dress procession to pay military 
honors to the deceased Union soldiers. The parade took 
place at nine o'clock on February 25. The firing party 
was composed of a section of the battery and an infantry 
battalion of four companies. Each regiment which did not 
furnish a portion of the firing squad was represented in 
the procession by one of its companies. During the cere­
monies the remainder of the troops which did not take 
part in the procession, paraded under arms at their ap­
propriate stations. Canby solemnly asked his men to 
"join him in the prayer that He who tempers the wind to 
the shorn lamb will deal tenderly with the bereaved rela­
tives and friends of the brave dead, and that they will 
unite with him in commending their memory to the respect 
and admiration of our countrymen.11 "While sorrowing 
for. . ./£he7 dead and sympathizing with. . .^his/ wounded 
comrades," Canby expressed his "heartfelt admiration of 
the gallant conduct and heroic acts of all who were en­
gaged in the desperate struggle of the battle." The 
commander assured his men that what had been "lost with­
out loss of honor. . .^/would/7 yet be gloriously retrieved, 
and that the battle of Valverde. . .^A7ould7 be ranked as 
one in which all its actors were entitled to the gratitude 
and respect of their country."2*® The deceased were 
^General Order No. 11, February 24, 1862, ibid., 
513-514. 
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interred in the post cemetary just a short distance from 
the fort and located on a slight bluff overlooking the 
Rio Grande. 
On the afternoon of March 1, Captain Herbert M. 
Enos, Assistant Quartermaster at Albuquerque, received 
reliable information that a body of about four hundred 
Texans had reached the town of Belen, thirty-five miles 
below. The captain, in command of twelve regulars and 
several militia and volunteer companies, quickly made 
preparations to destroy all the public property and 
supplies which could not be carried off. About six 
o'clock that night an express rider brought the news 
that a party of about fifty Texans had reached Los Lunas 
and had captured a civilian-owned wagon train which had 
been carrying government supplies. Enos had already 
loaded what ammunition and ordnance stores Bronson, the 
ordnance agent, considered important enough to carry 
away. These were started on the road to Santa Fe. Some 
eight or nine teams remained. Enos ordered them harness­
ed and made ready to move at a moment's notice for they 
were needed to carry his troops' baggage.^ 
The night passed without the Texans making an 
appearance. But believing that they would be arriving 
^9Enos to Donaldson, March 11, 1862, ibid., 
527-528. 
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soon, and not hearing of any Federal troops coming to his 
support from Santa Fe, Enos gave the order to burn the 
public property at six-thirty on the morning of March 2. 
The destruction would have been complete had it not been 
for the Mexican men, women, and children of the town. 
They had been up all night waiting anxiously for the op­
portunity to seize any government supplies they could. 
The only property which was not burned consisted of 
molasses, vinegar, soap, and candles in the subsistence 
department. In addition there were a few saddles, 
carpenter's tools, and office furniture in the quarter­
master's department. Most of these articles were carried 
off by the Mexicans. As it would have been impossible 
with his small force, as well as the short time at his 
disposal, to have removed the property from the buildings, 
Captain Enos found it necessary to set fire to those 
structures housing the- supplies. Enos believed that even 
had he been able to carry the goods out to be burned, the 
natives would have overpowered him and saved the property 
for the enemy.5° it was later reported that the fire 
spread and destroyed several privately-owned buildings.5^ 
5°ibid., 528. 
5^-Santa Fe Gazette, April 26, 1862. 
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The last five wagons which left Albuquerque for 
Santa Pe were escorted by volunteers and militia. While 
in camp near the Indian village of Sandia, about twelve 
miles north, the train was attacked by deserters from the 
militia and volunteers. The escort was thrown into such 
confusion that the bandits were able to carry off three 
wagons and some of the mules. It was mainly because of 
wagon-master Reilley that the bandits did not get the 
other two as well. Six wagons and teams which had been 
sent to the mountains for fuel on the morning of March 1, 
and later ordered by Enos to move on to Santa Pe by way 
of Galisteo, were also attacked by Mexican bandits and 
52 
carried off. 
* * * * 
As the "Army of New Mexico" pushed up the Rio 
Grande Valley, the country continued to appear barren 
and forbidding. Grass and wood were scarce and in one 
instance, the Texans forced the alcalde of a small village 
to furnish fire wood. One soldier's opinion, probably 
typical of most, was that this country was "never intended 
for white folks." In fact, he disgustedly commented that 
the first man that ever came to this land should have been 
killed by the Indians. On the night of March 6, the 
52Enos to Donaldson, March 11, 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 528. - - -
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Confederates held a council of war to determine whether 
or not the officers were willing to continue. Paced with 
near starvation, and with the enemy behind and before 
them, a majority were opposed to going on. They were 
overruled, however, and the advance to Albuquerque was 
continued. 
As Major Charles L. Pyron's men led the advance 
toward Albuquerque,^ three large columns of smoke in the 
distance told the tale of Enos1 destruction of most of 
the supplies there. Shortly after their arrival in town, 
a man by the name of Richmond Gillespie arrived with 
dispatches from a Dr. F. E. Kavenaugh who was "commanding" 
the temporary post of Cubero, sixty miles to the West. 
Gillespie reported that the depot was well supplied and 
he urged the importance of sending a small Confederate 
force there without delay. In compliance, Major Pyron 
dispatched Captain A. S. Thurmond with Company A of the 
Seventh Regiment to Cubero with instructions to "occupy 
the post and send forward as rapidly as possible all 
supplies and stores that might fall into his hands at that 
place."55 
53Paulkner (contrib.), "With Sibley in New 
Mexico," loc. cit., 136-137. 
3^Noel, A Campaign, 23. 
55 lb id. 
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Dr. Kavenaugh operated a store at the village of 
Cubero, and he and Richmond Gillespie, George Gardenhier, 
c6 
and R. T. Thompson were the only white inhabitants.-^ 
Being men of pronounced Southern sympathies, they daring­
ly planned to seize the Federal depot there. The post 
was commanded by Captain Francisco Aragon, whose force 
consisted of forty-two native New Mexicans and three 
Americans, and an American surgeon, Dr. Boyd. Fully aware 
of the attitude of the Mexicans toward the war, Dr. 
Gillespie "in command of his three companions,11 bravely 
notified Captain Aragon at 9:00 a.m. on March 3, to sur­
render his post to them in the name of the Confederacy. 
Aragon was given ten minutes to reach a decision. At the 
end of the allotted time, Aragon had not returned an 
answer, so Kavenaugh sent one of his party to demand an 
immediate reply. Having no desire to fight for a cause 
in which he had no interest whatsoever, Aragon decided to 
surrender his command to the four Southerners. "Upon 
taking command of the post Dr. Kavenaugh sent Richmond 
Gillespie to Albuquerque to bring the news before the 
Confederate commander so a sufficient force could be sent 
to occupy the post." The area between Cubero and Albu­
querque was hostile Navajo Indian country, and Gillespie's 
lone mission across that sixty miles was very dangerous. 
56 ib id. 
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Dr. Gillespie furnished Captain Aragon and his company 
with sufficient arms and transportation to take them 
safely to Albuquerque. Upon arrival at that town they 
promised to "deliver the Government property furnished 
them to the Confederate States Army officer commanding 
there." A "large and valuable lot of quartermasters, 
commissary, and ordnance stores" were seized at Cubero, 
as well as a large amount of needed medicines and other 
medical supplies. "There was not less than 60 arms and 
cy 
3,000 rounds of ammunition surrendered."-^ 
Captain Thurmond and his company of twenty-five 
men arrived at Cubero at 2:00 p.m. on March 5* and the 
following day Dr. Kavenaugh formally turned over the 
command to him.5® Thurmond immediately gathered up the 
stores, and twenty-five wagons carried the goods to 
Albuquerque.59 George Gardenhier, one of Kavenaugh's 
party was especially helpful in acting as assistant 
quartermaster and commissary. Thurmond was also much 
impressed by another of Kavenaugh's "command," R. T. 
Thompson. According to the captain, Thompson had, "not 
^^Thurmond to Officer Commanding C. S. Forces, 
March 19, 1862, 0. R. A., IX, 529. 
58 lb id. 
59Noel, A Campaign, 23. 
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only at the capture of the post, but always been truly 
Southern, being a Virginian by birth, and certainly his 
services were most efficient in carrying out the duties 
of adjutant, treating the enemy always with much 
leniency, but with the sternness and decision of a true 
Southern gentleman." Dr. Boyd, the Federal surgeon, ap­
parently manifested Southern sympathies, for Thurmond 
remarked that he "is also among us, a gentleman of high 
medical attainments, and was at the time doing the 
Texans valuable service," as Thurmond had quite a number 
of cases of pleurisy in his company.^0 Kavenaugh, 
Gillespie, Thompson, and Gardenhier rendered the Con­
federates a great favor by capturing and securing these 
desperately needed supplies. It is no wonder that 
Captain Thurmond praised these gentlemen most highly in 
his official report. 
On March 7, the bulk of the brigade arrived in 
Albuquerque Sibley and his staff set up temporary 
6P 
headquarters, and the town was formally occupied. 41 At 
a ceremony in the plaza, thirteen cannons roared a 
^Thurmond to Officer Commanding C. S. Forces, 
March 19, 1862, 0. R. A., DC, 529-530. 
^^Faulkner (contrib.), "With Sibley in New 
Mexico," loc. cit137. 
6^Santa Fe Gazette, April 26, 1862. 
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salute as the Confederate banner was raised to flutter 
in the cool New Mexican breezeIn an effort to gain 
the support of the people as well as to weaken the 
Federal forces in the Territory, Sibley issued the fol­
lowing proclamation: 
TO THE PEOPLE OF NEW MEXICO: 
The signal victory which crowned our arms at 
Valverde on the 21st of February proves the truth of 
the assertions contained in my first Proclamation in 
regard to our powers and ability to accomplish the 
purposes therein declared. Those of you who volun­
teered in the Federal service were doubtless deceived 
by designing officials and interested citizens. The 
militia were driven to the field by force of arms. 
Under these circumstances I deem it proper and but 
just to declare a complete and absolute amnesty to 
all citizens who have, or may within ten days lay 
aside their arms and return to their homes and 
avocations. 
The conduct of this army since its entrance into 
the Territory of New Mexico attests the honesty and 
integrity of our purpose, and the protection it has 
and can afford to the citizens of the country. 
Return then with confidence to your homes and 
to your avocations, and fear not the result. 
Given at Albuquerque under my hand this 13th day 
of March 1862. 
(Signed) H. H. Sibley 
Brig. General^. 
Commanding. 4 
Sibley observed that the wealthy Mexican citizens 
of Albuquerque "had been completely drained by the Federal 
^Faulkner (contrib.), "With Sibley in New 
Mexico," loc. cit., 137. 
6^Santa Fe Gazette, April 26, 1862. 
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powers, and adhering to them, had become absolute 
followers of their army for dear life and their invested 
dollars."^ indeed, the Santa Fe Gazette reported that 
many had fled their homes when the Texans were reported 
to be nearing. Sibley believed that although political­
ly the Mexicans had no "distinct sentiment or opinion" on 
the secession issue, it was power and interest alone which 
controlled the "expression of their sympathies." Rafael 
and Manuel Armijo were two notable exceptions. When 
Sibley entered Albuquerque, they boldly came forward, ex­
pressed their Southern sympathies, and placed their 
stores, containing goods amounting to $200,000 at the 
disposal of the Texas troops.^ The Armijo brothers were 
among the wealthiest native merchants and ranchers in the 
territory. Manuel had been governor of New Mexico under 
fiPt 
the Mexican Republic. He had also been in the militia 
and had been "compulsorily" present at the battle of 
65sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A., 
DC, 511. 
^Santa pe Gazette, April 26, 1862. 
^Tsibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 511. ~ 
^^Edward D. Tittmann, "The Exploitation of 




Valverde. ̂  Rafael owned stores in several villages, as 
70 
well as having heavy investments in and around Mesilla. 
The Confederates confiscated the contents of the 
stores of Clark and the Spiegelberg brothers as these men 
were sutlers for the Union army. All persons who had 
taken any public property before the arrival of the 
Texans, were ordered to turn it over to Confederate 
authorities. At Carnuel Pass a small party of Confeder­
ates captured a train of twenty-three wagons which was 
loaded with provisions destined for Canby's command at 
Port Craig.H The supplies secured at Cubero, Albu­
querque, Carnuel Pass—and those later taken in Santa 
Fe—gave the brigade about a three-month supply. Albu­
querque was selected as the supply depot for the "Army 
of New Mexico."^ 
* * * * 
During the first few days of March, Major James 
L. Donaldson, now commanding the District of Santa Pe, 
69sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A., 
DC, 511. ~ 
7°Tittmann, "The Exploitation of Treason,11 
loc. cit., 138. 
71santa Fe Gazette, April 26, 1862. 
72sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0, R. A., 
ix, 509-510. - - -
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had decided to abandon the capital. The major reasoned 
that Santa Fe was not defensible since it was bounded on 
all sides by hills. His only alternative was to fall 
back to the safety of Fort Union. The most valuable 
stores in the department—about a quarter of a million 
dollars' worth—were loaded into 120 wagons and sent to 
Fort Union on March 3. The train required all the availa-
73 ble troops in the district as an escort. 
On February 27> Canby had sent Captains R. S. C. 
Lord and George w. Rowland, each with fifty cavalrymen, 
to Santa Fe to observe the enemy as well as to bolster 
the defenses there. Even with these additional troops, 
Donaldson did not have a strong enough force to hold the 
74 
town. The major's small army was also augmented by the 
arrival of Captain James II. Ford's company of Colorado 
75 Volunteers. 
Companies A and B, which were to eventually be­
come the nucleus of the Second Regiment, Colorado Volun­
teers, had been organized in the fall of 1861. Ford's 
company was ordered to Fort Garland where, on December 24, 
73Donaldson to Paul, March 10, 1862, ibid., 527; 
Santa Fe Gazette, April 26, 1862. 
74paul to Adjutant-General, March 11, 1862, 
0. R. A., IX, 646. 
75whitford, Colorado Volunteers, 43-44. 
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it was mustered into service for three years. Captain 
Dodd's Company A—the "Foot Volunteers"—had received 
marching orders earlier and had reached Port Craig in 
time to engage in the battle of Valverde. On February 4, 
Ford's company was instructed to proceed rapidly to Santa 
Fe and there await further orders 
After drawing ten days' rations, Company B set 
out on probably one of the most perilous marches of the 
war. Three wagons, each pulled by a yoke of six oxen, 
carried the provisions and supplies. The company first 
planned to take the shortest route across the San 
Antonio Mountains, but as the command progressed, the 
snow became deeper and the road worse. Scouts were 
dispatched ahead to see if it was possible to get 
through, and they returned with the discouraging news 
that the mountain pass was impassable since in places it 
was blocked by forty feet of snow. The Coloradoans had 
to backtrack to the Rio Grande where they crossed over 
to take the more southern route through the Taos Valley. 
Even on this new road the going was hard and some days 
the command could progress only about two miles. Night 
snows covered up tents, wagons, and all traces of the 
road, and squads of soldiers had to be sent ahead to 
76Ibid. 
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"break the track." Others with shovels preceded the 
teams to clear the way for the oxen and wagons. Ac­
companying the company on this most difficult trek was 
the wife of the bugler and her two small children. Her 
baby boy "was most of the time in the arms of one or 
other of the soldiers, his comrade relieving him of his 
gun." Riding in the wagons was impossible, since to re­
main inactive was to expose oneself to the possibility 
of freezing, or to risk rolling down the mountainside, 
"as one misstep of the poor toiling oxen might have 
hurled the wagons down into the deep ravines burying all 
out of sight in the snow."^ 
At Santa Fe, Donaldson and his officers became 
alarmed when the Coloradoans did not arrive. Scouts 
were sent out to find them. Once they were located, 
Donaldson sent mules to relieve their jaded oxen,^ for 
it was all important that they join the garrison at 
Santa Fe before the town was abandoned. After a harrow­
ing adventure of twenty-eight days, Company B arrived in 
the New Mexican capital on March 4, the very day that 
Donaldson planned to leave for Port Union.79 
77Ellen Williams, Three Years and a Half in the 
Army (New York, 1885), 8-lTI 
78Ibid., 13. 
79whitford, Colorado Volunteers, 44. 
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The major ordered that all supplies which could 
not be carried to Port Union were to be destroyed. Two 
storehouses which contained large quantities of flour 
were burned. Donaldson made certain that little was left 
for the Texans, except two large hay ricks which were in 
the government corral. These were left untouched, since 
to have set them afire would have endangered nearby build­
ings. Even the flag pole was cut down so the Confeder­
ates would "never have the chance of raising their flag 
on it."81 
On March 4, Donaldson called his troops into line 
and set out for Port Union.82 With the capital undefend­
ed, and its capture by the Texans imminent, Governor 
Connelly decided to accompany the troops. He later 
established the executive department at Las Vegas, about 
thirty miles west of Port Union. The command of about 
two hundred men8^ consisted of Captain W. H. Lewis' 
company of the Fifth Infantry, Lieutenant Sidney Banks1 
Company E, Third Cavalry, Captain Ford's Colorado 
company, and two howitzers under Lieutenant C. J. Walker, 
8oSanta Fe Gazette, April 26, 1862. 
8lWilliams, Three Years, 30. 
82lbid., 15. 
83connelly to Seward, March 11, 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 645. 
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Second Cavalry. Some volunteers commanded by Lieutenant 
Colonel Manuel Chavez also accompanied the party. But 
by the time the column had safely arrived at Port Union, 
all the volunteers except Chavez and a few officers had 
OJi 
deserted. H 
The Federal soldiers' wives, including Colonel 
Canby's wife, were not allowed to accompany their 
husbands to Fort Union. Before leaving, Donaldson's 
men gathered up all the supplies they could find for the 
use of the women. When the troops departed, the Mexi­
cans lost no time in plundering what had been left be­
hind. For several days the white ladies feared that the 
Mexicans might harm them. Fortunately, the Mexicans had 
a "scare" put into them by the arrival of two Texans. 
These men had been previously arrested in Santa Fe as 
spies and had been released after the Federal troops had 
concentrated at Fort Union. Since the Mexicans stood in 
"great fear" of Texans, the warning "Tejanol Tejanol" 
was shouted throughout the town.®5 
Sibley's men were having a difficult enough time 
trying to feed themselves, let alone their prisoners. 
^Donaldson to Paul, March 10, 1862, ibid., 527. 
85williams, Three Years, 15-17. 
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When the main body reached Albuquerque, the Texans re­
leased eight prisoners of war that had been captured at 
the battle of Valverde. The men, an officer and several 
privates of the regular army, and one or two of Dodd's 
Colorado company, made their way northward and entered 
Santa Fe "weary, worn, and footsore.11 They planned to 
continue on to their respective commands at Port Union, 
but Mrs. Canby talked them into staying for a few hours 
to rest.^ 
* * * * 
Major Charles L. Pyron's advance guard did not 
remain in Albuquerque. The force continued northward to 
Santa Fe to occupy the capital and to secure any sup­
plies which might be found. On March 10, eleven Con­
federates rode into Santa Fe. Most of this advance group 
were not actually Texans, but were New Mexicans or Ari-
zonians who had gone to Mesilla to join Baylor earlier in 
the war.®7 These men began to seize all they could lay 
their hands on in the town and from the soldiers' wives. 
The officer in command of this contingent was Captain 
Battles. Fortunately, the wife of a Colorado captain was 
acquainted with him, and she requested that he put an end 
86Ibid., 19. 
®7santa Fe Gazette, April 26, 1862. 
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to the plundering. The captain complied and, as far as 
the women were concerned, the "scare was at an end."®® 
On March 13* Major Pyron, with seventy of his command, 
entered Santa Fe®9 and the second oldest town in what is 
novi the United States was formally occupied in the name 
of the Confederacy. 
The Santa Pe Gazette, which at one time had been 
a pro-Southern newspaper, had since become staunchly 
Union in sentiment.9^ On March 22, Pyron seized the 
Gazette office after the delivery of the following letter 
to the editor: 
SANTA FE NEW MEXICO 
March 22th 1862. 
Mr. John T. Russell 
Sir. You deliver to the barrer the keys of the 
printing of the Santa Fe Gazett. 
C. L. Pyron C. S. A. 
Maj. Comd'g Santa Fe.91 
While Pyron was on his way to Santa Fe, Sibley 
sent a detachment of the Fifth Regiment to patrol the 
88v/illiams, Three Years, 19. 
89santa Fe Gazette, April 26, 1862. 
9C>Keleher, Turmoil in New Mexico, 386. 
9-^Santa Fe Gazette, April 26, 1862. 
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mountain passes to the east. This was a security measure 
designed to report any intended junction of Canby's 
forces with those at Fort Union. As the force proceeded 
toward the mountains, the country appeared to be more 
desolate than ever. One soldier described it as "en­
tirely worthless--unfit for anything at all." Apparently 
the officers of this detachment were as disgusted with 
the situation as their men, for they were "drunk all the 
time, unfit for duty."^2 
The detachment encamped for awhile on Spruce M. 
Baird's Ranch. Baird, an outspoken Southerner, was a 
lawyer who had come to New Mexico as the representative 
of Texas when that state was claiming New Mexico to the 
Rio Grande. After the boundary settlement, Baird settled 
down in the territory. Some sheep, which were described 
as being almost unfit to eat, were butchered for food. 
A heavy snow fell upon the camp on March 13t and without 
tents or shelter of any kind, the men suffered severely. 
The following day the sun melted the snow and everything 
became wet and sloppy, forcing the soldiers to spend most 
of the day busily engaged in drying their blankets and 
clothing. At this time the troops were issued new 
garments to replace their worn and tattered ones. The 
92Faulkner (contrib.), "With Sibley in New 
Mexico," loc. cit., 137. 
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mountains were still covered with snow, and the wind, 
which "blew from the east, was bitterly cold. On March 18, 
while the detachment was encamped at Sour Spring, Major 
John S. Shropshire was ordered to take Companies A, B, C, 
and D of the Fifth Regiment and proceed to Santa Fe to 
reinforce Pyron.93 Shropshire, with his approximately 
. 04 
200 cavalrymen, reached the capital on March 24. The 
95 remainder of the detachment returned to Albuquerque.-^ 
The Confederates had been in Albuquerque for 
several weeks. Having secured all the available sup­
plies in the area, Sibley now decided to move against 
Fort Union. Colonel William R. Scurry, in command of 
the Fourth Regiment and the battalion of the Seventh 
under Major Powhatan Jordan, was sent forward by way of 
Galisteo. Colonel Green's Fifth Regiment, "being some­
what crippled in transportation," temporarily stayed in 
Albuquerque to check any movement which might come from 
Fort Craig.^ Captain Bethel Coopwood's company of 
Arizona Rifles and Captain William P. Hardeman's company 
93rbid., 137-138; Noel, A Campaign, 23. 
9^Santa Fe Gazette, April 26, 1862. 
95Faulkner (contrib.), "With Sibley in New 
Mexico," loc. cit., 138. 
96sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A., 
ix, 509. 
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of the Fourth were to garrison the post at Albuquerque.97 
Sibley knew that Fort Union was the key to the 
entire territory. If that post should fall, invaluable 
supplies would be seized, Canby would be helplessly cut 
off from aid, and virtually the whole of New Mexico 
would lay prostrate at his feet. 
California, of course, was the ultimate goal of 
the campaign, but what of the territories of Colorado 
and Utah? It is not certain what the Confederates 
planned to do after the capture of Fort Union. Did 
Sibley intend to march directly into Colorado from that 
post, or did he plan to backtrack southward, force 
Canby's surrender, and then return to invade Colorado? 
Perhaps he thought of moving to California immediately 
after the capitulation of Fort Craig, for he may have 
concluded that victory in New Mexico would inspire an 
adequate number of recruits from Colorado to join his 
forces, thus making an invasion of that territory un­
necessary. Realistically, however, it would have been 
dangerous to leave Colorado behind without first 
pacifying the area. In marching to the Pacific coast, 
Sibley's supply lines would be longer than ever. The 
retention of Colorado by the Union would allow the 
9^Noel, a Campaign, 25. 
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Federals to send reinforcements to the territory from 
Port Leavenworth, forces which could descend to threaten 
the Confederate lifeline. Whether or not he planned to 
deal with Canby first, it is reasonable to assume that 
Sibley intended to march into Colorado from Fort Union. 
The occupation of that area would not only assure the 
securing of his line of communication in his ultimate 
movement toward California, but it would also mean the 
gaining of new recruits and control over the valuable 
gold fields there. From Colorado the Confederates could 
send agents to Utah to enlist new soldiers, or they could 
march in with a sizeable force to accomplish their ends. 
In addition, both Colorado and Utah would be valuable for 
supplying the Texans with needed provisions and material. 
Once his army was augmented by volunteers and 
supplies from Colorado and Utah, Sibley would be in a 
position to move against California. The Confederates 
probably intended to invade that state through the 
southern route, following the Butterfield Trail. If 
Canby had not already surrendered, Sibley's greatly in­
creased army, returning southward after being in Colorado 
and Utah, could easily have overwhelmed the garrison at 
Fort Craig. The way to California would then be open. 
At the moment, however, everything in the Confederate 
timetable depended upon the fall of Fort Union. 
CHAPTER IX 
THE ARRIVAL OP THE COLORADO VOLUNTEERS IN NEW MEXICO 
After the disaster of Valverde, Colonel Gabriel 
R. Paul, the commander of Port Union, assumed command of 
"all troops, posts, and depots" in New Mexico which were 
not immediately under the command of Colonel Cariby.-1-
Paul was the second ranking officer in the department. 
The action did not imply that Paul was superseding or 
even equating himself with Canby in authority. Since the 
commander of the department was cut off from regular com­
munication, Paul was merely assuming authority in the 
northern district as Canby's subordinate. 
A Union soldier described the commander of Fort 
Union as follows: 
Col. Paul of the Fourth New Mexican is a sterling 
officer—one of the few never cursed by the soldiers. 
The best tactician in New Mexico and a strict disci­
plinarian, he yet combines so much judgment and tact 
in the discharge of his duty as to seldom give of­
fense. His pluck is indomitable, as was proven on 
the bloody fields of Mexico, and his men place all 
confidence in his thorough devotion to the cause of 
the Government. Of a medium size, the severe regu­
larity of his features, his silvery hair and gentle­
manly carriage compel respect. He dresses in 




citizen's clothes, puts on no unwarrantable airs, 
but quietly attends to his own affairs. Prom close 
observation I caught the impression that Paul is a 
man of deep and earnest convictions, endowed with 
the courage to follow wherever they lead—as a 
soldier, brave and true, quick to decide and prompt 
to execute. 
As the Confederates continued their northward 
advance, Paul reported that the state of affairs in the 
Department of New Mexico had been daily going from bad 
to worse. The bulk of the militia and considerable 
numbers of the volunteers had deserted and "taken to the 
mountains." Robbery and plunder seemed to be the order 
of the day. Although he was probably exaggerating, Paul 
maintained that there was "general panic in the country, 
and people. . .^/were/ flying from their homes." 
The native New Mexican troops had proven sorely 
disappointing. Major James L. Donaldson, who was 
exasperated by their conduct, maintained that no reliance 
could be placed on either the militia or the volunteers. 
He advised that they be formally disbanded. According to 
the major, they had a traditional fear of the Texans and 
would not face them in the field Captain Gurden Chapin, 
2Hollister, A History of the First, 102. 
3paul to Adjutant-General, March 11, 1862, 
0. R. A., IX, 645-646. 
Donaldson to Thomas, March 1, 1862, ibid., 636. 
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Cabby's assistant adjutant, after observing that the 
militia had run away and that the volunteers were desert­
ing in large numbers, expressed much the same attitude. 
To him the native troops were "worse than worthless; 
they. . ./were/ really aids to the enemy, who. . . 
/paught/ them, . . ,/too\£/ their arms, and. . ,/̂ old/ 
them to go home.From Port Craig, Canby warned his 
£ 
subordinates, "Do not trust the Mexican troops." Even 
Governor Connelly, who had written glowing letters about 
the merits and spirit of the New Mexican troops before 
the battle of Valverde, had changed his mind. Dejectedly 
he reported that the militia had all dispersed and had 
gone home to prepare their lands for the coming harvest. 
Connelly admitted that this was by far the best use that 
7 
could be made of them. The actions and attitude of the 
native New Mexican population made it quite clear that if 
the Union was to successfully hold the territory, it 
would have to do it with white troops. 
Even before the battle of Valverde, Colonel Canby 
had sent urgent appeals to the governor of Colorado for 
^Chapin to Halleck, February 28, 1862, ibid., 634. 
^Canby to Donaldson, March 7> 1862, ibid., 647. 
^Connelly to Seward, March 11, 1862, ibid., 645. 
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reinforcements. Though only one company of Colorado 
volunteers had arrived in time to take part in the en­
counter, Cariby's pleas had some effect. On February 10, 
Major General David Hunter, commander of the Department 
of Kansas, to -which Colorado was - attached, instructed 
Acting Governor Lewis Weld to send all the available force 
at his disposal to reinforce Canby and to keep open his 
line of communication through Port Wise. Weld was urged 
to act promptly. Basing his decisions upon the latest 
information, he was to take whatever measures he deemed 
necessary, and to send the Colorado troops where they 
8 
would do the most good. 
Governor William Gilpin, who earlier had taken 
measures to raise sufficient volunteer forces in Colorado, 
had failed to obtain Federal appropriations for the de­
fense of the territory. He therefore resorted to the un­
authorized issuance of drafts on the United States 
Treasury. The drafts were used to buy ammunition and 
supplies for the equipping of the volunteer companies 
which were being organized.9 jf any citizen refused to 
^Hunter to Acting Governor of Colorado, February 
10, 1862, ibid., 630. 
9percy S. Fritz, Colorado, The Centennial State 
(New York, 1941), 202. 
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accept these "Gilpin drafts," he was informed, "Now this 
is only a question of whether you will take them as an 
evidence of indebtedness or whether we take the property 
without any evidence of it. Drafts to the amount of 
$375*000 were issued.^ When they were at first not 
recognized by the Federal government, financial distress 
ensued and a strong faction in the territory demanded the 
IP governor's removal. Gilpin was recalled to Washington 
to explain his conduct. While he was away, Lewis Weld, 
the territorial secretary, assumed the duties of the 
governorship . 
Weld attempted to notify the commander of the 
Department of New Mexico that he had ordered seven 
companies of the First Regiment Colorado Volunteers to 
march to Santa Fe.'1'^ Since Canby was still at Fort Craig 
and cut off from regular communication, Major Donaldson, 
•L0John M. Chivington, The First Colorado Regiment 
(MS., Bancroft Library, University of California). 
llpritz, Colorado, 202. 
^Hubert H. Bancroft, History of Nevada, Colorado, 
and Wyoming (San Francisco, 1890J, 426̂ 27̂  
•^whitford, Colorado Volunteers, 53, 75. 






commanding in Santa Fe, received the notice of the send­
ing of reinforcements. Quickly he dispatched a trusty-
messenger to Canby to tell him of the coming of the 
15 
Colorado regiment. 
Three companies of the First Colorado were 
stationed at Fort Wise, Colorado. Since Weld believed 
that Canby would want these troops also, the acting 
governor notified Lieutenant Colonel Samuel F. Tappan to 
consider himself under Canby's orders. Fort Wise was an 
important post in holding open the line of communication 
with the east. Weld suggested that the post might be 
held by a detachment of New Mexican troops, thus freeing 
1 fi 
Tappan's men for field duty. Acting for Canby, Donald­
son lost no time in instructing Tappan to join the other 
companies of his regiment which were coming to New Mexico 
by way of Fort Garland 
After ordering all the available troops in his 
territory to the aid of Colonel Canby, Weld expressed the 
hope that the Colorado Volunteers would prove to be ef­
ficient and would ably support the Union cause in New 
1^Donaldson to Thomas, March 1, 1862, ibid., 636. 
^Weld to Canby, February 14, 1862, ibid., 631-632. 
•^Donaldson to Thomas, March 1, 1862, ibid., 636. 
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Mexico. The governor "trusteed/ that their enthusiasm 
and patriotic bravery. . .^AFould7 make amends, and more 
than that, for their lack of active service in the 
past."1^ 
Although the Colorado troops were known to be on 
their way, several of Canby's subordinates believed that 
more reinforcements would be necessary. Captain Gurden 
Chapin sent a dispatch to Major General Henry W. Halleck, 
commanding the Department of the Missouri. The captain 
explained that he would have sent his communication to 
General Hunter, a nearer military commander, but he 
feared that Hunter would be absent in the field when his 
letter arrived. Chapin asserted that New Mexico was in a 
critical condition, and though aware that a force of 
Colorado volunteers was on the way, he feared that the 
regiment might not arrive in time to save the Federal 
forces in New Mexico from immediate danger. To Chapin 
*! 
the conquest of the territory by the Texans was a "great 
political feature of the rebellion." It would gain the 
Confederates a name and prestige in Europe and operate 
against the Union cause. The invasion should therefore 
not only be checked, but it should in the future be 
"^Weld to Canby, February 14, 1862, ibid., 632. 
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"rendered impossible." The captain believed that the 
Texans would not rest with the forces that they already 
had with them. He believed that they would attempt to 
get large additions to their army in New Mexico in order 
to extend their conquest toward Mexico and southern 
California. Chapin begged "in the name of Colonel Cariby, 
who. . .^/wa£7 fighting two to one, and laying valuable 
lives upon this issue, to send at once—lose not a day— 
at least two regiments infantry and a battery of rifled 
cannon to Port Union. According to Chapin these troops 
could serve no better way than by saving New Mexico for 
the Union.^ 
Before abandoning Santa Fe, Major James L. 
Donaldson had also sent out urgent pleas for more rein­
forcements. The major notified General Lorenzo Thomas, 
adjutant general of the army, that he considered Cariby's 
situation as critical, and advised that no time be lost 
20 
in sending reinforcements. Donaldson also wrote to 
General Halleck and informed him that although a regiment 
of Coloradoans was on the way, the snow was deep on the 
Taos Mountains and he feared that the men would not get 
"^Chapin to Halleck, February 28, 1862, ibid., 
634-635. 
20Donaldson to Thomas, March 1, 1862, ibid., 636. 
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through in time. Donaldson "urgently recommended" that 
four regiments of infantry, some cavalry, and a battery 
Pi 
of rifled cannon be sent at once to Port Union. 
Colonel Paul at Port Union was also impressed 
with the gravity of the situation. He urged that a re­
inforcement of 4,000 men, two batteries of rifled cannon, 
and six siege pieces be sent to New Mexico immediately. 
To insure an adequate consideration of the territory's 
plight, Paul ordered Major Donaldson to go to Washington, 
D. C. "to represent the interests and wants of the de-
pp 
partment" and to "enter more fully into details." 
As the Confederates continued their northward 
advance, Colonel Paul began concentrating the Union troops 
in the northern district at Port Union. At that post he 
began organizing and equipping a column with the intention 
of marching southward to form a junction with Cariby's 
forces. Once the Union troops in the territory were 
united, Paul believed that the Federals would be able to 
2*3 
drive the Texans out. On March 9> Paul sent a dispatch 
to Canby in which he unfolded his plan to unite the 
forces. According to this arrangement, Paul would move 
^Donaldson to Halleck, March 1, 1862, ibid., 637* 




southward from Port Union on March 24. By taking a back 
road, avoiding the Rio Grande Valley and the Texans, he 
and his column of 1,200 troops and four guns, expected 
to arrive two days later at the village of Anton Chico. 
Here he would await the arrival of Canby's men, which, if 
they left on March 20, could arrive five days later. 
Should the Confederates threaten either his position or 
that of Canby's before the junction was made, Paul planned 
to continue his southward march, until he met Canby's 
column. Paul suggested that in order to confuse the 
Texans as to his true intent, Canby should send his 
mounted men with two guns to a point about thirty or 
forty miles up the river from La Joya. This feint would 
make it appear that the Federals planned to attack the 
Confederates in the rear. While the Texans were being 
deceived, Canby's main column could proceed safely to 
Socorro and across to Abo Pass and Punta del Agua. With 
a mountain range between him and the Rio Grande Valley, 
Canby could easily reach Anton Chico without fear of 
24 
molestation. In a dispatch dated March 14, Canby ap­
proved of Paul's plan, and the commander of Fort Union 
25 
hastened to complete the organization of his column. 
* * * * 
2^Paul to Canby, March 9, 1862, ibid., 653. 
25paul to Adjutant-General, March 24, 1862, 
ibid., 652. 
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During the latter part of August, 1861, the First 
Regiment Colorado Volunteers was organized. The nucleus 
was two volunteer companies which had already been raised. 
John P. Slough, the captain of Company A, was appointed 
colonel. Samuel P. Tappan, captain of Company B, became 
lieutenant colonel, and John M. Chivington was commis-
26 sioned a major. After the organization of the regiment, 
the women of Denver City presented the unit with a "hand­
some" silk flag.2? on the Platte River, two miles from 
the center of Denver City, barracks were erected and the 
encampment was named Camp Weld, in honor of the territorial 
secretary.2^ 
The regiment may have been composed of good 
material in the main; but it nonetheless contained a large 
number of undisciplined and restless men. Most of the 
volvinteers had enlisted with the idea of serving actively 
in the eastern campaigns and were disappointed with the 
inactivity of Camp Weld. As a result of this idleness, 
the men became dissatisfied and reckless.29 There were 
2^Hollister, A History of the First, 5» 
2?Rocky Mountain News, August 21, 1861. 
2®Hollister, A History of the First, 6. 
29Ibid., 7. 
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as many as two or three companies at a time who were 
stripped of their arms and placed under arrest with their 
•2Q 
officers for mutiny. Discipline was very difficult to 
maintain, and the citizens of Denver City had to have an 
extra police force to protect their property from the 
"31 
nocturnal forays of the drunken and rowdy soldiers. 
The men were publicly accused of being "chicken thieves, 
jayhawkers, turbulent and seditious, a disgrace to them-
•32 
selves and the country." Three companies of the regi­
ment were sent to help garrison Fort Wise; but these men 
were no better pleased there than they had been at Camp 
Weld.33 
Early in January an express arrived from New 
Mexico bringing the news of the Confederate advance and 
a call for assistance.3^ Since Colorado was within the 
jurisdiction of the Department of Kansas, permission from 
the commander of that department had to be received before 
3<^Chivington, The First Colorado Regiment. 
31Bancroft, A History of Nevada, Colorado, and 
Wyoming, 421. 
32Hollister, A History of the First, 7. 
33Bancroft, A History of Nevada, Colorado, and 
Wyoming, 421. 
^Hollister, A History of the First, 36. 
Colonel John P. Slough 
VJhitf or d, Color ado Volunteers in the Civil VJar, 4 6. 
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the troops coulcl be sent to New Mexico's aid. Gilpin had 
already departed for Washington, and Acting Governor Weld 
applied to General Hunter for authority to send the regi­
ment to New Mexico.^ Major Chivington also wrote to 
Hunter and asked for marching orders. He maintained that 
unless the men were put into the field, they would desert 
in the spring.^ Finally the long desired order to march 
was given. 1 No doubt the citizens of Denver City were 
quite relieved vihen Hunter's order arrived, sending the 
First Regiment on its way. 
The day after the battle of Valverde, February 22, 
Colonel Slough left Camp WeId with seven companies.3^ 
Nine days later the other three companies, under Tappan, 
set out from Fort Wise. On March 4, while Tappan's men 
were encamped at Bent's Fort, Captain A. F. Garrison ar­
rived by special coach from Fort Union. Unaware that the 
regiment had already begun its march, Garrison had been 
ordered to Fort Wise to urge the volunteers1 immediate 
advance. In order to move ahead as rapidly as possible, 
^^Whitford, Colorado Volunteers, 75 • 
•^Chivington, The First Colorado Regiment. 
^Hollister, A History of the First, 36. 
^Whitford, Colorado Volunteers, 75. 
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Tappan ordered his men to carry only a change of shirts 
and a pair of blankets. No longer incumbered by their 
baggage wagons, the three companies were able to march 
considerably faster. On March 5, Tappan left the 
Arkansas River and headed toward the Purgatoire, some 
seventy-five miles away. When en route, Lieutenant B. N. 
Sanford, of Company H, arrived from Slough's command to 
inform Tappan that the seven companies had crossed the 
Arkansas River at Pueblo the morning before. The two 
detachments would unite at the crossing of the Purgatoire 
39 
River. 
On March J, the three companies arrived at the 
headwaters of the Purgatoire half an hour after Slough 
and the bulk of the regiment had come in.^0 The rendez­
vous was at Gray's Ranch, near the present-day city of 
41 
Trinidad. That evening the camp of the reunited regi­
ment had the "bustle and hum of a small town." The as­
sembled regiment "'fell in' and gave the Colonel three 
cheers and a tiger. He raised his cap, but did not 
speak." Colonel Slough apparently did not properly 
3%ollister, A History of the First, 45-46. 
^°Ibid., 46. 





Approximate route of the First Regiment Colorado Volunteers 
Atla s to Accompany the Official Records of the Union 
and Confederate Armie s, II, plate CXIX, map 1. 
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understand human nature. Although he had a noble ap­
pearance, the men seemed to lack confidence in him. 
"His aristocratic style savor/ed/ more of eastern 
society than of the free-and-easy border to which he 
should have become acclimated." He had been the regi­
ment's colonel for six months and during that period he 
had never spoken to his troops. He failed to understand 
that on the eve of an important expedition, a few words 
42 from him were indispensable to a good understanding. 
On March 9, an ambulance from Port Union met the 
43 
Coloradoans on the southern slope of the Raton Moimtains. 
The officers informed Slough that they had abandoned Santa 
Fe and urged him to march ahead as fast as possible. 
Colonel Paul had reportedly mined Port Union and was pre-
iiii 
paring to abandon the place if the Texans appeared. Upon 
receipt of this news, the regiment "added wings" to its 
speed. By three o'clock the volunteers had reached the 
Red River where they halted and ate both donner and supper 
at onceMajor Chivington lined up his men and asked, 
^Hollister, A History of the First, 47. 
**3ibid., 48. 
44 Chivington, The First Colorado Regiment. 
^^Hollister, a History of the First, 48. 
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"All who will make a force march for the night to save 
Port Union, step two paces to the front." Every man 
46 
stepped out. After leaving behind everything except 
their weapons and a pair of "blankets, the men started 
out with all "possible and impossible speed" for Fort 
Union, some eighty miles distant. The baggage was left 
in charge of a corporal's guard and would be brought on 
later 
With the wagons emptied of most of their loads, 
many men climbed aboard to ride. Some three or four 
hundred were still left to walk. "Away into the wee 
hours of morning did. . tramp, tramp, tramp, the 
gay song, the gibe, the story, the boisterous cheer, all 
died a natural death. Nothing broke the stillness of the 
night but the steady tramp of the men and the rattle of 
the wagons." The overworking of the draught animals 
proved to be unwise for many began to "drop and die" in 
their harnesses. Had the regiment not attempted to drive 
the animals so hard, they probably could have made Union 
without a halt. The next morning the Coloradoans arrived 
at Maxwell's Ranch on the Cimarron River, thirty miles 
from Port Union. The owner was kindly disposed toward the 
Chivington, The First Colorado Regiment, 
^Hollister, A History of the First, 48. 
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Union soldiers, and several companies were given quarters 
to sleep in that night. He also supplied the troops with 
160 pounds of sugar and 100 pounds of coffee. The effects 
of the heavy driving had played heavily upon the stock. 
Fifteen or twenty animals were sick and many died. This 
forced the regiment to travel more slowly or face the 
hQ 
alternative of losing them all. The First Coloradoans 
had traveled sixty-seven miles continuously since the 
morning before, and a total of ninety-two miles in the 
iiq 
previous thirty-six hours. 
As the regiment approached Fort Union, the ter­
rain became "uniformly descending." The valley in which 
the fort lay was about four miles wide and was bounded on 
the east and west by timbered ridges. Through the valley 
ran a little stagnant, alkali stream. On a gentle swell 
within a mile of the west side of the vale was the fort. 
It was a simple fieldwork of moderate size with bastioned 
corners surrounded by a dirt parapet and ditch, with a 
slight abattis at exposed points. Although the armament 
was poor, consisting mainly of howitzers, the supply of 
ammunition was considered adequate for any emergency. 
Forming part of the works were bomb-proof quarters 
^Ibld., 48-50. 
^9vmitford, Colorado Volunteers, 78. 
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capable of housing 500 men and all the fort's supplies. 
Under a two hundred foot "precipitous and rocky ridge" 
which bounded the valley on the west., lay the old post. 
It was built of adobes, logs, slabs and lumber "without 
any apparent order of system."-'0 
The First Regiment arrived outside Fort Union on 
51 
March 11. Colonel Slough had earlier gone ahead by 
52 coach, and he came out to meet his command. About 
dusk, the men had finished unloading their wagons. They 
were formed in a column and marched into the post with 
drums beating and colors flying. The volunteers halted 
in front of Colonel Paul's quarters where, "in rather un­
intelligible words," both he and Governor Connelly 
welcomed them. "They commended the zeal with which. . . 
/the Colorado Volunteers/ had accomplished the march from 
Denver, but said nothing of the battle of Val Verde or of 
the whereabouts of the enemy at present; subjects that 
might naturally be supposed to slightly interest" the 
newly-arrived troops. Apparently the men were unimpressed 
5°Hollister, A .History of the First, 5I-52. 
^1Ibid., 52. 
52john M. Chivington, The Prospective (MS., 
Bancroft Library, University of California). 
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with the welcoming oratory. One trooper remarked that he 
"thought they might as well have permitted the boys, 
hungry and tired, to go to their camp near the fortifi­
cation as to have perpetrated this farce." The regulars 
at the post, numbering about 400, were also glad to see 
the Coloradoans "for they had been whipped in the fight 
below, and it was an undisguised fact that the Texans 
were having it their own way in the Territory." Within 
a few days the quartermaster department began issuing the 
Volvinteers arms and clothing in preparation for the coming 
trial with the Texans. ̂  
As in any army camp rumors "flew thick and fast" 
and when a dispatch arrived from Colonel Canby on March 
14, speculation arose among the men as to the contents. 
"Madame Rumor. . .kindly furnished the news as follows: 
Canby. . .^iTad/7 captured a large train coming from below, 
with an escort of one hundred and fifty men. Gen. 
Sibley. . ,/yja.s/ at Santa Pe, and recruits. . ,/yievoj 
rapidly swelling his ranks. His number. . .^was7 various­
ly estimated at from twenty-five to thirty-five hundred." 
Rumored reports were also "rife every day of the near 
5%ollister, A History of the First, 52, 54. 
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approach of any desired or undesired, number of Kansas 
troops, but, like the Advents' Messiah, the date of their 
arrival. . .^/wasT" postponed from time to time to suit the 
prophet. 
Soon after the arrival of the Colorado troops, an 
incident occurred in the Volunteers' infantry camp which 
was "but the natural consequence of the lawless tone of 
public sentiment in the regiment." Sergeant Philbrook of 
Company K had overindulged in spirits and when Lieutenant 
Gray of Company B attempted to arrest him for being drunk 
and disorderly, the sergeant fired five shots at him. 
One ball struck the officer on the bridge of the nose and 
glanced down and lodged in the lower part of his face. 
Though he must have suffered intense pain, Gray was not 
seriously injured. Officers who were standing nearby 
emptied their revolvers at Philbrook, but he managed to 
elude their aim. Later that night he was captured and 
confined to the guard house. This event caused great 
excitement among the men, and Company B demanded "instant 
justice by lynch process." Company K attempted to tone 
down the incident by circulating several versions of the 
affair which were favorable to their sergeant. Only the 
quick and firm action of the officer of the day, Captain 
34Ibid., 54. 
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Sanborn, saved the prisoner from "Judge Lynch." He was 
safely locked up while the "excited passions of all 
parties" was allowed time to cool. During the month of 
April, Philbrook was tried by a general court-martial and 
executed by a firing squad.55 
Other events indicated that at least certain 
members of the First Colorado left much to be desired. 
When Captain Pollock left for Denver City with the wagons 
which had transported the regiment to Fort Union, public 
property was discovered missing at the post. Suspiciously 
sounding like Pollock's men had helped themselves, a 
detail of twenty men under Sergeant Wilson was hastily 
dispatched at sundown to overtake the train and bring back 
the stolen goods. On the night of March 21, a group of 
the Volunteers broke into the sutler's cellar and "gobbled 
a lot of whiskey, wine, canned fruit, oysters, etc."^^ 
Apparently the men of the regiment were behaving no better 
at Fort Union than they had in Denver City. 
When Colonel Slough arrived at Fort Union, post 
commander Paul "had the mortification to discover" that 
the Coloradoan's commission was senior to his. By virtue 
of this seniority, Slough assumed command of the Union 
55ibid., 53-54, 86. 
56ibid., 54-55. 
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forces in the northern district and planned to carry out 
the junction with Canby according to Paul's original plan. 
VIoefully, Paul wrote the adjutant general that he had 
been deprived of a command which he had taken "so much 
pains to organize and with which.' . expected to 
reap laurels." Paul pointed out the injustice of an in­
experienced officer of only six months' service taking 
precedence over him who had many years' service and who 
had frequently been tried in battle." In order to pre­
vent any such future occurrence, Paul "modestly" asked 
the War Department to bestow upon him the rank of 
brigadier general of volunteers.57 
While Slough was completing the details for the 
coming march southward, a dispatch, dated March 16, ar-
e;8 
rived from Colonel Canby on March 21. Canby had 
changed his mind about the date of the proposed junction. 
Apparently he believed that Port Union was too valuable a 
post to be abandoned at this time. He made it clear that 
all other points in the department were of no importance 
compared to Port Union. Not only was it essential to 
maintain that post, but the line of communication with the 
-^Paul to Adjutant-General, March 11, 1862, 
0. R. A., IX, 646. 
58Paul to Adjutant-General, March 24, 1862, 
ibid., 652. 
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East had to be kept open at all costs. If it became 
evident, that B'ort Garland could not be held, Canby 
ordered Paul (Canby did not know that Slough had assumed 
command) to abandon and destroy it and concentrate all 
the troops in the northern part of the department at Fort 
Union. Here he was to remain until reinforcements from 
Kansas, Colorado, or California arrived. While awaiting 
these anticipated forces, Canby suggested that Paul 
harass the Texans with partisan operations. This would 
involve relatively small units which would obstruct the 
Confederates1 movements and remove or destroy any sup­
plies which might possibly fall into the Texans1 hands. 
Should sufficient reinforcements arrive, giving Paul a 
large enough army to operate directly against the enemy, 
Canby ordered Paul to notify him immediately of his plans 
so that he could cooperate from Fort Craig.Later when 
Canby learned that Slough had assumed command, he sent 
essentially the same instructions to that officer.^0 
Canby intended to retain Fort Craig as long as 
possible, for it was ideally situated to cut off any sup­
plies coming to Sibley from the Mesilla Valley. It also 
might serve as a strategic point to cut off any contem­
plated Confederate retreat down the river. There was no 
59canby to Paul, March 16, 1862, ibid., 653. 
^°Canby to Slough, March 18, 1862, ibid., 649. 
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need to send any immediate help to Fort Craig as it was 
stocked with enough food and supplies to last until 
April 10. Should Cariby consider it necessary to abandon 
the fort, however, it would mean that his forces would 
have to unite with Paul's troops as soon as possible. 
All supplies which could not be carried would be destroyed 
and the sick and wounded would be left at Limitar. Thus 
relieved of these incumbrances, Canby's column could move 
rapidly northward to junction with the forces from Port 
Union. When the decision to abandon the post had been 
made, Canby planned to send several messengers, by dif­
ferent routes, who would verbally inform Paul of the route 
and point of uiion. But until such information was re­
ceived, Paul was instructed not to move from Fort Union 
for the purpose of forming a junction. 
Differences of opinion soon developed between 
Slough and Paul over the interpretation of Canby's in­
structions. The matter was undoubtedly intensified by 
Paul's jealousy and Slough's apparent lack of tact. 
Garrison duty at Port Union certainly was not improving 
the restless and undisciplined nature of Slough's men. 
His awareness of this fact, as well as his desire to 
"reap laurels," too, were probably the main reasons which 
^Canby to Paul, March 16, 1862, ibid., 653. 
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motivated him to loosely interpret Canby's instructions. 
The Coloradoans had come to New Mexico to fight, and 
Slough made it known that he planned to move against the 
62 
enemy. 
Paul vigorously opposed Slough's decision to move 
in force from Fort Union. The colonel addressed a letter 
to Slough and informed him that he had originally turned 
over his command to him for the purpose of carrying out 
the plans approved by Canby "for the relief of and 
junction with his forces, to the end that when united the 
entire force should be used to drive the enemy from the 
Territory." But now Canby's dispatch of March 16 ordered 
that the movement from the post be delayed until further 
instructions. Paul believed that Slough's decision to 
move toward the enemy was contrary to Canby's orders; but 
if that officer was determined to move toward the enemy, 
Paul requested that he do so with his own regiment, two 
sections of artillery, and the regular cavalry which had 
already been sent out ahead as scouts. The remaining 
units of artillery and Captain VI. H. Lewis' company of 
infantry were in Paul's opinion the smallest forces which 
could garrison the post securely. But even this would not 
6^Paul to Adjutant-General, March 24, 1862, 
ibid., 652. 
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be sufficient should Slough meet with disaster or advance 
so far as to be unable to rapidly return to the fort's 
relief if it was attacked.^ 
In reply to Paul's protests, Slough insisted that 
Canby's instructions were not only "to protect Fort Union, 
but also to harass the enemy." Slough reasoned that by 
moving his command to the vicinity of Bernal Springs, 
forty-five miles from Fort Union, both ends could be ac­
complished. At that point the Federals would be between 
the enemy and Fort Union, and thus the post would be as 
much protected as if the troops remained there. At 
Bernal Springs the Union army could "better operate for 
the double purpose of harassing the enemy and protecting 
Santa Fe from depredation.11 An officer had reported that 
the Texans at San Antonio (New Mexico) were weak, and the 
Coloradoan asserted that, such being the case, the troops 
under his command would be "sufficient to control their 
action and to defeat them in case of an attack." In con­
cluding his reply, Slough stated that he needed every 
available man and therefore he could not consent to leaving 
behind the units which Paul deemed necessary for the de­
fense of Fort Union.^ 
^Paul to Slough, March 22, 1862, ibid., 654. 
6^Chapin to Paul, March 22, 1862, ibid. 
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Deeply chagrined by Slough's reply, and "be­
lieving that the best interests of the Government demand­
ed it," the commander of Fort Union once again addressed 
6^ 
a note to the Coloradoan, ^ urging him to reconsider his 
decision and to submit to the plan of the department com­
mander. Indignantly Paul stated that Slough must have 
been "aware that no part of the regular force of this 
district would have been turned over to. . had the 
instructions of Colonel Canby of the 16th instant been 
received twelve hours earlier." Again he stressed the 
fact that Slough's contemplated move was in direct con­
flict with Canby's orders and the possible attack upon 
the Texans at San Antonio was "most certainly" in vio­
lation. If that attack proved unsuccessful, it would re­
sult in "the entire loss of the Territory, at least for 
a time, and render its reconquest much more difficult." 
Paul pointed out that Canby must have had good reasons to 
change the plan he had at first approved, and his anxiety 
to have the change made known was indicated by his sending 
duplicates of his instructions by different messengers, 
"in the name of the department commander, of the best in­
terests of the service, and of the safety of all the troops 
^Paul to Adjutant-General, March 24, 1862, 
ibid., 652. 
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in this Territory,11 Paul implored Slough to reconsider 
his decision.^ 
Colonel Slough, either because he did not have 
time or because he did not consider it worth his while, 
did not bother to answer Paul's last letter. He had made 
up his mind to move southward and he had no intention of 
changing his plans. Paul was so upset that he wrote the 
adjutant general about the situation in order "to throw 
the responsibility of any disaster which. . .^/might/ oc­
cur on the right shoulders." Fearing the worst, Paul 
asked for reinforcements to the amount of 4,000 men and 
Cry 
several batteries of the best cannon. ' 
Governor Connelly was fully aware of the "little 
discord in relation to the movement. . .from Union," but 
since he was anxious for offensive action against the 
Texans, he sided with Slough. Connelly reasoned that 
Slough's movement "would curtail the limits of the enemy, 
and mayhap lead to the expulsion of the enemy from the 
capital" which was now reported to be occupied by one 
hundred men with two pieces of artillery. Connelly 
averred that this "slight" difference of opinion between 
6^Paul to Slough, March 22, 1862, ibid., 655. 
67paui to Adjutant-General, March 24, 1862, 
ibid., 652-653. 
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the two officers would "lead to no unfavorable result, 
as Colonel Slough. . .^would/ advance upon the road that 
the enemy. . .^fould/ necessarily have to march to reach 
Union, should an attempt be made upon that place." An­
other reason for Connelly's stand that Slough's action 
was justified was his guess that the Texans were "prepar­
ing for a precipitate retreat from the Territory by way of 
Port Stanton on the Pecos River." His belief was given 
credence by the fact that the Texans were making a "sudden 
and mercenary demand for money" from the inhabitants of 
the territory. According to the governor, the Confederates 
had not "behaved with the moderation that was expected, and 
. . .desolation. . .marked their progress on the Rio Grande 
from Craig to Bernalillo. Exactions and confiscations. . . 
^/were/ of daily occurrence, and the larger portion of those 
who. . .^Tad/ anything to give or to lose. . .left their 
houses and contents a prey to the invaders" and sought 
refuge within the Union lines. To Connelly this effort on 
the part of the Texans to secure as much money and goods 
as possible from the people was a clear indication that 
they were preparing to leave. Had the Confederates planned 
to remain in New Mexico, he reasoned that they surely would 
68 
not antagonize the native population in such a manner. 
68connelly to Seward, March 23, 1862, ibid., 651-
652. 
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About noon of March 22 Colonel Slough and his 
command sallied forth from Port Union, leaving that post 
practically ungarrisoned. The column consisted of the 
First Regiment Colorado Volunteers, 916 men; Captain 
W. H. Lewis' battalion of the Fifth Infantry and Captain 
James H. Ford's independent Colorado company, 191 men; 
Captain George W. Howland's detachment of the First and 
Third Cavalry, 150 men; Captain John F. Flitter's battery 
of four guns, 53 men; and Lieutenant Ira W. Claflin's 
battery of four small howitzers, 32 men. Slough's com­
bined force consisted of 1,3^2 men.^9 
The next day the Federal column approached the 
town of Las Vegas, now the temporary Union capital of the 
territory, and set up camp for the night. At a distance 
the village had appeared to be a "clump of bushes or 
rocks, and. . .^/Tmproved7 but slightly on closer ac­
quaintance . The buildings. . .^/were/7 not above nine feet 
high, with flat, dirt roofs, built of adobes and generally 
plastered with mud." The buildings which surrounded the 
plaza, about an acre in extent, were "ornamented with 
porticos and thick coats of whitewash in front. The 
church. . ./was? a building of more pretensions. . .one 
and one-half stories high, with a shingle roof and an 
^Slough to Adjutant-General, March 30, 1862, 
ibid., 534. 
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abortive attempt at a steeple surmounted by a small 
wooden cross. It. . decidedly the most civilized 
looking object in town." The streets were "tolerably 
regular and straight; courts and corrals. . .^/occupied/' 
the vacant portions of squares, and there. . ,/yias"/ not 
a spire of grass nor a green thing to be seen within the 
70 
town limits.11 Las Vegas may have appeared to be un­
appealing and desolate to the men from the green terri­
tory of Colorado, but the town itself was quite typical 
of the majority of the Mexican settlements throughout New 
Mexico at that time. 
On March 24 Slough's force left Las Vegas and 
started on the road to Bernal Springs. Soon after leaving 
the town the road began to wind "around, between and over" 
numerous foothills. "Blocks of mountains. . scat­
tered about, of every conceivable shape and running in all 
directions. Some. . .^/were/ bare and rocky—others covered 
with the white cedar and small pinion pines; the openings 
also. . ,/Ka.&7 some scattered timber, though no underbrush 
of account. The ground. . ,/via.s/ smooth and covered with 
the usual close-cropped turf; the road rough and stony." 
Near noon the Federals came to the village of Tecolote 
^Hollister, A History of the First, 56-57. 
276 
which was located on a muddy branch of the Pecos. From 
there the column continued on to Bernal Springs where 
71 
the men encamped for the night. Ironically, the camp 
was named Camp Paul in honor of the commander of Fort 
72 
Union. 
Company F of the Colorado Volunteers was ordered 
to continue on eight miles to San Jose, a small town 
located on the Pecos River. At that point the Colo-
radoans encountered Captain Iiowland in command of three 
companies of regular cavalry numbering about 150 men. 
Howland's force had been sent ahead earlier for scouting 
purposes. Since Company F had left their "grub, blankets, 
and even. . .^/Uheir/ saddle-bags" behind at Camp Paul, 
they had to borrow some rations from the regulars and 
were forced to crawl into a hay-mow to sleep. The next 
morning, March 25, the men were ordered to cook two days' 
rations and be ready to march at a moment's notice.^ 
Slough had reached the strategic point from which 
he was to operate with the dual purpose of protecting 
71 Ibid. 
?2Slough to Adjutant-General, March 30, 1862, 
0. R. A., IX, 53^. 
f^Hollister, a History of the First, 58-59. 
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Fort Union and harassing the enemy. He maintained that 
74 
he was adhering to Cariby's instructions,1 but what the 
commander of the Department of New Mexico considered 
compliance to his orders might be another matter. 
^Chapin to Paul, March 22, 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 654. 
CHAPTER X 
THE SKIRMISH OF APACHE CANYON 
While occupying Santa Fe, Pyron heard that a 
Federal column was marching toward the capital. Rather 
than await their arrival, the major,^ with a force esti­
mated at 250 to 300, set out on the Santa Fe trail to 
p 
meet the foe. The road, running through the southern 
extremity of the Sangre de Cristo mountains, passed 
through an elevated, corridor-like canyon known as La 
Glorieta Pass. The pass was several miles long, narrow 
at both ends and about a quarter of a mile wide at the 
middle. The western part of the pass was called Apache 
Canyon. When the command reached Apache Canyon the 
horses were worn out by hard riding, so the men dismounted 
and their horses, under guard of one company, were sent to 
a nearby ranch. The remainder of Pyron's men went into 
camp at Johnson's Ranch, which was located at the mouth 
of the canyon. On the morning of March 26, Pyron received 
•J-Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A., IX, 509. 
2Santa Fe Gazette, April 26, 1862; Walker to 
Macrae, May 20, l&b2, 0. R. A., IX, 531. 
3whitford, Colorado Volunteers, 23. 
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word that the Federals were coming "In the shape of two 
hundred Mexicans and about two hundred regulars.11 Quickly 
he assembled his men and marched down the trail, expecting 
4 an easy victory. 
* * * * 
About three o'clock in the afternoon of March 25, 
Major John M. Chivington left Bernal Springs with a de­
tachment of Colorado Volunteers.^ Chivington was a color­
ful character. Born in Warren County, Ohio, on January 27, 
1821, he moved to Illinois in 1848 and joined the Illinois 
Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church. He later 
transferred to the Missouri Conference and was a missionary 
to the Wyandotte Indians in Indian Territory. He came to 
Colorado in i860 and became the presiding elder of the 
£ 
Rocky Mountain District. When the First Regiment was 
being formed, Governor Gilpin offered him the post of 
chaplain of the regiment. Chivington refused, stating that 
if he went into the army, he had to have a "fighting" com-
7 
mission. As a result he was given the field rank of major. 
**Brown to Wife, April 30, 1862, Hollister, A History 
of the First, 167. Evidence indicates that part, or all of 
"OTis letter was a forgery. 
^Chivington to Cariby, March 26, 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 530. 
^Chivington, The First Colorado Regiment. 
^Chivington, The Prospective. 
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Chivington had heard that the Texans in Santa Pe 
numbered only about a hundred men with two pieces of 
o 
artillery. His plan was to make a rapid march on the 
place and take the enemy by surprise.9 when the major 
arrived at San Jose, he augmented his force with Company 
P and Howland's regular cavalry which had been sent there 
the day bef ore .-L<~) Chivington's column totaled 418 men 
consisting of 268 Colorado Volunteers and 150 regular 
cavalry: 
Company A, Colorado Volunteers, Captain Edward W. 
Wynkoop, 60 men. 
Company D, Colorado Volunteers, Captain Jacob 
Downing, 60 men. 
Company E, Colorado Volunteers, Captain Scott J. 
Anthony, 60 men. 
Company P, Colorado volunteers (mounted), Captain 
Samuel H. Cook, 88 men. 
Company E, Third Cavalry, Captain Charles J. 
Walker, 50 men. 
A detachment of the Third Cavalry, Captain George 
W. Howland, 50 men. 
Sections of Companies D and G, First Cavalry, 
Captain R. S. C. Lord, 50 men.H 
Chivington continued his forward movement until he 
12 
reached Kozlowski's Ranch about twelve o'clock that night. 
^Connelly to Seward, March 23, 1862, 0. R. A., 
ix, 651. 
^Chivington to Canby, March 26, 1862, ibid., 530. 
^Oflollister, A History of the First, 59. 
l^Chivington to Canby, March 26, 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 530. 
3-2 lb Id. 
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This ranch, located near the Pecos Indian ruins, twenty-
seven miles from Santa Fe, for many years had served as 
a hostelry. The trail itself crossed the Pecos River at 
the ranch. Near the main house was a grove of cotton-
wood trees which shaded a fine spring of pure water which 
flowed from crevices in the sandstone rock. In the back 
of the ranch was a small scrub cedar covered rise where 
the Federals set up their camp, named Camp Lewis in honor 
1^ 
of Captain William H. Lewis of the Fifth Infantry. 
At Kozlowski's Ranch Chivington learned that Con­
federate pickets were in the vicinity. In fact, the 
owner of the ranch informed the major that they had 
14 
visited him earlier that evening. Chivington also re­
ceived intelligence that the Texans1 advance guard, esti­
mated at 600 men, had set out from Santa Fe and was near­
by."1"-' In order to secure more information, the major 
ordered Lieutenant George Nelson of Company F to take 
twenty men and capture one of the enemy's pickets. The 
lieutenant set out on his mission at two o'clock in the 
-i /: 
morning. The Confederate pickets were supposed to be 
•^whitford, Colorado Volunteers, 84. 
14 
Chivington, The First Colorado Regiment. 
•^^Hollister, A History of the First, 59. 
•^Chivington to Canby, March 26, 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 530. 
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at Pigeon's Ranch* five miles ahead, but when Nelson ar­
rived there he discovered that they had gone to another 
ranch. Nelson thereupon decided to give up and return 
to Kozlowski's Ranch. As luck would have it, the Federals 
had gotten between the Confederate pickets and their main 
force. The well-armed and well-mounted Texas pickets mis­
took Nelson's party for their own men, for they rode into 
the midst of the Coloradoans before they realized their 
mistake. Thus, at ten o'clock that morning, the Federals 
were able to capture all four of the enemy pickets without 
firing a shot. One of the captured Confederates, Mclntire, 
had been on Canby's staff at the battle of Valverde, but 
he had left the Union ranks to join Sibley. Another, 
Captain Hall, had been well-known in Denver City before 
leaving to join the Southern army. An outraged Colorado 
Volunteer maintained that "being a Northern man, I can 
conceive no excuse for his conduct. He never should be 
allowed to taint the fair soil he has disgraced by his 
silly and despicable treachery. 
About eight o'clock in the morning of March 26, 
Chivington's column set out on the road to Santa Fe. The 
infantry led the advance, while the cavalry, in the order 
of their rank, brought up the rear. As the men leisurely 
^Hollister, A History of the First, 59. 
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made their way along, scouts reported back to confirm the 
iQ 
intelligence that the Texans were somewhere ahead. Near 
19 
two o'clock the Federals patssed by Pigeon's Ranch, the 
largest hostelry on the trail between Santa Fe and Las 
20 
Vegas. Ghivington's men did not stop at the ranch, but 
continued on down the canyon about a mile and a half" where 
21 
they reached the summit of the divide. On descending 
the slope, the advance guard passed through a narrow gulch 
to where the trail made a short turn. Here in the midst 
22 
of a thicket of trees and bushes, the Federals unexpect­
edly ran into the advance guard of the Texans. The Con-
23 
federates, numbering two lieutenants and thirty men, were 
taken completely by surprise and surrendered without firing 
24 a shot. One of the captured lieutenants was in charge 
of Pyron's artillery. A Union picket took one of the 
l8Ibid., 61. 
•^Walker to Macrae, May 20, 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 531. 
20Whitford, Colorado Volunteers, 85. 
2-LHollister, A History of the First, 61. 
22Whitford, Colorado Volunteers, 87. 
23chivington to Canby, March 26, 1862, _0. R. A., 
IX, 530. 
2^Chivington, The Prospective. 
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Texas officers and came rushing back to Chivington's 
force with him shouting, "We've got them corraled this 
time. Give them hell, boys, Hurrah for the Pike's 
Peakers. 
Immediately the Federals closed their ranks, the 
cavalry took open order by fours, and the soldiers rushed 
forward on the double for about three-quarters of a mile. 
Knapsacks, canteens, overcoats and clothing of all kinds 
were flung along the road as the troops stripped for the 
encounter. On turning a short bend, the Federals entered 
Apache Canyon proper and came face to face with the main 
26 
body of the Texans who were about 400 to 500 yards 
27 
ahead. 
The Confederates had marched a distance of four 
?8 
miles since leaving their camp at Johnson's Ranch. The 
capture of Pyron's advance guard resulted in the major's 
not knowing that the Federals were so near. Though taken 
completely by surprise, the Texans quickly halted and set 
25Hollister, A History of the First, 61. 
g6lbid. 
2^Walker to Macrae, May 20, 1862, 0. R. A., 
DC, 531. ~ ~ 
2®Brown to Wife, April 30, 1862, Hollister, 
A History of the First, 167. 
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up their two pieces of artillery which soon began throw­
ing grape and shell among Chivington's men.2^ The battery 
was supported by a company of mounted troops who displayed 
a red flag emblazoned with a white star, the emblem of the 
•50 
Lone Star State.-* 
The blasts from the Confederate mountain howitzers 
thundered throughout the canyon and temporarily threw the 
Federals into confusion, for Chivington's men had never 
been under fire before. As soon as a battle line across 
the canyon had been formed, the major attempted to calm 
his men by addressing them on the importance of the con­
test. Just then a shell came screaming through the air 
and a hundred voices cried, "Look out there, Major, the 
damned rebels are shooting at you with their cannon." 
Chivington made a polite bow as the first missile passed 
over his head, and his men laughed at his chivalry. 
Captain Wynkoop's Company A and Captain Anthony's Company 
E were ordered to deploy to the left and up the side of 
the canyon. Captain Downing was ordered to take his 
Company D and skirmish to the right and up the mountain 
side. Since the Federals had no cannon, it was necessary 
29chivington to Cariby, March 26, 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 530. ~ ~ 
3®Hollister, A History of the First, 61-62. 
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for Chivington to send his men up the sides of the 
canyon for in this way they would get beyond the possible 
elevation of the enemy cannon, and would be in a position 
to fire into the midst of the Texans. Chivington in­
structed the cavalry to retire to the rear where they were 
to hold themselves in readiness to charge whenever it ap-
•31 
peared that the Confederates might retreat. Captain 
Howland's cavalry company hastily filed to the rear in 
disorder, leaving Company F, Colorado Volunteers, in 
front. Several shells whizzed over the heads of Company 
F and the men crowded to the left to get out of range. 
"All was confusion. The regular officers in command of 
the cavalry plunged wildly here and there, and seemed to 
have no control of themselves or of their men. Every one 
was talking—no one talking to any purpose. Major Chiving­
ton was placing the infantry in position, and Cook's 
cavalry awaited orders, while the shells went tearing and 
Op 
screaming over them."J 
The Confederate battery maintained its fire for 
only five or ten minutes. Though the gunners had close 
range, the rough, rocky, and wooded terrain greatly less­
ened the effectiveness of the howitzers, and thus caused 
^chivington, The Prospective; Chivington to 
Canby, March 26, 1862, 0. R. A., IX, 530-531# 
32Hollister, A History of the First, 62. 
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the Federals little damage.33 Taken by such complete 
surprise, the Texans were not able to form an adequate 
battle line.3^ Chivington's men who had deployed up the 
sides of the canyon were soon up out of range of the 
cannon and began pouring a galling fire into the Con­
federate ranks. Pyron was forced to order a retreat and 
the gunners quickly limbered their howitzers and withdrew 
with the rest of the Texans following.35 The Union 
cavalry failed to charge as Chivington had earlier in­
structed them.3^ As the Confederates fell back the first 
phase of the skirmish of Apache Canyon came to a close. 
Pyron's men rapidly retreated down the canyon for 
about a mile where the two howitzers, supported by the 
mounted company, halted to check the Federals while the 
rest of the detachment continued on for about another 
mile.37 Pyron now chose a strong, natural position to set 
33walker to Macrae, May 20, 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 531. 
3^Brown to Wife, April 30, 1862, Hollister, A 
History of the First, 167. 
35chivington to Canby, March 26, 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 531. " " -
3^Chivington, The Prospective. 
3^Brown to Wife, April 30, 1862, Hollister, A 
History of the First, 167. 
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up his line of defense. In a narrower part of the 
canyon which wound abruptly to the left and then resumed 
its old course, a high, steep, rocky bluff blocked the 
path of the approaching Federals. On this bluff, which 
was like the bastion of a fort, Pyron posted a full 
company to support the two howitzers which he planned to 
set up on a smaller mound at its base. The ground in 
front of this small knoll was not suited for the action 
of cavalry, for the approaching road was rough, narrow, 
oO 
and crooked. About forty Confederates were stationed 
in and around some houses which were about 700 to 800 
yards to the right of the trail, while the rest of the 
detachment was drawn up in line of battle across the 
39 
road. The same arroyo which had run through the first 
battlefield also continued down into the second. About 
fifteen feet deep and as many wide,**0 the arroyo ran 
alongside the road with the road occasionally crossing 
it. This natural impediment made it impossible for the 
Federals to approach the battery's position except head 
3®Hollister, A History of the First, 63. 
39srown to Wife, April 30, 1862, Hollister, 
A History of the First, 167. 
^°Whitford, Colorado Volunteers, 89; Chivington, 
The First Colorado Regiment. 
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4l 
on by column. In addition, the Texans had torn up the 
42 
bridge across the arroyo. No sooner had Pyron com­
pleted his defensive arrangements than up came his 
4*3 howitzers with the Federals at their heels. J 
When the Confederates withdrew from the first 
field, Chivington assembled his men and cautiously 
followed down the canyon until he came to within an 
eighth of a mile of the Confederate line. Here he halted 
his men behind a projecting point while all the infantry 
units were collected from the hills After a hasty 
survey, Chivington decided to employ the same successful 
enveloping tactics which he had used before. All the 
cavalry, except Captain Cook's Coloradoans, were dis­
mounted and ordered to join the infantry as skirmishers. 
Company D was again deployed to the right, and Companies 
A and E to the left. A regular cavalry company joined 
each. Cook's mounted force was ordered to remain in re­
serve preparatory to charging the line the moment the 
Texans gave way before the fire of the infantry.^5 
^Hollister, A History of the First, 63. 
^2Chivlngton, The First Colorado Regiment. 
^^Brown to Wife, April 30, 1862, Hollister, 
A History of the First, 167. 
^Hollister, A History of the First, 62. 
^5chivington to Canby, March 26, 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 531. 
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As the battle commenced, Major Chivington was un­
doubtedly an inspiring sight to his men. "With a pistol 
in each hand and one or two under his arms chawed 
his lips with only less energy than he gave his orders. 
He seemed burdened with new responsibility, the extent of 
which he had never before realized, and to have no thought 
of danger. Of commanding presence, dressed in full regi­
mentals, he was a conspicuous mark for the Texan sharp 
shooters." A Confederate officer who was later taken 
prisoner stated that he had emptied his revolver three 
times at the major and then made his company fire a volley 
at him. As if possessed of a charmed life, Chivington 
galloped unhurt through the storm of bullets. Discouraged, 
lifi 
the Texans turned their attention to something else. 
The battle raged for nearly an hour. Chivington, 
seeing that the Confederates were weakening, ordered that, 
simultaneously with the attack on the flanks, the cavalry 
should charge the center. The howitzers commanded the 
road, but again the rocky and scrub-covered terrain made 
47 
the cannons far less effective than they should have been. 
^Hollister, A History of the First, 62. 
47lbid., 63. 
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Captain Downing, leading the skirmishers on the right, 
had nearly flanked the Texans and was in a position to 
48 
cut off their retreat. The time had come. As soon as 
the order to charge left Chivington's mouth, Captain 
Cook's ninety-nine mounted "Pike's Peakers"^ with swords 
Kf) 
and revolvers drawn, eagerly plunged ahead. As the 
cavalry neared the steep, rocky bluff, the Confederates, 
using old style musket cartridges containing an ounce 
ball and three buckshot, began firing into them. These 
bullets zipped by the heads of the cavalry so sharply that 
many took them for shells, and strained their eyes to see 
where "the spiteful bull-dogs were." The Confederates, 
however, had limbered up their howitzers again and were 
retreating down the canyon. The cavalry continued to be 
pelted by a "redoubled shower- of lead, rained on. . . 
/them/ from the rocks above." Captain Cook was hit in the 
thigh by a ball and three buckshot, but he was able to 
stay in his saddle. About forty rods further down, how­
ever, his horse stumbled and fell on him, badly spraining 
^Chivington to Canby, March 26, 1862, 0. R. A., 
EC, 531. 
^Hollister, a History of the First, 63-64. 
5QBrown to Wife, April 30, 1862, ibid., 167. 
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his ankle. He was shot again in the foot, but he was 
able to limp to one side and escape further injury. 
Lieutenant Nelson now assumed command of the cavalry 
charge. When the company came to the bend in the road 
where the small arms fire was heaviest, the men "halted 
slightly," fired a few shots from their revolvers at the 
51 
rocks above, and then dashed around the point. Ahead 
lay the fifteen foot wide arroyo. It was a sight to be­
hold as the Colorado cavalry undauntedly charged onward 
and leapt over the gulch into the midst of the enemy. 
Of the ninety-nine horses, only one failed to make the 
jump. As George Lowe's horse fell, his knee was badly 
wrenched, but he quickly got up and ran to a bank to gain 
cover. Here he was confronted by a stalwart Texas captain 
who, with a cocked pistol bearing on him, "guessed Lowe 
was his prisoner." Lowe sprang on him like a cat. After 
a violent struggle, the captain was disarmed and marched 
to the rear.^ 
The lightening charge of the "Pike's Peakers" 
crashed through the Confederate center and trampled down 
their reserve. All but two rear sections of the cavalry 
5-LHollister, A History of the First, 64. 
52chivington, The Prospective. 
^nollister, A History of the First, 64. 
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swept on down the canyon after the artillery. But the 
Confederate howitzers were too "fleet-footed" and after 
a short chase, the main body returned to the scene of 
battle to help Lieutenant Marshall's two rear sections 
clean out the reserve. The Texas reserve had been 
stationed in the road. Though at first confused and 
scattered by the thundering cavalry charge, they had taken 
54 
cover and now stood like a "tiger at bay." By this time 
the infantry under Captain Downing and Lieutenant Bernard 
of the Third Cavalry, poured a sharp fire into the reserve. 
This drove them up a small canyon on the left side of the 
main one where companies A and E were able to take a large 
number of prisoners.^ The Colorado infantry came down 
on them like a "parcel of wild Indians, cheering at the 
top of their lungs, regardless of the shower of bullets 
raining among them." The cavalry charge and this final 
infantry assault completely crushed resistance and the 
Confederates broke and fled in every direction. 
Some of the Texans were stationed in the houses 
to the right of the road. Undaunted by the arroyo in 
5^ lb Id. 
55chivington to Cariby, March 2b, 1862, 0. R. A_., 
EC, 531. 
^Hollister, A History of the First, 64. 
294 
front of the houses, part of the Colorado cavalry leaped 
over and charged upon the defenders. After a brief hand 
to hand encounter, the Texans had had enough and sur­
rendered.*^ Two "Pike's Peakers," Boone and Dixon, took 
fifteen prisoners from a house which "could have been 
held against fifty." As the Texans were being disarmed, 
someone cried out, "Shoot the sons of bitches." Boone 
immediately bellowed, "No, I'm damned if you do! You 
didn't take 'em. I took these prisoners myself, prisoners 
of wah. Pall in thar, prisoners! Forward, double quick," 
e;8 
and away went Boone to the rear with them. As the 
prisoners were marched off the field, they "saw some men 
with their heads nearly shot off, some with their arms 
or legs shot off, and one poor man. . .lying against a 
,,59 
tree with his brains all shot out. Even in remote New 
Mexico war was hell. 
Many of the "Pike's Peakers" had been unhorsed in 
the charge, some of the mounts escaping completely. This 
did not impair the effectiveness of the assault, however, 
for half an hour after the charge, the Texans had dis-
fin 
appeared and the firing had ceased. It was now sundown, 
5?Brown to Wife, April 30, 1862, ibid., 168. 
^Snollister, A History of the First, 64. 
59]3rown to Wife, April 30, 1862, ibid., 169. 
6°Holllster, A History of the First, 65. 
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and "not knowing how near the enemy's reenforcements 
might be, and having no cannon to oppose theirs," 
Chivington decided not to pursue the Texans any further. 
As stillness settled over the battlefield, the dead and 
wounded, including several of the Texans', were gathered 
up. Chivington's command then returned to Pigeon's R-anch 
where a hospital was set up and the men made arrangements 
/T *1 
to encamp for the night. Acting as a rear guard, 
Captain Walker's Company E, Third Cavalry, remained on 
the field until 9:30 that night before retiring to join 
the main body. When Chivington's men reached Pigeon's 
Ranch, a reinforcement of five hundred men and a howitzer 
battery arrived at the same time. "The woods rang for 
half an hour with their cheering. 
After being overwhelmed in the brief encounter, 
Pyron fell back to his camp at Johnson's Ranch. Late 
that evening he dispatched to Chivington a flag of truce 
asking that there be a cessation of hostilities until 
8:00 a.m. of March 28, in order to allow for the burying 
of the dead and the caring of the wounded. Chivington 
^Chivington to Cariby, March 26, 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 531. ~ _ 
^2Walker to Macrae, May 20, 1862, ibid., 532. 
63}jolllster, A History of the First, 66. 
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agreed, and the next day was spent in carrying out these 
64 
acts of humanity. 
Pyron's detachment had been soundly beaten by 
superior numbers—the first defeat the Confederates had 
suffered since they had begun their campaign. Even so, 
the Texans had fought valiantly. Captain John Phillips' 
company of "Brigandes" (independent volunteers) lost one 
man killed and two wounded. "On this occasion, as on 
every previous one, this company showed a devotedness to 
the cause which. . .elevated them and inspired confidence 
/T p 
throughout the army." 3 Pyron had lost four men killed, 
67 
six wounded, and seventy or so prisoners. Seven of 
these prisoners were commissioned officers. Completely 
64scurry to Jackson, March 31# 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 542-543; Connelly to Seward, March 30, 185*2, ibTd., 
657. 
^sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, ibid., 509. 
Sibley made references to Pyron's report of the skirmish 
of Apache Canyon. The report must have been lost, for it 
is not in the Official Records nor in the War Department 
collection of Confederate records. 
66journal of Ebenezer Hanna (MS., University of 
Texas Library). 
^Hollister, A History of the First, 67. 
Chivington gave the ConfederateTosses as 32 killed, 43 
wounded, and 71 prisoners. Chivington to Canby, March 26, 
1862, 0. R. A., IX, 531. Slough lists the Confederate 
casualties as" 20 to 25 killed, more wounded, and about 70 
prisoners. Slough to Adjutant-General, March 30, 1862, 
ibid., 534. 
68Hollister, A History of the First, 67. 
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routed and with a quarter of his original force prisoners 
of the victorious Yankees, there was truly no joy at 
Johnson's Ranch that night. 
The Federals lost five men killed, fourteen 
69 
wounded, and three missing. Captain Cook, who had been 
wounded in the foot and thigh, "was all shot to pieces, 
but his usual fortitude remained with him. The ghastly 
smile with which he endeavored to make light of his wounds 
to cheer his boys betrayed his agony." Lieutenant Marsh­
all of the Volunteers had accidentally shot himself while 
breaking a prisoner's loaded rifle which he foolishly had 
held by the muzzle. Marshall died within a few hours and 
"his cruel, unfortunate death cast a shadow athwart the 
glories of the day."7° 
So ended the skirmish of Apache Canyon. "The 
action, though small, was conducted with great spirit and 
judgement." The "green" Colorado Volunteers had proven 
their mettle and had taken on a new feeling of confidence. 
One Volunteer maintained that darkness alone had kept 
71 them from making their victory even more decisive. 
^^Ibid., 66. Chivington lists his casualties as 
5 killed and 14 wounded. Chivington to Canby, March 26, 
1862, _0. R. A., IX, 531 • Slough gives the Union losses 
as 3 men TcilTed in battle, 2 since died, and 8 wounded. 
Slough to Adjutant-General, March 30, 1862, ibid., 534. 
7°Hollister, A History of the First, 67. 
T^Ibid., 66. 
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During the morning of March 27, the Federals 
buried their dead in an open field a quarter of a mile 
72 
down the canyon from Pigeon's Ranch. After the burial, 
some teams were sent out to bring in a quantity of flour 
73 and corn which the Texans had stored a few days before 
in a building a short distance from the ranch. This was 
74 quickly converted into breakfast by the hungry troops. 
The well at Pigeon's Ranch proved to be inadequate to 
meet the needs of both the men and their horses, so 
leaving his wounded behind in the hospital, Chivington 
fell back to Kozlowski's Ranch where the water was plenti­
ful. Prom here Captain Lord's cavalry company escorted 
7S 
the captured Confederates to Port Union.1^ 
f^Whitford, Colorado Volunteers, 96. 
^Hollister, A_ History of the First, 67. 
T^Whitford, Colorado Volunteers, 97. 
75nollister, A History of the First, 67. 
CHAPTER XI 
THE BATTLE OP GLORIETA 
In pursuance of Sibley's plan to move upon Port 
Union, Lieutenant Colonel William R. Scurry was to pro­
ceed by way of the Galisteo road. He had under his com­
mand the dismounted Fourth Regiment and Major Powhatan 
Jordan's mounted battalion of the Seventh.1 Company A 
of the Fourth remained behind in Albuquerque to guard 
2 
the depot and the hospital. On March 20, all the sick 
of the Fourth were sent to the hospital in Albuquerque 
and rations were distributedScurry was now ready to 
move out. 
The following day the Fourth started on its way 
and after traveling seven miles encamped for the night. 
The Seventh came up the next morning and brought some of 
the Fourth's supplies which had been left behind. Scurry 
was taking the road by the mountains which was a fairly 
difficult route, but since the timber was heavier, fire­
wood would be available. Though the weather was 
•'•Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A., DC, 509. 
2Noel, A Campaign, 23. 
^journal of Ebenezer Hanna. 
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beginning to turn milder, it was still very cold at 
night. On March 23, the command marched ten miles and 
camped that night at a small Mexican town. The road 
continued to be rough, and the next day the footsore 
soldiers made only fifteen miles. That afternoon around 
two o'clock the command stopped to rest. The air was 
clear and the men could see the beautiful scenery which 
abounded around them. In the distance some could see a 
banner waving in the breeze. At first it appeared that 
it might be the enemy, but upon closer look, it proved 
to be only a white flag. Undoubtedly a Mexican had 
l\ 
placed it over his house as a sign of neutrality. 
Probably the most interesting town in which the 
men encamped was Real de Dolores. This village possessed 
a mill for the smelting of gold and silver, although it 
was not now in operation. All around the bases of the 
nearby mountains were ore diggings and no doubt the 
imaginations of many were fired by these sights. On 
March 25, the Fourth set out in an easterly direction. 
Part of the way the road ran up the course of a small 
stream which emptied into the Rio Grande. As the command 
neared Galisteo, the country became barren and level 
again which was in contrast to the distant snow-capped 
4Ibid. 
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mountains which presented "quite a picturesque scene." 
That evening the Fourth arrived at Galisteo where the 
troops set up their camp. This small Mexican village was 
about twenty-five miles south of Santa Pe. The Seventh 
Regiment was following behind and did not reach Galisteo 
5 
until late the next day. 
The troops were still suffering from lack of 
adequate food, and the basic diet remained flour and 
water. There was not an ounce of meat of any kind, nor 
even an "eye of grease." On March 26, the day of the 
skirmish in Apache Canyon, the men rested while remaining 
7 in their camp1 which had been set up on a ranch near the 
edge of a prairie. To the delight of the Texans, the 
ranch hands began butchering large quantities of sheep 
for their use, the mutton being as fat "as anyone could 
wish for." It was late in the evening as the men happily 
thought and talked about the feast they would soon have. 
In high spirits they began placing their mutton over the 
fire when suddenly a cloud of dust was seen approaching 
from across the prairie. As it came nearer, it proved 
5 Ibid. 
^Halcomb to Greer, August 5, 1927# "Confederate 
Reminiscences of 1862," loc. cit., 316. 
^journal of Ebenezer Hanna. 
Lt. Col. '..'illiam R. Scurry 
Whitfor d, Colorado Volunt eers in the Civil War, 
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to "be a man on horseback. The rider had a paper in his 
hand as he loped up to Colonel Scurry's tent. The ap­
pearance of this express naturally aroused the interest 
of the rank and file and for a moment at least, the 
men's minds wandered from their supper. Shortly after 
the messenger had delivered his dispatch, the colonel 
gave him another, and the rider was off again. One 
soldier who was standing nearby candidly surmised that 
"Hell is brewing and not a mile off."® 
The messenger had come from Major Pyron who was 
engaged in a sharp conflict with a "greatly superior" 
force of the enemy about sixteen miles away in Apache 
Canyon. The major urged Scurry to come immediately to 
his relief,9 and no sooner had the express left than 
Scurry went into action. He came down the line with his 
cap in his hand, bellowing, "Pack up, boys, Major Pyron 
has been fighting 600 Yankees with 300 men for two days 
and has got a truce until 8 o'clock tomorrow and we must 
10 
go to him." Immediately the order came to fall in line and 
^Halcomb to Greer, August 5, 1927* "Confederate 
Reminiscences of 1862," loc. cit., 316-317. 
^Scurry to Jackson, March 31* 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 5^2. 
lOHalcomb to Greer, August 5, 1927* "Confederate 
Reminiscences of 1862," loc. cit., 317. The author mis­
spelled Major Pyron's name and he gave the number of Con' 
federates as only twenty. Time had undoubtedly clouded 
his memory concerning the number of men engaged in the 
skirmish of Apache Canyon. 
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within ten minutes, Scurry's column was formed and ready 
to move out.^ It was sunset"1"2 as the main column began 
its march directly across the mountains to the scene of 
conflict.All packing and loading of the wagons was 
left to the teamsters Since the direct route would 
be too difficult for the wagons to follow, the baggage 
train, guarded by 100 men under Lieutenant John W. Taylor, 
was ordered to proceed by the longer road to a point about 
six miles in the rear of Pyron's position. 
The night was cold, so the men marched along as 
fast as possible to keep warm. In one instance, the road 
ran up a very steep mountain grade. The jaded horses were 
unable to pull the artillery to the top, so the men them­
selves had to accomplish this task. Long ropes were tied 
to the cannon and after an hour or so of tedious labor, 
16 
the pieces were pulled over the crest of the mountain. 
•'••'•Scurry to Jackson, March 31* 1862, R. A., 
IX, 542. 
•^Journal of Ebenezer Hanna. 
•^Scurry t0 Jackson, March 31* 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 542. 
•^Halcomb to Greer, August 5, 1927* "Confederate 
Reminiscences of 1862," loc. cit., 317. 
•^scurry to Jackson, March 31* 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 542. ~ ~ 
•^Journal of Ebenezer Hanna. 
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About three o'clock in the morning Scurry reached Pyron's 
17 encampment at Johnson's Ranch. ' Soon after their ar­
rival, the men set about gathering wood to build fires 
1 ft 
to warm their chilled bodies. Weary and exhausted, 
the troops lay on the ground to sleep until daylight.^ 
Pyron and Chivington had agreed to a cessation 
of hostilities until eight o'clock that morning, so as 
soon as daylight permitted, Scurry thoroughly examined 
the terrain in and around Johnson's Ranch. His recon­
naissance convinced him that the area he held was a 
20 
naturally strong defensive one. After breakfast he 
formed his men in a battle line across the road a few 
hundred yards below Johnson's Ranch where the canyon made 
a bend. Scurry planted his artillery on a hill in front 
of the ranch. The canyon walls were so steep here that 
21 
an attack could only come from down the canyon. By 
eight o'clock, the colonel had completed his defensive 
•^Scurry to Jackson, March 31* 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 542. 
nO 
Journal of Ebenezer Hanna. 
•^Halcomb to Greer, August 5, 1927* "Confederate 
R e m i n i s c e n c e s  o f  1 8 6 2 , "  l o c .  c l t 3 1 7 .  
20Scurry to Jackson, March 31* 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 542-543. 
21 Journal of Ebenezer Hanna. 
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arrangements and he was now ready to receive the ex-
22 pected Federal onslaught. 
About noon the wagon train arrived.2-^ Eagerly 
the hungry troops began unloading the wagons with the 
hope of finding the mutton which they had not had a 
chance to eat the evening before. Alas I No mutton was 
found, so the soldiers had to be content with their regu-
2 4 , lar flour and water diet. However, even this food put 
them in a better mood, for they were still greatly ex-
25 
hausted from the previous night's march. The Texans 
remained in battle formation, and throughout the remainder 
of the day and during the night, they vainly awaited the 
26 enemy. 
The next morning, March 28, Scurry had come to 
the end of his patience. If the Yankees would not come 
27 
to him to fight, he would go after them. When his 
22Scurry to Jackson, March 31* 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 543. 
2*5 
^Journal of Ebenezer Hanna. 
p]l 
Halcomb to Greer, August 5* 1927* "Confederate 
Reminiscences of 1862," loc. cit., 317. 
25journal of Ebenezer Hanna. 
2^Scurry to Jackson, March 31* 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 5^3. ~ 
2?Ibid. 
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troops had finished breakfast, they were told to put what 
remained in their haversacks, for they were moving out 
28 
and would not be back until that night. After posting 
a small guard for the wagon train, Scurry set out on the 
2Q 
Santa Fe Trail through Apache Canyon. y 
* * * * 
Near noon of March 27, Colonel John P. Slough left 
Camp Paul at Bernal Springs with the remainder of his 
troops. About two o'clock the next morning he arrived at 
•50 
Kozlowski's Ranch where his forces were reunited. 
Chivington had informed Slough of the previous day's en-
31 
counter and the Coloradoans "could not be restrained." 
The Federal commander learned from his spies that 
the Confederates who were in Apache Canyon and at John­
son's Ranch were about 1,000 strong. In order to recon-
noiter the position of the enemy, Slough decided upon a 
two-columned movement. Chivington, with a detachment of 
about 430 men, was to move off on the Galisteo road and 
pO 
Halcomb to Greer, August 5> 1927# "Confederate 
Reminiscences of 1862,11 loc. cit., 317. 
^9scurry to Jackson, March 31* 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 5^3. 
3°siough to Adjutant-General, March 30, 1862, 
ibid., 534. 
•^Chivington, The First Colorado Regiment; 
Hollister, A History of the First, 68. 
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push forward to Johnson's Ranch.^ He was to "attain 
the principal heights upon the side of Apache Canyon, 
and occupy them," while Slough with the main body of 
about 870 men moved directly into the deep, narrow, and 
thickly wooded canyon.^3 There can be little doubt that 
Slough was anxious to engage the Texans in battle. This, 
of course, was contrary to Canby's instructions. In his 
official report to the commander of the department, 
Slough justified his aggressive actions by maintaining 
that he was reconnoitering in force with the intention 
only of "ascertaining the position of the enemy and of 
nS4 harassing them as much as possible. ̂  
Between eight and eight-thirty o'clock on the 
morning of March 28, Slough's column left Camp Lewis and 
set out on the road to Santa Fe. v Captain Charles J. 
Walker's Company E, Third Cavalry, led the advance,3^ 
S^siough to Canby, March 29, 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 533. 
33siough to Adjutant-General, March 30, 1862, 
ibid., 534; Tappan to Chapin, May 21, 1862, 1862, ibid., 
3^Slough to Adjutant-General, March 30, 1862, 
ibid., 535. 
35slough to Canby, March 29, 1862, ibid., 533; 
Chivington to General, March 28, 1862, ibid., 538. 
36walker to Macrae, May 20, 1862, ibid., 532. 
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while the baggage train of one hundred wagons brought up 
the rear.^ At nine-thirty, about two miles down the 
road, Chivington's detachment parted from the main column 
and set out on the Galisteo trail which ran to the left 
oQ 
of Apache Canyon and nearly parallel to it. Slough's 
force continued on to Pigeon's Ranch—about three miles 
further—and by ten-thirty, all of his command had ar-
39 
rived. 
Pigeon's Ranch was the largest and most con­
venient hostelry on the trail between Santa Pe and Las 
Vegas. It was called "Pigeon's Ranch" after the nickname 
given to its Franco-American owner, Alexander Valle, who 
had a peculiar style of dancing at fandangos. The ranch 
was situated in a narrow defile, and the buildings, the 
trail, and an arroyo took up practically all the space 
in the canyon. In back of the main living quarters was 
a double corral in which loaded wagons were brought in 
for protection. Attached to it were sheds with stalls 
for draft animals. A formidable adobe wall ran from the 
sheds back up to a ravine and then surrounded a yard in 
3^Tappan to Chapin, May 21, 1862, ibid., 537. 
38chivington to General, March 28, 1862, ibid., 
538. 
39siough to Adjutant-General, March 30, 1862, 
ibid., 534. 
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which teams were kept and fed.^° After the skirmish of 
Apache Canyon, Chivington had fallen back to the ranch 
where he established a hospital for his wounded before 
moving on to Kozlowski's Ranch 
The various detachments of Slough's force halted 
upon reaching Pigeon's Ranch. The cavalrymen, leading 
the advance, had gotten to that point first and were 
able to rest about an hour and a half before the main 
lip 
column came in. Some of the soldiers rested while 
others visited the wounded in the hospital. Many filled 
their canteens with water from the well, for there was 
not another spring except at the western end of the pass 
where the Texans were reported to be encamped. As the 
men leisurely passed the time, they were completely un-
iio 
aware that the enemy was approaching nearby. J 
* * * * 
Colonel Scurry had proceeded about six miles down 
the canyon from his camp when his advance guard reported 
^°Whitford, Colorado Volunteers, 85. 
^Hollister, A History of the First, 67. 
^2Walker to Macrae, May 20, 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 532. - - -
^Hollister, A History of the First, 68. 
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that the enemy was ahead in force. Immediately the 
colonel came to the front of his column to reconnoiter 
the Federals' position. He found that the most advanced 
44 
units were about one mile west of Pigeon's Ranch. 
The Confederate commander had under his command 
parts of all three regiments of the Sibley Brigade. 
Major Henry W. Ragnet was in immediate command of the 
dismounted Fourth. This regiment consisted of portions 
of nine companies (B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, and K) 
officered by Captains George J. Hampton, Charles M. 
Lesueur, W. W. Foard, James M. Crosson, Julius Giesecke, 
V/. L. Alexander, Charles Buckholts, and J. M. Ode 11. 
Captain A. J. Scarborough of Company B was ill, so 
Lieutenant James B. Holland had assumed his duties. 
Major Powhatan Jordan's mounted battalion of the Seventh 
was composed of four companies (B, E, F, and I) com­
manded by Captains Gustav Hoffman, J. W. Gardner, J. F. 
Wiggins, and Isaac Adair. Major John S. Shropshire was 
in charge of companies A, B, C, and D of the Fifth Regi­
ment whose company officers consisted of Captains Denman 
Shannon and Daniel H. Ragsdale, and Lieutenants Pleasant 
J. Oakes and John J. Scott. In addition there was 
44 
Scurry to Jackson, March 31* 1862, 0. R. A., 
543. ~ " ~ 
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Captain John Phillips1 company of Arizona volunteers 
called "Brigandes." Both Shropshire's and Phillips1 
mounted troops had taken part in the skirmish of Apache 
Canyon. Scurry also had three pieces of artillery com­
manded by Lieutenant James Bradford. In all the Con­
federate commander had eighteen companies of troops. 
This would have made a force of approximately 1,000 men. 
According to Scurry, however, details "and other causes" 
had reduced this actual number until there were not "over 
600 men fit for duty."45 
Scurry's mounted troops had been marching at the 
head of his column. Immediately he ordered them to re­
tire slowly to the rear where they were to dismount and 
then come into action on foot. The colonel ordered his 
three pieces of artillery forward to a slight elevation 
in the canyon. When the howitzers had taken position, 
they at once opened fire with grape and shell. The 
infantrymen were rapidly deployed into a line which ran 
across the canyon from a fence on the left up into a pine 
46 
forest on the right. 
The canyon at this point was nothing more than a 




bottom. The ground rose precipitously on each side with 
47 
huge boulders and clumps of stunted cedars interspersed. 
The fighting began somewhere between ten-thirty and 
48 
eleven o'clock. It would not stop until six hours later. 
* * * * 
When Chivington's force was detached, Slough had 
about 850 men left. Lieutenant Colonel Samuel P. Tappan 
was assigned to the immediate command of the battalion of 
Colorado infantry. This consisted of Companies C (Captain 
Sopris), D (Captain Jacob Downing), G (Captain William P. 
Wilder), I (Captain Maile), and K (Captain Robbins). At­
tached to Tappan's command was Captain John F. Flitter's 
battery of two 12-pounders and two 6-pounders, and 
Lieutenant Ira W. Claflin's battery of four 12-pounder 
mountain howitzers.^9 The remaining units were cavalry, 
composed of Company P, Colorado Volunteers, and Captain 
George V/. Howland's detachments of the First and Third 
U. S. Cavalry. 
47pettis, "The Confederate Invasion of New Mexico 
and Arizona,11 loc . cit., 109. 
48scurry to General, March 30, 1862, _0. R. A., 
IX, 541; Slough to Adjutant-General, March 30, 1F62, 
ibid., 534. 
^Tappan to Chapin, May 21, 1862, ibid., 536. 
5°siough to Adjutant-General, March 30, 1862, 
ibid., 534. 
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When Slough arrived at Pigeon's Ranch he ordered 
Captain Gurden Chapin, Cariby's assistant adjutant general, 
to proceed ahead with Captain Howland's cavalry to re-
connoiter. The cavalry had advanced no more than 600 or 
700 yards when the pickets fell back on them to report 
51 
that the Texans were in position in the timber just ahead. 
Captain Walker's company was leading the advance, and as 
soon as he learned the location of the Confederate guns, 
he moved into the pine forest on his left. Here he dis­
mounted his men in order to skirmish on foot.52 
Meanwhile the bulk of the Federals were still 
resting at Pigeon's Ranch when news came that the Texans 
were about 800 yards away.53 immediately the bugles 
sounded assembly, and the startled men seized their 
54 
weapons and fell into line. Slough ordered Tappan's 
battalion and the batteries forward. The men rushed 
ahead on the "double-quick" about 400 yards to take 
position.But before Slough could complete the arrange­
ment of his forces,56 the Texas artillery had opened up 
53-lbid. 
5^v/alker to Macrae, May 20, 1862, ibid., 532. 
53iappan to Chapin, May 21, 1862, ibid., 536. 
^Hollister, A History of the First, 68. 
55iappan to Chapin, May 21, 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 536. 
5^Slough to Canby, March 29, 1862, ibid., 533. 
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cnr 
and had begun "cutting the tree tops" over their heads. 
The Confederates had taken the Union troops by complete 
surprise and from the beginning of the battle to its end, 
158 
Slough would have to fight a defensive action. 
The Union batteries were sent to a slight ele­
vation in, and to the left of, the road.-^ Ritter's 
guns had come up just about the time that Walker's 
cavalry had commenced skirmishing. They were set up on 
his right^® and soon began returning the Confederate fire 
"with great spirit." Colonel Slough came to the front, 
and in a hoarse voice, gave his orders.^1 Downing's 
Company D deployed to the left, while Maile's Company I 
started for the right. These units were ordered to oc­
cupy the hillsides as skirmishers. Captain Sopris' 
Company C was instructed to protect Ritter's guns, while 
Company K under Captain Robbins was to support Claflin's 
62 battery. These supporting units were stationed in the 
^Hollister, A History of the First, 68. 
58siough to Adjutant-General, March 30, 1862, 
0. R. A., IX, 535. 
59Tappan to Chapin, May 21, 1862, ibid., 536. 
^^Walker to Macrae, May 20, 1862, ibid., 532. 
6%ollister, History of the First, 68. 
^2Tappan to Chapin, May 21, 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 536. - - -
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road where they were sheltered by the brow of the hill. 
Slough also ordered the cavalry, most of which was now 
dismounted, to support the field pieces Company G 
was about a mile away acting as rear guard.^ 
About the time that Colonel Scurry had gotten 
his men into position, he observed that Tappan's infantry 
was advancing in separate columns upon his right and left 
fronts. Hurriedly he dispatched Major Pyron to check 
them on the right. After placing the center of his line 
in command of Major Ragnet, Scurry hastened to the left 
with the remainder of his men.^ As the battle opened 
and became general, the deafening roar of the artillery 
and the imceasing rattle of small arms was accompanied by 
all kinds of yelling and cheering by the men.^ 
When the Federals of Company I deployed to the 
right, they passed an open field which was commanded by 
Scurry's artillery. Though they suffered severely from 
63Hollister, A History of the First, 68. 
^Slough to Canby, March 29, 1862, 0, R. A., 
IX, 533. 
^Hollister, a History of the First, 68. 
^Scurry to Jackson, March 31* 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 543. 
67Hollister, L History of the First, 68-69. 
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their fire, the Coloradoans reached the position assigned 
/TQ 
them. . Company I was composed of Germans and, though 
Captain Maile was the commanding officer, the unit was 
now in charge of Lieutenant Charles Kerber.^9 After 
Scurry had taken position on his left, he saw the men of 
Company I moving down a gulch which ran up the center of 
the enclosed field on his left. The "Pike's Peakers" 
were proceeding under its cover past the Confederate left 
flank with the apparent purpose of gaining the Texans1 
rear. As rapidly as possible. Scurry and his men crossed 
the fence and though under a heavy enemy barrage, they 
advanced about 200 yards across the open field to the 
70 
gulch to engage the Federals.' Lieutenant John Baker had 
led the forward division of Company I until he had reached 
a point almost opposite the Texas battery which was on the 
higher ground to his left. Drawing and waving his saber, 
he shouted, "Let's capture the guns!" At that moment 
Baker was struck down.^ With "pistol and knife in hand," 
6&rappan to Chapin, May 21, 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 536. 
69whitford, Colorado Volunteers, 106. 
7°Scurry to Jackson, March 31* 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 543. ~ 
71whitford, Colorado Volunteers, 107. 
318 
Scurry's men dashed into the gulch in the midst of the 
Germans and for a few moments, a desperate and deadly 
hand to hand conflict raged. Finally the Federals broke 
before the "steady courage" of the Texans and fled "in 
the wildest disorder and confusion." Meanwhile Fyron 
had checked the enemy on the right, and Ragnet's force 
had charged down the center.^ 
The Confederate charge forced the Federals to 
fall back about 300 or 400 yards to a new position in 
front of, and near, Pigeon's Ranch. The battle had now 
been going on for half an hour. In forming the new line 
of defense, Claflin's battery took position on an 
eminence to the left^^ and Company F, Colorado cavalry, 
was posted on a rocky point opposite Claflin. This sup­
porting unit was now dismounted, and the troopers' horses 
were taken behind Pigeon's Ranch for protection.^ Ritter 
75 
set up his guns farther to the rear and south of the road. 
Captain Wilder's Company G, which had been acting as rear 
72Scurry to Jackson, March 31* 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 543. ~ 
^Tappan to Chapin, May 21, 1862, ibid., 536. 
7^Hollister, A History of the First, 69. 
75Ritter to Chapin, May 16, 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 540. 
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guard, heard the "rumpus" of battle and came up on the 
"double-quick. The company was assigned with Company 
C to support Ritter. Subsequently, Slough ordered Wilder 
to take his first platoon and hurry to the support of 
Downing,^ while Lieutenant Hardin, in command of the 
other, remained with Ritter. 
Ritter was not to stay in his new position, for 
he was exposed to a galling fire and his ammimition 
wagons were too far away.^ The Texans were taking ad­
vantage of the terrain, for as they advanced, they would 
"creep along up from tree to tree, and from rock to 
ftn 
rock." Because of this Ritter's guns could not ef-
O n  
fectively harm them. With the exception of Hardin's 
Qp 
platoon, c the battery's supports had been ordered to 
other locations, so under these circumstances, Ritter 
7%ollister, A History of the First, 69. 
77Tappan to Chapin, May 21, 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 536. ~ ~ 
7®Hollister, A History of the First, 69. 
79RjLtter to Chap in, May 16, 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 5^0. ~ ~ 
8°Hollister, A History of the First, 70. 
^Ritter to Chapin, May 16, 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 5^0. ~ ~ ~ 
Qp 
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"deemed it proper" to return to the road. But before 
this decision could be carried out, Lieutenant Peter 
McGrath was fatally wounded. After firing a few rounds, 
Ritter extricated himself from this precarious location 
and moved to a point in front of Pigeon's Ranch. One 
6-pounder was placed in the road, while, two at a time, 
the limber boxes were sent to the rear to be refilled. 
It was here that one of Ritter's guns disabled a Con­
federate piece by striking it "full in the muzzle" with 
a round shot. A Texas limber chest was also blown up 
when a case shot struck it. This excellent Union marks­
manship was due to the skill of Private Kelly of Company 
E, Fifth Infantry.companies D and I picked off the 
Confederate gunners and, combined with Kelly's deadly 
accuracy, the Texas artillery was temporarily put out 
84 of commission. Lieutenant Bradford, commander of the 
Confederate pieces, was wounded and carried from the 
field. Since the Texans had no other artillery officer 
present, the three guns were withdrawn to the rear before 
Scurry became aware of it.®5 Actually, the artillery was 
^Ritter to Chapin, May 16, 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 5^0. 
®**Hollister, A History of the First, 69. 
^Scurry to Jackson, March 31# 1862, _0. R. A., 
IX, 5^3. 
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not of great importance in this battle except in the 
center of the line. Owing to the "rough, hilly, rocky 
and timbered" nature of the terrain, the effectiveness 
86 
of field pieces was considerably reduced. The charac­
ter of the country made this engagement of the "bush­
whacking kind,"87 and it soon became evident that rifles 
"must decide the contest."®® 
After the Confederate charge had driven the 
Federals back to their new position, Scurry paused in 
order to regroup his somewhat scattered and disorganized 
forces. The colonel also ordered the two serviceable 
guns brought to the front again. Private W. D. Kirk of 
Phillips1 "Brigandes" took charge of one piece while 
Sergeant John W. Patrick of the artillery handled the 
other. After Scurry had assembled his men and was ready 
to advance again, he discovered that the enemy had fallen 
back and had taken cover. The colonel was unable to dis­
cern whether the main body of the Federals was stationed 
o/r 
Hollister, A History of the First, 69. 
®?Slough to Canby, March 29, 1862, 0. R. A., 
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behind a long adobe wall that ran nearly across the 
canyon, or had taken position behind a large ledge of 
rocks farther to the rear.^9 soon the two Confederate 
guns were "playing a lively tune,"9° for Scurry was 
using them in an effort to locate Slough's new line of 
defense 
While the Federal batteries were still occupying 
their second position, Colonel Slough asked Captain 
Chapin and Colonel Tappan to accompany him up the hill 
on his right to reconnoiter. After viewing the battlefield 
from that point, the colonel's two subordinates suggested 
that the hill on their left should be occupied to prevent 
the Texans from flanking them in that direction. For if 
the Confederates were successful in that quarter, they 
would be in a position to gain the Federal rear and 
destroy the wagon train. Skirmishers on this hill would 
also serve the purpose of supporting the batteries below. 
Slough agreed to these suggestions, and Tappan was 
ordered to detach twenty men from Sopris1 Company C to 
take position there. Later Tappan did not consider this 
®9scurry to Jackson, March 31> 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 543-544. 
^Holllster, A History of the First, 69. 
9^Scurry to Jackson, March 31> 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 544. 
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force large enough, so he also took the police guard of 
seventy men. He stationed his ninety infantrymen on the 
summit of the hill in front of, and to the left, of the 
batteries. His skirmish line extended for nearly three-
quarters of a mile in a half circle, and at nearly a 
right angle from the road where the Federal wagon train 
was drawn up. The colonel's position commanded the valley 
in part, and the "irregularities of the surface" afforded 
excellent protection from the fire of the enemy. Tappan 
remained in this strong location during the rest of the 
battle—nearly four hours. Occasionally small parties of 
Texans would attempt to ascend the hill, but they would 
be repeatedly driven back.92 
From his vantage point, Tappan saw Scurry as­
sembling his men after the first big Confederate charge. 
Believing that they were preparing to attack the batteries 
below, Tappan came down into the valley to inform his com­
mander. After returning to his position on the hill, 
Tappan received information from Slough that the Con­
federates were probably intending to attack his position. 
In view of this possibility, the colonel ordered Tappan to 
hold his line at all costs, for "all depended on it." 
"^Tappan to Chapin, May 21, 1862, ibid., 536-537 
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Slough also Informed his second in command that he 
expected that Chivington would momentarily attack the 
Texans in their rear. When this occurred, Slough planned 
to charge in front while Tappan attacked the enemy's 
flank.jf this maneuver were successful, perhaps all 
of Scurry's command would be either annihilated or 
captured. 
While the Confederate battery was firing in an 
effort to locate the enemy, Scurry ordered Major Shrop­
shire to proceed to the right and move up among the 
pines to find and attack the enemy. Major Ragnet, with 
similar orders, was dispatched to the left. As soon as 
he heard the sounds of their guns, Scurry planned to 
charge in front with the remainder of his forces.9^ 
About half an hour after Tappan had received 
Slough's communication, a group of soldiers dressed in 
the uniform of the Colorado Volunteers approached Tappan's 
line. They requested him not to shoot as they were his 
own men. Since Slough had informed him that Chivington 
would be attacking soon, and probably some of the Colo-
radoans would be coming into his skirmish line, Tappan was 
reluctant to fire on approaching parties until their 
93Ibid., 537. 
9^Scurry to Jackson, March 31* 1862, ibid., 544. 
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identity was definitely established. As such, these 
soldiers were allowed to come within a few paces of his 
men. When they could not give satisfactory answers to 
questions in reference to their commanders, Tappan 
recognized them to be Texans. Immediately he ordered his 
men to open fire, and the enemy fled, leaving several 
dead and wounded behind.^5 
Meanwhile, Scurry sent Major Pyron to assist Major 
Ragnet on the left. Leaving instructions for the center 
to charge when the firing began on the right, Scurry went 
to that section of his line to discover what was delaying 
Shropshire's assault. Following his commander's in­
structions, Major Shropshire had set out to find the Union 
q 6 
line in the pine forest.-7 Both he and Captain Denman 
Shannon were at the head of their column as it approached 
Tappan's center. When they had unsuspectingly come to 
within a few paces of the Union skirmishers, Private 
Pierce of Company F, Colorado Volunteers, killed and dis­
armed Shropshire and took Shannon prisoner. Tappan's men 
opened up against the still advancing Confederate column, 
and their effective fire drove the Texans back with the 
loss of several killed and wounded. Private Pierce 
95Tappan to Chapin, May 21, 1862, ibid., 537. 
^Scurry to Jackson, March 31 j 1862, Ibid., 544. 
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returned to the main body below and delivered his 
97 
prisoner to Captain Chapin. During these assaults, 
Lieutenant Colonel Tappan inspired his men with his 
bravery. As one soldier described it, "Lieut. Col. 
Tappan sat on his horse during the charge, leisurely 
loading and firing his pistols as if rabbit hunting."9® 
When Scurry discovered that the gallant Major Shropshire 
had been killed, he took command of the right himself and 
immediately attacked the enemy whose line formed in front 
QQ 
of the ranch. ^ 
Before the renewed Confederate onslaught, Captain 
Chapin ordered Ritter's battery to cross the ravine to 
the right side of the canyon to a new location. Claflin's 
mountain howitzers joined Ritter.'1'00 Majors Ragnet and 
Pyron, commanding the Confederate left, ordered their men 
to charge the batteries. "Encouraged and shouted on by 
as brave officers as live," the Texas began their assault. 
"Some in squads, others singly, taking advantage of the 
^Tappan to Chapin, May 21, 1862, ibid., 537. 
9%ollister, A History of the First, 70. 
^Scurry to Jackson, March 31* 1862, _0. R. A., 
IX, 544. 
•'•^Ritter to Chapin, May 16, 1862, ibid., 540. 
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timber as much as possible." The Federal gunners waited 
until the "terrible Texans" came to within fifty yards 
of them and then opened fire "like a regiment of Mexican 
dogs roused by the stranger at midnight. One man shoved 
in a charge with his arm, another fired her off, and the 
four pieces played the liveliest Yankee doodle ever 
heard." The "thud, thud, thud" of bullets hitting the 
ground from the mountainsides added to the intensity of 
battle. The Federal artillery's "salute" apparently 
astonished the advancing Texans, and when that ceased, 
the battery's supports fired volley after volley into 
their faces. The Texans now concluded that they were 
"going the wrong way," and temporarily reeled back."^"*" 
Soon some Confederates got on a rocky hill on Ritter's 
right flank and began pouring a destructive rifle and 
musket fire into his midst. One of his men was killed 
and three others were wounded. Two horses were also 
killed. Forced out of this position, the battery 
102 
limbered up and fell back some distance. Meanwhile 
the Confederates had rallied and charged again, but when 
they closed in on the spot where the batteries had been, 
10^Hollister, A History of the First, 71. 
102Ritter to Chapin, May 16, 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 5^0. 
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they found only a few dead and wounded Federals 
Flitter's battery had taken a new position, selected by 
Chapin, in front of a deep ravine. This new area af­
forded the battery's supports complete shelter from 
enemy fire. The supply train was in the road about forty 
yards from the left of the battery Though Tappan was 
still holding his position firmly, the main Federal line 
had now been driven from the ranch to a ledge of rocks. 
It was here that the "Pike's Peakers" made their final 
and most desperate stand.*1'0^ 
As the Confederates savagely pressed forward, the 
Union batteries of eight guns opened a furious fire of 
grape, canister, and shell. "Heedless of the storm," the 
Texans surged on, determined if possible to capture these 
pieces as they had McRae's at Valverde. A large body of 
Union infantry came in to save the artillery, and here 
the conflict reached its peak! "inspired with the un­
alterable determination to overcome every obstacle to the 
attainment of their object," the Texans madly fell upon 
the enemy. The Confederate right and center had now 
l°3Hollister, A History of the First, 71. 
•^^Ritter to Chapin, May 16, 1862, 0, R. A., 
IX, 5^0. 
^°5scurry to Jackson, March 31* 1862, ibid., 5^. 
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united on the left. "The intrepid Ragnet and the cool, 
calm, courageous Pyron had pushed forward among the 
rocks until the muzzles of the guns of the opposing 
forces passed each other." But the iron courage of 
the Federal infantry temporarily repulsed the Confederate 
attack, and the Union artillery had time to escape 
with a number of its wagons. When the Union batteries 
had gotten safely away, the infantry broke ranks and fled 
from the field. So rapid was their flight that they cut 
108 
loose their teams and set fire to two of their wagons. 
Tappan had stubbornly maintained his skirmish 
line on the hill, but the main column had now been driven 
down the valley a considerable distance. With the Texans 
continuing to advance, the colonel considered it extremely 
hazardous to remain where he was any longer. The enemy 
was now in a position to gain his rear and cut him off 
from the retreating main body. Quickly Tappan ordered 
his men to retire and close in on the rear of the beaten 
Union column. This was accomplished at a point nearly 
two miles back from the battlefield."1'0^ 
lo6Ibid. 
•'•OfRitter to Chapin, May 16, 1862, ibid., 5^0. 
108scurry to Jackson, March 31* 1862, ibid., 5^* 
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The Confederates attempted to renew their pursuit, 
"but they were forced to halt from "extreme exhaustion.11 
They had been engaged for six hours in the hardest con­
test that "it had ever been. . .^curry's/ lot to wit-
110 
ness." As Alexander Valle, the owner of Pigeon's 
Ranch, later said, ". . .ze foight six hour by my vatch, 
and my vatch vas slow I 
After the Federals had left the battlefield, 
Colonel Scvirry came galloping up on his horse and asked 
his men for a white handkerchief. He wanted to send a 
flag of truce to tell "them damned Yankees" to come back 
and pick up their dead and wounded. Since no one had a 
white handkerchief, the old colonel bellowed, "God Damn 
it, tear off your shirt tail, we have got to have a white 
flag." One Texan had just picked up a beautiful, white 
silk handkerchief from the field, which apparently a 
"Pike's Peaker" had lost in his haste to leave the area. 
The soldier looked about him and decided that there was 
not a shirt tail in the crowd that would do for a white 
flag. In fact, most of them would have been better suited 
for battle flags I In view of this situation, the Texan 
H°Scurry to Jackson, March 31, 1862, ibid., 544. 
Apparently the Texans had been too severely repulsed to 
renew their assault upon the retreating Union force. 
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walked up and reluctantly handed the prized handkerchief 
to his colonel. Scurry said that it was just the thing 
and that the soldier would get it back later. But in 
his reminiscences the soldier lamented that that was the 
last he saw of it. The white flag messenger had to 
gallop all the way back to Kozlowski's Ranch before he 
could find any Union officers in sufficient command to 
stop the retreat and send back details. Within a few 
hours a detachment of Union soldiers returned and, work­
ing all night long, they removed their men from the field 
IIP 
and cared for their wounded. Slough and Scurry had 
agreed to an armistice of eighteen hours 
The battle had been savagely fought, and Colonel 
Scurry did not hesitate to commend the valor of the enemy. 
He maintained that these Federals, composed of "Pike's 
Peak miners and regulars," were "the flower of the U. S. 
Army. "•'-•'-4 All of the Texas field officers upon the ground 
had been either killed or "touched." Major Pyron had had 
his horse shot from under him, and Scurry's "cheek was 
•'•^Halcomb to Greer, August 5, 1927* "Confederate 
Reminiscences of 1862," loc. cit., 317-318. 
"^Hollister, A History of the First, 71. 
T l2i 
Scurry to Jackson, March 31* 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 544. ~ 
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twice brushed by a minie ball, each time just drawing 
blood, and . . .^Tis/ clothes torn in two places."11"* In 
this encounter the Confederacy lost four of the most 
"brave and chivalrous officers as ever graced the ranks 
of any army." Major Shropshire had been killed earlier 
in the day, and "brave and chivalrous" Major Ragnet had 
fallen mortally wounded from his horse while engaged in 
the last and most desperate charge of the battle. Ragnet 
survived long enough to "know and rejoice at. . ,/T5he/ 
victory, and then died with loving messages upon his 
expiring lips." Captain Buckholts and Lieutenant Mills 
conducted themselves with distinguished gallantry through­
out the fight and they, too, fell near its close. "Of 
the living," Scurry asserted with pride that it was "only 
necessary to say all behaved with distinguished courage 
and daring. 
In his official report, Scurry asserted that the 
battle of Glorieta had proven conclusively that few mis­
takes had been made in the selection of the officers of 
his command. "They were ever in the front, leading their 
men into the hottest of the fray."11^ Scurry himself was 
•^^Scurry to General, March 30, 1862, ibid., 5^2. 
•^Scurry to Jackson, March 31* 1862, ibid., 5^5. 
11^Ibid. 
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a sterling example to his men. During the course of the 
battle, he moved among his troops encouraging them and 
telling them to give the enemy "hell." As one soldier 
later recalled, "if he called using bullets Hell they 
3.13 
were getting plenty of it." Major Pyron was also 
distinguished by his calm and intrepid bearing through­
out the engagement. Scurry also acknowledged the 
"courage and activity" which Adjutant Ellsberry R. Lane 
displayed in the discharge of his official duties, and 
for the manner in which he carried out his orders .-^9 
Colonel Scurry proudly proclaimed that the battle of 
Glorieta was another victory which would be "added to 
120 
the long list of Confederate triumphs." From the 
field of Glorieta, he issued the following: 
HEAD-QUARTERS, ADVANCE DIVIONS, 
ARMY OP NEW MEXICO. 
Canon Glorieta March 28 1862. 
General Order 
No. 4 
Soldiers—You have added another victory to the 
long list of triumphs won by the Confederate armies. 
By your conduct you have given another evidence of 
the daring courage and heroic endurance which actuate 
1;L%alcomb to Greer, August 5 »  1927# "Confederate 
Reminiscences of 1862," loc. cit., 318. 
"^Scurry to Jackson, March 31, 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 545. - - -
120Scurry to General, March 30, 1862, ibid., 541. 
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you in this great struggle for the independence of 
your country, you have proven your right to stand 
by the side of those who fought and conquered on the 
red field of San Jacinto. The battle of Glorieta— 
where for six long hours you steadily drove before 
you a foe of twice your numbers over a field chosen 
by themselves, and deemed impregnable, will take its 
place upon the roll of your country's triumphs, and 
serve to excite your children to imitate the brave 
deeds of their fathers, in every hour of that 
country's peril. 
Soldiers--I am proud of you. Go on as you have 
commenced, and it will not be long until not a single 
soldier of the United States will be left upon the 
soil of New Mexico. The Territory, relieved of the 
burdens recently imposed upon it by its late op­
pressors, will once more, throughout its beautiful 
valleys, 'blossom as the rose1 beneath the plastic 
hands of peaceful industry. 
By order of Lieut. Col. W. R. Scurry, 
C ommanding. -1-21 
Unfortunately the poetic Scurry had won at best 
a pyrrhic victory. Though the Confederates may have 
driven the Federals from the field and forced them to re­
tire in great disorder, the party under Chivington was 
about to strike a blow which, in the words of a con­
temporary reporter, would pierce the Confederate "vitals 
and. . .^Traw/' from thence the life blood."^22 
As previously related, Slough had decided upon a 
two-columned movement against the Texans who were reported 
•^Isanta Fe Gazette, April 26, 1862. 
122jjolllster, A History of the First, 72. 
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to be at Johnson's Ranch. While Slough moved down the 
canyon with the main column, Chivington's detachment was 
to proceed along the rim until the Confederate camp was 
reached."1'2^ Presumably this was intended to be a co­
ordinated movement. As it turned out, however, Chiving­
ton 's force moved on independently and failed to join 
Slough in combatting Scurry's main army. 
At nine-thirty in the morning, Chivington left 
124 
the main colvtmn and took the trail which led to Galisteo. 
Although Slough listed the number of soldiers Chivington 
had as "about 430 officers and picked men, the major's 
figures total only 357. The detachment was composed en­
tirely of infantry and was divided into two battalions. 
Captain W. H. Lewis, Fifth U. S. Infantry, assisted by 
Captain Asa B. Carey, commanded the first battalion, 
consisting of the following units: 
"^Slough to Adjutant-General, March 30, 1862, 
0. R. A., IX, 534. 
-'-'^Chivington to General, March 28, 1862, 
ibid., 538. 
-l-25siough to Canby, March 29, 1862, ibid., 533* 
In listing the units involved, Chivington was seemingly 
careless regarding the numbers in the first battalion. 
It is possible that the members of Ford's company were 
not included. Chivington to General, March 28, 1862, 
ibid., 538. 
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Companies A and G, Fifth U. S. Infantry commanded by 
Lieutenants Samuel L. Barr and Stevens T. Norvell, 
60 men. 
Company B, First Regiment Colorado Volunteers, in 
charge of Captain S. M. Logan and Lieutenant 
Edward A. Jacobs, 78 men. 
Captain James H. Ford's company of the Second Regi­
ment Colorado Volunteers. Ford was assisted by 
Lieutenant Cyrus H. DeForrest .126 
The second battalion, composed entirely of the 
First Regiment Colorado Volunteers, was under the com­
mand of Captain Edward W. Wynkoop. It was composed of 
the following: 
Company A commanded by Lieutenant James A. Shaffer, 
60 men. 
Company E in charge of Captain Scott J. Anthony and 
Lieutenant J. A. Dawson, 71 men. 
Company H officered by Captain George L. Sanborn and 
Lieutenant B. N. Sanford, approximately 80 men.127 
Since Chivington was completely unfamiliar with 
the territory, Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Chavez was 
selected to guide the detachment. Chavez was a member of 
an old and distinguished native family. He had won 
honors in fighting Apaches and he had been with Canby at 
128 the battle of Valverde. When Donaldson evacuated 
Santa Fe, he was one of the few New Mexican volunteers 
•^6chivington to General, March 28, 1862, ibid. 
127lbid. 
•U2£3whitford, g0i0raa0 volunteers, 116. 
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who did not desert on the way to Port Union.jn 
addition to Chavez, James L. Collins, Superintendent of 
the Indian Office in Santa Fe, also accompanied the force 
as a guide and interpreter. Collins had become Slough's 
volunteer aide-de-camp. By his own request, and with 
1"2Q 
Slough's approval, he had joined Chivington's party. J 
Though a civilian, Collins had taken part in the skirmish 
of Apache Canyon. He had been in the lead of a party of 
flankers on the mountain side, but in advancing too 
rapidly, he had been surprised and captured by four 
Texans. He was a prisoner for only a short time, for 
when Captain Cook made his cavalry charge, the stunned 
1^1 Confederates released him. J 
The detachment continued down the rough and rocky 
Galisteo trail for about eight miles and then left the 
road.^32 Proceeding "with no regard to obstacles, 
routes, or ought else save direction, "^-33 ^he column 
^^Donaldson to Paul, March 10, 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 527. 
to General, March 28, 1862, 
ibid., 539. 
•*-31santa Pe Gazette, April 26, 1862. 
132chivington to General, March 28, 1862, 
0. R. A., DC, 538. 
^Spjoiiig-ter, A History of the First, 72. 
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wended its way eight miles more toward Johnson's Ranch. 
About one-thirty in the afternoon, the Federals arrived 
at the edge of an eminence which overlooked the Con­
federate encampment a Texas picket who was 
stationed on the crest was immediately captured. About 
1,000 feet below lay Johnson's Ranch with the wagon 
train drawn up in the canyon.^35 "you are on top of 
dem!" Chavez pointed out to his commander.^36 
The Texans were totally unaware of the Federals' 
presence, and Chivington was able to spend nearly an 
hour observing the situation below. From his position, 
everything was in plain view: the ranch house, the Santa 
Fe trail, the ravines running to the right and to the 
left, the small hills, the wagon train, and the few 
soldiers who were leisurely walking about. Chivington 
observed that a field piece was set up on one of the 
higher hills"1"^? and that there were about 200 men guard­
ing the camp."*"-^ After discussing the matter with his 
•^^chivington to General, March 28, 1862, 
0. R. A., IX, 538. 
•L35whitford, Colorado Volunteers, 116. 
•l^Hayes, The New Mexican Campaign of 1862, 
loc. cit., 180. 
137whitford, Colorado Volunteers, 116-117. 
^Sghivington to General, March 28, 1862, 
0. R. A., IX, 539. 
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officers, Chivington agreed to attack. Captain Lewis 
was placed in immediate command of the assault, for 
apparently Chivington was to remain on the mountain dur­
ing the action. The major feared an ambush, so before 
Lewis left, Chivington informed him that should that 
possibility develop, he would sound recall. As Lewis 
set out, he remarked to Carey that "they would never 
loq 
hear that signal." y 
Rapidly the men started down the steep mountain­
side. When they had gotten about a quarter of the way, 
the crashing of loosened rocks rolling down the precipice 
aroused the unsuspecting Texans below. The Confederate 
field piece was soon firing into the descending troops, 
but because of the nature of the terrain, its shots were 
ineffectual. Cheering and yelling, the Federals reached 
the bottom and reformed themselves into ranks, preparatory 
for action. Taken completely unaware, many of the Texans 
seized what horses and mules they could and dashed off. 
Others disappeared down the Santa Fe trail toward 
Glorieta.-1-^ Captain Wynkoop took thirty men and deployed 
^•39Hayes, The New Mexican Campaign of 1862, loc. 
cit., 180. The Santa Fe Gazette stated that it took two 
hours for Chivington to make up his mind to attack. 
Santa Fe Gazette, April 26, 1862. 
"^Sjhitf ord, Colorado Volunteers, 118. 
Fiajor John M. Chiving ton 
Photograph courtesy of the State Historical 
Society of Colorado. 
3^1 
to the mountainside to disable the 6-pounder by picking 
off its gunners Three Texans were instantly killed 
142 
and several wounded by a volley from Wynkoop's rifles. 
At the same time Captain Lewis and his men fearlessly 
charged up the hill and captured the piece after it had 
fired five shots at them.-^3 After taking the gun, 
Lewis spiked it with an iron ramrod, jammed an iron ball 
into the muzzle, and then sent it tumbling, carriage and 
all, down the hillside. A quantity of the gun's am-
144 munition was also set afire. Meanwhile the bulk of 
the Federal command had surrounded the wagons and the 
ranch buildings .^5 During the height of the assault 
the Confederate chaplain of the Fourth Regiment, 
Reverend L. H. Jones, was shot and severely wounded even 
though he displayed a white flag in his hand.^^ Within 
a short v/hile the Texas rear guard had been scattered, 
and the wagons and camp were securely in the Federals' 
hands. 
"'"^•'"Chivington to General, March 28, 1862, 0. R. A 
IX, 539. 
l 
Whitford, Colorado Volunteers, 119. 
•^Schivington to General, March 28, 1862, _0. R. A 
IX, 539. 
•'•^WiiLtford, Colorado Volunteers, 119-120. 
•^Schivington to General, March 28, 1862, 0, R. A 
IX, 539. 
•^Scurry to Jackson, March 31* 1862, ibid., 544. 
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It is entirely possible that Chivington over­
estimated the number of Texans (200) who were guarding 
the train and camp."1"^ Many of the Confederates there 
lilft were either sick, wounded, cooks, or drivers. The 
captain in charge of the camp later maintained that two 
companies of German soldiers which had been assigned as 
guards had left earlier. Upon hearing the reverberating 
thunder of the cannons down the canyon, they could not 
restrain themselves, so they left their post to join the 
fight. As they put it, they had "enlisted to get glory 
149 
by fighting, and not in guarding mules and provisions." 
Had these two units remained behind at the camp to un­
leash their bellicose feelings against the attacking 
Federals, Chivington's raid might have ended in failure. 
The Confederate wagons were all heavily loaded 
with ammunition, clothing, subsistence, forage,^® of­
ficers' baggage,^51 and surgical supplies .^52 -j-n fac-b, 
•^Tchivington to General, March 28, 1862, ibid., 
538-539. 
148Wright to Greer, September 7, 1927* "Confeder­
ate Reminiscences of 1862, loc . cit., 322. 
•^9whitford, Colorado Volunteers, 119. 
^Ochivington to General, March 28, 1862, 
0. R. A., IX, 539. 
151slough to Canby, March 29, 1862, ibid., 533. 
l^Hayes, New Colorado, I69. 
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the train contained everything which Scurry's command 
possessed. Chivington was not in a position to carry 
away the captured materiel, so all the wagons, most of 
which had been hastily overturned, "^3 were set afire and 
burned on the spot, or otherwise rendered useless. Dur­
ing the pillage, one of the wagons which contained 
ammunition exploded and severely injured Private Simon 
Ritter of Company A. He was the only Union casualty.^54 
Chivington's men retook five Federal privates 
who had been taken prisoner during the forenoon at 
155 
Glorieta. They had been sent to the rear by Scurry and 
1^6 arrived during the action at the ranch. J It was from 
these men that Chivington and his commanders received 
their first information concerning the general engage­
ment down the canyon. During this brief engagement, the 
Federals killed three Texans and wounded several others. 
Seventeen prisoners, two of whom were officers, were also 
^53vjhitford, Colorado Volunteers, 120. 
^-^chivington to General, March 28, 1862, £. R. A., 
IX, 539* There was a difference of opinion concerning tKe 
number of wagons in the train. Chivington listed the 
number as eighty. Slough gave the number as only sixty. 
Slough to Adjutant-General, March 30, 1862, ibid., 535. 
•^chivington to General, March 28, 1862, ibid., 
539. 
•^scurry to Jackson, March 31* 1862, ibid., 544. 
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captured. In addition, the command took about thirty-
horses and mules which were in a nearby corral."1"-^ 
After accomplishing the destruction of the train, 
Chivington ordered his men to ascend the mountain pre­
paratory to leaving.He had heard that a large Con­
federate force was approaching from Galisteo, and he did 
not want to risk being caught in the canyon. On the way 
up the mountainside, it was discovered that four heavily 
loaded wagons were hidden behind a hill outside of the 
main camp. These had been overlooked during the burning 
of the main train, so to complete the destruction, four 
volunteers returned to burn them. Within an hour the men 
had completed their task.-3-59 
•^Tchivington to General, March 28, 1862, ibid., 
539* Although he makes no mention of it in this report, 
Chivington in his manuscript The First Colorado Regiment 
(written in 1884) asserts that his men bayoneted 1100 
mules which had pulled the Confederate wagon train. 
Scurry makes no mention of this in his reports. H. C. 
Wright denies it emphatically. Wright to Greer, September 
7, 1927* "Confederate Reminiscences of 1862,11 loc. cit., 
322. 
^•58chivington to General, March 28, 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 539. 
"^Whitford, Colorado Volunteers, 122. VJhitford 
asserts that while the Federals were burning the train, 
a Confederate messenger galloped out of the ravine in 
back of the ranch house, and sped down the canyon toward 
Pigeon's Ranch. It is Whitford's contention that the 
arrival of this messenger was the cause of Scurry's send­
ing in a flag of truce. Scurry's official reports make no 
345 
The seventeen Texas prisoners were carried off 
with the command. Chivington, undoubtedly showing his 
worst nature—a trait which would later crop up in the 
infamous Sand Creek Massacre—ordered that the prisoners 
should be shot in case they were attacked by Scurry on 
their return march. Greatly outraged, Colonel Scurry in 
his official report scathingly criticized the Federal com­
mander for this order as well as for the shooting of the 
defenseless chaplain. As Scurry put it, "These instances 
go to prove that. . ./the Yankees/ have lost all sense of 
humanity in the insane hatred they bear to the citizens 
of the Confederacy, who have the manliness to arm in de­
fense of their country's independence."1^0 
reference to any such messenger, nor do they state that 
the flag of truce was sent in upon learning of the 
destruction of the train. Scurry to General, March 30> 
1862, 0. R. A., IX, 541-542; Scurry to Jackson, March 31# 
1862, iblcT., 542-545. 
It was also contended that the rear guard attack 
caused a rumor to spread among the Confederate troops at 
Glorieta that they were being attacked in the rear by 
Canby's column. This supposedly caused a panic among part 
of their force, and prevented an effective pursuit of 
Slough's defeated troops. I have found no evidence to 
verify this contention. Anderson, "Canby's Services," 
loc. cit., 699. 
Scurry to Jackson, March 31* 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 544. ~ 
3^6 
After the command had reached the summit and had 
marched three or four miles, Lieutenant Alfred S. Cobb 
rode up with a dispatch from Colonel Slough. The Federal 
commander ordered Chivington to return immediately to 
support the main army which was steadily being driven 
back by the Texans."^1 Cobb also informed the major that 
the enemy was in possession of the trail he was following. 
It was exceedingly dar'k and it would have been next to 
impossible for Chivington to have found his way back to 
camp. Chavez was unwilling to accept the responsibility 
of guiding the party over any other trail than the one 
they had used. At this point Padre Ortiz, a Roman 
Catholic priest who had joined Chivington's force at the 
top of the mountain, came forward. The priest, who was 
from a small village near the Pecos ruins and familiar 
with the mountainous territory, offered to lead the 
Federals to Kozlowski's Ranch. Chavez was acquainted 
with Padre Ortiz and he advised Chivington to accept his 
services. In almost, total darkness the priest, riding a 
white horse, led the column over a pathless route through 
the mountains. Chivington had dismounted and stumbled 
along while leading his horses. It was a difficult march 
n ̂  n 
Chivington to General, March 28, 1862, ibid., 
539; Chivington, The Prospective. 
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as the band made its way through the rough and thicket 
covered mountains. At last the column reached the main 
road near the Pecos ruins. Chivington then set out down 
the trail to Camp Lewis at Kozlowski's Ranch. ^ 
Near ten o'clock that night the column came in 
sight of the Federal camp fires.-^3 <phe major was not 
certain whose camp it was, so he called his men to a 
halt. "Pall in, every man in his place, fix bayonets," 
cautioned Chivington, "I don't know whose /camg? it is, 
but if it a'nt ours we'll make it so. Forward, keep 
close." On coming within hailing distance of the guard, 
however, Chivington found it to be Slough's. Tired and 
weary, Chivington's men rejoined their comrades and 
"reserved their hostility for other occasions. "•'•64 
•^^Whitford, Colorado Volunteers, 122-123. 
•^^chivington to General, March 28, 1862, 
0. R. A., DC, 539. 
•^Hollister, A History of the First, 72. 
Chivington, in his The First Colorado Regiment, written 
in 1884, says essentially the same thing. However, in 
The Prospective, also written in 1884, Chivington states 
that he first encountered Slough's pickets who were 
doubtful of his identity. After convincing them that he 
and his men were part of the Federal command, Chivington 
marched into camp. 
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Chivington's rear guard foray more than com­
pensated for Slough's defeat on the main battle field. 
The destruction of the wagon train was -undoubtedly the 
165 
most decisive action of the whole New Mexican campaign. 
Already seriously "short of needed supplies, Sibley would 
now be forced to discontinue his plans to assault Fort 
Union. It must have been discouraging, indeed, when the 
Texans learned that, though they had won the battle of 
166 
Glorieta, they had lost the victory at Johnson's Ranch. 
-L^5slough maintained in his report to Canby that 
he had received notice of Chivington's successful action. 
He gave this as one of the reasons for his abandoning 
the field of Glorieta. This appears doubtful. Undoubt­
edly Slough wrote this in an effort to smooth over the 
fact that he had engaged the Texans in force—an action 
contrary to the departmental commander's instructions. 
Slough to Canby, March 29, 1862, 0. R. A., IX, 533. 
l66Many New Mexicans asserted that Chivington 
unjustly received the credit for the burning of the 
enemy supply train. In Santa Fe some contended that 
James L. Collins, the Indian superintendent, was the 
individual who suggested the idea to Chivington. 
Keleher, Turmoil in New Mexico, 181. In 1864 the Terri­
torial Legislature of New Mexico passed a resolution 
which asked the President of the United States to confer 
upon Captains William H. Lewis and Asa B. Carey the rank 
of major for their "meritorious and distinguished 
services in attacking the rear guard of the rebel army." 
No mention was made of Chivington. New Mexico Laws, 1864, 
124. The March 8, 1864, issue of the Rio Abajo Press 
scathingly denounced Chivington and objected to His 
"strutting about in plumage stolen from Captain William 
H. Lewis, 5"th U. S. Infantry." The editor pointed out 
that it took two hours to convince Chivington to attack 
the train, and then he remained safely behind on the hill 
while the attack was carried out under the direction of 
Captain Lewis. Rio Abajo Press, March 8, 1864. 
3^9 
The battle of Glorieta, referred to by the Union 
commanders as the battle of Pigeon's Ranch, was a rela­
tively small engagement, but the casualties attested to 
the ferocity with which it was fought. Scurry gave his 
losses as thirty-six killed and sixty wounded. Of the 
killed, twenty-four were of the Fourth Regiment, one 
from the Fifth, eight from the Seventh, and one from the 
artillery .^7 In addition, the Federal commander stated 
that his men had taken twenty-five Confederate prison-
ers. There is considerable disagreement concerning 
the Union casualty figures. Colonel Slough reported 
twenty-nine killed, forty-two wounded, and about fifteen 
prisoners.-^9 Tappan stated that in his command alone 
he had twenty-nine killed, sixty-four wounded, and 
thirteen missing. Nine later died of their wounds, so 
this raised the number of dead to thirty-eight.1'''0 
Hollister in his account of the campaign lists forty-
171 
six killed, sixty-four wounded, and twenty-one prisoners. 
"^^Scurry to Jackson, March 31> 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 5^5. - - -
•^Slough to Canby, March 29, 1862, ibid., 533. 
l69s.lough to Adjutant-General, March 30, 1862, 
ibid., 535. 
•^Tappan to Chapin, May 21, 1862, ibid., 538. 
^f^Hollister, A History of the First, 75-76. 
CHAPTER XII 
THE DECISION TO EVACUATE NEW MEXICO 
At eight o'clock on the morning after the battle, 
Slough ordered a small guard to take all the horses back 
to Fort Union. The horses, weary and jaded, were in such 
poor condition that Slough considered them an incumbrance. 
News of the commander's order quickly spread throughout 
the camp, and it was interpreted as meaning that the 
colonel was planning to move against the Texans again. 
Great was the dismay of many of the men, and "it was some­
what amusing to see the various aches, ills, etc., with 
which some of the boys. . .were instantly attacked." Ap­
parently the lure of Santa Fe had lost its charms to many, 
for "any sacrifice of manhood" was preferable to the risk­
ing of another battle with the Texans. Before the horses 
were ready to start, however, the order was countermanded, 
and the men breathed freely once again.^ Slough, believ­
ing that the Texans were too strongly entrenched in the 
canyon to be attacked by his force, decided to move back 
•hiollister, A History of the First, 73. 
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to Bernal Springs—the keypoint, so he thought, for 
2 
protecting Port Union and for harassing the Texans. 
The Federals were busy the morning of March 29 
bringing in their wounded and burying their thirty-five 
dead on the battlefield. During the day Colonel Scurry 
sent in another flag of truce asking for a continuation 
of the armistice until eight o'clock the next morning. 
The Texan maintained that it would take that long to 
provide adequately for the needs of his wounded. Slough 
agreed, for it made little difference how many armistices 
were accepted since he had already decided to fall back 
to Bernal Springs. After completing arrangements for 
providing for the comfort of the wounded, Slough's column 
set out on the road to San Jose about two o'clock that 
afternoon. Company F, the mounted Colorado unit, acted 
as rear guard. Fresh graves and a crowded hospital at 
Kozlowski's Ranch attested to the horrors of the battle 
of the day before.^ 
The road from Kozlowski's Ranch to San Jose passed 
through beautiful scenery, running between the base of a 
O 
Slough to Adjutant-General, March 30* 1862, 
0. R. A., IX, 535. 
3Hollister, A_ History of the First, 7^. 
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mountain and the Pecos river. "The ground. . ,/yia.sf 
smoothly outlined, bearing a handsome pine forest inter­
spersed with beautiful openings." But most of the men 
were little interested in the countryside as the Federal 
column sadly moved along. One Coloradoan maintained that 
the men were "half glad to escape the renewal of yesterday 
yet revolting at the idea of backing out before. . .^/the^/ 
4 
were well whipped." 
At San Jose the next day, some Mexicans from the 
"upper Tecolote country" (across the mountains to the 
northwest) arrived at Slough's camp to report that they 
were being endangered by Texas foragers. With a force of 
eighty men from the different mounted companies, Captain 
Walker of the Second Cavalry was sent out to investigate. 
Nothing came of the matter and Walker's command returned 
without mishap.5 
On March 31* Slough's column left San Jose and ar-
rived at Bernal Springs and set up camp. While encamped, 
Captain William Nicodemus, Canby's adjutant general, 
galloped up with orders from the departmental commander 
to fall back to Fort Union. As yet Canby had not left 
4Ibid. 
5Ibid., 77. 
6 lb id., 78. 
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Fort Craig, but he would notify the northern department 
as soon as he did. There was nothing Slough could do 
but return to Port Union as he now had definite orders 
from his superior officer.^ At dusk on April 2, the 
column arrived at the post. The Colorado infantry oc­
cupied its old campsite, and the mounted Coloradoans 
were quartered in a log house located below the fortifi­
cation. Slough's force had been gone eleven days, had 
traveled a distance of seventy-five miles, and had 
fought two battles. After this brief, but arduous 
O 
campaign, the men were glad of a chance to rest. 
In his official report to the adjutant general, 
Slough maintained that his action at Glorieta had been 
done solely for the purpose of annoying and harassing 
the enemy as ordered by Colonel Cariby.^ The departmental 
commander, however, considered Slough's action to be a 
breech of his orders. This could mean a court-martial. 
When Slough arrived at Port Union, he relinquished his 
^Connelly to Seward, April 6, 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 659-
^Hollister, A History of the First, 78. 
9siough to Adjutant-General, March 30, 1862, 
o. R. A., IK, 535• 
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command, and Colonel Paul re-assumed the headship of the 
northern district.'1'0 No doubt Paul rejoiced at finally 
winning out over his rival. 
* * * * 
The day after the battle was a hard one for 
Scurry's men, for they had not eaten since the morning 
before. Some hungrily picked up kernels of corn, which 
the horses and mules had wasted in the corral, and 
parched them over camp fires. Tired, hungry, and with 
their ammunition nearly exhausted, the Texans were in no 
condition to follov/ up their shallow victory 
The morning was spent burying the dead and caring 
for the wounded. The Confederates had no picks and 
shovels, so when the Federals finished interring their 
dead, they graciously loaned their tools to the Texans. 
That evening the bugle called the troops into line, and 
Scurry addressed his men to inform them of the situation. 
All their wagons and supplies had been burned, and the 
sick that had remained behind with the wagon train had 
•L0Canby to Adjutant-General, March 31* 1862, 
ibid., 658; Hollister, A History of the First, 7^. 
•L1Halcomb to Greer, August 5, 1927, "Confederate 
Reminiscences of 1862," loc. cit., 318. 
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"been taken prisoner. For two days his men had gone 
unfed and blanketless. Since Santa Fe was the only 
place where supplies and transportation could be ob­
tained to replace what had been destroyed by the enemy, 
Scurry decided to fall back to the capital. After mak­
ing certain that the wounded were taken care of as 
satisfactorily as possible in the hospital established 
13 
at Pigeon's Ranch, Scurry's command set out for Santa Fe. 
A few Texans remained behind at the hospital to care for 
the wounded.^ Scurry reached Santa Fe, a distance of 
about twenty-two miles, early the next morning.^ The 
men came into town in squads of different sizes. "Some 
rode, some walked and some hobbled in."^ Quarters and 
12lbid., 318-319. 
•^scurry to General, March 30, 1862, 0, R. A., 
IX, 5^2; Scurry to Jackson, March 31* 1862, ibid., "5^5. 
l^Wright to Greer, September 7, 1927> "Confeder­
ate Reminiscences of 1862," loc. cit., 323. 
•^scurry to General, March 30, 1862, 0. R. A^., 
IX, 5^1j Halcomb to Greer, August 5* 1927* "Confederate 
Reminiscences of 1862," loc. cit., 319• 
-^Santa Fe Gazette, April 26, 1862. 
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food were soon secured for the exhausted and destitute 
command.^7 
Soon after entering the capital, Scurry dis­
patched a message to Sibley informing him of the events. 
The colonel urged that supplies of ammunition be sent as 
soon as possible, for as quickly as he could. Scurry 
"wlsh/ed/ to get after them again." Scurry also told the 
general that three different sources, all of whom were be­
lieved to be reliable, had informed him that Canby had 
left Fort Craig on March 24. 
When Major Pyron had first set out to meet the 
Federals on March 25, Mrs. Canby urged all "loyal women" 
to make preparations for the receiving of any wounded that 
might result from the impending clash. She set the example 
by "having beds filled, hospital rooms set in order, lint, 
soups and everything she could think of," prepared for the 
comfort and aid of the suffering. When some of the Union 
ladies protested that "rebel wounded might be the ones" 
which had to be cared for, Mrs. Canby snapped, "No matter 
whether friend or foe, our wounded enemy must be cared for 
and their lives saved if it is possible, they are sons of 
•^Scurry to General, March 30, 1862. C>. R. A., 
XX, 5^1; Halcomb to Greer, August 5, 1927* Confederate 
R e m i n i s c e n c e s  o f  1 8 6 2 , "  l o c .  c i t 3 1 9 .  
•1 O 
AOScurry to General, March 30, 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 542. ~ ~ 
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some dear mother."^ when the Confederate wounded were 
brought in, Mrs. Canby nursed and cared for them as if 
they were her own sons. Her large home was filled with 
sick and wounded, and she personally saw that no one 
suffered from lack of care. In the absence of ambulances 
to bring in the wounded, Mrs. Canby contrived the idea of 
nailing tent cloths across the wagon beds, so as to form 
hammocks. This made the rough trip to Santa Fe much 
20 
easier for the suffering. The wounded who could not be 
brought to town became Mrs. Canby's special charge. 
Every day on the road her carriage could be seen bearing 
either her, or some needed items for the suffering men at 
Pi 
the field hospital. Needless to say, Mrs. Canby's 
loving care endeared her to the Confederates. One Texan 
maintained that that Christian lady "captured more hearts 
of Confederate soldiers than the old general /Colonel 
22 Canb^7 ever captured Confederate bodies." Several 
•^ty/illiams, Three Years, 20. 
20Halcomb to Greer, August 5> 1927* "Confederate 
Reminiscences of 1862," loc. cit., 320; Wright to Greer, 
September 7, 1927# ibid., 323. 
21williams, Three Years, 25. 
22Halcomb to Greer, August 5# 1927* "Confederate 
Reminiscences of 1862," loc. cit., 320. 
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months later when a group of the sick and wounded had 
convalesced sufficiently to leave, the following 
resolution was unanimously passed by them: 
RESOLVED, That we should be doing violence to 
our feelings were we to leave this place without 
expressing to the ladies of Santa Fe and, through 
them, to those who have aided them in their mission, 
our proformed /fi-o/ gratitude for the delicate kind­
ness which has oeen shown to many of us in suffering 
and sickness, and the attention and courtesy which 
has been extended to all.^3 
Although every effort was made to care for the 
men, privations and hardships, intensified by a climate 
much colder than their own, caused many Texans to fall 
prey to disease. Pneumonia particularly "gave the grave 
as many as the fight." Day after day the hospital wagon 
with its silent load wended its way along the mountain­
side to inter its contents on the lonely plateau. Only 
a few months before these men had been hale and hearty, 
and filled with optimism as they left the sunny soil of 
24 Texas to begin the New Mexican campaign. 
On March 31> Captain W. H. Lewis of the Fifth 
Infantry and Captain James H. Ford, Colorado Volunteers, 
23santa Fe Gazette, May 31# 1862. 
24wiHiams, Three Years, 25-26. 
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came into Santa Fe under a flag of truce to negotiate 
an exchange of prisoners. Scurry and the Federals could 
reach no agreement, so the two captains left that after­
noon without accomplishing their mission. 
That same day the Confederates had the good 
fortune to discover a large amount of government property 
which belonged to the Indian agency. These goods were 
intended for distribution among the Indians, but because 
of the hostile attitude of the Navajos, the supplies had 
been accumulating for the past four years. Before leaving 
Santa Fe, Superintendent James L. Collins had placed the 
26 supplies in a storeroom at the superintendency. The 
door to the room was carefully closed up, plastered over, 
27 and then whitewashed. 1 The Texans had suspected that 
property of this nature was at the agency and had made 
frequent investigations in reference to it. Undoubtedly 
someone told the Confederates of its whereabouts. As a 
result the Texans gained a valuable supply of blankets 
and other articles in which they were sorely in need. 
2%anta Fe Gazette, April 26, 1862. 
26Ibid. 
27lbid., May 17, 1862. 
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Some goods were of no value to them, and these the Con­
federates attempted to sell at nominal prices to the 
28 people of the town. 
Meanwhile the six companies of Green's Regiment 
which had remained temporarily behind in Albuquerque 
were doing a great deal of patrol duty in the neighbor-
29 hood of Albuquerque and the mountains to the east. 
When the Fifth's transportation was ready, Sibley order­
ed Green to move on to Santa Fe. The general remained 
behind in Albuquerque and was to follow later behind the 
main body.^0 On March 28, the day of the battle of 
Glorieta, the Fifth was encamped at the ranch of Manuel 
31 Armijo, a strong Southern sympathizer. As previously 
related, he and his brother had turned over for Sibley's 
use some $200,000 worth of supplies. While the battle 
of Glorieta was getting under way, Sibley was still in 
Albuquerque, being shaved by his barber and completely 
^ibid., April 26, 1862. 
29Faulkner (contrib.), "With Sibley in New 
Mexico," loc. cit., 137. 
3°Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A., 
ix, 509. ~ ~ ~ 
3^Faulkner (contrib.), "With Sibley in New 
Mexico," loc. cit., 137. 
32sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A., 
ix, 511. - - -
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unaware of the developments ahead.33 Green's Regiment 
remained in camp at Armijo's ranch on March 29, and it 
was only during the next day that news arrived of the 
engagement ahead. At three o'clock in the morning of 
March 31* Green's men started out. For two days the 
force traveled up the Rio Grande valley, camping at 
Indian pueblos each night. On April 2, the Fifth left 
34 
the river and the next day camped in sight of Santa Fe. 
Sibley hastened ahead to the capital where he 
found his "whole exultant army assembled." The sick and 
wounded had been cared for, and the loss of clothing and 
transportation had been made up from Federal supplies 
and confiscations. Sibley observed that Scurry had taken 
35 care of everything "which should have been done." 
The Confederates had occupied the capital for 
nearly a month, and the forage and supplies in the general 
33Hayes states that Sibley was only twenty miles 
from the battle. Sibley's report of March 31* however, 
was written in Albuquerque. On this basis it is reason­
ably safe to assume that the general had not yet left for 
Santa Fe. Hayes, New Colorado, 169. 
Oil 
Faulkner (contrib.), "With Sibley in New 
Mexico," loc . cit., 140-141. 
35sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, £. R. A., 
ix, 509. 
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area were becoming exhausted While in Santa Fe 
Sibley issued an order for the seizure of all the funds 
in the territorial treasury. The act was executed by 
the brigade quartermaster. The amount of money which 
•37 
was taken is unknown, but apparently it was not great. 
Regardless of what materiel and money had been seized in 
and around Santa Fe, the loss of Scurry's wagon train 
had caused irreparable damage. This was particularly 
true in regard to ammunition„ As a result, the plan to 
move upon Fort Union now had to be temporarily set aside. 
The great question of "what to do" now pressed heavily 
upon Sibley and his staff. Santa Fe was untenable, the 
brigade was suffering from lack of supplies, and rumors 
reported Canby's advance from Fort Craig. The situation 
was critical. Anxiously Sibley wrote to the adjutant 
general and begged for reinforcements.3® It was obvious 
that only with additional materiel and men could the 
campaign be successfully concluded. 
36Ibid., 509-510. 
•^Santa Fe Gazette, April 26, 1862. 
3®Sibley to Cooper, March 311  1862, _0. R. A., IX, 
5^1. Canby reported that Colonel Steele with a force of 
500 men had attempted to reinforce Sibley about March 20, 
but had been prevented from doing so. Canby to Adjutant-
General, May 18, 1862, Ibid., 673. 
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After due consideration, Sibley and his staff 
decided that the whole brigade should occupy the village 
of Manzano which lay on the eastern side of the Manzano 
mountains. Intermediate between Fort Union, Albuquerque, 
and Fort Craig, this position would enable the Texans to 
keep a watch on the movements of the Federals at Fort 
Craig and Fort Union. Since Manzano was on the road to 
Fort Stanton, communication lines could be kept open with 
39 
the Mesilla Valley. While awaiting the anticipated re­
inforcements, the brigade could live off the land in and 
around the village, and send out patrols to keep the 
staff informed of any Union activity. When reinforce­
ments arrived, Sibley could then move upon Fort Union and 
bring the New Mexican campaign to a glorious conclusion. 
Should the hoped for aid not arrive, however, and if 
evacuation became necessary, the road from Manzano to 
Fort Stanton and the Mesilla Valley would be an advan­
tageous route, for there would be little danger of an 
attack upon the retreating brigade from either of the 
Federal armies. 
Hardly had the Confederates made the decision to 
move to Manzano when the plan was completely upset by the 
^Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, ibid., 510. 
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arrival of "rapid and continuous" dispatches from Albu­
querque. Canby had advanced from Fort Craig as rumored, 
40 
and was now attacking Albuquerque I The two companies 
under Coopwood and Hardeman were putting up a stout de­
fense of the town, but they could not hold out for long. 
Quickly orders were issued for the whole brigade to rush 
to Albuquerque to relieve the beleaguered garrison and 
protect the supply depot. Green's Fifth Regiment, camped 
just below Santa Fe, was ordered to set out immediately. 
The dismounted Fourth and the battalion of the Seventh 
soon followed, while Pyron's command remained behind in 
Santa Fe. After forced marches, Green and Scurry arrived 
in town only to learn that Canby had withdrawn from the 
area. For his defense of Albuquerque, Captain Hardeman 
was promoted to lieutenant colonel.^ Pyron's command 
42 came into Albuquerque on April 12. After leaving be­
hind several hundred sick and wovinded soldiers, the Con-
43 
federates had abandoned the capital. Upon his arrival 
40Ibid. 
^•kEbid.; Noel, A Campaign, 25, 118. 
^2Noel, A Campaign, 25. 
^3wright to Greer, September 7 >  1927# "Confederate 
Reminiscences of 1862," loc. cit., 324. 
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in Santa Fe, Sibley had found many people who espoused 
the Southern cause and when the Confederates abandoned 
the capital, some of these citizens left with them. 
William Pelham and Alexander P. Wilbar, both ex-surveyors 
general of the territory, and a Mr. Clemens were among 
24.it 
those who chose to cast their lot with the Confederacy. 
When Governor Connelly returned to the capital to resume 
his duties, the Santa Fe Gazette caustically remarked that 
the "only memento. . ./the Texans]7 left for our worthy 
Chief Magistrate was some of Sibley's proclamation's ^•ic/ 
and empty champagne bottles." 
The crisis had come. The "Army of New Mexico" 
was caught between two better equipped and better sup­
plied Federal forces which would shortly unite, giving 
the enemy numerical superiority. The Texans were fairly 
well-clothed, but they had only fifteen days' full 
rations. Possessing from thirty-five to forty cartridges 
^Santa Fe Gazette, April 26, 1862. 
^5jbid. A Federal Indian agent at Maxwell's 
Ranch reported on March 19, 1862, that the Texans es­
tablished their own territorial government in Santa Fe 
and selected ex-surveyor general William Pelham as 
governor. Pelham was supposed to have appointed Indian 
agents and a superintendent of Indian affairs. The 
Federal agent also asserted that he had heard that Pelham 
had issued a proclamation requiring all citizens of New 
Mexico to swear allegiance to the Confederate States under 
the penalty of the confiscation of their property. Arny 
to General, March 19* 1862, Records of the Bureau of 
366 
per man, they might have enough ammunition to engage one 
Union army, but not both.^ Under these circumstances, 
the great decision which Sibley now faced was "whether 
to evacuate the country or take the desperate chance of 
fighting the enemy in his stronghold ^/Ejnion/, for scant 
47 rations at the best. It did not take the general and 
his staff long to decide. 
The Confederates' nearest base of supply was 
hundreds of miles away. But they had not maintained a 
line of supply, for Sibley had been adamant in his belief 
that he could capture all that he needed from Federal 
depots and posts once he entered New Mexico. The state 
of Texas had been unable to fully equip and maintain 
Sibley's army in the field, so even if Sibley had had a 
supply line, very little materiel would have reached him 
from Texas. What few supplies Colonel Steele might send 
from the Mesilla Valley would be stopped by the Federals 
at Fort Craig. Sibley's grand strategy had been based up­
on seizing what he needed from the enemy. When such sup­
plies and equipment were not forthcoming, the general found 
Indian Affairs. I have found no other evidence concerning 
the setting up of a Confederate territorial government for 
New Mexico. It is quite possible that the Federal agent 
was reporting only a fallacious rumor as he did not have 
first hand information. 
^Noel, A Campaign, 25. 
^Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A., IX, 510. 
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himself stranded and destitute. Engulfed in a barren and 
hostile country, and faced with a superior enemy, rapid 
withdrawal from the territory was the only alternative to 
certain disaster. 
At a council of war Sibley and his staff agreed 
to the evacuation of the territory. The Texans hoped to 
withdraw as rapidly as possible in order to avoid another 
encounter with the main Federal army. Knowing that Port 
Craig was now garrisoned by a small force of volunteers, 
the Confederates planned, as a parting gesture, to attack 
48 
and destroy that post on their way down the Rio Grande. 
The retreat began on April 13. Since there was 
not enough ammunition for all the howitzers, Sibley con­
sidered it expedient to abandon some of these pieces. 
This would lighten the load on the draught animals and 
the carriages would serve as needed transportation for 
baggage. In order to keep them from falling into the 
hands of the Federals, eight brass howitzers were secretly 
buried in the town. Sibley kept the six guns his men had 
captured—"The Valverde Battery"—for there was great 
sentimental value attached to them.^9 By ferry and ford, 
^9whitford, Colorado Volunteers, 130, 137-138. 
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the Fourth Regiment, the battalion of the Seventh, Pyron's 
command, and part of the artillery crossed over to the 
west bank of the Rio Grande. The Fifth Regiment and the 
brigade commissary train were to follow, but Green found 
that there was too much quicksand in the ford for his 
heavy wagons. He decided to camp for the night on the 
east bank and then move down the river the next day to 
50 
find a better crossing. In the meantime, Sibley and 
the bulk of the brigade continued down the west bank of 
the river eighteen miles to the village of Los Lunas. 
Here they halted and made camp to await the arrival of 
the Fifth.51 
Hearing that the ford between Peralta and Los 
Lunas was a good one, Green set out the next morning 
down the east bank. For about five miles the regiment 
passed through very heavy sand and the progress of the 
column was slowed considerably. That evening Green ar­
rived at Peralta, which was opposite Los Lunas and 
Sibley's camp. Instead of crossing over that night, 
Green decided to make his camp at Governor Connelly's 
ranch. The heavy commissary wagons which were bringing 
5°Noel, A Campaign, 25-26. 
53-Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A., IX, 
510. - - -
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up the rear, failed to arrive, so Green sent back some 
empty wagons to lighten their loads to speed their pace. 
The wagon master had explicit orders to bring his train 
into camp, but having already turned his mules out to 
graze, and believing that there was no danger, he dis­
obeyed Green's order. He remained that night where he 
•52 was—about six or eight miles north of Peralta. 
* * * * 
Canby was deeply upset when a dispatch from 
Colonel Slough arrived informing him of the skirmish in 
Apache Canyon and the intention of the Coloradoan to move 
against the Texans with his entire force. Canby viewed 
Slough's actions as a definite breech of orders. Slough's 
impetuosity could easily lead to serious consequences, 
not only by jeopardizing the army in the northern district 
but by endangering the territory as a whole.^3 indeed, 
at the battle of Glorieta Slough had been driven from the 
field, and the defeat would have been disastrous had not 
54 
Chivington's party succeeded in burning the supply train. 
In view of this situation, Canby decided to leave Fort 
52Noel, A Campaign, 26. 
53canby to Adjutant-General, March 31* 1862, 
0. R. A., IX, 658. 
^Anderson, "Canby's Services," loc. cit., 699. 
370 
Craig as soon as possible to form a junction with the 
forces in the north.^5 Hastily he dispatched Captain 
William Nicodemus, his adjutant general, to order Slough 
to fall back to Port Union and await further word con-
56 
cerning the uniting of the Union forces. 
There were two main routes which Canby could take 
in his northward march. One ran through Abo Pass and up 
the eastern side of the mountains to Anton Chico. The 
other was the river route which could be followed to 
Albuquerque and from there eastward through Carnuel Pass 
to San Antonio, and up the eastern side of the mountains 
to Galisteo. Canby chose the river route because it was 
"the boldest," for he believed that the Texans would 
least suspect that he would use it. Furthermore, if 
Albuquerque could be occupied without serious loss, Canby 
intended to hold the town until a junction could be ef­
fected. By uniting his troops below the Confederates, 
reported to be concentrated at Santa Fe, Canby's united 
force would be in a strategic position to cut off any 
contemplated retreat by the Texans. Should Albuquerque 
prove to be too heavily defended, Canby planned to make a 
55canby to Adjutant-General, March 31> 1862, 
0. R. A., IX, 658. 
^Connelly to Seward, April 6, 1862, ibid., 659. 
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demonstration against the town. This feint might draw 
the bulk of the Confederate army from Santa Fe. While 
the Confederates were being deceived, Canby could quietly 
move out and unite his column elsewhere without fear of 
opposition.^ 
Once the forces of the department were combined, 
Canby was confident that he could drive the Texans from 
New Mexico, at least from the area north of Fort Craig. 
If adequate reinforcements from the East arrived, a suf­
ficient occupation force could be left in the north while 
the bulk of the army could proceed down to the Mesilla 
Valley. The New Mexican Volunteers, of course, could not 
"be relied on for any purpose of this kind."-^ Marching 
orders were posted at Fort Craig and preparations were 
made to move out. Each man and each company was allowed 
a limited amount of baggage. All property which was over 
the weight limit was left behind to be stored in one of 
the stone buildings of the post.^9 on April 1, with a 
force of 860 regulars and 350 volunteers (including 
"Paddy" Graydon's Spy Company), and two 24-pounders, Canby 
set out from Fort Craig. 
5^Canby to Adjutant-General, March 31* 1862, 
ibid., 658. 
5®lbid. 
59Las Vegas Gazette, September 1$, 1877* 
6°Canby to Adjutant-General, April 11, 1862, 
0. R. A., IX, 549-550. 
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Colonel Christopher "Kit" Carson was left in 
command of Port Craig, charged with the duty of holding 
that post "to the last extremity." Carson's garrison 
consisted of seven companies of his First Regiment, two 
of the Second, and one of the Fourth Regiment New Mexico 
Volunteers. As the convalescents from the hospital be­
came fit for active duty, they were counted upon to add 
to Carson's strength. How Carson would carry out his 
duty was left to his own "judgment and discretion," for 
Canby placed great reliance upon the ability of this 
frontiersman. Before leaving, the departmental commander 
warned that the Confederates in the Mesilla Valley were 
not strong enough to attack the fort openly, but that 
they might attempt to take it by surprise. In order to 
guard against such a possibility, Carson was to "exact 
from all of. . ./his/ command the most unremitting 
vigilance." Canby also stressed that the sick and wound­
ed at the hospital were to receive careful attention. 
Any expenditures which Carson considered necessary for 
their comfort were fully authorized.^ 
As Canby's column proceeded northward, the road 
became very soft and sandy. It was only with the greatest 
6%icodemus to Carson, March 31* 1862, ibid., 659. 
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difficulty that the men were able to keep the heavy 
field pieces and the transportation wagons, which were 
loaded to the brim, rolling. In order not to tire out 
the draught animals, rest stops were numerous, and at 
best the march was tedious and tiring. When Canby ar­
rived just below Socorro, "Doc" Stracham, a resident of 
Albuquerque, galloped up to deliver a dispatch from the 
northern district. In the meadow below the town, the 
column formed in a hollow square and the letter was read 
aloud to the assembled men. This was the first that 
Canby had heard about the battle of Glorieta. The dis­
patch stated that with the burning of the Confederate 
supply train, the Texans considered themselves routed so 
badly that they had begun their retreat toward Texas. 
After the reading of the message, the whole Federal 
column, "from the commanding officer down to the lowest 
private in the rear rank," gave three rousing cheers 
62 
which reverberated throughout the countryside. 
The Texans in charge of the hospital in Socorro 
had seen the approach of the Federals, and when they heard 
the cheers, they erroneously assumed that Canby was plan­
ning to storm the town. Quickly they hoisted a hospital 
^2Las Vegas Gazette, September 15, 1877. 
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flag and a delegation was sent to tell Cariby that the 
few Confederate soldiers in town were serving only as 
guards and nurses for the sick and wounded. After as­
suring the Texans that he did not plan to attack them, 
Canby reformed his men and continued his advance.^3 
Shortly before reaching the sandhills above 
Socorro, some of the infantrymen who had been drinking 
whiskey, got out of hand. One in particular was acting 
up, so he was seized and tied behind a wagon. Many were 
the curses which were emitted by this unfortunate. The 
sergeant of the guard took pity on the fellow when he saw 
that he was too drunk to stand on his feet. The sergeant 
offered to untie the soldier's hands and let him lie down 
in the feed trough to sober up, if he promised to behave 
himself. The soldier quickly agreed, but no sooner were 
his hands free, than he jumped up, jerked out the 
sergeant's pistol and shot him through the breast. The 
drunken infantryman was quickly overpowered, and at camp 
that night he was tried by a field court-martial. The 
next day the column formed in a three-sided square and 
the sentence was read. The prisoner, his eyes bandaged, 
was seated in a chair which had been placed at the open 
63Ibid. 
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end of the square. At the command of "fire!" a squad of 
mounted riflemen pierced his body with six bullets and 
"sent him into eternity for his rash act." 
On the afternoon of April 8, Canby arrived at 
Los Barelas, the southern suburb of Albuquerque. Scouts 
reported a large force of Texans in the town, J so in 
order to determine their strength and to locate their 
batteries, Canby, as planned, ordered a demonstration 
against the town. Captain Graydon's Spy Company, sup­
ported by the regular cavalry, headed the attack. The 
Texans opened fire with their howitzers which were 
located near the mill at Rancho Seco. Sharp skirmishing 
ensued and Confederate six-pound shot threw sand in the 
eyes of the support of Canby's batteries. As these 
cannon balls harmlessly bounced over the Federal artillery, 
they kept rolling, forcing the cavalrymen in the rear to 
take refuge near some buildings. In trying to dodge one 
of these missiles, Major Duncan lost his balance in the 
saddle and fell to the ground, seriously injuring his 
head. As the cannon duel continued, some of the citizens 
of Albuquerque came into the Union lines to report that 




town to seek refuge. Since the townspeople were ap­
parently suffering more from the attack than the Texans, 
f>£> 
Canby ordered his cannoneers to cease firing. 
Sharp skirmishing, less the cannonading, con­
tinued throughout the next day. Canby, convinced that 
Albuquerque was too strong to be captured by his force, 
decided to keep up the attack as a ruse to draw the main 
Confederate army from Santa Pe .67 <phe Federal commander 
held a council of war and at sundown on April 9, large 
campfires were built and when darkness set in, the 
Federals silently began loading their baggage wagons. 
Leaving behind only buglers, drummers, and fifers, the 
whole force steathily made its way toward Carnuel Pass. 
At eight o'clock that night, with the campfires still 
burning, the musicians played tattoo, and then mounted 
their horses. In company with a small escort, they soon 
/TQ 
caught up with the column. The Texans in Albuquerque 
had been completely deceived by Canby's wily maneuver. 
66canby to Adjutant-General, April 11, 1862, 
0, R._A.j IX, 550; Las Vegas Gazette, September 15, 1877. 
67canby to Adjutant-General, April 11, 1862, 
_0. R. A., IX, 550; Roberts to Thomas, April 23, 1862, 
ibid., 553. 
^^Las Vegas Gazette, September 15, 1877. 
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Canby's column marched that night and part of the 
next day. Passing through Carnuel Pass between the Sandia 
and Mansanito Mountains, Canby continued on until he 
halted at the village of San Antonio, about twenty miles 
east of Albuquerque. The commander was now in communi­
cation with Colonel Paul, and a junction could be accom­
plished at any point. Canby's feint had worked well, for 
his spies reported that the entire Confederate army had 
left Santa Pe and was moving rapidly to the relief of 
Albuquerque. Canby planned to remain in San Antonio in 
order to watch the movements of the Texans and to await 
the arrival of Paul's column from Port Union. Prom all 
indications, it appeared that the Confederates were 
planning to evacuate the territory.^ 
* * * * 
On the morning of April 5j Colonel Paul informed 
the troops at Port Union to prepare to march within an 
hour. The order "came like a dash of cold water," and 
"letters were cut short in haste, poker took wings and 
vanished, blankets and effects were bundled, the herd 
brought in, adieux said." Major Chivington briefly ad­
dressed the Colorado infantry to explain the marching 
^Canby to Adjutant-General, April 11, 1862, 
0. R. A., IX, 550. 
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order. He informed his men that Canby had left Fort 
Craig and the troops at Fort Union were to march south­
ward to divert the enemy's attention and to unite with 
Cariby to drive the Texans from the land. Though still 
weary and sore from the previous campaign, the infantry­
men assembled and set out about dusk. They marched as 
far as the Lome and encamped there for the night. 
Company F, mounted Colorados, and Claflin's battery left 
Fort Union the next day and overtook the main force at 
Las Vegas. That night Colonel Paul, escorted by Captain 
Lord's company of the First Cavalry, arrived at the camp. 
The weather during the day had been very cold and windy, 
and the men were happy to bed down in their warm blankets. 
Before leaving Las Vegas the next day, Corporal Sampson 
was sent back to the Lome with a squad of men to see if 
he could find five Colorado Volunteers who "had dropped 
TO 
behind in such a way as left no doubt of their desertion." 
At three o'clock in the afternoon of April J, 
Paul's force arrived at Bernal Springs and set up camp. 
For several days Paul's main body remained here while 
cavalry detachments were sent out to check the whereabouts 
of the enemy. Company F was ordered to proceed toward 
7°Hollister, A History of the First, 79-80. 
379 
Kozlowski's ranch where the Union hospital was. On ar­
rival at their old campsite, the Coloradoans were at­
tended by about 100 paroled Texas prisoners who had 
recently been released from Port Union and were on their 
way to rejoin their commands. Conversations between the 
two groups naturally developed. One Coloradoan was so 
exasperated by the Texans' defensive arguments that he 
came to the conclusion "that a war of extermination is 
all that will ever restore American unity. Kindness is 
accepted only as their due and as food for their haughti­
ness. Nothing can cure their insane prejudice against 
Northern men, whom they habitually stigmatize with every 
base epithet known to the vocabulary of abuse. All they 
want is the power to inflict a worse servitude on us than 
that which the unfortunate negro suffers. 
On April 9, Paul left Bernal Springs. At San 
Jose he was met by Colonel Green and Lieutenant Colonel 
McNeill who had ridden up in a carriage bearing a white 
flag. They had come to propose an exchange of prisoners, 
but since they would consent only to an even exchange 
"between Mexicans and Whites," Paul refused to negotiate. 
Both Green and McNeill were under the influence of liquor 
and acted in an "insolent and threatening" manner. Paul 
^ibid., 80-81. 
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was forced to be "somewhat peremptory" with them, and 
when the Texans realized that they could not deal with 
this Union commander, they turned back toward Santa Pe. 
The two officers stopped at Kozlowski's ranch on their 
return and stayed part of the night for rest and refresh-
72 
ments. Early the next morning they left for Santa Fe. 
A few hours after leaving San Jose, Paul received 
intelligence directly from Santa Pe that the Confederates 
had evacuated the capital and were retreating to Albu-
73 
querque. During the late afternoon of April 10, Paul 
and the main column reached Kozlowski's ranch. Captain 
Howland was sent to Santa Pe to check on the validity of 
the report while Company P continued toward Galisteo, 
about twenty miles equidistant between Santa Pe and 
Kozlowski's Ranch, for purposes of reconnaissance. The 
day was miserable, for it was snowing and the v/ind was 
blowing directly into the faces of the men of Company F 
as they plodded along. Shivering from the cold and 
dampness, the company finally reached Galisteo, but there 
72lbid., 82-83* Connelly stated that one of the 
Confederate officers was Major Alexander M. Jackson. The 
governor, however, was not present when the Texans arrived 
and received this information from someone else. Connelly 
to Seward, April 11, 1862, 0. R. A., DC, 661. 
73connelly to Seward, April 11, 1862, £. R. A_., 
DC, 662. 
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was no sign of the Texans. Prom all appearances it 
seemed that the Confederates were evacuating the country. 
A trooper candidly observed that "As they have bought up 
with Confederate scrip all the army supplies in this 
section, the soundness of their judgment in not returning 
here is evident." Captain Nicodemus came into town on 
his way to contact Paul. At first the captain did not 
know whether to take the Coloradoans for "cowboys or 
skinners," but the men soon convinced him that they were 
Union soldiers. Nicodemus informed the company that 
Canby had made a feint against Albuquerque and was now 
74 encamped at San Antonio, some forty miles away. 
Company P was ordered to continue on to Pino's 
ranch, twenty miles west of Galisteo, for further scout­
ing. The command, starting out at two o'clock in the 
afternoon, had gone eighteen miles when a messenger over­
took them with an order to fall back to Galisteo. "Ten 
hours in the saddle for nothing," cried the disgusted 
volunteers. This incident, plus the real or imagined 
preference given to the regulars, caused a member of 
Company F to sarcastically state that "if there is a dis­
agreeable task to be performed, or danger to be encounter­
ed, they call on us; but if a town is to be occupied after 
^Hollister, A History of the First, 83-84. 
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the enemy has gone, the regulars come in. Howland's 
company went into Santa Fe yesterday and had their spree 
while we were marched out twenty miles across the prairie 
and back as if we needed exercise."75 
Colonel Slough had accompanied the column from 
Port Union, but on April 12, he resigned his commission. 
In his parting address, which was read to the assembled 
regiment on parade, Slough claimed that his motives had 
been pure, and he referred to the engagement in Apache 
Canyon as proof of his earnest effort to save the country 
for the Union. He expressed regret wherever he had failed 
to give satisfaction. Slough was a man of undoubted 
ability and bravery, but his personal contact with his men 
was never of the sort to make him beloved. The former com­
mander of the First closed his remarks by asking the men 
to remember that they "were Colorados, men and Americans, 
and could not afford to do anything to dishonor" them­
selves. In the morning he set out for Canby's camp at San 
Antonio to talk with that officer personally. In company 
with two other officers who had resigned their commissions, 
Lieutenants Roath and Sanford, Slough left New Mexico for 
Denver City.^ 
75Ibid., 85. 
76Ibid., 86, 89 
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On April 12, Captain Howland returned by way of 
Pino's ranch to Paul's command at Kozlowski's. He re­
ported that on entering Santa Fe his company was received 
with "public demonstrations of joyand that the Con­
federates had evacuated the capital and had fallen back to 
Albuquerque. Howland estimated that there were still about 
78 
250 sick, wounded, and deserters in the town. After 
hearing this report, Paul wrote to Governor Connelly in 
Las Vegas to inform him that Santa Fe was once again in 
Union hands and that the governor could return to the 
capital whenever he desired.^ 
With the southern column only sixty miles away, 
dispatches between Paul and Canby were sent and received 
nearly every hour. Since the Confederates had now 
Ibid., 87J Paul to Connelly, April 12, 1862, 
0. R. A., IX, 664. 
78Hollister, A History of the First, 87. 
79Paul to Connelly, April 12, 1862, _0. R. A., 
IX, 663-664. Connelly reported that when the Texans 
abandoned Santa Fe they left behind one surgeon and a 
few attendants to care for the sick and wounded. He 
received this information from a man who left the 
capital the day after the Confederates evacuated the 
town. Connelly to Seward, April 11, 1862, ibid., 662. 
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concentrated at Albuquerque and were giving every indi­
cation of leaving the country, the way was now clear for 
Paul to rapidly move southward to unite with Canby. The 
stillness of the morning of April 13 was rudely broken by 
the drum and bugle calling Paul's men to rise and prepare 
for the hard march ahead. At two o'clock, before the men 
had even time to eat breakfast, the column started moving 
out. For the first few miles the road passed through 
hills covered with scrub pine. Soon the trail led through 
a cactus covered plain which stretched out in every 
direction except in the west where it was bounded by a 
broken chain of mountains. Through occasional gaps in 
these mountains "the blue and hazy peaks of other and more 
distant ranges" could be seen. Thirty miles from Galisteo 
the road approached the mountains and then passed up a 
canyon toward the head of Carnuel Pass. About dark Paul's 
column reached the village of Tijeras where Canby had his 
camp "snugly embosomed among the densely timbered hills 
of the Pass." Canby had moved his force from San Antonio 
at the head of the canyon to Tijeras which was about five 
or six miles below. The column from the north had been 
on the road for fourteen hours, traveling a distance of 
some forty miles without food. Some of the horses were 
in such jaded condition that they had to be led into 
385 
camp. Footsore and weary, Paul's men were happy to make 
Oq 
camp and rest from the long, arduous march. 
Slough's resignation had gone into effect on 
April 9. Lieutenant Colonel Tappan "generously waived 
his rank," and a petition, asking that Chivington be 
promoted to succeed Slough, was signed by all the officers 
of the First Regiment and presented to Canby. On April 14, 
that officer designated the popular Major Chivington 
colonel of the First. This appointment, however, was 
subject to the approval of the governor of the territory 
of Colorado.®-1-
With his forces.now united, Canby was ready to 
strike against the enemy which was now reported to be 
moving down the river from Albuquerque.^ on the after­
noon of April 14, the Federals came down Carnuel Pass to 
the mouth of the canyon where they briefly halted to eat. 
From this point the men could see the Rio Grande which, 
at that distance, appeared "like a silver thread glisten­
ing under the slanting beams of the setting sun."^ When 
®^Hollister, A History of the First, 85, 88-89. 
^Ibid., 89; Whitford, Colorado Volunteers, 130. 
82canby to Adjutant-General, April 23, 1862, 
0. R. A., IX, 550-551. 
83nollister, A History of the First, 89. 
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the troops finished eating, the wagons were reloaded and 
the column moved silently out "without the cracking of a 
Oh 
whip, or the lighting of a pipe."OH After emerging from 
the canyon, Canby veered southward and followed a course 
which angled toward the river. At midnight, after a 
march of about thirty-six miles,Federals struck 
the Rio Grande about one mile above the village of 
Peralta.®^ 
Encamped at Peralta, Green's Regiment was totally 
unaware of the approach of Canby's men. The Texas pickets 
were taken prisoner and, through spies, the condition of 
the "Sibley Brigade" was learned. The Texas officers 
were "carousing" at a fandango while their men were badly 
demoralized by "ill usage and bad management."®''' To be 
sure, in the distance Canby's ears "were saluted with the 
'sounds of revelry by night.' The violin was in full 
QO 
blast, accompanied by other and more noisy instruments.1 
®^Las Vegas Gazette, September 15* 1877• 
85canby to Adjutant-General, April 23, 1862, 
0. R. A., IX, 551. 
86nollister, A History of the First, 89. 
8?Ibid., 91. 
®®Connelly to Seward, April 20, 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 665. 
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Undoubtedly the Texans were celebrating their leaving 
hated New Mexico. 
Many of Canby's men expected to attack immedi­
ately, and they impatiently awaited orders.^9 Cariby had 
other plans, however1, and the wagons "were corraled" and 
camp made.9° Chivington offered to capture or disperse 
the Texans with his Colorado regiment alone, but Canby, 
knowing that Green had made his camp in a strong de­
fensive position, did not want to risk an engagement. 
During the remainder of the mild, moonlight night, the 
troops watched and waited, hoping to surprise the Texans 
in the morning.9^ • 
89Hollister, A History of the First, 91. 
9°Las Vegas Gazette, September 15* 1877• 
9%ollister, A History of the First, 91-92; 
Canby to Adjutant-General, ApriT~23, lbb2, 0. R. A_., 
IX, .  551.  
CHAPTER XIII 
THE SKIRMISH OP PERALTA AND THE CONFEDERATE RETREAT 
PROM NEW MEXICO 
The first sound which startled the Federal and 
Confederate troops the next morning was a "thrilling" 
reveille from Canby's bugles. This was soon followed by 
the stirring strains of Dixie which was "thrust upon the 
deathly quiet by the brazen throats of Sibley's Brass 
Band." All thoughts of a surprise attack were now at an 
end, and by daylight, both camps were in motion. A group 
of Union soldiers were in the process of making some 
coffee to warm their chilled bodies when they saw a Con­
federate wagon train approaching unsuspectingly along the 
road from Albuquerque. These were the wagons which 
Green had ordered into camp the night before. Through a 
spyglass, the Federals observed that the train, now 
equidistant from the Confederate and Union camps,con­
sisted of seven wagons and a small escort of thirty-four 
men commanded by a lieutenant. Canby immediately dis­
patched Paul and his column and three companies of 
2 cavalry under Captain Morris to capture the train. 
^Hollister, A History of the First, 92. 
2Cariby to Adjutant-General, April 23, 1862, 0. R. A., 
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When the Confederates saw the enemy coming to­
ward them, a few fled "with more speed than was neces­
sary to ensure their safety or vindicate their bravery." 
The Texans, of course, were overwhelmingly outnumbered. 
The small escort could have abandoned their overloaded 
wagons and easily made it to the safety of their own 
camp. Instead they chose to defend the train. While 
several unlimbered their brass howitzer, the others took 
cover under the wagons. . With their artillery piece in 
position and leaning on their "trusty rifles for sup­
port, " the Texans awaited the attack.3 perhaps they 
thought that the men of their camp would see their 
plight and come to their aid. 
The mounted Union troops galloped to within two 
hundred yards of the train and quickly dismounted to 
deploy as skirmishers. As they advanced, the Texans 
fired, but the Federals "hit the dirt," fired back, and 
rose to advance further. These tactics were continued 
until they were within fifty yards of the Texans when, 
with a loud yell, the Federals rushed the train. At 
that moment abotft a dozen Texans stepped out in sight, 
^Hollister, A History of the First, 92. 
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dropped their arms, and hoisted a dirty handkerchief on 
a ramrod. The others took "leg •bail" and were either 
shot down, captured, or allowed to escape. Perhaps the 
Confederates could have held out longer, but two compa­
nies of Union infantry were rapidly coming to the sup­
port of the cavalry. With no help in sight from their 
own camp, the Texans considered it useless to resist 
further. The Union infantry arrived in time to witness 
2i 
the surrender. In this brief encounter, Canby reported 
that six Confederates were killed, three wounded, and 
twenty-two captured.^ One Union soldier was wounded so 
f i  severely that he died within a few days. 
The wagon train contained quartermaster and com­
missary supplies,^ and the household goods of Judge 
Baird. Baird was leaving the territory with Sibley's 
army, and though his possessions were captured, he and 
O 
his family managed to escape unhurt in their ambulance. 
4Ibid., 92-93. 
5canby to Adjutant-General, April 23# 1862, 
0. R. A., IX, 551. Hollister maintained that several of 
T^he Texans managed to escape. This conflicts with 
Canby's report which accounts for the whole escort being 
killed, wounded, or captured. Hollister, A History of 
the First, 93• 
^Hollister, A_ History of the First, 93. 
?Ibid. 
8"Notes on the Affair at Valverde," Stanley, Fort 
Union, 179• 
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Judge Baird and his family were not alone, for when the 
Confederates began to evacuate, Rafael and Manuel 
Armijo abandoned "luxurious homes and well-filled store­
houses" to join their fate to the Southern Confederacy 
Seven wagons, one howitzer, seventy mules, and from ten 
to fifteen horses and equipment were taken. ' The Federals 
limbered up the howitzer and made the prisoners haul it 
in. On the way back, the party met Captain Claflin on his 
way to another part of the field. That artillery officer 
took charge of the cannon and was "soon testing its 
functions against its late owners.""1,0 
The Texans were greatly surprised to discover that 
Canby's column had moved up during the night. Green's 
whole force numbered only about 550 men. Supported by 
his four howitzers,he occupied, however, a strong, de­
fensive position. In fact, Canby maintained that it was 
the strongest in the territory outside of Port Union.I2 
The village of Peralta was for two miles a series of 
^Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A., IX, 511. 
l°Holllster, A History of the First, 93> 9^. 
11 
Noel, A Campaign, 26. 
12Canby to Adjutant-General, April 23, 1862, 
0. R. A., IX, 551. 
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adobe houses, thick adobe fences, raised ditches (which 
could serve as well as common field works), and groves 
of large cottonwood trees.^3 Governor Connelly's 
residence, where Green had set up his headquarters, was 
particularly strong since it was surrounded on all sides 
for half a mile by a low, heavy growth of trees. Only 
the main road leading to the house could be used for 
wagons or artillery. Numerous wide and sloughy irri­
gation canals ran parallel to, and across, the road and 
adobe walls, enclosing the cultivated fields, "crossed 
and recrossed" the area.^ 
When Canby ordered the detachment after the wagon 
train, Captain "Paddy" Graydon's Spy Company began feel­
ing out the enemy by galloping into Peralta and firing a 
few shots.^5 on the return of this unit, Canby opened 
16 
a "furious, but harmless," cannonade on Green's position. 
Hardly had his first 24-pounder shell burst over the 
Texans than there appeared white smoke from the muzzles 
•^Hollister, A History of the First, 97. 
•^Connelly to Seward, April 20, 1862, 0. R. A_., 
IX,  665.  
•^Hollister, A History of the First, 93. 
^Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX,  510.  
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of the Confederate 6-pounders It was here that the 
"Valverde Battery" was tested for the first time."1'® The 
first ball the Texans fired fell short and bounced over 
the enemy and buried itself in loose sand near their 
rear. The second shot was in range. After making a 
high arc in the air, the ball came whizzing in, and 
crashed among a pair of battery wheel mules. The ball 
tore "away the whole face of the saddle mule and. . . 
^nocked/ the off wheeler on the head just under and be­
hind the ear." Both animals fell to the ground not know­
ing what had struck them."1"^ With the Federals in their 
sights, the Texans rapidly began pouring shells into the 
midst of Canby's ammunition and supply train. Hastily 
Canby ordered his wagons to pull back further to the rear 
to get out of range, for they were killing his mules 
"three or four at a shot." Canby's guns continued to 
return the fire, but since their shots were ineffectual, 
20 
they were ordered to cease firing. 
ITLas Vegas Gazette, September 15, 1877. 
•^Noel, A Campaign, 26. 
•^Las Vegas Gazette, September 15, 1877. 
90 
Hollister, A History of the First, 93. 
39^ 
The column sent after the wagon train had now re­
turned, but before the men could get back to their 
PI 
coffee, they were on the move again. Canby ordered 
22 
the bosque in front of Peralta cleared of the enemy. 
Two columns under Paul and Chivington, with a section of 
artillery in the center of each, started toward the river. 
The objective was to approach Peralta from the protective 
shelter of the trees on the river. This position would 
allow them to command the ford and prevent reinforce­
ments from coming to Green's aid from across the Rio 
Grande. On the way, the columns halted several times to 
fire their artillery to sound out the Texans. The Con­
federate battery was located in a good position, for it 
was on higher ground and was sheltered by the bank of a 
large canal. A Union soldier maintained that one of the 
Confederate gunners had been captured at Apache Canyon and, 
though released on parole, was now "paying his respects." 
The Texans had the Federals' range exactly, and the two 
columns had to keep moving. The Union cavalry was "here, 
there and everywhere; now preparing to charge, now on 
2lIbid. 
pp 
Canby to Adjutant-General, April 23, 1862, 
0. R. A., IX, 551. 
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foot advancing as skirmishers; always about to do some­
thing but never doing it. 
Paul and Chivington were under the impression 
that Canby, with a portion of the army and a section of 
artillery, was assaulting the other side of town while 
they were attacking from the river side. Paul was 
anxious to close in and take Peralta by storm, so he 
planned to send Major VJynkoop's battalion forward while 
the cavalry charged on the right. Chivington's column 
was to support Wynkoop when necessary. Before Paul could 
put his plan into operation, Canby arrived on the scene 
and forbade it. He knew that the nature of the terrain 
and the well-entrenched position of the Texans would 
make such an attack too costly. The horses of the Union 
cavalry were weak and jaded, and they would have bogged 
down in the muddy ditches. In this position, well-con-
cealed Texas sharpshooters could easily have picked off 
their riders. An infantry charge might have met with 
2 4 
more success, but only at a heavy cost. At any rate, 
Canby's objective had been accomplished for the moment, 
23Hollister, A History of the First, 93-9^• 
lb id . ,  94 .  
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for the bosques in the front and rear of the town were 
cleared and occupied by the Federal forces 
When Sibley was notified of Green's critical 
position, he ordered Colonel Scurry to take the whole 
disposable force, including the artillery, across the 
river to bolster the Fifth. Only a "sufficient" guard 
of 
for the supply wagons remained behind. w Near nine 
o'clock Green's men heard the shouts of their comrades as 
they came from the river. The ford was nearly 800 yards 
wide and averaged four feet deep. Although mush ice was 
floating in the water, the Texans waded up to their arm 
pits, holding their guns in their right hands and their 
27 
cartridge boxes in their left. Not all were willing to 
cross. It was later reported that 250 positively refused 
to follow Scurry into action, and openly threatened his 
28 
life if he forced them to do so. 
25canby to Adjutant-General, April 23, 1862, 
0. R. A., IX, 551. 
^Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, ibid., 510. 
2^Noel, A Campaign, 26-27. 
2®Hollister, A History of the First, 97-98. 
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With a portion of his staff, Sibley followed 
shortly to assume immediate command. He had just 
crossed the river when a group of officers which had 
preceded him several hundred yards, galloped back to 
inform him that a large force of enemy cavalry was ap­
proaching. Finding himself completely cut off, Sibley 
was forced to recross the river "amid a shower of 
balls."2^ Once again the Confederate commander did not 
lead his troops into battle. 
The skirmishing increased somewhat when the 
30 
Federals made one last effort to dislodge the Texans. 
After that the fighting died down to nothing more than 
"ineffectual firing" on both sides Cariby's soldiers 
had been twenty-four hours, some as long as thirty-six 
hours, without eating. To allow his troops to obtain 
food and rest, Canby decided to cease his attack for the 
time being.The men, though many were sleeping, re­
mained in line of battle. Near noon some hungry 
2^Sibley to Cooper, May b, 1862, jO. R. A., 
IX, 510. 
3°Noel, A Campaign, 27« 
^Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 510. _ _ _ 
32canby to Adjutant-General, April 23, 1862, 
ibid., 551. 
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Coloradoans who saw no "likelihood of getting any secesh 
to eat, . . .knocked over a dozen of their beeves." The 
meat was broiled over the coals of their fires and made 
33 
a fine meal. 
While his men were resting and eating, Canby sent 
out scouting parties to thoroughly reconnoiter the ap­
proaches to Peralta. When the scouts made their reports, 
the points and direction of attack were decided upon, and 
Canby moved the command camp nearer the town. The wagons 
were also moved to an area where they could be guarded by 
a smaller number of men.About two o'clock that after­
noon a high wind sprang up and, as is typical in New 
Mexico, the air became a solid cloud of moving sand and 
dust. It was difficult to breathe, let alone see. As 
further operations were impossible while the sand storm 
continued, the Federals abandoned their advanced positions 
and retired to the shelter of their camp. The men had 
been on the battle line—just beyond rifle range of the 
Texans—for six hours.^5 so ended the skirmish of 
Peralta. 
33Hollister, A History of the First, 95 • 
3^Canby to Adjutant-General, April 23, 1862, 
0. R. A., IX, 551. 
35Hollister, A History of the First, 95* 
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Canby gave his losses as one killed and three 
wounded.other accounts, particularly the records of 
the Colorado adjutant-general's department, mention four 
deaths among the Colorado Volunteers alone. In one 
instance during the skirmish, Colonel Chivington and one 
of his captains barely escaped being hit by a cannon ball. 
The missile, after skipping along the ground toward them, 
bounded a few inches over their heads and fatally struck 
•37 
two soldiers who were walking nearby.-" There are no 
available records for Confederate losses, aside from 
those reported by Canby concerning the capture of the 
oQ 
wagon train. 
After nightfall, with the wind still blowing 
furiously, Sibley ordered his forces to the west bank of 
the Rio Grande. Again the men of the Fourth and Seventh 
40 
Regiments had to wade the icy waters. With the 
3^canby to Adjutant-General, April 23, 1862, 
0. R. A., IX, 551. 
^whitford, Colorado Volunteers, 132, 150. 
38canby to Adjutant-General, April 23, 1862, 
0. R. A., IX, 551. 
^^Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, ibid., 510. 
^°Noel, A Campaign, 27. 
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exception of the supply wagons, the brigade made it 
across without "interruption or casualty.n^"1" Green's 
teams were weak and run down and with the river swollen 
by spring thaws, the Fifth had to abandon three of its 
wagons. The mules were unhitched and taken across to 
ijo 
help pull the rest of the brigade's transportation. 
At daylight the next morning the "Army of New Mexico" 
quietly resumed its march down the riverThe sick 
and wounded, "without attendance, without medicines, and 
almost without food," were left behind to the mercy of 
44 
the Federal army. 
Canby incurred much ill feeling for allowing the 
Texans to escape so easily. Many accused him of being 
lenient toward the enemy because he and Sibley were 
4c 
brothers-in-law. J One Union soldier cynically remarked 
^Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 510. : 
^Santa Fe Gazette, April 26, 1862. Connelly re­
ported that the Fifth abandoned its whole train of sixty 
wagons. Connelly to Seward, April 20, 1862, _0. R. A., 
IX, 665. 
^Noel, A Campaign, 27. 
^Cariby to Adjutant-General, April 23, 1862, 
0. R. A., IX, 551. 
^^Whitford, Colorado Volunteers, 131. 
401 
that the skirmish of Peralta was the "most harmless 
battle on record, putting one in mind of two gamblers 
colleagued to do a greeny, betting and bluffing together 
with perfect recklessness to bait him, but suddenly find­
ing their judgment when he put his foot into it." He 
went on to say that "As if by mutual understanding, . . . 
/The Texans/7 commenced crossing the river when we drew 
off the field, and morning saw them all over, snapping 
their fingers at us. As Sibley waved his farewell from 
the opposite bank he seemed to say, 'Thank you, gentle­
men, for your hostile intentions. Doubtless they are 
46 
sincere, but Canby and I understand each other." 
These criticisms were, of course, unfair for the 
Federal commander had good reasons for not attacking more 
vigorously. Had he launched a full-scale assault against 
the Texans in their entrenched positions, the casualties 
would have been heavy. And the colonel considered an 
"honest man's life worth ten" of the enemy.^ Aside from 
casualties, what would have resulted? Victory would 
probably have meant the capture of the entire Confederate 
army. That might have been glorious, to be sure, but it 
^Hollister, A History of the First, 94-96. 
^flbid., 102. 
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would not have been practical. The territory v*as 
stripped of provisions of all kinds, and even the Union 
troops were on short rations. If the Confederates were 
captured, Canby would not only have to use the bulk of 
his array to guard them, but he would also have to feed 
them. This he was not in a position to do. His only 
alternative was to let the Texans slip away, and then 
follow closely behind to make certain that they were 
evacuating the country and would not pillage villages on 
48 the way. Since leaving Carnuel Pass, Canby knew that 
Sibley was abandoning New Mexico, so he probably intended 
the skirmish at Peralta to be no more than a threat to 
49 
hasten the Texans' departure. Canby's course of action 
caused a great deal of discontent within his own army, 
and the Union men of the territory never forgave him.^° 
In retrospect, however, his decision was undoubtedly a 
wise one. 
^Anderson, "Canby's Services," loc. cit., 699; 
Canby to Adjutant-General, May 12, 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 671. ~ ~ 
^Canby to Adjutant-General, April 23, 1862, 
0. R. A., IX, 550-551. 
50pettis, "The Confederate Invasion of New 
Mexico and Arizona," loc. cit., 110. 
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The Texans1 abandonment of their strong position 
at Peralta was ample evidence that they did not care to 
engage the Federal forces again. Since it was obvious 
that they were getting out of the country as fast as 
ci 
possible, Canby decided to send his departmental staff 
officers to Santa Fe and Port Union so they could make 
arrangements for future operations.-^ These officers, 
plus the small force of volunteers which would accompany 
them, would not weaken Canby®s strength to any degree. 
Colonel Benjamin S. Roberts was ordered to Santa 
Pe to take command of the Central, Northern, and Santa 
Pe Districts. He was charged with the duty of reestab­
lishing garrisons, securing public property, and re­
storing order to those areas which had recently been 
evacuated by the Confederates. His command consisted of 
one company of the First, three of the Second, and one 
of the Fifth Regiment New Mexico Volunteers. The chief 
commissary was instructed to make the "necessary provision" 
for the food supplies of the department. The senior 
quartermaster, Captain J. C. McPerran, was instructed to 
go to Port Union to superintend the operations of the 
5lHollister, A History of the First, 98. 
52General Orders, No. 30, April 16, 1862, 
0. R. A., IX, 664. 
4o4 
department, and to collect and send supplies to Canby's 
column. Surgeon E. I. Baily, the medical director of 
the department, was to proceed to Santa Pe and Fort 
Union to establish general hospitals and to purchase 
any supplies which he deemed necessary to "secure the 
comfort and speedy recovery of the wounded." He was to 
be assisted in these duties by Surgeon J. M. Whitlock 
of the First New Mexico Volunteers. The senior paymaster 
was to make immediate arrangements for the payment of 
the troops and those men who had gone the longest with­
out pay were to be paid first.53 
Roberts set out from Peralta with his command and 
the staff officers on April 16. He reoccupied Albuquerque 
and after leaving a small garrison he continued on to 
54 
Santa Fe, arriving there on the evening of April 20. 
Northern New Mexico was once again securely held by the 
Union army. 
With the departure of Roberts and the staff of­
ficers, Canby was ready to move after the Confederates. 
But the cavalry and draught animals on both sides were so 
53Ibid. 
5^Connelly to Seward, April 20, 1862, ibid., 665; 
Roberts to Thomas, April 23, 1862, ibid., 666. 
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completely broken down that Canby was aware that neither 
a retreat nor a pursuit could be carried out with "any 
55 
degree of rapidity." The Federal command was divided 
into three columns. Colonel Paul was to head the first 
column and Colonel Chivington was to command the second. 
With the exception of Graydon's Spy Company, all the 
cavalry was placed in charge of Captain R. M. Morris of 
the Third Cavalry. Though he was certain that the 
Texans had abandoned Peralta, Canby left nothing to 
chance, and he cautiously circled the town before enter­
ing it. As his men observed the natural strength of the 
Confederates' former position, they were convinced that 
Canby had exercised sound judgment in not storming the 
town the day before. Through a captured assistant 
surgeon, the Federals learned that the Texans were "much 
disaffected" and were complaining that they had been 
"misled, misused and not paid."57 
The wind continued to blow throughout the day, 
filling the sky with moving sand as the Union army 
58 
started down the east bank of the river. Canby 
55connelly to Seward, April 13, 1862, ibid., 663. 
^General Orders, No. 30, April 16, 1862, ibid., 
664. 
57Hollister, A History of the First, 97-98• 
58ibid., 98. 
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maintained that the road on the east bank was shorter 
than the one the Confederates were following across the 
river. If he had not already overtaken the enemy, 
Canby intended to cross to the west bank at La Joya, 
CO 
Polvadera, Sabino, or Port Craig. ̂  During the remainder 
of the day, the road ran "through towns and across in­
numerable acequias, the whole seeming one endless farm, 
supporting adobe houses, swarthy, blanketed Greasers, 
goats and burros, besides thousands of cattle and sheep." 
Some of the ground was heavily turfed, but in other areas 
it was nothing but drifting sand or akalki-crusted wastes. 
As the men passed below Los Lunas they saw the smoking 
remains of some of Sibley's heavy baggage. After a march 
60 
of from ten to twelve miles, Canby's men made their camp. 
fil 
They were now five miles behind the Confederates. To 
add to the excitement that night, a commissary wagon 
caught fire. Apparently the sergeant, who had been 
reading, knocked over his candle, and being too drunk to 
» 
do anything, both he and the wagon were consumed by the 
6P 
flames. 
59canby to Adjutant-General, April 23, 1862, 
0. R. A., 551. 
^°Hollister, A History of the First, 98. 
^Canby to Adjutant-General, April 23, 1862, 
0. R. A., 551. 
f\0 
Hollister, A History of the First, 98-99. 
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Many of the men still did not understand Canby's 
reasons for not overtaking and capturing the Confederates. 
As one soldier remarked: "Sixty miles per day to catch 
the traitors and ten to let them go. Of course it is all 
right .we do not want to take any unfair advantage of them. 
We would be chivalrous like them. God grant they may 
never get the same advantage of us. "^3 
The next day Canby's men had been on the road but 
a short while when they sighted the Texans three or four 
miles ahead on the opposite bank. "Sibley's Brigade," 
which did not exhibit unseemly haste in its march, ap-
fill 
peared to be as large as the Federal column. Canby's 
army moved closer—almost within easy cannon range—and 
only the river intervened to separate the two belliger-
65 
ants. When one army halted, no matter how short, the 
other did the same. Neither force showed any disposition 
to engage in combat, though occasionally sharpshooters 
exchanged "compliments" across the Rio Grande. In this 
f\fs 
manner, both armies marched along throughout the day. 
63lbid., 98. 
64 lb id., 99. 
^5canby to Adjutant-General, April 23, 1862, 
0. R. A., IX, 551. 
66jyoel, A Campaign, 27. 
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The road on the Federal side passed through poor 
country and, except for a few scattered areas, it was 
practically desert. Sand banks up to fifteen feet high 
were common, making it exceedingly difficult to keep the 
wagons rolling. In the afternoon the Texans halted to 
eat supper, and the Federals passed slightly ahead of 
them to camp at the village of La Joya.^ At four 
o'clock the Confederates arrived near the narrow pass 
through the mountains by La Joya, and near where the Rio 
Puerco empties into the Rio Grande. Here the Texans made 
their camp which was in full view of the Federals across 
the river.^ With the aid of a spyglass, the Federals 
observed that the Texans appeared to be preparing to 
march again, but they did not move out while it was still 
daylight.^9 
Canby's men had marched twelve miles that day and 
had made their camp in a bed of deep, loose sand. The 
camp ground was a barren area with not a "spire of grass 
nor a green thing around." Soon after dark the wind be­
gan to rise again, blowing furiously throughout the night 
^THollister, A History of the First, 99• 
^^Noel, A Campaign, 27. 
69Hollister, A History of the First, 99. 
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and filling and covering everything with sand. "Men who 
had grown gray in the Service swore they never spent a 
worse night. Eating, drinking, talking, seeing or sleep­
ing were alike impossible. Tents were prostrated and 
buried." The men gave little thought to the Texans 
across the river, for they were too busy cursing the 
"unpardonable stupidity" which would locate a camp in a 
70 sandbank.1 
Across the Rio Grande Sibley was pondering his 
next move, and, no doubt, bolstering himself with alcohol. 
He knew that a clash with the Union forces would be in­
evitable if he continued to follow his present route.^ 
His original plan had been to retreat down the river well 
ahead of Canby, and attack and destroy Port Craig as a 
parting gesture. Green's failure to cross over at Albu­
querque had thwarted this, for the brigade was delayed 
long enough to allow Canby to catch up with him at 
Peralta. Ahead lay Fort Craig on the west bank of the 
river. Surely "Kit" Carson's garrison would contest the 
brigade's passage. While thus engaged, Canby's force 
could cross over and attack from the rear. To add to his 
7°Ibid., 99-100. 
7lNoel, A Campaign, 27. 
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troubles, the road over which he had been traveling was 
very poor. Heavy sand made it difficult for the weary 
draught animals to pull the wagons and artillery. All 
along the route forage and grass had been scarce and 
the animals had been suffering more than ever as a re­
sult. With his animals too weak to pull both the wagons 
and the caissons, it was obvious that, if he was to con­
tinue to keep moving, he would have to abandon one or 
the other.?2 Paced with these tremendous problems, the 
old general called a council of war to determine the 
course of action.73 
At the council Colonels Green and Scurry, and 
several other "practical" officers, expressed their 
views. They suggested that in order to avoid Port Craig 
and avert another clash with the Federals, they should 
take an old trail around the mountains and strike the 
river below the fort.7^ Though it would be a difficult 
route, with water frequently only at points thirty to 
thirty-five miles apart, the council decided that the 
72Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 510. - - -
7%oel, A Campaign, 27-28. 
7^Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 510-511. - - -
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brigade should follow it.^ Major Bethel Coopwood was 
familiar with the country and he was given the respon­
sibility of guiding the army through this "mountainous, 
trackless waste. Several officers suggested that the 
artillery should be destroyed,?7 but Scurry stepped for­
ward and pledged his services and that of his regiment 
to push the artillery through "at all hazards and at any 
expenditure of toil and labor." This detour, Sibley 
mused, would have two advantages. It would "mystify" 
the Federals and prevent another engagement with them, 
and there would probably be more grass for the animals 
7 fit 
along this route than the river road. 
Orders were issued that each man of the brigade 
should wear what he could—above all to carry his gun 
and ammunition—and to pack seven days 1 rations. All 
the wagons which could possibly be dispensed with were 
abandoned and the provisions packed on the backs of the 
mules. At one o'clock in the morning, with the sand 
75Noel, A Campaign, 28. 
f^Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0, R. A., 
IX, 511. 
^Noel, A Campaign, 28. 
f^sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 511. ~ ~ 
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blowing furiously, the retreat through the mountain be­
gan. The infantry led the advance of each party, and 
following them came the few remaining wagons and the 
artillery. The cavalry brought up the rear.^ 
When the Federals gazed across the Rio Grande- on 
the morning of April 18, nothing but an abandoned camp 
met their eyes. "Paddy" Graydon's Spy Company crossed 
over to reconnoiter, and discovered that, aside from some 
sick and disabled soldiers,^0 the Confederates had 
81 abandoned thirty-eight wagons and their contents. 
Graydon observed that the Texans had taken an old trail 
through the mountains which passed twenty miles ..west of 
Port Craig and struck the river thirty miles below that 
Rp 
post. Canby made arrangements to secure the abandoned 
property,ancj after providing for the unfortunates the 
Texans had left behind, he set out for Polvadera, fifteen 
Oh 
miles away. 
79l\foel, A. Campaign, 27. 
^^Hollister, A History of the First, 100. 
^Canby to Adjutant-General, April 23> 1862, 
0. R. A., IX, 551. 
82Hollister, A History of the First, 101. 
83canby to Adjutant-General, April 23, 1862, 
0. R. A., IX, 551. 
S^Hollister, A History of the First, 100-101. 
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Colonel Canby was usually seen near the head of 
his column, attended by his staff and escorted by a few 
mounted troopers. "Tall and straight, coarsely dressed 
in citizen's clothes, his countenance hard and weather-
beaten, his chin covered with a heavy grizzly beard of 
two weeks' growth, a cigar in his mouth which he never 
lighted/''—using a pipe when he wished/ to smoke—he 
certainly. . .^FTad/ an air of superiority, largely the 
gift of nature, though undoubtedly strengthened by long 
habits of command." Canby's portly and commanding ap­
pearance, and his dignified and self-possessed manner, 
usually inspired confidence and respect from his of­
ficers and men alike. "Patient, prudent and cautious," 
the colonel exhibited not only foresight and sound 
judgment, but also great moral and physical courage. 
Canby was a regular army officer and many of the Con­
federates he was now fighting had been his comrades a 
short twelve months before. Undoubtedly this influenced 
his feelings, but it did not swerve him from what he be­
lieved to be his duty. Canby was as "true to the Govern-
85 
ment as any man in existence." 
The Federals arrived at Polvadera®^ in the after­
noon and made their camp in a large "bottom" which, 
85Ibid., 101-02. 
86canby to Adjutant-General, April 23, 1862, 
0. R. A., IX, 551. 
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unfortunately, had "little water and less wood." The 
wagon train did not get into camp until late that night. 
Lack of forage along the way and the sandy road had 
weakened the draught animals to such an extent that they 
could not keep pace with the main column.Cariby re­
mained in camp the following day to rest his stock and 
to make certain that the Confederates were actually re­
treating behind the mountains and were not trying to 
deceive him with a feint. He was also informed that a 
supply train from Port Union was not far behind, and he 
wanted to wait until he was sure that it would arrive 
safely.^ 
While at Polvadera, William Pelham, the former 
surveyor general of the territory, came into camp with 
thirty other Texans to surrender.^ Pelham had not 
formally joined the Confederate army, but when Sibley 
began his retreat, he "shouldered his gun to fight for 
Southern independence." Pelham was paroled, but because 
he was a civilian, he was made a political prisoner. As 
such he was not eligible for exchange. On February 8, 
87Hollister, k History of the First, 101, 102. 
S^Canby to Adjutant-General, April 23, 1862, 
0. R. A., IX, 551. 
89Hollister, A History of the First, 102-103. 
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1863j the speaker of the House of Representatives of 
the state of Texas wrote to General J. B. Magruder to 
ask his aid in securing the exchange of this "brave, 
true and valuable citizen."9® The remainder of the men, 
after taking the oath of allegiance, left, presumably 
for Texas, where, according to numerous letters found 
in the abandoned wagons, the young Texas ladies "would 
fain wear Yankee ears for necklaces." One displeased 
Union soldier cynically observed that these oaths of 
allegiance meant nothing, and that these parolees would 
be met again whenever there was another engagement.91 
On learning that the supply train was proceeding 
safely, and assured that Sibley's men were retreating 
behind the mountains, Canby set out again.^ After a 
march of three miles, the Federals crossed the Rio Grande 
to the west bank at the ford opposite Limitar. The river 
was about "belly-deep" to a horse and the men and the 
wagon train were able to cross without mishap. At sun­
down the troops went into camp two miles south of the 
9°Burnley to Magruder, February 8, 1863, 0. R, A., 
Series II, V, 827-828. 
^Holllster, A_ History of the First, 103. 
92canby to Adjutant-General, April 23, 1862, 
0. R. A., DC, 551. 
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village. That night the commissary train arrived from 
Port Union. Eagerly the soldiers anticipated the new 
supplies, for they were thoroughly tired of "rotten 
,.9-5 
bacon and bread without soda, salt, coffee or sugar. 
"Paddy" Graydon had been sent out to reconnoiter 
the area over which Sibley was retreating. He reported 
that the Texans had buried all their artillery, except 
two pieces, had burned all but fifteen of their wagons, 
and were going through the mountains to Mesilla by way 
of Cook's Springs. The Texans were suffering im-
measureably and it is significant that even a Colorado 
Volunteer who bitterly hated the "rebels" felt disposed 
to express his sympathy: 
Poor fellows! The climate and Uncle Sam's boys 
have sadly wasted them. They are now flying through 
the mountains with a little more than a third of the 
number with which they first assaulted us at Fort 
Craig. Many, very many, 'softly lie and sweetly 
sleep low in the ground.1 Let their faults be buried 
with them. They are our brothers, erring it may be, 
still nature will exact a passing tear for the brave 
dead. And doubt not there are those who will both 
love and honor their memory if we cannot. Any cause 
that men sustain to death becomes sacred, at least 
to them. Surely we can afford to pay tribute to the 
courage and nobleness that prefers death to even 
fancied enthralment.94 
^^Hollister, A History of the First, 103. 
9^ibid., 103-104. 
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The following day, Canby came into Socorro. The 
Texans still maintained their hospital here and about 
seventy-five stragglers and convalescents were taken 
prisoner. The oath of allegiance was then administered 
to allow them to return home to Texas. That night the 
command camped about ten miles south of town^5 and the 
following afternoon, April 22, the Federal column reached 
Port Craig.^ With the Texans in full flight, the men 
hoped for a period of rest and relaxation. For nearly a 
mile the next day the river bank was lined with men who 
were bathing and washing their clothes.9? 
Canby wrote the adjutant general on April 23, to 
inform him of the latest developments. The Texans were 
still in the mountains to the west and the colonel stated 
that if they took the route by the Mimbres river, it 
would be impossible for him to overtake them. If they 
took the one by Canada Alamosa, however, he was "not 
without hopes" of intercepting them.9^ The colonel issued 
95ibid., 104. 
9^canby to Adjutant-General, April 23, 1862, 
0. R. A., IX, 551. 
97Hollister, A History of the First, 116. 
^^Canby to Adjutant-General, April 23, 1862, 
0. R. A., IX, 551. 
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a general order which placed Paul in command of the field 
force which was to operate in the district, and Captain 
Morris of the cavalry was instructed to report to Paul 
for duty as soon as possible. The companies of the 
Seventh Infantry and Claflin's battery were to form part 
of the garrison of Port Craig.^ That afternoon all the 
mounted troops were instructed to pack two days1 rations 
and be prepared to start down the river. This order was 
soon modified, and instead of just the cavalry, the 
whole command moved three miles down the valley and en­
camped for the night. Canby dispatched pickets to watch 
the region where he thought the Texans might be coming 
to the river from the mountains. "Paddy" Graydon, like 
"the vulture over the carrion," had advanced further and 
was to use signal fires to keep the pickets informed of 
^ 100 the enemy's movements. 
If Canby had intended to continue pursuing the 
Confederates, he now changed his mind. Canby was a 
realistic commander. He knew that his draught animals 
and cavalry mounts were in a broken-down condition. But 
99oeneral Orders, No. 34, April 23, 1862, 0. R, A., 
IX, 666-667. 
lOORollister, A History of the First, 116. 
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of more Importance was the fact that he was sorely lack­
ing needed supplies .-^l ipQ have continued down the 
valley in this condition, and perhaps engage in another 
battle, would have been dangerous, if not fatal. In the 
Mesilla Valley the Confederates had fresh troops under 
the command of Colonel Steele, and undoubtedly that of­
ficer had been busy gathering materiel to resupply 
10? 
Sibley's approaching forces. After taking these 
matters into consideration, and even though Morris, 
Chivington, and Paul were anxious to continue after the 
103 
Texans, Canby abandoned the pursuit for the time being. 
Canby requisitioned all the available transpor­
tation in and around Fort Craig and sent it north to 
bring back supplies. The nearest depot was 300 miles 
away at Fort Union. Spring thaws had swelled the Rio 
Grande and parts of the road were flooded. These facts, 
coupled with the poor condition of the stock, would mean 
that it would take a supply train a long time to get 
through."1"0^ Meanwhile the troops were placed on short 
101Ibid., 118. 
102Canby to Adjutant-General, May 4, 1862, 
0. R. A., IX, 669. 




rations and would have to make out the best they could. 
"Cooking utensils, saleratus, tobacco, etc., were 
absolutely 'non est.1"- Some men were fortunate enough 
to secure tents and make themselves comfortable. Most 
passed the while resting, playing cards, mending their 
clothes, or engaging in various other pursuits. A few, 
however, spent their time reading, for a "bushel" of 
books had been captured from the Texans1 abandoned 
106 wagons. 
On the night of April 24, fifty men were ordered 
south to reconnoiter. Within a day or so they returned 
to report that they had gone as far as where the trail 
taken by the Texans came out to the river. Dead stock, 
broken wagons, and "camp refuse of every description" 
107 
attested to the Confederates' flight. Through scouts 
and from prisoners, Canby was kept informed of the 
"greatly demoralized" state of Sibley's army. The 
Texans were leaving behind everything that slowed them 
loft 
down—even their sick and wounded. "Paddy" Graydon 
105canby to Adjutant-General, May 12, 1862, 
0. R. A., IX, 671. 
10^Hollister, A History of the First, 118. 
1Q7lbid. 
^•®®Canby to Adjutant-General, May 4, 1862, 
0. R. A., IX, 669. 
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was ordered to bring in the abandoned unfortunates and 
to gather up any valuable property which was found. 
The Texans still held as prisoners about thirty 
110 
Union officers and men. On March 26, Cariby sent 
Captain W. H. Lewis with an escort under a flag of truce 
to negotiate an exchange-1--1-1 "grade for grade and man for 
man." Lewis carried with him a list of officers and non­
commissioned officers which had been either paroled by 
the Confederates or were still held as prisoners. The 
Federal commander proposed that Union Surgeon Gray and 
Assistant Surgeons McKee and Alden be exchanged for Con­
federate Surgeon Covey and his two assistant surgeons. 
E. N. Covey, Sibley's chief surgeon and medical director, 
had been taken prisoner at the hospital in Socorro. 
Canby stated that he did not regard these medics as 
combatants and, therefore, as legitimate prisoners of 
war. Since the Texans had considered them as such, how­
ever, he felt it only just that they be exchanged with 
the others. In his note to Sibley, the Federal commander 
10^Graydon to Paul, May 14, 1862, ibid., 671-672. 
'̂-'Cariby to Adjutant-General, May 12, 1862, 
ibid., 671. 
^^Cariby to Sibley, April 26, 1862, ibid., Series 
XI, III, 498. 
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asked that one or more medical officers from Sibley's 
command be sent back for the purpose of taking care of 
112 
the Confederate disabled. The hospital in Albu­
querque alone had about one hundred sick and wounded 
Texans."1^ At Santa Fe and Socorro were even greater 
numbers Canby, faced with the caring of his own 
sick and wounded, simply did not have enough medical 
personnel, for his own medical officers were "actively 
employed" and could not be disturbed from their "appro­
priate duties." In conclusion, the Union commander 
stated that he hoped that the exchange would be complete 
and effective within thirty days.5 Captain Lewis, how­
ever, was unable to overtake the fleeing Confederate 
troops, so he returned to Fort Craig without accomplish­
ing his mission.-*--^ 
•^^Cariby to Sibley, April 26, 1862, ibid., 
478-479. 
•^3Nicodemus to Commanding Officer, April 29, 
1862, ibid., 506. 
Upright to Greer, September 7, 1927j "Con­
federate Reminiscenses of 1862," loc. cit., 324. 
•'•'̂ Canby to Sibley, April 25* 1862, _0. R. A., 
Series II, III, 479-
•^Canby to Adjutant-General, May 12, 1862, 
ibid., DC, 671. 
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With all danger from the enemy now removed, Canby 
decided to return to departmental headquarters in Santa 
Fe. As soon as possible, he planned to move his army 
down the Rio Grande to drive the Confederates from the 
Mesilla Valley. Lack of materiel had prevented him from 
continuing beyond Fort Craig. At the capital he would 
be in a better position to expedite the gathering of 
supplies, not only for the contemplated offensive, but 
also for the immediate needs of his troops. Though it 
would involve a great deal of difficulty, Canby hoped to 
stockpile enough materiel at Peralta and Fort Craig to 
be ready to move against the Texans by June l.1^ 
. On April 27> the departmental commander left for 
lift 
Santa Fe, leaving Colonel Chivington in charge of the 
Southern Military District with his headquarters at Fort 
Craig.Canby arrived at the capital on the night of 
May 3*^® and the following day he issued a congratulatory 
proclamation to his army: 
•^Tcanby to Adjutant-General, May 4, 1862, ibid., 
669; Canby to Adjutant-General, May 10, 1862, ibid., b71. 
•'-•^Canby to Adjutant-General, May 4, 1862, 
ibid., 669. 
•^•^chlvington to Canby, June 11, 1862, ibid., 677* 
12°Canby to Adjutant-General, May 4, 1862, 
ibid., 669. 
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GENERAL ORDERS HDQRS. DEPARTMENT OF NEW MEXICO 
No. 41. Santa Fe, N. Mex., May 4, 1862. 
The colonel commanding desires to express his 
grateful appreciation of the conduct and services of 
the troops in this department, tested as they have 
been in the past four months by two general battles, 
many skirmishes, and much toilsome and laborious 
service. 
Daring and energetic in action, patient and 
reliant when policy dictated a different course; 
enduring with equal constancy and fortitude pri­
vations of food, of clothing, and of rest; forced 
marches; snow-storms of the mountains and the sand­
storms of the plains, they have driven a superior 
force of the enemy into the mountains, forced him to 
abandon his trains, his supplies, and his plunder; 
to leave his sick and wounded by the wayside without 
care, and often without food, and finally to abandon 
a country which he has entered to 'conquer and 
occupy,' leaving behind in dead and wounded and in 
sick and prisoners one-half his original force. 
These results have not been attained without 
serious losses, and the laurels won at Valverde and 
Apache Canon, hallowed by the blood of many brave 
and noble men, will ever be a bond of union and 
friendship between those who have struggled together 
to free New Mexico from the domination of an ar­
rogant and rapacious invader. 
By order of Col. E. R. S. Canby: 
GURDEN CHAPIN, 
Capt. Seventh Infantry and 
Acting Assistant Adjutant-
General. 121 
* * * * 
After all preparations had been made, and un­
daunted by the howling sandstorm, the "Army of New 
!21(jeneral Orders, No. 41, May 4, 1862, ibid., 
LI, 523-524. 
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Mexico" marched off in a southwesterly direction toward 
the Magdalena Mountains. Near daylight the command 
halted to rest. At sunrise the army resumed its march 
until it arrived at Salada about ten o'clock that morn­
ing . Here there was a mountain creek, and though the 
water was brackish, it was refreshingly welcome to the 
122 thirsty men and animals. 
While at Salada the Confederates realized that the 
rough and nearly impassable road would necessitate the 
abandoning of more wagons and equipment. Rather than 
leave the materiel behind for the Federals to seize, it 
was decided to render it as useless as possible. Forty 
shells were buried in one place and 38 in another, six 
one hundred pound barrels of powder were destroyed, and 
one 12-pounder and two howitzers were buried. Nineteen 
wagons, ten ambulances, six caissons, and three carriages 
were burned, ̂ 3 most of the supplies from the 
abandoned wagons were packed on the backs of the mules. 
After all encumbrances had been reduced to a few wagons, 
belonging principally to brigade headquarters, and the 
122Moel, A Campaign, 28. 
123Graydon to Paul, May 14, 1862, 0. R. A., 
ix, 672. 
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"Valverde Battery," the army set out toward the south 
124 
over "mountain, valley and plain." Farther down the 
trail, another caisson was blown up, thise more wagons 
125 
were burned, and some hospital supplies were destroyed. 
What had started out to be a relatively orderly retreat 
had now become a veritable flight. 
Many of the men were still sick with smallpox. In 
the mornings when the army would first set out, the column 
would be about a mile long, but toward the end of the day 
it would be stretched out for at least ten miles. Picket 
duty was especially heavy for the cavalry. Since grass 
was scarce, the men would turn their horses loose at 
night so they could roam about to find enough to eat. In 
the mornings the troopers would often have to walk long 
distances to round up their mounts before going on duty. 
Food, of course, was poor and scanty and "baked bread in 
a frying pan" and meat from "some poor broken down 
draught oxen" was the main bill of fare. Sibley dis­
patched messengers to Colonel Steele in the Mesilla Valley 
to send every available wagon loaded with everything he 
12^Noel, A Campaign, 28. 
12^Graydon to Paul, May 14, 1862, 0, R. A., 
IX, 672. 
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had to eat. The train was to meet the "suffering 
humanity" when they came out on the Rio Grande.126 
The road the Confederates were following was 
little more than a trail and the going was extremely 
difficult.12''' Coopwood led the brigade southward to 
the west of the Magdalena Mountains and when the trail 
passed through the Sierra de San Mateo, the most trying 
part of the route was encountered. "Descents into and 
ascents out of the deepest canyons" bore heavily upon 
the endurance and fortitude of the command.128 Frequent­
ly the cavalry would halt while the artillery was pulled 
through some deep canyon, or up and down the sides of 
mountains. In these areas, the horses were unhitched and 
the men of the Fourth tied long ropes to the cannon and, 
with "great perseverance and endurance," pulled them 
over. Sometimes members of the other regiments who were 
nearby would also lend a hand.129 
12^Noel, A Campaign, 29, 32. 
127Graydon to Paul, May 14, 1862, C). R. A., 
IX, 672. 
12^Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, ibid., 511. 
129Noel, A_ Campaign, 29. 
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On the evening of April 25* the brigade failed to 
reach water and the men had to bivouac without food or 
water. Early the next morning the command struck out 
for Alamosa Creek and arrived there at nine o'clock that 
morning. After satisfying their thirst, the men set 
about fixing breakfast which consisted of flapjacks and 
b r o i l e d  b e e f  ( p r o b a b l y  o x e n ) .  T h e  d e s t i t u t e  a n d  d e ­
moralized command remained on Alamosa Creek until near 
sunset, and after carrying the artillery and wagons up 
the last high hill before the creek, the brigade made 
camp. At nine o'clock that night Colonel William Steele 
came into camp with his battalion of the Seventh Regi­
ment . He brought the heartening news that a large supply 
train was on the way and that the Rio Grande eould be 
easily reached the next day. This was glorious news, 
indeed—"No enemy now between us and our supplies and 
friends." Steele also brought dispatches and letters 
"from home and loved ones" which had been accumulating 
while the brigade was away. It was truly a night of 
rejoicing as the men read their mail from those whom 
they had not heard in months. Steele's men carried four 
full days' rations with them and before reaching the 
river the next day, they had divided their food "to the 
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last mouthful" with their hungry comrades .-^O 
On April 27* the brigade proceeded down Alamosa 
Creelc and struck the river. "As the broken down 'foot 
pad1 hove, in sight of the Rio Grande ana its fertile 
valley, he was led to exclaim 'how beautiful.1" Five 
miles below Alamosa, at the mouth of Sheep Canyon, the 
"Army of New Mexico" made its camp. It was a pathetic 
sight to behold the "Weary, tired, sore-footed, . . . 
sick. . .and half-starved" men. "Some washing, some 
sleeping, some caring for the sick, and some dying, 
while but a few were cooking the ribs of some work 
oxen." For nine days, with only seven days' poor 
rations, the brigade had struggled through a most diffi­
cult and rugged terrain. The purpose of the march had 
been accomplished, however, for there had been no clash 
with the enemy, and the army was now safely below them. 
Only a small body of cavalry near Fort Craig had been 
reported by the scouts.^31 The detour of a little over 
a hundred miles had been extremely costly, and all along 
the trail was strewn "old harnesses, iron ovens, and in 




horses and mules were left dead on the route. Near the 
Magdalena Mountains three partially buried bodies, and 
in another place the "bones of a man's arm, half eaten 
n o p  
by wolves" attested to the tragic events of the march. D 
A year later a Union officer passed over this route and 
"not infrequently /Re/ found a piece of a gun-carriage, 
or part of a harness, or some piece of camp or garrison 
equipage, with occasionally a white, dry skeleton of a 
man. "^33 
After the failure of the campaign and the dis­
astrous retreat, the men of the brigade would, no doubt, 
have been cynically amused had they heard of the follow­
ing resolution passed by their government in Richmond: 
- Resolved by the Congress of the Confederate States 
of America, That the Thanks of Congress are hereby 
tendered to Brigadier General H. H. Sibley, and to 
the officers and men under his command, for the com­
plete and brilliant victories achieved over our 
enemies in New Mexico. 
Approved, April 16, 1862.^^ 
•^SQraydon to Paul, May 14, 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 672. ~ ~ 
^•33pettis, "The Confederate Invasion of New Mexico 
a n d  A r i z o n a , "  l o c .  c i t 1 1 1 .  
134Ricjiarclson (comp.), Messages and Papers of the 
Confederacy, I, 231. 
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On April 28, Colonel Scurry delivered a farewell 
address to his men and then departed for the Lone Star 
State."*"35 Apparently Sibley had ordered him to proceed 
to headquarters in Texas to personally report the state 
of affairs and to make arrangements for the future. 
In the neighborhood of Port Thorn on the night of 
April 28, the army met Steele's commissary train. Great 
was the joy of the half-starved soldiers as they ate 
their first good meal. The next morning, after their 
hunger had been "duly appeased," the men set out from 
Fort Thorn.Under the direction of Colonel Green, the 
brigade began crossing to the east bank of the Rio Grande 
that evening at San Diego.^37 "Here another grand wading 
scene was presented." Green had rafts built to carry the 
ammunition and the few remaining wagons which contained 
the brigade's "archives." The artillery had marched in 
advance that morning and had reached the ford considerably 
ahead of the "foot pads" ivho were taking their time. 
Throughout the march, the gunners had kept their pieces 
"^Noel, a Campaign, 30. 
136ibid., 31-32. 
137sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 511. 
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loaded with shotted charges. Fearing that if the guns 
got wet in the crossing it would be difficult to remove 
the charges, the artillerymen attempted to pull them 
out. But the charges were stuck fast, and with the con­
sent of headquarters, the gunners decided to clear the 
pieces by firing them. As the six howitzers boomed out, 
their thunderous roar echoed throughout the valley. This 
caused a great deal of excitement among the uninformed 
infantry following behind, for they thought the Yankees 
were attacking. Most of the men reached a decision on 
one point, however. They would "rather fight twenty 
Yankees (apiece) than to try another one of Coopwood's 
cut-offs.nl38 
When the command had safely crossed the river and 
was out of danger, Sibley left for Port Bliss on April 30. 
He was accompanied by Colonel Reily (who had come up to 
meet the army on Alamosa Creek) and Judge Baird and his 
"interesting and patriotic" family. Colonel Green was 
left in charge of the brigade .^39 
Since no part of the Mesilla Valley could support 
the whole army, it was decided to quarter parts of it in 
^®Noel, A Campaign, 32. 
139lbid., 32. 
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the various villages from Dona Ana to Port Bliss. The 
morning that Sibley left for Fort Bliss, Green marched 
the brigade twenty-three miles to Robledo. Part of the 
Seventh Regiment--Steele's fresh troops—remained behind 
here as an advance guard to check against any Federal 
movement down the valley. The next day the rest of the 
brigade marched through Dona Ana, where another portion 
of the Seventh was quartered, and to Las Cruces where 
part of the Fifth was garrisoned. The remainder of the 
army camped three miles below Las Cruces on a high 
acqueduct. During the night someone—probably a Mexican— 
cut the bank and flooded the camp. Leaving the rest of 
the Fifth at Mesilla, the next day the Fourth Regiment 
marched to Willow Bar, its old camp. After a general 
muster on May 1, the Fourth continued on, most of the 
regiment being left in Franklin, while four companies 
made their camp one mile below Fort Bliss.With the 
whole force now quartered in villages extending from Dona 
Ana to Fort Bliss, the men were at last able to relax and 
141 
rest after a most harrowing and devastating campaign. 
l4°Ibid., 32-33. 
1^1Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 511. -
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Little organized activity took place. Captain 
A. S. Thurmond's Company A of the Seventh Regiment set 
out to reconnoiter at San Augustine Springs and beyond. 
Before returning, the men of the command were forced 
"to eat snakes and insects to keep soul and body to­
gether . 
Since the Texans were in dire need of horses, at 
least one raiding party was sent out for the purpose of 
capturing mounts from the Federals. During the month 
of May, a small force under the command of Captain 
Joseph G. Tilford, U. S. Third Cavalry, was stationed 
at Paraje about eight miles below Fort Craig. The Union 
spies in this instance were completely negligent, for the 
party of Texans under Lieutenant Bowman-^3 were able to 
approach the town at night without detection. A few 
days before Bowman's arrival, a group of Confederates 
•^Noel, A Campaign, 33 • 
-*-^3captain Tilford was not at all certain of the 
name of the commander of the Texas party. It is quite 
possible that this was Captain Thurmondfs company. When 
the bearer of the flag of truce informed Tilford of his 
commander's demand for the surrender of the town, it is 
conceivable that he may have said "Thurmond" in his 
Texas drawl which was understood by Tilford to be "Bow­
man." Tilford to Anderson, May 30* 1862, 0. R. A., 
DC, 608. 
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under a Lieutenant Taylor had come into Paraje Tinder a 
flag of truce and had then departed southward. They had 
probably come in to take the oath and then were allowed 
to leave. Captain Tilford was of the opinion that 
Taylor and his men had noted that there were only twenty 
Federal soldiers at Paraje and that the command's horses 
were herded at night on the river bottom some distance 
from town. Taylor had apparently informed his superiors 
of this situation, and the result was Bowman's raid. In 
the meantime, however, Tilford's command had been in­
creased to forty-five men, and instead of leaving their 
horses out at night to graze, they were now brought into 
town.^* 
When Lieutenant Bowman and his men came up to 
Paraje and discovered that the horses v/ere not in their 
reported location, they must have been sorely disappointed. 
Instead of attacking the town, Bowman drew his command up 
under the bluff on the river, ̂ 5 and about sunup of the 
morning of May 21, he sent one of his men to demand a 
surrender of the garrison. A Union guard brought the 
Confederate, who was carrying a flag of truce, to Captain 
l2^Ibid. 
•^^Hollister, A History of the First, 122. 
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Tilford's quarters.Had the Texans stormed the town 
instead of waiting, they probably would have been 
successful, for the Union commander was still in bed, 
and neither he nor his men were aware of the approach 
of Bowman's force. The guard awakened Tilford and in­
formed him that a Texan was waiting to see him. While 
in the act of dressing, the captain sent word to his 
command to prepare for immediate action. The messenger 
was then ushered in and allowed to deliver his ulti­
matum.1^^ Tilford informed the Texan that compliance 
with Bowman's demand "depended altogether on his ability 
to enforce it." When the Confederate left, the captain 
took immediate steps to station his men in the best 
positions to resist the impending attack. About the 
time that the demand for the surrender had come in, 
Tilford later learned that a smaller party of Texans 
had been in the vicinity where the horses had formerly 
been herded day and night. The commander believed that, 
had the herd still been there, the Texans would have 
attacked the town while simultaneously running off with 
the herd.-^8 
l46Tiiford to Anderson, May 30, 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 608. 
3-47Hollister, A History of the First, 122. 
I48ipi3.f0rd. to Anderson, May 30, 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 608. 
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When Bowman received Tilford's message of refusal 
to surrender, he considered it inexpedient to attack. 
After a few "straggling shots at long ranges," the Con­
federates withdrew southward down the Jornada del 
Muerto, completely failing in their mission. Tilford's 
spies reported that the Texans' numbered about one 
hundred, but with his horses in a weakened condition, 
the Union commander did not pursue the enemy. Tilford 
feared also that had he followed the retreating Con­
federates, a larger force might have been waiting to 
149 
ambush him. At any rate, Tilford "saw no more of them," 
and what was probably the last "skirmish" between the 
Confederates and Federals in New Mexico came to an end. 
* * * * 
•*•49 lb id. On May 25# Canby reported from Santa 
Pe that a superior force of the enemy had attacked an 
outpost eight miles below Fort Craig. He stated that 
there were no Union casualties, but the Confederates had 
suffered the loss of four men. Since Paraje is eight 
miles below Fort Craig, Canby was undoubtedly referring 
to Tilford's affair on May 21. Tilford's report was 
written on May 30. Since that officer made no mention 
of casualties, and definitely stated that there were no 
further hostilities, it is safe to assume that Canby had 
received unreliable information concerning this incident. 
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Sibley established his temporary headquarters at 
James Magoffin's residence at "Magof f insville11 near Port 
Bliss. On May 4, the Confederate commander wrote to 
Samuel Cooper, the adjutant general, and gave a brief, 
but full account of the whole campaign. Par less 
exhuberant than he once had been, the general expressed 
the conviction, "determined by some experience, that, ex­
cept for its political geographical position, the Terri­
tory of New Mexico. . . .^was/7 not worth a quarter of the 
blood and treasure expended in its conquest." Numerous 
defensible positions were apparently about the only 
aspect the country could offer in regard to military 
operations. Sibley discovered, of course, that the land 
could not be relied upon for food or other supplies. The 
entire campaign had been carried out without a dollar in 
the quartermaster's department, for Captain H. II. Harrison, 
the brigade paymaster and quartermaster, had not yet ar­
rived from San Antonio. Sibley had found it almost im­
possible to obtain specie and one thousand dollars was 
all he could secure for the use of the hospitals and for 
his secret service. The general maintained that his 
chief regret in making the "retrograde" movement from 
New Mexico was the necessity of leaving hospitals at 
Santa Fe, Albuquerque, and Socorro, though everything had 
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been provided for the comfort of the sick and wounded. 
In order to meet additional needs, adequate funds in 
Confederate currency had been left with the hospitals. 
But such money would be of little use if the natives 
refused to accept it."^0 
Sickness and battle casualties had taken a heavy 
toll of the brigade.^51 Canby stated that he had taken 
480 Confederate prisoners3-52 an(j[ it was reported that of 
the 2,600 men that had formed the Confederate invading 
force,-1-53 only 1,250 came back to the Mesilla Valley. 
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Of the 327 wagons which had started out on the campaign, 
seven returned. The captured "Valverde Battery" of six 
156 
guns alone remained with the brigade. All the other 
•^Osibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, ibid., 511-512. 
^libid., 511. 
-l-520ariby to Adjutant-General, May 12, 1862, 
ibid., 671. 
I53cariby to Adjutant-General, March 1, 1862, 
ibid., 488. 
"'•̂ Cariby to Adjutant-General, June 21, 1862, 
ibid., 678. 
^^Brown to Wife, April 30, 1862, Hollister, 
A History of the First, 169. 
156canby to Adjutant-General, May 18, 1862, 
0. R. A., IX, 673. 
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artillery pieces had been buried, captured, or destroyed. 
The campaign, indeed, had been a most disastrous one. 
In summing up his operations to the adjutant 
general, Sibley toned down the true condition of his 
army. Perhaps he thought that if he gave an accurate 
picture of the brigade's state, he might suffer not only 
loss of prestige in Richmond, but he might be severely 
censured and reduced in rank. According to Sibley, his 
army was now "comfortably11 garrisoned in the small towns 
from Dona Ana to Fort Bliss. Though his brigade had 
reached Port Bliss that winter blanketless and in rags, 
the general now claimed that his men were "well clad and 
well supplied in other respects." In fact, Sibley went 
so far as to assert that his forces were now the best 
armed in the country 1 But even if the Texans were in 
such good shape, and even if they had beaten the enemy 
in "every encounter," the general could not speak "en­
couragingly" for the future. His men had suffered in­
tensely during the campaign and they naturally manifested 
a "dogged, irreconcilable detestation" of New Mexico and 
her people."^7 His troops were eagerly awaiting the time 
•^Tsibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, ibid., 512. 
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when they would take up the line of march for San 
Antonio, for it was known that that was their "sure 
destiny.Sibley believed that the prevailing dis­
content, backed up by the distinguished valor displayed 
on every field, entitled his men to "marked consideration 
and indulgence." These factors, combined with the 
scarcity of supplies in the area, and the rapid depreci­
ation of Confederate currency, made it clear to the 
general that his stay must be short. The brigade com­
mander notified the adjutant general that, without wait­
ing for orders, it might be necessary for his army to move 
by slow marches back to San Antonio. At that base of sup­
ply, Sibley could remount and re-equip his forces, and 
recruit new men to fill the thinned ranks of his regi­
ments.1^ 
At Fort Bliss on May 14, 1862, Sibley addressed 
the following valedictory proclamation to his men: 
Port Bliss, Texas, May 14, 1862: 
Soldiers of the Army of New Mexico:-It is with 
unfeigned pride and pleasure that I find myself 
occupying a position which devolves upon me the duty 
of congratulating the Army of New Mexico upon the 
successes which have crowned their arms in the many 
•^Noel, A Campaign, 3^. 
159sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 512. ~ 
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encounters with the enemy during the short but 
brilliant campaign which has just terminated. 
Called from your homes almost at a moment's 
warning, cheerfully leaving friends, families and 
private affairs, in many cases solely dependent 
upon your presence and personal attention, 
scarcely prepared for a month's campaign, in the 
immediate defence of your own firesides, you have 
made a march, many of you over a thousand miles, 
before ever reaching the field of active operations. 
The boasted valor of Texans has been fully 
vindicated. Val Verde, Glorietta, Albuquerque, 
Peralto, and last, though not least, your success­
ful and almost unprecedented evacuation, through 
mountain passes and over a trackless waste of a 
hundred miles through a famishing country, will be 
duly chronicled, and form one of the brightest 
pages in the history of the Second American 
Revolution. 
That I should be proud of you—that every partici­
pant in the campaign should be proud of himself—who 
can doubt? 
During the short period of inaction which you are 
now enjoying, your General indulges the hope that 
you will constantly bear in mind that at any moment 
you may be recalled into activity. 
God and an indulgent Providence have guided us in 
our councils and watched our ways: let us be thankful 
to Him for our successes, and to Him let us not for­
get to offer a prayer for our noble dead. 
160 
H. H. Sibley, Brig. Gen. Commanding 
l^ONoel, A Campaign, 38-39-
CHAPTER XIV 
THE CONFEDERATE OCCUPATION OP TUCSON AND THE 
ADVANCE CP THE "CALIFORNIA COLUMN" 
While Baylor was engaged in his "lightning" 
campaign in the Mesilla Valley of New Mexico dviring the 
summer of 1861, action was taking place in California 
which would eventually influence the situation in the 
Southwest. By terms of Abraham Lincoln's "Act to 
authorize the employment of volunteers to aid in en­
forcing the laws and protecting public property,"1 
California set about raising one regiment of infantry 
and five companies of cavalry. These troops were to be 
used in protecting the Overland Mail route between 
California and the East by way of Salt Lake City.2 
Brevet Major James H. Carleton, First Dragoons, U. S. 
Army, was given command of these volunteers and re­
ceived the rank of colonel.3 The regiments rendezvoused 
^McNulty to Hammond, October 1863, 0. R. A., 
L, i, 136. 
2Thomas to Sumner, July 24, 1861, ibid., 543• 
3sumner to Carleton, August 6, 1861, ibid., 555 • 
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at Oakland and during the months of August and September, 
1861, the units acquired nearly their full complement of 
men. Active preparations were made to train the raw 
recruits into reliable soldiers.^ During the middle of 
August, California's volunteer quota was raised, the 
Secretary of War requesting Governor John G. Downey to 
muster into service four regiments of infantry and one 
regiment of cavalry.^ 
General Edwin V. Sumner, the military commander 
of the Department of the Pacific, had replaced Albert 
Sidney Johnston on April 25, 1861.^ Meanwhile in 
Washington, D. C., the military high command decided that 
the volunteers raised in California could be put to better 
use than guarding the mail route. Sumner was instructed 
to outfit an expeditionary force in San Francisco which 
would proceed by water to Mazatlan, Mexico. Once at that 
debarkation point, Sumner was to lead his men across 
Mexico to western Texas. The object of this movement was 
^McNulty to Hammond, October —, I863, ibid., 136. 
^Cameron to Downey, August 14, 1861, ibid., 5^9* 
^Orders, No. 5* April 25, 1861, ibid., 469. 
445 
to "regain the public property in that State (Texas) and 
draw off insurgent troops from Arkansas, Missouri," and 
elsewhere.7 The United States government had already 
secured.permission to cross the foreign soil from the 
governors of the states involved, as well as from the 
Central Mexican government.® Sumner's force was to in­
clude one regiment of volunteer cavalry, four regiments 
of volunteer infantry, two batteries of regular artil­
lery, and ten companies of regular infantry.9 
Sumner was beset by domestic troubles in Cali­
fornia. Up to the time of the first battle of Manassas, 
matters had been relatively quiet in his department, but 
since the Union defeat, the commander was finding it 
difficult to raise volunteers. A state election would 
soon be held, and Sumner estimated that there were 
between 25,000 and 45,000 "disunionist" voters in the 
?Townsend to Sumner, August 16, 1861, ibid., 572. 
^Richard H. Qrton (comp.), Records of California 
Men in the War of the Rebellion, I8bl-lfcfo7 X^"acr>amento# 
TBiJoTT S3T 
^Townsend to Sumner, August 16, 1861, 0. R. A., 
L, i, 572. 
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state. Under these circumstances the general deemed it 
necessary to take strong measures to repress any attempt 
on the part of those who would "thwart the Government." 
Sumner promised to raise the troops as soon as possible 
in order to carry out the western Texas campaign. 
Though he approved of this expedition, he suggested to 
his superiors in Washington that he believed Guaymas, 
Sonora, would be a better port of debarkation.10 Later 
Sumner changed his mind about Guaymas, for the surveyor 
general of California pointed out to him that the 
scarcity of water from Guaymas to Texas made that route 
impractical. Sumner now suggested that San Bias be the 
debarkation point.11 
On September 4, 1861, the "union" party triumphed 
in the California elections. Nevertheless, a count of 
the ballots revealed that there were about 20,000 
"secession" voters. Sumner reported that the "dissolute 
and loose portion" of this party was congregating in 
force in the southern counties of the state. The general 
feared that the "great and unaccountable success" of 
Baylor's Confederates in Arizona and New Mexico would 
l°Sumner to Townsend, August 30, 1861, ibid., 
593-594. 
^Sumner to Townsend, September 7# 1861, ibid., 
610. 
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embolden this element. He reported that these "Rebels" 
were not only organizing, but also collecting supplies 
apparently with the idea of receiving a military force 
from Texas. Should the Confederates send an army into 
California, Sumner warned that it would serve as a 
rallying point for all the secessionists and would in-
evitably inaugurate a civil war within the state. The 
commander pointed out that the most alarming feature of 
the whole affair was that the secessionists had "se­
duce/fly7 the native Californians by telling them that 
they. . ./would/ be ruined by taxes to maintain the 
war. 
In order to meet the crisis in the southern 
counties, Sumner was compelled to send reinforcements 
into the area immediately. A strong garrison was to be 
established at Warner's Ranch, which was located on the 
road to Fort Yuma. Adequate military contingents at 
that place would not only serve to support Port Yuma, 
the key to entering California from Arizona, but it 
would also prevent the gathering of secessionists in the 
vicinity. In addition such troops would be in a relative­
ly convenient position to challenge any invading force 
12Ibid. 
•^Sumner to Townsend, September 17, 1861, 
ibid., 623. 
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coming from Arizona should Fort Yuma fall or be by­
passed. Sumner created the military District of 
Southern California which included the "disaffected" 
counties, and.Colonel George Wright was placed in com­
mand. Meanwhile the Pacific commander continued his 
preparations for the western Texas campaign. 
The plan to send California troops out of the 
state to fight in Texas caused considerable excitement 
among those of Union sentiment. Just a few days before 
the state election, sixty-five business men and firms 
signed a protest which was forwarded to the Secretary of 
War. These Unionists maintained that a majority of 
their present state officers were avowed secessionists, 
in addition to about three-eighths of their population 
being composed of men of Southern birth. And in this 
crisis, they were almost a unit in their sympathies. 
The "Knights of the Golden Circle," a secret secession 
organization, purportedly had a membership of nearly 
16,000 and was still organizing, even in loyal districts. 
Because of this alarming situation, the Unionists in 
l4Ibid. 
•^special Orders, No. 180, September 23, 1861, 
Ibid., 633. 
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their letter advised the necessity of keeping their 
troops at home in order to uphold the authority of the 
United States government and to keep California firmly 
in the Union.^ 
Exactly how much effect, if any, the above letter 
had is not known.^7 At any rate, General Winfield Scott 
and the Secretary of War ordered a suspension of the 
expedition, and Sumner was ordered East for duty. All 
the regular troops in the department, except four compa­
nies of artillery, were to be collected and transported 
by steamer to New York as fast as possible As the 
regulars began to withdraw from their posts, they were 
replaced by volunteers. Early in October, California 
troops began moving south from their northern training 
camps and a new base called Camp Latham was established 
near Los Angeles."^ On October 14, three companies of 
volunteer cavalry, commanded by Major Edward E. Eyre, 
•^Rogers, et al. to Cameron, August 28, 1861, 
ibid., 589-591. 
17Latham to Sumner, September 17, 1861, ibid., 
624. 
•^Townsend to Sumner, September 16, 1861, 
ibid., 620-621. 
•^McNulty to Hammond, October —, 1863, 
ibid., 137. 
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were ordered to relieve the regulars stationed at San 
20 
Bernardino. It was important that some army contingents 
be sent to this town for San Bernardino was "the hot-bed 
21 
of secessionism.11 The same day Lieutenant Colonel Joseph 
R. West received instructions to take three companies of 
22 
California infantry to replace the regulars at Port Yuma. 
With the exception of the Ninth U. S. Infantry, whose de­
barkation orders had been cancelled,2^ and four companies 
of the Third U. S. Artillery, all regular troops soon de-
24 
parted for the eastern theatre of operations. The 
stationing of the volunteer forces in key positions in the 
southern counties apparently had the desired effect, for 
their presence served to restrain any overt secessionist 
activity.2^ On October 20, 1861, Colonel George Wright, 
Ninth U. S. Infantry, became the new commander of the De-
26 
partment of the Pacific. Colonel James H. Carleton, First In­
fantry California Volunteers, assumed Wright's former position 
20General Orders, No. 2, October 14, 1861, ibid., 
660. 
21McNulty to Hammond, October —, 1863, ibid., 137* 
22General Orders, No. 2, October 14, 1861, ibid., 
659. 
23Special Orders, No. 309 > November 19, 1861, 
ibid., 730. 
2^0rton (comp.), Records of California Men, 32. 
25wright to Thomas, October 21, 1861, 0. R. A., 
L, i, 667-668. -
2^General Orders, No. 28, October 20, 1861, ibid., 
666. 
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as commander of the District of Southern California.2^ 
Reports of Confederate activity in southern New 
Mexico continued to cause concern among the military in 
California. The state was more accessible through 
Arizona by way of Port Yuma than from any other point. 
Confederate successes in New Mexico and Arizona might 
result in the sending of an invading army to capture the 
p Q  
west coast. Wright was fully aware of this possibility 
and shortly after he assumed command of his department, 
he suggested a new offensive plan. He proposed to send 
a force from southern California to recapture the forts 
in Arizona and New Mexico since all the troops needed for 
such a campaign, about 1,500, were already in the south­
ern part of the state. At first the commander believed 
that Guaymas should be his base of operations, but after 
careful consideration he concluded that Port Yuma would 
be better. At any rate, he believed that Guaymas should 
be occupied to prevent the possibility of its falling 
into the hands of the Confederates.2^ 
27General Orders, No. 2, October 14, 1861, ibid., 
659. 
2®McNulty to Hammond, October —, 1863, ibid., 
137. 
29wright to Thomas, December 9* 1861, ibid., 
752-753. 
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Wright reasoned that his plan, if carried out 
successfully, would accomplish three main purposes. 
First, he believed that the best defense was a good of­
fense. By sending this column eastward, it would serve 
to prevent an invasion of California from that quarter. 
Secondly, and probably of greater importance, the 
Callfornians would attack the rear of the Confederates 
who were now reported to be on their way to northern 
New Mexico. With Canby's men attacking in front and the 
California volunteers falling upon their rear, the Con-
30 
federates would undoubtedly be defeated. Thirdly, 
after having driven out the Texans and reoccupied the 
forts in Arizona and New Mexico, the southern mail route 
could be reopened.31 
In anticipation of approval from Washington, 
Wright chose Colonel Carleton to lead the expedition, 
and then he set about making the necessary arrangements 
for the campaign. Confidently Wright exclaimed that his 
men were "fine troops and well officered, and under the 
command of Colonel Carleton, an officer of great ex­
perience, indefatigable and active, the expedition must 
3°McNulty to Hammond, October —, 1863, ibid., 137. 
3^Wright to Carleton, January 31, 1862, ibid., 
836. 
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be successful."32 on December 18, 1861, General George 
B. McClellan approved of Wright's plan,33 so the stage 
was set for Californians to achieve glory in the South­
west. 
* * * * 
In pursuance of orders to relieve the regulars 
at Port Yuma,*^ Lieutenant Colonel Joseph R. West left 
Camp Wright on October 26 with three companies of the 
First California Infantry. He arrived at Port Yuma on 
November 3.35 The post was located on the Colorado 
36 
River and was surrounded on all sides by a vast desert. 
Prom a strategic point of view, Port Yuma was the out­
post of all southern California, for it was on the route 
over which Confederate troops would have to march in 
order to attack the state. 
32Wright to Thomas, December 9* 1861, ibid., 753. 
^Endorsement by McClellan, December 18, 1861, 
ibid., 753. 
3^"Carleton to West, October 16, 1861, ibid., 662. 
^^West to Cutler, November 7, 1861, ibid., 714-• 
3^McNulty to Hammond, October —, 1863# ibid., 
137. 
•^Carleton to West, October 16, 1861, ibid., 662. 
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Because of the importance attached to the post, 
Carleton gave West specific instructions. Not only was 
it necessary to keep a constant vigilance against the 
approach of an enemy force, but also measures had to be 
taken to prevent the passage of spies to and from the 
"disaffected" districts of California. West was ordered 
to seize all the ferryboats on the Colorado River and 
all crossings were to be made "under the guns of the 
fort." If he considered it necessary, West was also 
authorized to assume control of the river steamers. All 
persons going to Sonora or Arizona from California, and 
vice versa, were to take the oath of allegiance before 
being allowed to continue on their way. The commander 
was to keep an exact record of the name, place of 
residence, age, occupation, destination, and place of 
origin of each person crossing the river. West was in­
structed not to hesitate in arresting anyone who was an 
avowed enemy of the Union government, or who would not 
subscribe to the oath of allegiance. In case he should 
be attacked by the enemy, West was to call upon the com­
manding officer near Warner's Ranch for assistance. The 
new commander was instructed to see that his command was 
well drilled.38 when the colonel assumed command of 
38Ibid., 662-663. 
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Port Yuma, he immediately set about improving its de­
fenses . In an effort to keep his men in fighting trim, 
one hour daily was devoted to company drill.39 
Rumors from Arizona soon came to West's ears. 
Baylor was reported to be at Tucson with 200 men, while 
Van Dorn was at Mesilla with a still larger force. West 
sent out four scouts to check the validity of these 
stories as well as to get more accurate information.^® 
The new post commander had been at Port Yuma scarcely 
three weeks when, on November 26, Carleton ordered him 
to return to Los Angeles. Carleton had been called to 
San Francisco to discuss matters with Wright and West 
was to command the District of Southern California in 
his absence. Major Edward A. Rigg, commander of Camp 
Wright, near Oak Grove, received orders to report to 
Port Yuma to relieve West.^ 
While maintaining a constant vigilance, Major 
Rigg continued the work of strengthening the defenses 
39west to Carleton, November 4, 1861, ibid., 699* 
40lbid., 698. 
^Carleton to Rigg, November 26, 1861, ibid., 
742; General Orders, No. 1, January 12, 1862, ibid., 
802. 
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of Fort Yuma. The decision to send an expeditionary 
force against the Confederates in Arizona and New 
Mexico greatly increased Rigg's duties since Port Yuma 
was to be the base of supply. Though materiel from 
hp 
California was being stockpiled, Rigg's instructions 
were to make local arrangements for forage and food 
supplies along the line of march. Contracts were let 
at the fort to have hay cut and stored at various 
points between Port Yuma and the Pima Villages 
Pima Indians were an agricultural people who raised 
large quantities of wheat. Ammi White, an American of 
decided Union sentiments who owned a flour mill at the 
Pima Villages, was contracted to buy up all the wheat 
the Indians had and to grind it into flour for the 
illL 
eventual use of Carleton's expeditionary force. 
While Rigg was busily preparing for the coming 
of Carleton's troops, rumors of Confederate activities 
to the east continued to pour into his post. Baylor 
^2Wright to Thomas, December 19» 1861, ibid., 
771. 
^Carleton to Rigg, December 21, 1861, ibid., 
780-781. 
^McNulty to Hammond, October —, 1863> ibid., 
139. 
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reportedly wrote to Colonel Palatine Robinson of Tucson 
that just as soon as Sibley arrived, he would march to 
Tucson with a force of 900 men. Citizens of the town 
were betting freely as to whether or not the troops 
lit; 
would arrive. ̂  Baylor's letter stated in part: 
Hold on to the willows a little while longer. 
General Sibley's command is in a few days' march of 
this place, and as soon as he arrives I will march 
for Tucson. I want you to talk to the chiefs of 
the Papagos and Pima Indians to help me clean out 
the Apache Indians. I will hang White for his un­
lawful trading with the Indians.46 
According to the terms of the Confederate 
sequestration act, the "estates, property and effects 
of alien enemies" was to be confiscated.^ Colonel 
Baylor, as governor of the Confederate territory of 
Arizona, appointed a Tucsonian to be the receiver of 
confiscated property in that area.^® Palatine Robinson 
^ciymer to Rigg, January 9 ,  1862, ibid., 
811-812. 
46walker to Rigg, March 1, 1862, ibid., 899* 
47Mesilla Times, January 15* 1862. 
^Clymer to Rigg, January 9, 1862, 0. R. A., 
L, i, 811. - - -
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lost no time in posting notices at Arivaca and at Tubac, 
declaring confiscated the property of Samuel Colt, a 
Union man.^9 Robinson and another named Washburn went 
to Colt's Sierra Colorado mine and proceeded to take 
possession.-^0 Van Alstein, Colt's agent at Arivaca, 
objected, and pistols were drawn. The usual compliments, 
"sons of bitches; damned sons of bitches," were exchanged, 
but both parties separated without bloodshed.^ A large 
amount of property was removed from the mine and carried 
to the Patagonia mine which belonged to a loyal South­
erner, Sylvester Mowry. Two men were killed by Apaches 
while engaged in removing the boiler from the Sierra 
Colorado to the Patagonia mine. After the seizure of 
Colt's property, Van Alstein left for Magdalena to see 
Major F. T. Lally, the new superintendent of the Poston 
mine. Apparently Lally was remaining in the safety of 
that place while observing the turn of events.53 
^9srady to Yager, January 1, 1862, ibid., 824. 
5°White to Rigg, February 9» 1862, ibid., 867. 
53-Brady to Yager, January 1, 1862, ibid., 824. 
52white to Rigg, February 9 >  1862, ibid., 867. 
^^Brady to Yager, January 1, 1862, ibid., 824. 
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Robinson reportedly wrote to Lally to inform him that if 
54 
he dared come to Tucson he would be mobbed. 
Rigg was quite upset over these current repox-'ts. 
He wrote Carleton that a force of mounted men could come 
to the Colorado and harass his post without his being 
able to prevent it, since all he had was infantry units. 
The commander was also aware of the fact that a large 
number of Baylor's soldiers were well acquainted with the 
country and with the people. Since it was widely known 
that Ammi White's sentiments were pro-Union, Rigg pointed 
out that he would probably be one of the Confederates' 
first victims. This would particularly be the case since 
it was common knowledge that he had a large quantity of 
wheat at his mill. Rigg felt certain that by now Baylor 
had arrived in Tucson. Undoubtedly he would learn of 
the hay which was being stored at the various stations 
along the route from Port Yuma to the Pima Villages. 
The Union commander reasoned that Baylor would send a 
detachment to destroy it, and he would be helpless to 
prevent it.-^ 
•^White to Rigg, February 9> 1862, ibid., 867. 
55Rigg to Carleton, January 17, 1862, ibid., 
809-811. 
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In a further effort to gain an accurate picture of 
the state of affairs to the east, Rigg dispatched an 
agent to Tucson. The spy was to communicate with S. 
Warner in Tucson and bring back information concerning 
56 the ntunber and movements of Baylor's troops. The agent 
went by way of Altar and Sonoita, Sonora, and returned 
after twenty-two days. He reported that Baylor had not 
as yet arrived in Tucson, though there were twelve men 
in town who claimed that they belonged to Baylor's army. 
The Confederate commander had planned to come to Tucson 
earlier, but upon learning of the large Union force 
congregating at Fort Craig, he had been forced to change 
his plans. After defeating the Federals, Baylor 
promised to come to Tucson to protect the people from 
57 the Apaches.Protection from the Indians was sorely 
needed, and the prevailing opinion seemed to be that any 
58 
troops, whether Union or Confederate, would be welcome. 
56-[bid., 810. 
5?Rigg to Carleton, February 14, 1862, ibid., 
865. 
5&Warner to Hinton, January 31* 1862, ibid., 
867. 
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Meanwhile Rigg reported that friendly Indians 
(probably Pimas and Papagos) were keeping a good lookout 
along the river, and with the assistance of Ammi White 
at the Pima Villages, it would be impossible for an 
enemy force to surprise his post. Being thus warned 
ahead of time of a Confederate approach, Port Yuma's 
commander had no fear of having to evacuate or sur­
render .59 
These reports of Confederate activities in 
Arizona were relayed to the District of Southern Cali­
fornia. Carleton, of course, was greatly concerned 
about the safety of Port Yuma, so he sent additional 
instructions to the post commander. Rigg was to keep 
his scouts out along the Gila River in the direction of 
Tucson. All boats, large and small, were to be kept on 
the California side of the Colorado and under a heavy 
guard. Should Port Yuma be attacked, Rigg was to defend 
it to the last extremity. But if forced to fall back, 
he was to destroy the post, fight his way across the 
desert, filling in the wells as he retreated. Carleton 
pointed out that since Rigg had command of the river, 
he should be able to "whip any force that. . .^Tould]7 
-^Rigg to Carleton, February 14, 1862, ibid., 
866. 
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menace" him. In concluding his letter, Carleton 
promised to send some artillery ammunition and a detach­
ment of cavalry.^0 
On February 8, Carleton ordered Captain William A. 
McCleave, First California Cavalry, and thirty picked 
men of his Company A to proceed to Rigg's post.DX 
McCleave left Camp Carleton, San Bernardino, on February 
62 
11 and arrived at Fort Yuma five days later. These 
cavalrymen were to act as scouts, and it would be their 
special duty to see that no Confederate force would 
surprise the garrison at Fort Yuma. 
* * * * 
Meanwhile over on the Rio Grande, as previously 
described, Sibley's "Army of New Mexico" was at Fort 
Thorn preparing to leave on the campaign for the con­
quest of the northern part of the territory. Before 
departing, Sibley ordered Captain Sherod Hunter of 
Company A, Second Regiment Mounted Rifles (Baylor's old 
6°Carleton to Rigg, February 5> 1862, ibid., 847. 
^Carleton to Eyre, February 8, 1862, ibid., 851. 
^McCleave to Eyre, February 171 1862, ibid., 
871-872. 
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command), to take post at Tucson, some two hundred and 
fifty miles to the west. The general sent this small 
occupying force "with a view to the protection of the 
important and growing interest, chiefly mineral, in 
Western Arizona, and for the further purpose of opening 
communications with Southern California, whose people. . . 
^were]7 favorably inclined to. . ,^/Ehe Confederate^ 
Government. 
Following close behind Hunter's Company A was 
Colonel Reily and his escort of twenty men. As Sibley's 
diplomatic agent, Reily was on his way to see Governor 
64 
Pesqueira of Sonora. Hunter's and Reily's combined 
forces, including civilian employees, did not exceed 105 
men. All the troops, however, were mounted and well-
armed. Only three wagons accompanied the column and no 
artillery was brought along.^ 
Violently stormy weather occurred during part of 
the trip, but there were no accidents or misfortune, 
^Sibley to Cooper, January 27, 1862, ibid., 
IV, 170. 
64sibley to Governor of Sonora, December 27# 
1861, ibid., L, i, 1031. 
^Fergusson to Drum, October 4, 1862, ibid., 
ii, 152. 
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save the loss of one man who died at San Simon. On 
February 28, 1862, Captain Hunter arrived in Tucson and 
occupied the town for the Confederacy. His timely ar­
rival was hailed by a majority, if not the entire popu­
lation, of the "Old Pueblo. The following day, 
Colonel Reily, his two subalterns, and his escort of 
twenty rank and file came into town. In a special cere­
mony, the Confederate flag was raised in the plaza, and 
Reily delivered a patriotic address.^7 Two days after 
his entrance, Reily and his escort commanded by 
Lieutenant James H. Tevis, set out for Sonora. ° 
Rumors were rife in Tucson when Hunter arrived. 
According to the various reports, the town was about to 
be attacked by a large body of Indians, great quantities 
of Federal military supplies had been landed at Guaymas, 
and Union troops from California were on the march up the 
Gila River to Tucson. These stories were so well be­
lieved that a few citizens who were more "ultra" in their 
Southern feelings were preparing to leave before Hunter 
6%unter to Baylor, April 5, 1862, ibid., IX, 707. 
^carleton "to Wright, March 22, 1862, ibid., 
L, i, 944. 
^^Hunter to Baylor, April 5, 1862, ibid., IX, 708. 
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came with his men. These individuals preferred to 
sacrifice all their interests in the town and "look for 
69 
safety among their Southern brethren on the Rio Grande." 
On March 3> immediately after Reily's departure, 
70 
Hunter and his command started out for the Pima Villages, 
a distance of ninety-three miles True to Rigg's 
prediction. Hunter had heard of White's activities. 
Hunter's march to the Pima Villages took White by com­
plete surprise and he was captured and placed under ar­
rest. All of his property was confiscated in the name of 
the Confederate government.^ Aside from numerous farm 
animals,^3 the Texans captured 1,500 sacks of wheat. 
Since Hunter had no way of transporting the grain back 
to Tucson, he decided to distribute it among the Pimas. 
The captain was interested in negotiating friehdly re­
lations with these Indians, and the gift of wheat would 
69lbid., 707-708. 
7°Ibid., 708. 
f-'-White to Rigg, February 9, 1862, ibid., L, i, 
8b7.  
"^Hunter to Baylor, April 51 1862, ibid., IX, 
708. 
f^Rigg to Carleton, March 30, 1862, ibid., 
L, i, 966. 
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undoubtedly strengthen his position with them. At any 
rate, he decided that this was a much better policy than 
to destroy it or leave it behind to fall into the hands 
of the enemy. While at White's mill, Hunter heard a 
report that a Federal train of fifty wagons was en route 
to that place to pick up the wheat. Rather than return 
immediately to Tucson, Hunter decided to wait and capture 
74 
the train. 
On arrival at Fort Yuma, Captain McCleave and his 
men were assigned to guard the hay which was stored at 
Mission Camp, about twenty miles away. It was necessary 
to have a guard there to prevent travelers coming from 
Sonora from using the forage. After several days of 
this duty, Major Rigg ordered McCleave to proceed toward 
the Pima Villages to look for an overdue express rider 
whom he feared might have been attacked by hostile 
Indians. Since the country from Tucson to the Colorado 
River was supposed to be thoroughly picketed by friendly 
Indians, it was thought that there was no danger of any 
Confederates being in the area. With nine men McCleave 
set out on a rapid march.^ 
f^unter to Baylor, April 1862, ibid., IX, 708. 
75william A. McCleave, Recollections of a 
California Volunteer (MS., Bancroft Library, University 
of California). 
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Atlas to Accompany the Official Records of the Union 
and Confederate Armies, II, plate XCVIII, map 1. 
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On the third night out, March 6, McCleavefs 
scouting party reached the Pima Villages.7^ Though it 
was quite late McCleave knocked at the door of White's 
house to see if the owner was in. The person who opened 
the door, after affirming that White was home, asked 
where McCleave and his men were from. The captain 
promptly replied that he and his men were United States 
soldiers from the Colorado. With that the man retired, 
ostensibly to inform White of their presence. Actually 
White was being held a prisoner elsewhere .77 The Con­
federate soldier went into the room where Hunter was 
sleeping, awakened his captain and told him that a 
Federal officer and two troopers were at the door.^® 
Hunter quickly dressed and came out, representing 
himself as Ammi White. He asked McCleave if these were 
all the men he had with him. The captain replied, "No; 
I have six more at the next station."79 Meanwhile about 
76 ib id. 
77sacramento Daily Union, May 23, 1862. 
7®Rigg to Carleton, March 30, 1862, 0. R. A., 
L, i, 966. - - -
79ibid. 
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thirty of Hunter's men appeared, and the Confederate 
captain drew his pistol, leveled it at McCleave's breast 
and stated, "I am Captain Hunter of the Southern army. 
„80 
Consider yourselves prisoners. Lay down your arms." 
McCleave, of course, was taken completely by surprise 
since none of the Confederates wore uniforms. Thinking 
that he was among friends, he had taken off his side-
arms while his men were engaged in putting up their 
horses.^ At first the Union captain was reluctant to 
surrender, but Hunter remarked, "if you make a single 
motion, I'll blow your brains out—you are in my power— 
surrender immediately." Under the circumstances, 
8P 
McCleave decided upon the expediency of capitulation. 
All eight of McCleave's party were also taken prisoner?^ 
®°Sacramento Daily Union, May 23, 1862. 
^Rigg to Carleton, March 30, 1862, 0. R. A., 
L, i, 966. 
^Sacramento Daily Union, May 23, 1862. 
83Rigg to Carleton, March 30, 1862, 0. R. A., 
L, i, 966. A Union officer stated that he had"Tieard a 
report that McCleave and his men were tied hand and foot 
after they were captured. Barrett to Rigg, March 19, 
1862, ibid., 940. 
470 
While at White's mill Hunter learned that at 
every Overland Mail station between the Pima Villages 
and Port Yuma, hay had been stockpiled for the use of 
the Federals. The Confederate leader later sent out a 
84 
party which destroyed the hay at six of these stations. 
Hunter did not destroy White's mill. Some essential 
parts of the mill machinery, however, were hidden so 
85 
that it could not be operated. 
After learning that there was no Federal wagon 
train on the way, Hunter returned to Tucson.®^ The 
Federal captain and White were to be held until the re­
turn of Colonel Reily from Sonora. Reily soon arrived, 
and McCleave observed that it was plainly evident by his 
manner that his mission had not been successful. The 
^Hunter to Baylor, April 5* 1862, ibid., IX, 708. 
®5carleton to West, May 3, 1862, ibid., L, i, 
1049. 
86nunter to Baylor, April 5.> 1862, ibid., IX, 
708. McCleave maintained that there were many northern 
men in Hunter's company. They told him of the speeches 
Sylvester Mowry and his "rebel" friends had made to them 
at the various mines in Arizona. Mowry and others set 
"forth the miserable condition of the Union army and that 
the South was only awaiting a favorable opportunity to 
capture Washington and take control of all the States 
and by changing the Govt, bring prosperity and happiness 
to the people such as they have never known." McCleave 
said he gave these men a true statement of facts, and this 
caused many of them to desert—some to Mexico, others to 
New Mexico. Hunter makes no mention of any desertions, 
if there were any. McCleave, Recollections of a Cali­
fornia Volunteer; Hunter to Baylor, April 1862, 
0. R. A., IX, 707-708. 
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captured enlisted men were paroled at Tucson and allowed 
to do as they pleased, but McCleave and White were sent 
to the Rio Grande under guard. On the way to the river, 
the small command halted at the abandoned post of Fort 
McLane. Here news was received of the battle of 
Valverde. The Confederates were formed in line as the 
dispatch setting forth the great gallantry of the Texans 
over the Union troops was read to them. Three cheers 
were shouted for the heroes of Valverde. At that moment 
an officer approached McCleave and remarked, "You are 
not cheering, Captain." "No, sir," answered McCleave, 
"My time to cheer will come by and by." In addition the 
captain asserted that he did not believe the report that 
had just been read. At these comments a general scowl 
spread over the faces of the Texans, some of whom 
menacingly snarled that no prisoner should be allowed 
to talk that way about their victory. From Fort McLane 
the party continued on to Mesilla where McCleave and 
White were imprisoned.®''' 
During the Confederate occupation of Tucson, 
Hunter's troopers were neither formally drilled nor 
^^McCleave, Recollections of a California 
Volunteer. 
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disciplined. The company's horses were kept in the 
corral of the Overland Mail Company, and the men slept 
anywhere in town they pleased. Hunter's company was 
not reinforced, either from the Mesilla Valley or from 
Reily's escort when that officer passed through Tucson 
on his return from Sonora. At no time did Company A 
QO 
exceed seventy-five men. 
* * * * 
The Confederate occupation of western Arizona was 
a source of irritation which the pompous Colonel Carleton 
was determined not to allow to continue. Since small 
groups of his expeditionary force were now beginning to 
arrive at Fort Yuma, he instructed his subordinate, Major 
Edwin A. Rigg, the post commander, to send forth a de­
tachment to engage Hunter's company. When, and if, this 
force defeated the Confederates, Carleton stipulated that 
Colonel Reily should be captured on his return trip from 
Sonora, and that every secessionist in Tucson should be 
arrested and brought to Fort Yuma. To accomplish these 
objectives, the colonel considered one company of 
infantry and two of cavalry a sufficient force. 
88pergusson to Drum, October 4, 1862, 0. R. A., 
L, ii, 151-152. 
^9cutler to Rigg, March 17 t  1862, ibid., i, 937. 
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It fell upon Major Rigg to devise a plan to carry 
out Carleton's instructions. Aside from attacking 
Hunter's command, the expedition now had the added pur­
pose of rescuing Captain McCleave and his men. After due 
consideration, Rigg selected Captain William P. Calloway 
of Company I, First California Infantry, to lead the of­
fensive. Calloway's force, numbering 272 men, consisted 
of the following units: 
His own Company I, First California Infantry, 97 men. 
Company A, First California Cavalry (McCleave's com­
mand, now officered by First Lieutenant Benjamin F. 
Harvey), 83 men. 
Company D, First California Cavalry (Captain 
Nathaniel J. Pishon), which included a detachment 
of Company K, First California Infantry, with two 
12-pounder mountain howitzers (Lieutenant 
Jeremiah Phelan), 92 men.90 
Rigg's strategy called for Company A to set out for 
Stanwix Station, a distance of eighty miles from Fort 
Yuma, followed somewhat later by Calloway's infantry. 
When the footsoldiers arrived at the station, Company A 
was to scout ahead, keeping a sharp lookout for the enemy. 
In an effort to obtain reliable intelligence concerning 
the whereabouts of the Confederates, Rigg engaged the 
services of Pauline Weaver, a noted scout and trapper. 
9°Rigg to Carleton, March 25* 1862, ibid., 950; 
Orton (comp.), Records of California Men, 4T~» 
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Weaver was to proceed in advance of all the military 
units and to inform them-'whether or not the Confederates 
were still in the vicinity of the Pima Villages. If 
they were, when Pishon's cavalry arrived at Stanwix, the 
infantry was to march directly to the Pima Villages. 
Rigg hoped that this maneuver would "draw them out," and 
if all went according to plan, the cavalry, in the mean­
time, would circle around to the south and fall upon the 
enemy's rear, thus catching Hunter's men in the jaws of 
a trap. If the Confederates were not at the Pima 
Villages, Calloway was instructed to move his command to 
that point. Weaver was to continue on to Tucson where, 
"by means of Indian messengers, he was to inform Calloway 
of Hunter's position. After receiving such information, 
Calloway was to move rapidly upon Tucson, rescue 
McCleave, and then fall back and entrench his command at 
the Pima Villages.91 
Rigg's plan appeared feasible. In addition, the 
moral of the troops involved was high: McCleave's company 
was "pawing for advance," Pishon's men were "full of 
92 
fight," and Calloway's infantrymen were "in fine order." 
9^Rigg to Carleton, March 25, 1862, 0. R. A., 
L, i, 950. 
92 lb id. 
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At nine o'clock p. m. on March 22, Captain Callo­
way's infantrymen formed in two lines in front of their 
quarters at Port Yuma. After roll call the men marched 
to the Colorado River where they were ferried to the 
Arizona side. Once on the opposite bank, the troops 
were called to attention and Major Rigg addressed them 
on the importance of their mission: 
Men, you have now crossed the Rubicon and emerged 
into the great field of labor spread out before you. 
The first duty of the soldier is obedience. Un­
aided by the vigilance and cooperation of his men, a 
commander is powerless. There is work for you to 
accomplish and you can never return without glory or 
disgrace.93 
After a few more remarks, the old major returned to Port 
Yuma, and the soldiers set out by the light of the moon 
"in anticipation of the glory spoken of." Since the 
daytime heat was so intense, the company made the march 
to Stanwix Station during the coolness of night. On 
March 28, the infantrymen reached their destination.9^ 
Company A of the cavalry had already arrived at the 
station twelve days before.95 
93sacramento Daily Union, May 23# 1862. 
9^ibid. 
95orton (comp.), Records of California Men, 69. 
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The following day, while Calloway was awaiting 
the arrival of Pishon's cavalry, a party of the enemy 
shot at two pickets posted on the Gila River about six 
miles north of Stanwix Station. The Confederates at 
first had attempted to take the two prisoner, but fail-
q6 
ing in this, they opened fire on them. Though one 
picket, Private William Semmilrogge,97 was severely 
wounded in the shoulder, both managed to escape and came 
galloping back to the Federal camp to give the alarm. 
According to the two the enemy party consisted of about 
Q8 
forty men.-7 
Captain Pishon's Company D had just arrived in 
camp. Since they were still mounted, Calloway ordered 
them to pursue the Confederates. Though they set out at 
a fast gallop, the approach of night and the jaded con­
dition of their horses prompted Captain Pishon to give 
up the chase.99 On April 4, the detachment of Confeder­
ate scouts returned to Tucson to report to Captain Hunter 
96sacramento Daily Union, May 23, 1862. 
9?0rton (comp.), Records of California Men, 69. 
98sacramento Daily Union, May 23, 1862. 
99ibid. 
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the coming of the Union troops to Stanwix Stat ion. •L0° 
Calloway's united command set out from Stanwix 
Station on April 8.^®^ Pour days later the Federals 
arrived at the Pima Villages, but there were no Con­
federates to be found.After a two-day delay at the 
Villages, Calloway decided the time was ripe to advance 
upon Tucson.The first day the men marched a 
distance of twenty-four miles. The enemy was nowhere to 
be found. On April 15—the same day that the skirmish 
of Peralta was fought over .on the Rio Grande—Calloway's 
men arose early and started on their way.~®^ As the 
column neared Picacho Pass that afternoon, Indian scouts 
brought back the intelligence that a small force of the 
-'•^Hunter to Baylor, April 5, 1862, 0. R. A_., 
L, i, 978. 
•L°l0rton (comp.), Records of California Men, 14. 
102Aurora Hunt, The Army of the Pacific (Glendale, 
1951), 88. 
103orton (comp.), Records of California Men, 47. 
104nunt, The Army of the Pacific, 88. 
•*-°5sacrainento Daily Union, May 23, 1862. 
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enemy was ahead.These advance Confederate scouts 
107 
were under the command of Lieutenant Jack W. Swilling. 
Calloway hastily devised a two-prong cavalry 
flanking movement. Lieutenants James Barrett and 
Ephraim C. Baldwin were ordered to move forward with 
their cavalry detachments until near the pass where they 
were to leave the main road. Baldwin was to turn off to 
the left, circle around and close in on the enemy from 
the west while Barrett was to detour around in a circular 
maneuver and close in from the east through an opening 
to the left in the mountain. Calloway's plan was for 
these two cavalry units to strike the enemy simultaneously 
o n  t h e  f l a n k ,  t h e r e b y  c u t t i n g  o f f  t h e i r  r e t r e a t , w h i l e  
his main body of infantry attacked from the front.'1'0̂  
No Confederates were encountered as Calloway ad­
vanced cautiously down the road. But after a march of 
several miles, the sounds of rapid firing were heard 
106orton (comp.), Records of California Men, 47. 
"'•̂ Wyllys, Arizona, 148. 
10^Sacramento Daily Union, May 23, 1862. 
l^Orton (comp.), Records of California Men, 47. 
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a h e a d . A s  i t  t u r n e d  o u t ,  t h e  i m p e t u o u s  L i e u t e n a n t  
Barrett had disregarded his commander's instructions to 
await the approach of Baldwin and attack simultaneously. 
Barrett, after moving eight miles in advance of the main 
column, discovered that the Confederate pickets were 
concealed in a thicket. The lieutenant did not even 
dismount his men so they could deploy and surround the 
i 
enemy. Instead he decided to charge them. Barrett dis­
charged his pistol and ordered the enemy to surrender. 
Lieutenant Swilling and his eight men immediately re­
sponded with a volley which cut down four Federals. The 
firing soon became general and three of the Confederates 
threw away their arms and surrendered. Barrett dis­
mounted to help tie them up. As he was getting back 
into his saddle, a ball struck his neck and broke it. 
Ill 
The overzealous lieutenant tumbled to the ground dead. 
Shortly the remainder of the Confederates made good 
their escape.Captain Calloway soon arrived at the 
scene, but the brief skirmish of Picacho, the westernmost 
HOlbid. 
^Sacramento Daily Union, May 23# 1862. 
112carleton to West, May 3# 1862, 0. R. A., 
L, i, 1049. 
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battle of the War for Southern Independence, was over. 
Calloway did not pursue the enemy, but remained on the 
field that night.H3 
Had it not been for the rash behavior of Lieu­
tenant Barrett, doubtlessly the skirmish would never 
have taken place. One of the captured Confederates as­
serted that had Barrett called upon them to surrender 
Hit 
before he started firing, they would have done so. ̂  
Federal losses were three killed and three wounded.^5 
Private George Johnson of Company A was shot near the 
heart and died within a few minutes. William S. 
Leonard of Company D was hit in the back, the ball con­
tinuing upward and out his mouth. He died the following 
morning. William C. Tobin of Company B was struck in 
the forehead, but the brasses of his hat caused the ball 
to glance upward. Though it left an ugly wound, it was 
not fatal. Two other Federals were shot in the arm and 
116 
shoulder, but their wounds were not reported as serious. 
•^3sacramento Daily Union, May 23* 1862. 
•^Carleton to West, May 31 1862, 0. R. A., 
L, i, 1049. ~ ~" 
115orton (comp.), Records of California Men, 47. 
•'••^Sacramento Daily Union, May 23, 1862. 
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The Confederates were listed as having two men wounded 
and three prisoners Lieutenant Barrett and those 
who died with him were buried side by side, a few feet 
from where they fell."^® 
The morning following the skirmish, Calloway, 
against the protests of his officers, ordered his com­
mand to turn back. 9 Several factors prompted the 
captain to discontinue the advance toward Tucson. He 
was convinced that the Confederates were too great in 
number for his party to successfully combat. Only 
three days1 provisions remained. Furthermore, the road 
from Picacho Pass to Tucson led through thickets and 
passes where small bands of the enemy could lie in wait 
to pick off his men as they passed. Prom the prisoners 
it was learned that McCleave had already been sent to 
the Rio Grande. Thus, one of the principal reasons for 
attacking Tucson was now gone.-1-20 
Calloway arrived at the Pima Villages on April 
24, but he did not stop. Apparently he had decided to 
H7orton (comp.), Records of California Men, 47. 
H^sacramento Daily Union, May 23> 1862. 
•^Qrton (comp.), Records of California Men, 47. 
^'-'Sacramento Daily Union, May 23* 1862. 
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return to Fort Yuma. Near Stanwix Station, however, he 
met Colonel West with the advance of the California 
army. Both parties then proceeded to the Pima Villages 
where an earthwork was thrown up around White's mill, 
and a permanent camp was established. It was named 
Port Barrett in honor of the young lieutenant who had 
fallen in the skirmish of Picacho.-*-2^ 
Meanwhile Carleton was finally assembling his 
army at Port Yuma. Unforeseen difficulties had prevented 
his getting into the field earlier. Not for twenty years 
had a winter of such severity occurred in California. 
Heavy rains had inundated the country, and for weeks it 
had been almost impossible to move a vehicle of any kind. 
Commissary stores and forage were sent by sea to Fort 
Yuma. As the rains subsided and the ground became 
firmer, the troops were gradually moved out. The men 
marched across the desert by companies, one day apart, 
but the ground was not dry enough for the movement of 
Shinn's artillery until April 13. By that time nearly 
*L?P all the command was at, or on the way, to Port Yuma. 
^•^Orton (comp.), Records of California Men, 
47, 69. 
^^McNulty to Hammond, October 1863, 0. R. A., 
L, i, 138-139. - - -
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On April 28, Carleton was promoted to brigadier general 
of volunteers, and Joseph R. West became colonel of the 
First California Infantry. 
Carleton arrived at Port Yuma on April 29.-^4 
"General Order Number One" specified that "the forces 
belonging to the United States which are now moving from 
the Department of the Pacific toward Arizona and New 
Mexico will hereafter be known as the Column from Calif­
ornia. "125 Carleton's expeditionary force consisted of 
the following: 
First California Cavalry, five companies, commanded 
by Lieutenant Colonel Edward E. Eyre. 
First California Infantry, ten companies, under 
Colonel Joseph R. West. 
Battery A, Third U. S. Artillery, two 12-pounder 
howitzers and two 6-pounders, First Lieutenant 
John B. Shinn commanding. 
Later Colonel George W. Bowie's Fifth California Infantry, 
five companies, was sent to reinforce the "Column." 
This made an army of nearly 1,800 men.•'•27 
•L23orton (comp.), Records of California Men, 47. 
•^^McNulty to Hammond, October 1863, 0. R. A_., 
L, i, 139. 
125General Orders, No. 1, May 15, 1862, 
ibid., 1075. 
126orton (comp.), Records of California Men, 47. 
•^^Whitford, Colorado Volunteers, 140. 
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The definite news that a sizeable Union army would 
soon be marching into Arizona was ample reason for Hunter 
to decide to evacuate western Arizona. On May 4, the 
captain called his company into line, and the small force 
marched out of Tucson for the Rio Grande. The Confeder­
ate occupation of what is now Arizona had lasted for 
slightly over two months. Near Dragoon Spring Hunt­
er's company was attacked by Apaches. Pour men were 
killed in the skirmish and the Indians managed to run off 
thirty mules and twenty-five horses.^29 company A reached 
the Mesilla Valley shortly after* Sibley's army had come 
back from the disastrous New Mexican campaign. Hunter's 
intelligence of the coming of the "California Column" 
certainly did nothing to bolster the morale of the weary 
and demoralized "Army of New Mexico." 
On May 15* Colonel West, with the advance detach­
ment of the "California Column," set out from Port 
Barrett for Tucson. The command moved up the Gila River 
to old Port Breckenridge where, amid the cheers of the 
1*^0 men, the Federal flag was raised once again. J On May 
20, Tucson was occupied and western Arizona was securely 
in the hands of the Union army."1^! 
128west to Cutler, May 21, 1862, 0. R. A., L, i, 
1088. - - -
129carleton to Drum, May 25> 1862, ibid., 1095. 
•^Oorton (comp.), Records of California Men, 47. 
^Iv/est to Cutler, May 21, 1862, 0. R. A., L, i, 
1088. - - _ 
CHAPTER XV 
THE END OP THE CAMPAIGN 
While the "Army of New Mexico" was retreating down 
the Rio Grande, the Confederacy was suffering reverses 
elsewhere. The month of April witnessed the bloody 
battle of Shiloh and the fall of New Orleans. Even 
with these great disasters attracting his attention, 
General Paul 0. Hebert, Confederate commander of the De­
partment of Texas, had not forgotten about the New 
Mexican campaign. When he received urgent pleas from • 
Sibley for reinforcements, he ordered two regiments of 
cavalry to march to his support."1' But communications were 
slow, and apparently Hebert had not received notice that 
Sibley had already evacuated New Mexico. 
In faraway Richmond, though McClellan had begun 
his Peninsula campaign and was pressing upon the capital, 
there were others who were worried about the "Army of New 
Mexico." On the very day of the opening of the battle of 
Seven Pines, May 31* 1862, Robert E. Lee, general in 
iLee to Hebert, May 31* 1862, 0. R. A., IX, 716. 
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chief under the President, wrote to Hebert, informing 
him that Jefferson Davis had received communications 
which reported the "very destitute and critical con­
dition" of Sibley's army. The general asserted that 
Hebert was "perfectly right" in reinforcing Sibley with 
the two regiments which had been intended for service 
in Little Rock. Lee also advised that the "very remote 
and isolated position of General Sibley's command" made 
it necessary that Hebert should promptly send to the 
western frontier of Texas all the supplies for Sibley's 
vise that he could. In this matter, Lee suggested that 
the departmental commander should call upon the governor 
of Texas for assistance.2 
Jefferson Davis, of course, was also very much 
interested in the New Mexican campaign. Captain Thomas 
P. Ochiltree, Sibley's aide-de-camp, had earlier 
journeyed to Richmond to personally report the condition 
of the brigade to the President. When Davis considered 
the field of operations, the superior number of the 
enemy, and the many other obstacles which Sibley faced, 
he considered that officer's conduct, and the army under 
his command, as most "praiseworthy." Through Ochiltree, 
2Ibid. 
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the President rejoiced "in being able to congratulate 
. . .^Bible;^ on the distinguished successes of. . . 
^Kis/ command." He hoped that the two regiments which 
were being sent to bolster his army would enable him to 
meet the "more immediate and pressing exigencies." 
Ochiltree was to inform the general of the state of af­
fairs in the East. This, the President believed, would 
be a sufficient explanation as to why Sibley's command 
had not been more quickly reinforced and supplied. 
Though the enemy in New Mexico was superior in numbers 
and in supplies, Davis expressed the fond hope that 
Sibley's own ability and military resources, and the 
valor of the troops under his command, would offset any 
such disparity. Davis had not yet learned of the dis­
astrous results of this southwestern campaign when he 
wrote this congratulatory letter to Sibley on June 7* 
1862.3 undoubtedly, Sibley must have been greatly 
embarrassed when Captain Ochiltree later delivered this 
communication to him. 
Sibley first learned of the coming of reinforce­
ments from unofficial reports. During the latter part 
of May, the week's mail brought information from "various" 
3Davis to Sibley, June J ,  1862, ibid., 717-718. 
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sources that the government Intended to reinforce the 
brigade with one or more regiments. In fact, Colonel 
X. B. Debray was supposed to be already on the march. 
The postmaster at San Antonio also informed the general 
that Hamilton Bee, the commander of the Western 
District of Texas, said that New Mexico and Arizona 
were to be held at "all hazards."^ But neither Sibley 
nor his men were desirous of engaging in another New 
Mexican campaign I 
On May 27> Sibley dispatched a letter to Bee 
through Captain Wager, his volunteer aide. In this 
communication, the general gave a far more accurate ac­
count of the condition of his army than he had done In 
his report to the adjutant general. Sibley pointed out 
that he had been forced to evacuate New Mexico because 
his provisions, forage, and ammunition had been com­
pletely exhausted.^ Any force sent to operate in New 
^Sibley to Bee, May 27, 1862, Ibid., 71^• 
5lbid. During the retreat from New Mexico, 
Canby had captured the official papers of Major Brown-
rigg, Sibley's chief commissary. Canby offered to 
exchange these for the records of the U. S. Third 
Cavalry which were reported to be in the possession of 
the Texans. Canby to Sibley, May 24, 1862, ibid., 
Series II, III, 589. 
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Mexico, the general warned, should not depend upon the 
country for siipplies, except,. perhaps, the single 
article of flour. In the vicinity of the Mesilla Valley 
and Port Bliss, Sibley found himself "but little better 
off." There were no provisions in the area to be had. 
Sibley had already confiscated all the spare supplies in 
the vicinity, and he now had ordered that all the trans­
portation and provisions which could be obtained should 
be taken from the villages below Port Bliss. The brigade 
was subsisting on a limited supply of poor meat and 
bread. It was reported that the men were at the point 
of starvation and were receiving as a ration one pound 
and a quarter of beef and twelve ounces of flour.7 "Of 
sugar and coffee. . .^/Ehe army had/ scarcely a pound; 
all other small rations. . ./yievof alike deficient; 
whilst of salt meat. . ./They had/7 not an ounce." Cloth­
ing for the troops was completely gone and there was no 
way of replenishing the stock. The ammunition was nearly 
exhausted, and there was only about a hundred rounds re­
maining for the heavy guns. The brigade's sick and 
^Sibley to Bee, May 27, 1862, ibid., IX, 714. 
?Canby to Adjutant-General, June 21, 1862, 
ibid., 678. 
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wounded were suffering from lack of medicines and other 
necessities. To be sure, with specie some supplies 
could be purchased on the Mexican side of the river. 
O 
But of hard money, Sibley had none. Confederate cur­
rency was selling at the rate of twenty cents on the 
dollar, and large amounts could have been bought for less 
g 
if there had been any purchasers. 
Sibley's confiscations, individual acts of forag­
ing, and other "outrages" committed by soldiers upon the 
inhabitants engendered the bitter hatred of the native 
Mexican population. An observer on the Mexican side of 
the Rio Grande noted that no army would be able to sub­
sist in the valley that year unless the necessary sup­
plies were brought with them. The wheat crop of that 
year would be "scanty" at best, and since the Texans had 
been so thorough in their confiscations, it was believed 
that there would be a famine among the people at Mesilla, 
Las Cruces, Dona Ana, and Picacho.^"0 
Sibley lamented to Bee that he had sent "report 
after report" to the Confederate authorities during the 
%ibley to Bee, May 27, 1862, ibid., 714. 




recent campaign. To date he had not received a "single 
line of acknowledgment or encouragement," either from 
Richmond or from military departments closer at hand. 
In the absence of all official communication, Sibley had 
been forced to rely entirely upon his own judgment. 
Since he believed that the safety of his brigade depended 
upon its moving to a base of supply, the general informed 
Bee that he had already given the order for the bulk of 
h i s  f o r c e s  t o  w i t h d r a w  t o  S a n  A n t o n i o . A s . f a r  a s  
Sibley was concerned, the New Mexican campaign was at an 
end. 
On or about May 20, the evacuation began when 
Major Pyron and his command set out on the road to San 
Antonio.The morning of June 5* saw Companies A, B, 
D, E, G, I, and K of the Fourth Regiment called into 
line preparatory to leaving. Colonel Hardeman addressed 
his men and informed them that, though their rations 
were short, undoubtedly a supply train from San Antonio 
would meet them at Port Lancaster. At the conclusion of 
his remarks, the seven companies set out on the 750 mile 
1 •'•Sibley to Bee, May 27, 1862, ibid., 714. 
•^Cariby to Adjutant-General, June 21, 1862, 
ibid., 6784 
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journey. The following day Major Hampton led the next 
division of the Fourth."1^ Green's Fifth Regiment, which 
was now scattered in parties of fifteen to twenty along 
the road between Dona Ana and Franklin, was preparing to 
take up the line of march shortly. By the morning of 
June 10, General Sibley and his staff were ready to 
leave.Though the bulk of the Confederate forces were 
evacuating, Sibley ordered Colonel William Steele, who 
was then at Dona Ana, to stay behind with his force of 
a b o u t  4 0 0  m e n  t o  h o l d  t h e  t e r r i t o r y  o f  A r i z o n a . u n ­
doubtedly Sibley meant this to be a rear guard holding 
operation. Surely he could not have seriously enter­
tained the thought that Steele could have held the terri­
tory for long against Canby's impending invasion from the 
north. With the withdrawal of the greater part of the 
brigade, all hopes for the conquest of New Mexico and 
the West, temporarily at least, came to an end. 
Sibley's men had endured a great deal during the 
New Mexican campaign. Their suffering, however, was not 
•^Noel, A Campaign, 34. 
•^Cariby to Adjutant-General, June 21, 1862, 
0. R. A., IX, 678. 
15steele to Cooper, July 12, 1862, ibid., 722. 
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yet over. Lack of adequate transportation and food, as 
well as the broken-down condition of the men, would make 
the long journey back to San Antonio a most difficult 
one. The ordeal which the first division of the Fourth 
Regiment experienced was probably typical of the others. 
When this unit set out, it was the month of June, and 
the weather was oppressively hot in the Rio Grande Val­
ley. One eyewitness reported that the sickness occa­
sioned by the first few days' march was "truly painful 
to behold." It was not an unusual sight to see some of 
the men "giving out" along the road after they had 
marched but a few miles. To make matters worse, the 
division had no surgeon to care for the suffering. When 
the command reached Fort Quitman, the exhausted men 
rested for a day. Eagle Springs, thirty-six miles away, 
was the next watering place. Lieutenant John Barns, in 
command of a small party, was ordered to proceed ahead 
to make certain that the springs were cleaned out and 
ready for the use of the main command. 
At daylight the division set out from Fort Quit­
man and proceeded up Eagle Canyon. There was no orderly 
^Noel, A Campaign, 34-35* 
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marching in line. It was every man for himself, and 
"the wagons take the hindmost." The advance members of 
the "foot pads" arrived at Eagle Springs about two 
o'clock that afternoon.^ Eagle Springs had been an 
Overland Mail stage station, but the building was now 
i n  r u i n s . T w o  d a y s '  r a t i o n s  o f  b e e f  a n d  u n s a l t e d  
bread were cooked here. After the water barrels were 
filled, the march was resumed at sundown. At daybreak,^ 
twenty-two miles later, the command reached Van Horn's 
Wells. The wells here were similar to the ones at Eagle 
20 
Springs, but the Indians had filled them in with dirt 
and the carcasses of sheep. Lieutenant Barns' advance 
party had not attempted to clean them out. It was about 
thirty-eight miles from Van Horn's Wells to the next 
water at Dead Man's Hole.2-1- Great must have been the 
men's disappointment as they thirstily resumed their 
march. 
ITibid., 35. 
•^Noel, Autobiography, 64. 
•^Noel, A Campaign, 35. 
20Noel, Autobiography, 64. 
2lNoel, A_ Campaign, 35. 
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The road to Dead Man's Hole ran through a 
relatively flat "boundless prairie." The weather con­
tinued to be excessively hot as the unmerciful sun bore 
22 
dovm upon the command. The teams were "fast caving," 
and the weary soldiers were strung out along the road 
for miles,23 Many of them were so exhausted that they 
gave out completely and threw themselves down by the 
side of the road to die. Many kept plodding onward, but 
their tongues were so swollen that they were unable to 
articulate a word. "More crazed than rational, they 
looked like frantic mad men." As the sun was setting, 
the reeling men could clearly see the foothills at whose 
base lay Dead Man's Hole. This was a heartening sight 
for it seemed just a short distance away. But the clear 
air of the West is deceiving, and the command was still 
fourteen miles from the water. The men kept up the march 
' for another six miles when, to their great joy and re­
lief, they were met by Lieutenant Barns. He had come 
.24 
from Dead Man's Hole with a wagon containing water! 
As each Individual quenched his thirst, he would go back 
22 Ibid. 
23Noel, Autobiography, 65. 
S^Noel, A Campaign, 35. 
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and lie down in the road. This was the only place the 
men could find to rest, for the area outside the road 
' 25 
bed was covered with sage brush, cats-claw, and cactus. 
At Dead Man's Hole, .the division rested for a day before 
setting out again for Barrel Springs. On arrival at 
Port Davis, a part of the command's supplies was met, and 
2.6 
the soldiers hungrily feasted upon fat beef. At the 
fort there was plenty of wood. The men kneaded unbolted 
flour, wound the dough around their iron ramrods, and 
baked it over camp fires. There were some scales at the 
fort, and some men whose ordinary.weight had been 185 
pounds, now weighed less than 115* After resting for a 
27 
day and a night, the division resumed its march. 
The weather continued to be hot, and the barren, 
cactus-covered terrain was exceedingly dry and dusty. 
Wearily, the men plodded along from Fort Davis to Port 
Stockton, to Port Lancaster, and to Howard Spring. Prom 
Howard Spring the command marched forty-five miles to 
the next water at Beaver Lake at the head of Devils 
25Noel, Autobiography, 65. 
2^Noel, A Campaign, 36. 
^T^oel, Autobiography, 66. 
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River. Undoubtedly the most momentous event of the long 
march occurred twenty-two miles west of Beaver Lake. At 
daylight on the morning of July 3j the men met a supply 
train of six wagons which had come to their relief. 
Friends and relatives had sent clothing, soap, combs, 
fresh corn meal, sugar, salt, bacon, coffee, tobacco, 
and other luxuries. Some soldiers received nothing. 
Those, however, who had received goods freely divided 
.them with those "whose friends had forgotten them in 
their hour of need." From this point on, all progressed 
well. At D'Hanis friends and more supply trains met the 
28 
brigade. • At last San Antonio was reached. 
"Straggling back on foot, broken, disorganised, 
and in an altogether deplorable condition,the men 
were home again after a ten month absence. For a while, 
at least, the hardships of the New Mexican campaign were 
forgotten. The soldiers received sixty-day furloughs, 
though they were still subject to call "at a moment's 
notice." While at home they were ordered to remount and 
reoutfit themselves.3° Though the campaign in New Mexico 
28 
Noel, A_ Campaign, 36. 
29williams, With the Border Ruffians, 201. 
3°Noel, A Campaign, 36, 
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had ended, the war was not over for the "Sibley Brigade." 
* * * * 
Colonel William Steele, who had been ordered to 
stay behind with his force of 400 men to hold the terri­
tory of Arizona, found himself in a most unenviable 
position. The colonel had formerly been at Dona Ana as 
Sibley's rear guard, but he now moved his headquarters 
to Port Fillmore. Prom a purely military standpoint, 
Steele's condition was critical. He had less than thirty 
days' supply of food, his ammunition was low, and his 
transportation facilities were highly inadequate. The 
Confederate commander realized that something would 
have to be done soon, or his men would be faced with 
starvation. Steele had been sick for several days. 
Though "scarcely able to be about," he wrote to Sibley 
to ask that some of the supplies which Green and Harde­
man had taken with them be left on the road for the use 
of his men. To compensate Green and Hardeman, Steele 
suggested that supplies be sent from San Antonio to meet 
them on the way. Though the country would soon be pro­
ducing flour and cornmeal, the colonel did not believe 
that he would be able to stay in the Mesilla Valley long 
enough for the crops to be harvested .3^-
3^-steele to Sibley, June 26, 1862, 0. R. A., 
IX, 720. - - -
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Of great concern was the native Mexican popu­
lation in the valley. After Sibley had left with the 
bulk of the brigade, the Mexicans correctly reasoned 
that Confederate tenure was "frail and uncertain." As 
such they were unwilling to sell anything for Confeder­
ate currency. Since Steele had no specie, he was com­
pelled to authorize his men to seize needed supplies 
from the natives^ and to force them to accept Confeder­
ate script as payment.33 Food, wagons, and draught 
animals were the main items which were requisitioned. 
These foraging operations, which were even more thorough 
than Sibley's had been, aroused greater ill feeling. The 
Mexicans had little interest in the present war between 
the states. They were only concerned with their own 
welfare, and when the Texans began seizing their goods, 
they attempted to defend their property. In many in­
stances they offered armed resistance. In the various 
skirmishes which took place, one captain and several men 
of the Seventh Regiment were killed.3^ it is, indeed, 
32steele to Cooper, July 12, 1862, i b i d 7 2 2 .  
33Eyre to Cutler, July 8, 1862, ibid., L, 125. 
34steele to Cooper, July 12, 1862, ibid., IX, 
722. 
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not difficult to understand the attitude of the Mexicans. 
While it had been the policy of Baylor and Sibley to 
treat the people with "kindness and justice," many of 
the soldiers had acted otherwise.^ Since the days of 
the Revolution, Texans in general had held Mexicans in 
low regard. When the whole brigade had been in the 
valley, the Mexicans had been powerless to resist. 
Against Steele's small force, however, the Mexicans were 
able to express in deeds their hatred of the "Tejanos." 
In addition to the Mexicans, Steele was confronted 
with the attitude of his own men. They were completely 
disgusted with the campaign and were anxious to return to 
Texas as had the rest of the brigade. So strong was this 
feeling that, in one or two instances, the soldiers were 
on the point of open mutiny. Unless they were "speedily" 
marched back to San Antonio, they threatened to take 
matters into their own hands.3^ 
Meanwhile Carleton's "California Column" had 
reached Tucson where it momentarily halted in order to 
pacify the area and to make repairs and to secure supplies 
35Reminiscences of H. C. Wright. 
3^steele to Cooper, July 12, 1862, R. A., 
IX, 722. 
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from Sonora.37 While at the "Old Pueblo," Carleton at­
tempted to contact Canby. Twice before, his messengers 
had failed to get through.^ The third time he sent 
two soldiers and a Mexican guide. The men left Tucson 
on the evening of June 15. Three days later they came 
into Apache Pass39 which was midway between Tucson and 
the Rio Grande. The pass was about three and a half to 
four miles long and ran through a spur of the Chiricahua 
Mountains. Extending around this spur was a plain which 
fanned out from thirty to forty miles. Apache Pass con­
tained a fine spring, but it was also a favorite haunt 
of the Apache Indians. Approaching parties could be 
seen miles away, and as they entered the pass, the 
40 
Indians would lie in wait at the spring to ambush them. 
Such was the case with Carleton's three riders. In the 
3?McNulty to Hammond, October —, 1863, ibid., 
599.  
3®Carleton to Canby, August 2, 1862, ibid., L, i, 
92-93.  
39carleton to Drum, July 22, 1862, ibid., 89. 
^McNulty to Hammond, October --, 1863* ibid., 
IX, 601. 
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attack two of the men were killed. The survivor, ex­
pressman John Jones,211 was pursued for nearly forty 
miles, but he made good his escape At sunset on the 
evening of June 20, J Jones reached Picacho, about six 
miles above Mesilia.^ Exhausted and in a half-
delirious state after his perilous ride, the express 
rider arrived at the Rio Grande only to be captured by 
a party of Texans.^ Jones was brought before Colonel 
Steele who interrogated him and then confined him to 
jig 
jail. News of his capture was brought to Port Craig 
by a friendly Mexican who was present when Jones was 
hi 
taken. 1 All the dispatches which Carleton endeavored 
to send to Canby fell into the Confederate commander's 
hands. From them Steele was able to learn the exact 
^Carleton to Drum, July 22, 1862, ibid., L, i, 
89. 
^McNulty to Hammond, October —, 1863, ibid., 
IX, 600. 
^3carleton to Canby, August 2, 1862, ibid., L, i, 
93. 
^Carleton to Drum, July 22, 1862, ibid., 89. 
^5carleton to Canby, August 2, 1862, ibid., 93. 
^Carleton to Drum, July 22, 1862, ibid., 89. 
^Eyre Cutler, July 6, 1862, ibid., 123. 
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strength of the "California Column" as well as Carleton's 
h O 
intended movement. A perusal of these documents con­
vinced Steele that his stay in the Mesilla Valley would 
be "very short. 
On June 21, Carleton's advance guard of 140 men 
under Lieutenant Colonel Edward E. Eyre left Tucson for 
SI 
the Rio Grande. These two companies of cavalry leached 
the river near Santa Barbara on July 4; immediately after 
making camp, and since it was Independence Day, the Union 
flag was raised "amid the loud and continued cheers of 
the assembled command." This was the first time that the 
"stars and stripes" had floated over the area below Port 
Craig since the occupation of the territory by the Con­
federate forces. The following day Eyre's command moved 
52 
three miles down the river and occupied Port Thorn. 
^McNulty to Hammond, October —, 1863, ibid., 
IX, 600. 
Steele to Sibley, June 26, 1862, ibid., 719. 
5°Carleton to Drum, July 22, 1862, ibid., L, i, 
89. 
53-McNulty to Hammond, October —, 1863, ibid., 
IX, 600-601. 
52Eyre to Cutler, July 6, 1862, ibid., 589. 
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On the morning of July 6, an express came from 
Fort Craig v;ith communications from Colonel Chivington. 
Accompanying these was a letter addressed to Colonel 
Steele and empowering Eyre to negotiate an exchange for 
Captain William McCleave and the other men who had been 
captured with him in Arizona. Shortly after the express 
had arrived, the Californians saw a party coming up from 
Mesilia. One of the men proved to be Captain McCleave. 
Though still on parole, he was on his way to Port Craig 
with a letter from Steele which proposed his exchange 
for Captain Gardner of the Confederate army. The express­
man who had just come from Fort Craig informed the men 
that Gardner had died only a few days before. In view 
of this, Eyre dispatched Captain Emil Fritz, First 
California Volunteer Cavalry, to Fort Fillmore. He was 
to inform the Confederate commander of Gardner's death 
and to request that some other captain be exchanged for 
McCleave. In addition he was to ask that those who had 
been captured with McCleave, the expressman, John Jones, 
and a John Lemon also be exchanged. Lemon was a citizen 
of Mesilla. During Jones' confinement Lemon had been 
very kind to him. In fact, he had horses saddled and 
hidden out for Jones' escape. The Texans apparently 
505 
discovered the plot in time, and Lemon was ordered to be 
hanged. He and a Mr. Marshall were taken to a tree to 
be executed, but after Marshall was hanged, Lemon's 
sentence was postponed for some unknown reason. ̂  
The Rio Grande was still at flood stage and almost 
the entire bottom between Fort Craig and Mesilla was in­
undated. It was impossible to approach Mesilla from the 
west bank, for the river had washed a new channel on that 
side of the town.^ Shortly after reaching the Rio 
Grande, Eyre sent a scouting party down as far as the 
ford at San Diego. Since he was anxious to fall upon 
Steele's command, the party had the dual purpose of look­
ing for enemy pickets and to see if the river could be 
crossed at that point. The scouts returned to report 
that it would be impossible to get to the crossing with 
wagons. However, the flood level was rapidly falling 
and, perhaps, in a week's time the river could be forded. 
In view of this situation, Eyre decided to remain a"t 
Port Thorn for the time being. Meanwhile his men and 
animals would receive a needed rest. In addition, he 
53gyre to Cutler, July 8, 1862, ibid., 589-590. 
5^ lb id., 590. 
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planned to await the reinforcements from Fort Craig 
which he had asked for while on his way to the Rio 
Grande. 
On July 8, Captain George W. Howland of the U. S. 
Third Cavalry, in command of a squadron of 100 men, ar-
rived from Fort Craig and reported to Eyre for duty.-' 
Howland's horses were in a "shocking" condition. In 
fact, they were so jaded that Eyre believed that should 
his command meet Steele's and a mounted charge be made, 
it would have to be done by his California squadron 
alone.^ With the river falling, Eyre hoped to be able 
to move soon against the Texans in the Mesilla Valley. 
Two days after Howland's arrival, though, the Californian 
received a communication from Colonel Chivington which 
upset his plans for achieving laurels on the battlefield. 
The commander of the Southern Military District reported 
that Canby did not favor an advance from Fort Thorn 
until the arrival of a larger force. This would not be 
55Eyre to Cutler, August 30, 1862, ibid., 592. 
From Cow Springs on June 28, 1862, Eyre had sent an 
express to Fort Craig asking for reinforcements. Ibid. 
56 lb id. 
57syre to Cutler, July 8, 1862, ibid., 590. 
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long for Chivlngton was under orders to advance to Santa 
Barbara with sixteen companies of infantry., a force of 
cavalry, four 6-pounders and two 24-pounder howitzers. 
This column was to support Carleton's advance and to 
cooperate with his troops in the reoccupation of the 
Mesilla Valley. While awaiting Chivington's force, 
Eyre was instructed to learn all he could concerning the 
enemy's strength, position, and plans. 
* * * * 
The seasonal rains had already begun to fall and 
Colonel William Steele knew that Canby would soon be 
able to cross the Jornada del Muerto with the large in­
vading force which he had been preparing. Prom Carle-
ton's captured dispatches, Steele learned that the 
"California Column" had nearly 1,500 men and would 
shortly set out in force for the Rio Grande. Steele's 
intelligence also brought reports that Canby had re­
ceived additional reinforcements. From Colorado had 
come 500 more volunteers. The paymaster from Kansas had 
arrived with an escort of 250 soldiers and six rifled 
cannon. Not counting these 750 additions, and even after 
leaving sufficient garrisons behind, Steele believed that 
5&Eyre to Cutler, August 30, 1862, ibid., 722. 
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the Federals would be capable of sending a force of 3j000 
men against him. Under these circumstances the evacuation 
of the territory of Arizona would have to be carried out 
as rapidly as possible.59 
Since the actions of the Texans—particularly the 
foraging operations—had caused such great feelings of 
bitterness on the part of the Mexican population, Steele 
feared that they might take their wrath out on the white 
people who were remaining behind.^ All those Americans 
who had sided with the Confederacy had either left with 
Sibley or were preparing to leave with Steele Those 
whites, some of whom had families, who were staying had 
taken no part in the struggle between the Confederate 
and Union governments. To insure their safety, the Texas 
commander entered into a covenant with the principal 
Mexicans of Mesilla who bound themselves to protect these 
Americans. The consideration was the release of a Domingo 
Cebeno who was Steele's prisoner "under circumstances 
which would ordinarily cost him his life." Before leaving 
687. 
59steele to Cooper, July 12, 1862, ibid., 722. 
6oIbid. 
63-Canby to Adjutant-General, July 20, 1862, ibid., 
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the area, the colonel addressed a letter to the Federal 
commanding officer to inform him of the arrangement. 
"For the sake of humanity," Steele hoped that the Union 
officer would "inquire into the manner" in which the 
f.o 
agreement had been kept. ̂  
Confederate government in the territory of Arizona 
naturally received a death blow with Steele's decision 
to leave. Sibley's disastrous campaign in the north had 
already been reflected in the court record, "in con­
sideration of the disturbed condition of the County," the 
regular session of the court which had been scheduled for 
May, 1862, was adjourned until the following June. On 
June 2, 1862, Charles A. Hoppin wrote the final sentence 
in the records of the Confederate judiciary in Arizona: 
The Honl. J. Peter Deus having filed his notice of 
Resignation of the Judgeship of the Court, this court 
is adjourned to the next Regular July term 1862 for 
the Probate Business and to September term 1862 for 
the Trial of Civil Cases ."3 
On the same day that Howland's squadron united 
with Eyre's command, July 8, 1862, Colonel Steele gathered 
^Steele to Commanding Officer United States 
Forces, July 5, 1862, ibid., 687. 
/To 
•^Walker, "confederate Government in Dona Ana 
County," loc. cit., 260-261. 
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together his forces and marched from Port Fillmore to 
6k 
Port Bliss. With his evacuation the Confederate 
territory of Arizona ceased to exist. 
Twenty miles below Port Fillmore, Captain Emil 
Fritz overtook Steele's retreating column. Under a flag 
6R 
of truce, J the Confederate commander agreed to exchange 
Captain McCleave and the others that Colonel Eyre had 
requested. Since Steele maintained that he knew of no 
captured Texas captains, two lieutenants were exchanged 
for McCleaveOne of these lieutenants was Steele's 
adjutant.Eyre maintained that there were a number of 
Confederate captains available, but Steele wanted of-
/TO 
ficers from his own Seventh Regiment only. 
^Steele to Cooper, July 12, 1862, 0. R. h_., 
IX, 722. 
^Carleton to Drum, July 22, 1862, ibid., L, i, 
90. 
^Eyre to Cutler, July 8, 1862, ibid., IX, 691. 
^Carleton to Drum, July 22, 1862, ibid., IX, 
89-90. 
^^Eyre to Cutler, July 8, 1862, ibid., 591* 
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At Port Bliss Colonel Steele made hasty arrange­
ments to leave for San Antonio. All public property at 
the post which was too bulky to haul or not worth trans­
porting, was ordered to be sold for specie or for food. 
Though there was a large amount of material which could 
not be disposed of—items such as horse and mule shoes, 
cannon ammunition, tents, etc.—the sale resulted in $830 
in specie. This was turned over to Dr. M. A. Southworth 
for the use of the military hospital in Franklin. Credit 
69 
to a larger amount was also left with parties in Mexico. 
With very limited means of transportation, with an 
insufficient supply of breadstuff and beef, and with his 
troops "in many instances almost naked," Steele was ready 
to leave for San Antonio by July 12.7° Accompanying the 
69steele to Cooper, July 12, 1862, ibid., 722. 
ten Carleton's Union forces later occupied Franklin in 
August, 1862, -they found a surgeon of the Confederate army 
and twenty-five sick and disabled soldiers. Twelve wagon-
loads of hospital and quartermaster supplies were located 
in storerooms connected with the custom house in El Paso, 
Mexico. Carleton managed to recover these supplies, and 
the remaining Confederates were made prisoners of war. 
Carleton to Drum, September 20, 1862, ibid., L, i, 101. 
The Texas prisoners, furnished with provisions, trans­
portation, and an escort, were sent to San Antonio on 
September 1, 1862. Carleton to Canby, September 9> 1862, 
ibid., IX, 696. 
7°Steele to Cooper, July 12, 1862, ibid., 722. 
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force were the remaining whites in and around Franklin 
who had not already left with Sibley. When Steele 
abandoned Fort Bliss, the northwestern frontier of the 
state of Texas and its line of military posts was left 
exposed to the oncoming Federal forces.?1 confederate 
military operations in the west Texas, Arizona, and New 
Mexico areas now came to an end. 
f^Hebert to Chief of Staff of Major-General 
Holmes, August 26, 1862, ibid., 732. 
CHAPTER XVI 
SUMMING UP AND SOME "IPS11 
The "Army of Ne\v Mexico" had been victorious over 
the Union forces in both major engagements of the 
campaign. But success on the battlefield obviously had 
not been enough. Lack of supplies of all kinds was the 
major factor which, in the end, had defeated the Con­
federates . From the outset the Texans had been ill 
equipped and poorly provisioned."1" The outfitting of the 
three regiments of the brigade had been entrusted virtu­
ally to Texas alone and, as it turned out, the state's 
O 
resources were limited. This did not worry Sibley 
greatly, however, for he planned to capture all needed 
materiel from the Federal garrisons and depots. One of 
Sibley's officers maintained that the general did not 
bring as many supplies with him as he could have. Count­
ing upon capturing all that he needed, he carried along 
^-Teel, "Sibley's New Mexican Campaign," loc. cit., 
700. 




just enough to sustain the army en route.3 Had Sibley 
waited until he had a properly provisioned army, the New 
Mexican expedition doubtlessly would never have come 
4 about. The only hope that the Texans had for winning 
was to march quickly into New Mexico and defeat the 
5 
Union forces before their provisions gave out/ 
Sibley was not a good administrative officer. 
Though he knew his army was poorly equipped, he made 
little effort to husband what supplies he did have. As 
one of his officers later attested, he was "too prone to 
let the morrovr take care of itself."^ Apparently the 
Confederate commander believed that conditions in New 
Mexico had not materially changed since he had left the 
department. In this respect, he grossly underestimated 
3Noel, A Campaign, 12. 
^Teel, "Sibley's New Mexican Campaign," loc. cit 
700. 
5canby to Adjutant-General of the Army, January 
25, 1862, 0. R. A., IX, 89. 
^Teel, "Sibley's New Mexican Campaign," loc. cit., 
700. 
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the ability of his opponent. Failing to capture the 
amount of supplies which he had anticipated, Sibley soon 
found himself in the heart of a hostile country hundreds 
of miles from any possible base of supply.7 
After the battle of Valverde, Sibley lost the 
O 
confidence of his soldiers. Most members of the "Army 
of New Mexico" were of frontier stock, and the individual­
ism which v.Tas a characteristic of that section did not 
lend itself to rigid discipline. When the men lost faith 
in their commander, both discipline and morale reached a 
low ebb. Throughout the campaign, Sibley had been a 
shadowy figure, and it was his aggressive subordinate of­
ficers like Green, Scurry, and Pyron who inspired their 
troops to victory on the battlefield. 
Failure to secure readily the necessary equipment 
and men in Texas resulted in Sibley's reaching the New 
Mexican theatre of operations much later than he had 
anticipated. Winter weather made a difficult campaign 
even more difficult. Diseases such as smallpox and 
7 Ibid. 
^Steele to Cooper, March 7> 1862, 0. R. A., 
LIII, 793. 
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pneumonia thinned the Confederate ranks more than did 
the battle casualties.9 These losses were permanent, as 
far as the immediate campaign was concerned, for Sibley 
could not replace them. When reinforcements were on the 
way, it was too late, for the campaign was over. 
The country and people were important contributors 
to Sibley's defeat. New Mexico proved to be no store­
house, and the army could not live off the land. Barren 
and desolate, the territory was barely able to support 
its native inhabitants."1'0 The Confederates had counted 
upon the New Mexicans to be pro-Southern, or at least 
apathetic. But the Texans failed to take into con­
sideration the underlying hatred which the Mexicans had 
for them."1""1" The undisciplined behavior of the invading 
army only served to increase this feeling. 
The role of the territory of Colorado was of the 
utmost importance in saving New Mexico for the Union. 
Governor Gilpin's quick action in suppressing the 
9sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, ibid., IX, 507* 
•L0Teel, "Sibley's New Mexican Campaign," loc. 
cit., 700. 
•^Bancroft, History of Arizona and New Mexico, 
686. — 
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secession element eventually enabled him to send a regi­
ment of volunteers to New Mexico's defense. Had this 
force not arrived at the opportune moment, Port Union 
undoubtedly would have fallen. Cut off from all out­
side support, Canby's garrison at Port Craig would have 
been forced to surrender. 
It is true that Slough's troops were driven from 
the field of Glorieta, thus nearly upsetting Canby's 
plan to unite his forces. But the fortune of destroying 
the Confederate wagon train proved to be the decisive 
event of the campaign. The loss of these invaluable and 
irreplacable supplies stopped at once the Confederate 
advance. If Chivington's men had not accomplished this 
act, it is entirely conceivable that the Texans would 
have successfully continued their march upon Fort Union 
and would have conquered the territory. Though a very 
minor action, Chivington's rear guard movement resulted 
in the subversion of the whole Confederate plan of 
campaign. There were parallels elsewhere. The relatively 
small battle of Pea Ridge gave the Union control of 
Missouri, while McClellan's skirmishes in western 
Virginia resulted in the Federal control of that area 
for the duration of the war. Small engagements often 
have momentous results. 
518 
The New Mexican campaign had been virtually an 
independent effort of the state of Texas. But if 
Sibley had been successful in New Mexico, the Confeder­
ate government undoubtedly would have taken a greater 
interest and would have sent more supplies and men to 
bolster Sibley's march to California. The advantages 
of acquiring California for the Confederacy go without 
saying. 
Assuming that Sibley was successful in conquer­
ing the territory, the "Army of New Mexico" would have 
been confronted by the arrival of Carleton's "California 
Column." This was not a great threat for it was a 
smaller force composed of green troops. The Texans, 
particularly after gaining new recruits and supplies 
from Colorado and Utah, probably would have had little 
difficulty in defeating the "Column." The Union govern­
ment undoubtedly realized the inadequacy of the 
California expeditionary force, for an army of five 
thousand men was being prepared in the Department of the 
IP Mississippi to be sent to Canby's aid. This was a 
formidable force with which to cope. If Sibley had been 
^Halleck to Pope, March 21, 1862, 0. R. A., 
VIII, 629. 
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able to gain men and materiel from Colorado and Utah, 
and if the two regiments sent to his relief had arrived 
in time, he might have succeeded in defeating this new 
army. Once this was accomplished, the path to 
California would have been open. Needless to say, the 
obstacles which Sibley would have faced before this was 
realized were great, indeed. But granted that he was 
able to overcome them all and march into California, the 
course of the war possibly might have been altered. If 
the capture of New Mexico would have rendered the con­
quest of California probable, then the New Mexican 
campaign of 1862 was one of the most important military 
operations of the war."*"3 
"^Anderson, "canby's Services in the New Mexican 




Bancroft, Hubert H., History of the Life of William 
Gilpin. The History Company. San Francisco, 
, History of Arizona and New Mexico, 1530-
100b. The History Company, San Francisco, lBB"9. 
, History of Utah, 1540-1886. The History 
Company, San Francisco, TH89I 
, History of California, I86O-I89O. The 
History Company, San Francisco, 1090. 
, History of Nevada, Colorado, and 
Wyoming. The History Company, San Francisco, 
1090. 
Barber, John W. and Howe, Henry, All the Western 
States and Territories. Howe's Subscription 
Book Concern, Cincinnati, 1867. 
Barnes, Charles M., Combats and Conquests of Im­
mortal Heroes. Guessaz and Ferlet Company, 
San Antonio, 1910. 
Bartlett, John R., Personal Narratives of Explo­
rations and Incidents in Texas, New Mexico, 
California, Sonora, and Chihuahua. D. Appleton 
and Company, New York, 1856• 
Bender, Averam B., The March of Empire, Frontier 
Defense in the Southwest7~~ltt4o-lBoO" "Un'i-
verslty of Kansas Press, Lawrence, 1952. 
Browne, J. Ross, Adventures in the Apache Country: 
A Tour Through Arizona and Sonora, with Notes 
on the Silver Regions of Nevada. Harper and 
Brothers, New York, ltSb9. 
Callahan, James M., The Diplomatic History of the 
Southern Confederacy^ The Johns Hopkins 
Press, Baltimore, 1901. 
521 
Callahan, James M., American Foreign Policy in 
Mexican Relations. The Macmillan Company, New 
York, 1932. 
Coan,.Charles P., A History of New Mexico. 3 vols. 
The American Historical Society, Inc., Chicago 
and New York, 1925* 
Coman, Katharine, Economic Beginnings in the Far 
West. 2 vols"! The Macmillan Company, New 
York, 1919. 
Cozzens, Samuel L., The Marvellous Country, or 
Three Years in Arizona and New Mexico. Lee 
and Shepard, Boston, I875T 
Davis, William H., Seventy-Five Years in California. 
J. Howell, San Francisco, 1929* 
Davis, William W. H., El Gringo; or, New Mexico and 
Her People. Harper and Brothers, New York, 
155?. 
Drumm, Stella M. (ed.), Down the Santa Fe Trail and 
Into Mexico, The Diary of Susan Shelby 
Magoffin, 1845^1847« ifaTe University Press, 
New Haven, 1926. 
Duffus, R. L., The Santa Fe Trail. Longmans, Green 
and Company, New YorlcJ" 1930. 
Evans, Clement A. (ed.), Confederate Military 
History. 12 vols. Confederate Publishing 
Company, Atlanta, 1899* 
Farber, James, Texas, £. S^ A. The Jackson Company, 
New York, 1947. 
Farish, Thomas E., History of Arizona. 8 vols. 
Filmer Brothers Electrotype Company, San 
Francisco, I9I5-I9I8. 
Forbes, Robert H., The Penningtons, Pioneers of 
Early Arizona. The New Era Printing Company, 
Lancaster, Pennsylvania, 1919* 
522 
Fritz, Percy S., Colorado. The Centennial State. 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., New York, 1941. 
Ganaway, Loomis M., New Mexico and the Sectional 
Controversy, 184b-10b1. University of New 
Mexico Press, Albuquerque, 1944. 
Greeley, Horace, The American Conflict. 2 vols. 
0. D. Case and Company, Hartford, 1877-1881. 
Griggs, George, History of Mesilia Valley or the 
Gadsden Purchase. Bronson Printing2ompany, 
Las Cruces, New Mexico, 1930. 
Guernsey, Alfred H. and Alden, Henry M., Harper's 
Pictorial History of the Civil War. 2 vols. 
Harper, and" Brothers, New York, lbb6. 
Hafen, LeRoy and Rister, Carl Coke, Western 
America. Prentice-Hall, Inc., New York, 1941. 
Haines, Helen, History of New Mexico. New Mexico 
Historical Publishing Company, New York, 1891. 
Hall, Frank, History of the State of Colorado. 
4 vols. The Blalcely Printing Company, Chicago, 
I889-I895. 
Hamersly, T. H. S. (comp.), Complete Army Register 
of the United States: For Qne"~Hundred Years 
TT779 to 1879)• T. H. S. Hamersly, Washington, 
iaao. 
Hamilton, Patrick, The Resources of Arizona. A. L. 
Bancroft and Company, San Francisco, 1884. 
Hammond, George P. (ed.), Campaigns in the West, 
I856-I86I; The Journal and Letters of colonel 
John VarTpeusen Du BoTs. Arizona Pioneers 
Historical Society, Tucson, 1949. 
Hardee, W. J., Rifle and Light Infantry Tactics, 
for the Exercise and Manoeuvres or Troops When 
Acting as Light Infantry or Riflemen. 2 vols. 
Lippincott, Grambo and Company, Philadelphia, 
1855. 
523 
Harris, Gertrude, A Tale of Men Who Knew Not Fear. 
Alamo Printing Company, San Antonio, 1935• 
Hayes, A. A., Jr., New Colorado and the Santa Fe 
Trail. Harper and Brothers, New York, 18BU". 
Headley, J. T., The Great Rebellion; A History of 
the Civil War in the United ^Tates" 2 vols. 
Hurlbut, Scranton and Company, Hartford, 
1864-1866. 
Heartsill, William V/., Fourteen Hundred and 91 Days 
in the Confederate Army. W. V/. Heartsill, 
Marshall, Texas, 187b. 
Henderson, Harry M., Texas in the Confederacy. The 
Naylor Company, San Antonio, 1955* 
Hinton, Richard J., The Handbook to Arizona. Payot, 
Upham and Company, San Francisco, . lfc>7fc>. 
Historical and Biographical Record of the Territory 
of Arizona" McFarland and PooTe", Publishers, 
Chicago, 1896. 
Hitchcock, Benjamin W., Hitchcock's Chronological 
Record of the American Civil~ar. B. W. 
Hitchcock, New York, 1866. 
Hittell, Theodore H., History of California. N. J. 
Stone and Company, New Yorlc, 1898* 
Hollister, Ovando J., A History of the First 
Colorado Regiment of Volunteers. Thomas 
Gibson and Company, Denver, 1863. Reprinted 
as Boldly They Rode. The Golden Press, Lake-
wood, Colorado, I949. 
Horgan, Paul, Great River: The Rio Grande in North 
American History . 2 vols. Rineh'ar't and 
Company, New York, 195^ • 
Howiett, William J., Life of the Right Reverend 
Joseph P_. Machebeuf. The Franklin Press 
Company, Pueblo, Colorado, 1908. 
Hunt, Aurora, The Army of the Pacific. The Arthur 
H. Clark Company, GXendale, 1951• 
524 
Johnson, Robert U. and Buel, Clarence C. (eds.), 
Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. 4 vols. 
The .Century Company, New York, 1884-1888. 
Johnson, Sid S., Texans Who Wore the Gray, Tyler, 
Texas, c. 1907. 
Johnston, William P., The Life of General Albert 
Sidney Johnston. D. AppleTjon and Company, 
New York, 1878. 
Keleher, William A., Turmoil in New Mexico, 1846-
1868. The Ryda1 Press, Santa Fe, 1952. 
Kennedy, Elijah R., The Contest for California in 
1861. Houghton Mifflin Company, New York, 
I9I2. 
LaBree, Ben, The Confederate Soldier in the Civil 
War, 1861-1865. The Prentiss Press, Louisville, 
IB9Y. 
Lane, Lydia S., I Married a Soldier, or Old Days in 
the Old Army. J. B. Lippincott Company, 
Philadelphia, 1893• 
Lockwood, Prank C., Arizona Characters. The Times-
Mirror Press, Los Angeles, 192b. 
, Pioneer Days in Arizona, From the 
Spanish Occupation to Statehood. The Macmillan 
Company, New York, 1^32. 
, and Page, Donald W., Tucson—The Old 
Pueblo. The Manufacturing Stationers, Inc., 
Phoenix, 1930. 
Lossing, Benson J., Pictorial History of the Civil 
War in the United States of America. 3" vol's. 
G. W. Childs, Philadelphia, 18bb-1868. 
McClintock, James H., Arizona. 3 vols. The S. J. 
Clarke Publishing Company, Chicago, 1916. 
McKee, James C., Narrative of the Surrender of a 
Command of U. S. Forces, at Fort F ignore, N. M. 
in July, A. D., 1861'. John A. Lowell and 
Company, Boston, 1886. 
525 
Miller, Francis T. (ed.), The Photographic History 
of the Civil War in Ten Volumes. 10vols. 
Patriot Publishing Company, Springfield, 
Massachusetts, 1911. 
Mills, Anson, My Story. Edited by C. H. Claudy. 
Press of Byron S. Adams, Washington, 1918. 
Mills, William V/., Forty Years at El Paso, 1858-
I898. W. B. Conkey Company, Chicago, 1901. 
Moore, Frank (ed.), The Rebellion Record; A Diary 
of American Events. 12 vols. D. Van 
Nostrand Company, New York, 1862-1868. 
Mowry, Sylvester, Memoir of the Proposed Territory 
of Arizona. H. PolkTnhorn, Washington, 1^57• 
, The Geography and Resources of Arizona 
and Sonora. H. Polkinhorn, Washington, 1^59. 
, Arizona and Sonora: The Geography, 
History, and Resources of the Silver Region of 
North America. Harper and Brothers, New Yorlc7 
TTO7 
, The Mines of the West. G. E. Currie, 
New York, 1864. 
Nankivell, John H., History of the Military Organi­
zations of the State of Colorado, 10b0"-1935» 
W. H. Kistler Stationery Company, Denver, 1935• 
Newmark, Harris, Sixty Years in Southern California, 
1853-1913. The Knickerbocker Press, New York, 
191b. 
Noel, Theo., A, Campaign from Santa Fe to the 
Mississippi. Shreveport News Printing 
Establishment, Shreveport, 1865. 
, Autobiography and Reminiscences of 
Theophilus Noel. Theo. Noel Company Print, 
Chicago, 1964. 
O'Neil, James B., They Die But Once, The Story of 
a Te;]ano. Knight Publications, Inc., New 
York,' 1935. 
526 
Orton, Richard H. (comp.), Records of California 
Men in the War of the Rebellion, lbbl to 1867» 
Adjutant-GeneraT"~0ffice, Sacramento, 1890* 
Owsley, Prank L., King Cotton Diplomacy: Foreign 
Relations of the Confederate States of America. 
The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1931• 
Paxson, Frederic L., The Last American Frontier. 
The Macmillan Company, New York, 1910. 
Pettis, George H., The California Column. New 
Mexico Historical Society, Santa Fe, 1908. 
Pinart, Alphonse L., Voyage dans 1'Arizona. 
Societe de Geographie, Paris"]! 1877. 
Poston, Charles D., Apache-Land. A. L. Bancroft 
and Company, San Francisco, 1878. 
Pumpelly, Raphael, Across America and Asia: Notes 
of a Five Years' Journey Around the World, and 
of Residence in Arizona, Japan, and China. 
Leypoldt and Holt, New York, 1870. 
, Reminiscences . 2 vols . Henry Holt 
and Company, New York, 1918. 
Read, B. M., An Illustrated History of New Mexico. 
New Mexican Printing Company, Santa Fe, 1912. 
Richardson, Albert D., Beyond the Mississippi: 
From the Great River to the Great Ocean. 
American Publishing Company, New York, 1867. 
Richax'dson, Rupert N., Texas, The Lone Star State. 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., New York, 19^3. 
and Rister, Carl C., The Greater South­
west . The Arthur H. Clarke Company, Glendale, 
California, 193 5• 
Hippy, J. Fred, The United States and Mexico. 
F. S. Crofts and Company, New York, 1931• 
Rodenbough, Theo. F. (comp.), From Everglade to 
Canon with the Second Dragoons. D. Van 
Nostrand, New York, 1875• 
527 
Sabin, Edwin L., Kit Carson Days, 1809-1868. 
2 vols. The Press of the Pioneers, Inc., New 
York, 1935* 
Scott, Winfield, Infantry-Tactics; or Rules for 
the Exercise andL Manoeuvres of the United 
States Infantry. Harper and Brothers, New 
York, 1854. 
Smiley, Jerome C., History of Denver. The Times-
Sun Publishing Company, Denver, 1901. 
Smithwick, Noah, The Evolution of a_ State; or, 
Recollections of Old Texas Days. GammeT Book 
Company, Austin, 1900. 
Stanley, P., Fort Union. The World Press, 
Canadian (?), Texas, 1953. 
Stone, Wilbur F. (ed.), History of Colorado. 5 vols. 
The S. J. Clarke Publishing Company, Chicago, 
1918-1919. 
Taylor, Richard, Destruction and Reconstruction-;-. 
Personal Experiences of the Late War. D. Apple-
ton and Company, New York, 1879• 
Thrall, Homer S., A Pictorial History of Texas. 
N. D. Thompson and Company, St. Louis, 1879• 
Twitchell, Ralph E., The Leading Facts of New 
Mexican History. 5 wis. The TorchHPress, 
Cedar Rapid's, 1911-1917• 
Webb, Walter P. and Carroll, H. Bailey (eds.), The 
Handbook of Texas. 2 vols. The Texas State 
HlstoricaT~Association, Austin, 1952. 
Whitford, William C., Colorado Volunteers in the 
Civil War: The New Mexico Campaign in 1862. 
The State Historical and Natural History 
Society, Denver, 1906. 
Williams, Ellen, Three Years and a Half in the Army] 
or, History of the Second CoTorados. Fowler 
and Wells Company, New York, 1885. 
528 
Williams, R. H., With the Border Ruffians, Memories 
of the Far West, 1852-1bbb. Edited by E. W. 
Williams. The Musson Book Company, Toronto, 
1919. 
Wilson, James G. and Fiske, John (eds.), Appleton's 
Cyclopaedia of American Biography. 7 vols. 
D. Appleton and Company, New York, I888-I9OI. 
Wooten, Dudley G., A Comprehensive History of Texas. 
William G. Scarff, Dallas, lb9B"I 
Wyllys, Rufus K., Arizona, The History of a Frontier 
State. Hob son and Herr, Phoenix, 
Articles: 
Anderson, Hattie M. (contrib.), "Mining and Indian 
Fighting in Arizona and New Mexico, I858-I86I— 
Memoirs of Hank Smith," Panhandle-Plains 
Historical Review, I (1928), 67-115* 
, "With the Confederates in New Mexico--
Memoirs of Hank Smith," Panhandle-Plains 
Historical Review, II (1929), 65-97. 
Anderson, Latham, "Canby's Services in the New 
Mexican Campaign," Battles and Leaders of the 
Civil War, II, 697-^9^ 
Bender, A. B., "Frontier Defense in the Territory 
of New Mexico, 1853-1861," New Mexico 
Historical Review, IX (October, 1934), 3^5-373. 
, "Military Posts in the Southwest," New 
Mexico Historical Review, XVI (April, 1941)» 
125-147" 
Boyd, Le Roy, "Thunder on the Rio Grande, The 
Great Adventure of Sibley's Confederates for 
the Conquest of New Mexico and Colorado," 
Colorado Magazine, XXIV (July, 194-7)> 131-140. 
529 
Cooney, Percival J., "Southern California in Civil 
War Days,11 Annual Publications of the 
Historical Society of Southern California, 
XIII (1924), Part 1, 54-b«. 
Crimmins, M. L., "Port Fillmore," New Mexico 
Historical Review, VI (October, 1931)t 327-333• 
(contrib.), "The Battle of Val Verde," 
New Mexico Historical Review, VII (October, 
1932), 34b-352. 
Darrow, Caroline B., "Recollections of the Twiggs 
Surrender," Battles and Leaders of the Civil 
War, I, 33-39. 
Dodson, S. H. (comp.), "Diary and Correspondence of 
Salmon P. Chase, Annual Report of the American 
Historical Association for the Year 1902, II, 
11-527. 
Donnell, F. S., "When Las Vegas was the Capital of 
New Mexico," New Mexico Historical Review, VII 
(October, 193377 255-272. 
, "The Confederate Territory of Arizona, 
from Official Sources," New Mexico Historical 
Review, XVII (April, 194277 14«-lb3. 
Earlie, John J., "The Sentiment of the People of 
California with Respect to the Civil War," 
Annual Report of the American Historical Asso-
c ia-blon"TorTh~Year 1907/I, 123-135. 
Eaton, W. Clement, "Frontier Life in Southern 
Arizona, I858-I86I," Southwestern Historical 
Quarterly, XXXVI (January, 1933)> 173-192. 
Evans, A. W., "Canby at Valverde," Battles and 
Leaders of the Civil War, II, 699-700. 
Faulkner, Walter A. (contrib.), "With Sibley in New 
Mexico; The Journal of William Henry Smith," 
West Texas Historical Association Year Book, 
XXVTl (October, 1951), 111-142. 
530 
Gilbert, Benjamin P., "The Confederate Minority in 
California," California Historical Society 
Quarterly, XX^June, 1941), 154-170. 
Greer, T. L., "Confederate Reminiscences of 1862," 
New Mexico Historical Review, V (July, 1930), 
3T5-W: 
Hayes, A. A., "The New Mexican Campaign of 1862," 
Magazine of American History, XV (February, 
IBdSTTTTl^lBC 
Holden, W. C., "Frontier Defense in Texas During 
the Civil War," West Texas Historical Asso­
ciation Year Book, IV (June7 1928), lb-31. 
Hunsaker, William J., "Lansford W. Hastings' 
Project for the Invasion and Conquest of 
Arizona and New Mexico for the Southern 
Confederacy," Arizona Historical Review, IV 
(July, 1931), 
Lockwood, Frank C., "Arizona and Its Heritage," 
University of Arizona Bulletin, VII (Acril, 
1936), 13*!-TO" 
McCoy, Raymond, "The Battle of Glorieta Pass," 
United Daughters of the Confederacy Magazine, 
XV (February, 195^7, 12-13, 23. 
Pettis, George H., "The Confederate Invasion of 
New Mexico and Arizona," Battles and Leaders 
of the Civil VJar, II, 103-111. 
Rippy, J. Fred, "Mexican Projects of the Confeder­
ates," Southwestern Historical Quarterly, 
XXII (April, 1919), 291-317. 
Santee, J. F., "The Battle of La Glorieta Pass," 
New Mexico Historical Review, VI (January, 
Scammell, J. M., "Military Units in Southern 
California, 1853-1862," California Historical 
Society Quarterly, XXIX (September, 1950), 
229-249. 
531 
Smith, C. C., "Some Unpublished History of the 
Southwest," Arizona Historical Review, IV 
(July, 1931), 13-38. 
Teel, Trevanion T., "Sibley's New Mexican Campaign: 
Its Objects and the Causes of Its Failure," 
Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, II, 700. 
Tittmann, Edward D., "Confederate Courts in New 
Mexico," New Mexico Historical Review, III 
(October ,~~l92 8), 347-35b. 
, "The Exploitation of Treason," New 
Mexico Historical Review, IV (April, 1929), 
128-145. 
Walker, Charles S., Jr., "Confederate Government 
in Dona Ana County as Shown in the Records of 
the Probate Court, 1861-1862," New Mexico 
Historical Review, VI (July, 193^, 253-302. 
, "Causes of the Confederate Invasion of 
New Mexico," New Mexico Historic<y.x Review, 
VIII (April, 1933), 75-97: 
Wallace, R. B., "My Experiences in the First 
Colorado Regiment," Colorado Magazine, I 
(November, 1924), 307-312. 
Waller, J. L., "The Civil War in the El Paso Area," 
West Texas Historical Association Year Book, 
XXII (October, 194b), 3-14. 
Watford, W. H., "Confederate Western Ambitions," 
Southwestern Historical Quarterly, XLIV 
(October, 1940),  161-187. 
Newspapers: 
Houston Chronicle, April 17, 19H. 
Las Vegas Gazette, September 15, 1877« 
Mesilla Times, May 11, 1861; July 27, 1861; 
January 15» 1862. 
532 
Rio Abajo Press, March 8, 1864. 
Rocky Mountain News, August 21, 1861. 
Sacramento Daily Union, May 23, 1862. 
Santa Fe Gazette, May 25, 1861; April 26, 1862; 
May 1?, i8b2; May 31* 1862; November 29, 1862. 
Weekly Arizonian, September 15, 1859* 
Manuscripts and Theses: 
Bewley, Mary, The Indians of New Mexico in the 
Civil War. M. A. Thesis, University of New 
Mexico, 1938o 
Chivington, John M., The First Colorado Regiment. 
MS., Bancroft Library, University of 
California. (Microfilm) 
, The Prospective. MS., Bancroft Library, 
University of California. (Microfilm) 
Connor, Daniel A., Military Operations in the 
Southwest, I86I-I865; Battles and Movements 
of the Union and Confederate Forces and 
Campaigns Against the Indians in Northwest 
Texas, New Mexico and Arizona During the Civil 
War Period. M. A. Thesis, Texas Western 
College, 1949. 
Felgar, Robert P., Texas in the War for Southern 
Independence, I86I-I865. Ph.D. Thesis, Uni­
versity of Texas, 1935* 
Hall, Martin H., Confederate Military Operations 
in Arizona and New Mexico. M. A. Thesis, 
University of Alabama, 1951. 
Hammons, Nancy Lee, A History of El Paso County, 
Texas, to 1900. M. A. Thesis, Texas Western 
College, 1942. 
533 
Ivey, Rosalie, A History of Port Bliss. M. A. 
Thesis, University of Texas, 19^2. 
Journal of Ebenezer Hanna. MS., Uriversity of 
Texas Library. (Microfilm) 
Killin, Hugh E., The Texans and the California 
Column. M. A. Thesis, Texas Technological 
College, 1931* 
Kit Carson Papers. MS., Bancroft Library, Uni­
versity of California. (Microfilm) 
Kroh, Robert P., Tom Green: Shield arid Buckler. 
M. A. Thesis, University of Texas, 1951* 
Marshall, Thomas M., A Report on Certain Material 
for the History of Arizona and New Mexico. 
M. A. Thesis, University of California, 1910., 
McCleave, William A., Recollections or? a California 
Volunteer. MS., Bancroft Library, University 
of California. (Microfilm) 
O'Malley, Catherine B., A History of El Paso Since 
i860. M. A. Thesis, University of Southern 
California, 1939• 
Reid, Robert L., The Early History of Fort Bliss., 
M. A. Thesis, Baylor University, 19^7. 
Reminiscences of H. C. Wright of Austin. MS.. 
University of Texas Library. (Microfilm) 
Taylor, Albion, Jr., Military Operations in Texas 
During the Civil War. M. A. Thesis, Baylor 
Unive rs ity, 1931• 
Waldrip, William I., New Mexico During the Civil 
War. M. A. Thesis, University of New 'Mexico, 
1950. 
Wallace, James 0., San Antonio During the Civil 
War. M. A. Thesis, St. Mary's University, 
1940. 
534 
Whitworth, Bonnye R., The Role of Texas in the 
Confederacy^ M. A. Thesis, North Texas State 
College, 1951• 
Government Documents: 
Annual Report of the American Historical Association 
for the Year~^02. 2 vols. Government Print­
ing Office, Washington, I903. 
Annual Report of the American Historical Association 
For the~Year~"IWn 2 vols. Government Print­
ing Office, Washington, 1908. 
Atlas to Accompany the Official Records of the Union 
and Confederate Armies. 2 vols . Government 
Printing Office, Washington, I89I-I895. 
Circular No. 4_, A Report on Barracks and Hospitals 
with Descriptions of Military Posts. War De­
partment, Surgeon General's Office, Washington, 
1870. 
Heitman, F. B. (comp.), Historical Register and 
Dictionary of the United States Army, 1789 to 
1903. 57th Congress, 2nd Session, House 
Document No. 466. 
House Executive Documents, 33rd Congress, 2nd 
Session, No.' 1, Part 2. 
Indian Tribes, Condition of the., Report of the 
Joint Special Committee, Appointed Under Joint 
Resolution of March 3* 1865 (1867). 
Journal of the Congress of the Confederate States 
2zL America, I061-T8&5. 7 vols . Senate Docu­
ments, 58th Congress, 2nd Session. Government 
Printing Office, Washington, 1904-1905. 
Kennedy, Joseph C. G. (comp.), Population of the 
United States in i860; Compiled from tEe 
Original Returns of the Eighth "Census, Under 
the Direction of tKe Secretary of the Interior. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, lbb4. 
535 
Laws of the Territory of New Mexico. Passed by the 
legislative AssemBTy, Sessions of 1856-1857, 
I859-I86O. 
Official Reports of Battles, as Published by the 
Order of the Confederate Congress at Richmond. 
Charles B. Richardson, New York, 185*3. 
Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Selected 
Documents Concerning the Administration of 
Indian Affairs in Texas and New Mexico, 1861-
1862. Record Group 75* National Archives, 
Washington. (Microfilm) 
Reports of Committees of the Senate of the United 
States'! 4 vols . h Congress,"Jrd Session. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, I863. 
Richardson, James D. (comp„), A Compilation of the 
Messages and Papers of the Confederacy Including 
the PipTomatic Correspondence, 18bl-TEo65. 2 
vols. United States Publishing Company, 
Nashville, I905-I906. 
Senate Executive Documents, 36th Congress, 1st 
Session, No. 52. 
War of the Rebellion; A_ Compilation of the Official 
Records of the Union and confederate Armies. 
128 vols. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, 1880-1901. 
EXAMINATION AND THESIS REPORT 
Candidate: HALL, MARTIN H. 
Major Field: HISTORY 
Title of Thesis: THE ARMY OF NEW MEXICO, SIBLEY'S CAMPAIGN OP 1862 
Approved: 
> 
/ — L  
^Major Professor and Chairman 
[e Graduate School Dean o: 
EXAMINING COMMITTEE: 
A A  0 (f̂ OLC A ( A A A  t  
/ X—-
Date of Examination: } \ 
March 29, 1957 
<J— 
